American buildup, possible targets and vulnerabilities
The US is building up remarkably large resources in the Middle East after the Iranian regime is suspected of killing thousands of protesters who protested decades of misrule and Islamist dictatorship. President Trump threatens with military force if the killing does not stop. After threats of military force in mid-January, the regime managed to postpone an American attack by signaling that it did not intend to execute protesters. It was an Iranian bluff that bought the regime time. At the same time, the Trump administration realized that several options needed to be planned. On January 18, the aircraft carrier task force CSG-3 under the command of the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) left Singapore and arrived about 5-6 days later in the area of operations. Under the pretext of training, large resources were flown in, primarily to Jordan. Additional F-15, F-35, C-5, C-17, KC-135 and RC-135 have been flown in. The latter is in the "nuclear sniffer" variant, which may indicate that they intend to attack nuclear facilities again. B-52s have also arrived, and extra F-18 Growlers used for electronic warfare. There were already several other aircraft types in the area before. What should also be assumed is on the way or already in the area is 1-2 of the strategic SSGN submarines armed with 154 cruise missiles. USS Georgia (729) has been mentioned.
What one can assume is an American plan to attack has a couple of vulnerabilities:
- What does the US want to achieve? Air strikes and cruise missiles alone cannot topple the regime, but they can buy the youth breathing space and cause the regime to pay for its behavior. The US's deterrent is at stake. The regime can absorb a lot but is weaker than ever internally. How the purpose of the attack is communicated is important.
- One vulnerability is time, or the lack of time, depending on what the plan is. Venezuela is underway, and perhaps Cuba and Greenland are coming. That's not something the MAGA cluster appreciates. They were promised peace, a good economy, and that the US would stop intervening abroad. The Iranian regime feels they have time, that's their strongest card.
- Israel lacks air defense. If the Iranian regime is attacked, it can be assumed that it will retaliate against Israel and initiate a new duel of attrition. Iran's deterrence is based on this, that it needs to be able to penetrate air defenses in order to force its opponents to negotiate. Israel and the US need to knock out incoming missiles, which is expensive, and knock out firing units, which is difficult. The wars against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991 and 2003 showed this. Israel claims that they knocked out 70% of Iran's firing units by June 2025, which is likely disinformation.
The cyber domain
The cyber domain is highly active. During the 12-Day War, it was discovered that Iranian bots used to push negative messages about Britain quickly shifted and began working to support the Iranian regime's message.[1] Similarly, Iranian troll factories reportedly posted 240,000 times to disrupt American decisions to attack. When the smoke cleared in June 2025, a new phase began. Accounts controlled by Israel pushed anti-regime messages and worked to overthrow the regime.
Iran and Russia
Russia was a disappointment to Iran in June 2025 and Putin looked weak internationally. Their defense alliance weighed lightly in light of Israel’s determination, American assistance and the fact that Russia’s offensive war against Ukraine was taking up all resources. Russia and Iran had been growing closer and signing new agreements after Iran intervened in Syria in 2012, which benefited the Assad regime and Russia. Legions of diplomats, ideologues and military personnel have traveled back and forth between the countries. The heads of their national security councils meet regularly.
The Russian S-300PMU2 (SA-20B) air defense system that Iran received in 2016 posed no challenge to the United States and Israel. The countries had already learned the system after operating over Syria for many years. The S-300 was an expensive and almost pointless acquisition for the Iranian regime. Now Iran has received delivery of new Russian attack helicopters of the Mi-28 type. These will make no difference in the big picture. However, the Su-35 fighter jet, the delivery of which Iran has been waiting for for a long time, can. The Su-35 is intended to be able to compete with the air forces of the region but hardly with the American or Israeli F-15, F-22 and F-35.
It is likely that Russia can support Iran with various forms of telewarfare and signals intelligence, etc. Several reports claim that there may be unconventional chemical substances in the tear gas that the Iranian regime uses. Several protesters have experienced hallucinations, panic, anxiety, etc. This type of chemical substance is something of a Russian parade branch. Chemical weapons are a national trauma in Iran as they endured Iraqi chemical warfare during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. This also led to problems in supporting Assad after his many chemical weapons attacks.
Russia's former secretary of the National Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, now handles several issues directly under the president. One of them is maritime issues. This week he was in Oman, while the US is building up combat forces in the region. His trip coincided with the Udaloi destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov's naval visit. Iran has announced that it will exercise with Russia and China. However, the Russian destroyer is also scheduled to participate in an Indian exercise. Whether or not the destroyer chooses to participate in an activity aimed at disrupting American planning will be a yardstick for their relationship. Likewise for the relationship between China and Iran. The Russian corvette Stoikiy (Steregushchiy class) and the tanker Yelnya should also be heading up the east coast of Africa after participating in a South African exercise. Their performance will also be an opportunity to measure the Russia-Iran relationship.
The Indian Ocean is a main direction – but the Caspian Sea is already a battle zone
It is not only the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean that are of interest. The Caspian Sea is already an active combat zone where Ukraine operates. A large volume of arms deliveries between Russia and Iran go through the Caspian Sea. Iran’s former chairman of the National Security Council, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, now an advisor to Iran’s supreme leader, has a complex shipping network through his son Hossein Shamkhani called the “Shamkhani Fleet.”[2] The ships operate through a maze of companies in the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong and the Marshall Islands, among others. However, Ukraine has noted the importance of the Caspian Sea and has carried out several attacks on shipping. Several attacks have taken place against the Russian naval base in Kaspyisk and at sea, including against merchant ships. In August 2025, the ship Port Olya-4 was sunk at the dock in Olya. In December 2025, the ships Kompozitor Rakhmaninov – which was a notorious arms transporter – and Askar-Sarydzha were attacked. The warship Rasul Gamzatov (Okhotnik class) was hit in December 2025 while patrolling an oil field, and the ships Tatarstan and Dagestan (Gepard class) and Uglich (Buyan-M class) may have been hit in a Ukrainian attack in November 2024. Several Russian oil platforms in the Caspian Sea have also been attacked. The ship Lauga, which was in the North Sea in May 2025, is now in the Caspian Sea. She has gone there via Russia's so-called internal waterways. Lauga is certainly in the Ukrainian target bank. She is suspected of covert transport, connections to Rosatom and drone operations. Russia is a significantly weaker ally in the Indian Ocean due to the distance to its home bases.
Russia and Israel
Russia has often had to rationalize its relationship with Israel in the region. During Syria’s Assad era, Russia and Israel needed to de-conflict in the airspace to avoid Russia shooting down Israeli aircraft or Israel fighting Russian systems. Israel could then communicate that it was “coordinating” with Russia to bomb Iranian targets in Syria. It was an elegant method of undermining the Iran-Russia relationship. We can expect something similar in the current scenario.
Israelis of Russian origin make up 15% of the Israeli electorate. They generally vote to the right and often have a role as a wave-maker. Israel is interested in courting Russia also to pursue positions within the UN system, possible JCPOA negotiations (the nuclear agreement) and because Russia has influence in the rest of the Middle East.
War is not just about direct confrontations
The war between Israel and Iran on June 13-24, 2025, took place in the larger context of several decades of proxy wars in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Europe, Argentina, Thailand, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere, and a race to weaponize Iran's nuclear program. After Hezbollah was defeated and Assad was ousted in 2024, Iran lost strategic depth and the front line moved closer to Iran.
Two high-profile attacks took place after the end of the 12-Day War. First, Yemeni Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi was killed in an Israeli airstrike on August 28, 2025. Rahawi led the Houthi administration that was behind several missile and drone attacks on both Israel and ships considered to be of Israeli interest. Then, Haytham Ali Tabatabai (Abu Ali) was killed in southern Beirut on November 23, 2025. He was one of Hezbollah's most important commanders still alive after the 12-Day War. Tabatabai was responsible for Hezbollah and Iran's regional projects. He was Lebanese-Iranian and his Iranian family was the closest thing to IRGC Shia nobility one could get.
During the 2025 war, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) lost hard-hitting and capable cadres at the top, all of whom were handpicked by the legendary IRGC Qods leader Qasem Suleimani. It was the first Trump administration that killed Suleimani in January 2020. He was the architect of Iran's regional expansion. Suleimani's demise was the beginning of the end for Iran's projects in, above all, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq. The Iranian regime never recovered from that loss. Suleimani was both a skilled military leader but above all charismatic and enormously popular. Since his demise, Iran has tried to retaliate against the United States, including in Pretoria, South Africa, but without success.[3]
The day after
Assuming Trump attacks, the outcome will be debated, especially kinetics, civilian and military casualties, regime change, democracy, etc. It is not obvious how to measure the eventual success or failure of an attack or a campaign. It depends on the objectives. Some will be announced and others will be hidden or redefined. The Trump administration will not announce that an attack will bring about regime change. It is not in their hands. They are communicating that they want to prevent further abuses against the population, that the nuclear energy program needs to be controlled, that the regime’s missile arsenal threatens the region, etc. The latter two are easier to deal with, the first is the difficult one. The regime is known for buying time, and then executing people in secret. The regime will need to feel that they are being watched until a major change takes place in Iran, otherwise there will be many more abuses in the wake of American strikes.