Since the Swedish Total Defense Bill in the fall of 2024, three overarching driving forces have shaped the European security environment. The first is the continuation of the war in Ukraine – an existence characterized by stabilization and relatively small front movements, where dramatic decisions on the battlefield appear increasingly unlikely. The second is the nature of the Russian threat: European intelligence services assess that Russia may be ready for war against the EU and NATO countries within a few years. The third, and perhaps most multifaceted, is the political development under Donald Trump – a phenomenon that deserves to be broken down into three distinct dimensions. It is partly about the administration's policy development in relation to European security and support for Ukraine, partly about its systematic dismantling of American liberal democracy, and partly about the broader adaptation of the United States to structural power shifts in world politics – where the Trump administration should be seen more as an accelerator than as an original driving force.

The EU as a defense industrial locomotive

How have these drivers affected Europe? One of the most visible changes is the EU's emergence as a defence industrial powerhouse. In March 2025, the Commission launched the ReArm Europe plan, followed by the White Paper European Defense – Readiness 2030, with the ambition to close capacity gaps, increase military support to Ukraine and strengthen the European defence industry through aggregated demand and joint procurement. The SAFE Regulation is based on joint borrowing with the EU budget as collateral, which frees up space for defence investments outside the regular budgetary rules of the stability package. In December 2025, the Council adopted the EDIP – European Defence Industry Programme – with a financial package of EUR 1,5 billion for the period 2025–2027, of which EUR 300 million was earmarked for a Ukraine support instrument. The amount is modest in the context, but signals a clear ambition to significantly grow the resource ahead of the upcoming multiannual budget. In addition, the loan to Ukraine of EUR 90 billion was based on the same principle of joint borrowing: EUR 30 billion in budget support and EUR 60 billion directed towards the defence industry and equipment.

Overall, the EU’s industrial development illustrates four trends. Firstly, joint borrowing is now a proven path – tested during Covid, confirmed through SAFE and now deepened through the Ukraine support. Swedish politicians can call it whatever they want, but it essentially constitutes joint indebtedness. Secondly, the political will to circumvent brake pads and Trojan horses like Hungary is strong and seems to be lasting. Expect a new normal of flexible integration that navigates past unwilling or hostile members. Thirdly, the ambition is to develop a European defence industry using the instruments used to finance European security throughout, with clear European preference clauses in SAFE, EDIP and the Ukraine support. Buy European is becoming the norm, despite American protests – in this area the Trump administration does not seem to be seeking balanced trade flows. And finally – under von der Leyen II, the European Commission has fully assumed the role of motor – partly with the help of Trump’s trade conflicts and economic coercion, which have shifted transatlantic tension to areas where the EU actually has competence and room for action. But also with the help of an increasingly knowledgeable civil service within the Directorate-General for Defence and Space.

Europe has largely managed to compensate for the US's reduced support

Europe has largely managed to compensate for the abrupt US withdrawal of support for Ukraine. The most structurally significant change is that EU institutions now dominate financial support: the EU level share has increased from around 50 percent in 2022 to almost 90 percent in 2025, equivalent to 35,1 billion euros. The new 90 billion loan reinforces this trend further – especially if we manage to get the money out… An important consequence is that financial support is now distributed more proportionally in relation to GDP – unlike military support, which is still based on bilateral decisions.

Military support is much more unevenly distributed. Western Europe – dominated by Germany and the UK – accounted for 62 percent of total European military support in 2025, while Northern Europe contributes about a third, despite the region representing only 8 percent of GDP. Eastern Europe’s contribution has plummeted, from 17 percent in 2022 to 2 percent in 2025. Southern Europe, with 19 percent of GDP, accounts for just 3 percent of support. Another change is that a growing share of military support is now being provided through procurement rather than donations from existing stocks. The conclusion is that Europe has largely compensated for the US withdrawal – but that financial support is more fairly distributed than military support, and that Eastern Europe has gone from being a forerunner to a laggard. The ideas around 2022 that Eastern Europe’s strong support for Ukraine would pave the way for more leadership in European politics have not materialized.

What is the plan?

In a research project in 2025 – Geopower – we interviewed politicians, diplomats and experts in Europe and the US. One of the clearest conclusions was the lack of a coherent plan for European security. Formally, NATO has of course adopted new defence plans, but for most interviewees it was obvious that these are mainly based on assumptions from an earlier era, where the various American swings and the risk of reduced engagement are not priced in. A map for a previous reality, in other words.

The picture that emerged was that even without the US, most NATO countries would turn first to the alliance for collective defence, second to a coalition of willing states, and only third to the EU as a framework for territorial defence. The EU's strongest roles today are as Arsenal – industry, procurement and financing – and as Protector – hybrid, cyber and protection of critical infrastructure under Article 5. The EU is significantly weaker as Defender, that is, an actor for territorial defense, and which Actor for external crisis management, a role that is in practice dormant, which has even been communicated by HRVP Kallas, who is ultimately responsible in the area. In addition, there is a lack of effective formats for even discussing these issues openly: within NATO it is politically sensitive, within the EU the focus is still relatively narrow. However, the Greenland crisis increased the will to jointly address the issue of Europe's long-term security architecture.

This turbulence around plan A, B or C is probably most turbulent for Sweden. The rest of Europe already had an active discussion about this when Sweden joined NATO, but our political bandwidth probably had difficulty in handling both our own adjustment and being able to constructively deal with the fact that NATO cooperation was a very moving target. Today there is a different insight.

Looking ahead – caught between sovereignty and security

Dependence on the US has become increasingly uncomfortable – not only because of the policies pursued, but also because of the way Trump is systematically undermining the US as a liberal democracy. As the evidence of democratic decline accumulates – in democracy rankings, press freedom indices and corruption surveys – it is becoming harder for European politicians to deal with what this means for NATO as a political community without any discomfort.

The dilemma for Europe is this: the need for security is urgent given the ongoing threat from Russia, but the dependence that this need generates simultaneously erodes our sovereignty – with the Greenland crisis being the most tangible example. Europe is thus in a structural predicament: we need to reduce our dependence on the US for the sake of our sovereignty, but we need to keep the US close for our security. How this dilemma is handled differs between European actors, and one can roughly divide Europeans into three groups.

The Defeatists – perhaps most clearly represented by Mark Rutte – advocates that the sovereignty issue be ignored: accepting economic subordination and security policy dependencies to keep the US in a security-creating role in Europe. This was mainstream for a long time, but is harder to defend after Greenland. When Rutte mocked European ambitions after Davos to even in the long term – good luck / dream on – be able to defend themselves, it constitutes pure defeatism: not even in the long term should one of the world's richest political entities strive for sovereignty and self-government. The goal in this logic is a Europe that remains eternally dependent on the US – but with higher defense spending. This is a remarkably low level of ambition. Fortunately, it is shared today by relatively few European countries.

The Pragmatists see the problem and are prepared to act – as Sweden did with praise regarding Greenland, for example, but basically want to wait for normalization. Plan A – take more responsibility for our security – and Plan B – manage without the USA – still boil down to the same political measures from this perspective: build more European capacity. In this way, we will do it without making too much of a fuss. The goal is to ride out the transatlantic storm through a form of de-risking, and then return to a transatlantic normal state with strengthened European capabilities / pillars within NATO. This is where the vast majority of European countries are today.

The reformists has a more ambitious goal: gradual liberation from structural vulnerabilities – not just in response to Trump, but in response to deeper geopolitical shifts as power shifts around the world and we leave the unipolar era. The vision is a sovereign Europe in alliance with a sovereign USA: two parties that can each defend themselves, but can achieve all the more together. It requires a different form of European integration than NATO alone can offer, as both the American hardware (equipment, communications, intelligence information, etc.) and the software (the decision-making capacity of a relatively unequal group of Europeans) must be replaced or compensated for. The US critical enablers must be made less critical by providing us as Europeans with acceptable, if not equal, alternatives if needed. Very few European countries today can be said to harbor strong reformist agendas – it is expensive and would require a highly practical form of integration that is seen as a hard sell – but the idea is important as it has an impact in certain sectors and regarding certain critical systems.

In the longer term, my assessment is that only a reformist line can offer Europe both security and sovereignty – and also incorporate Ukraine into a future security community. The risk with the pragmatic line is that Europe waits for a return that never comes, and thus never fully adapts to the reality in which we actually already live.

A European form of defense and war?

Whether Europe takes more responsibility for its security as a pragmatist – waiting for better times – or as part of a more sovereign project, a fundamental question is raised about what a European defence would actually entail. Must Europe learn a European Way of War?This is something we covered in last year's GeoPower report but has become even more relevant after the Greenland issue.

The reasons are both economic and political. When the US reduces its commitment in various ways – which has been well-publicised for a very long time but is too often met with denial from too many Europeans – there is a risk of a deterrence gap emerging. Europe is said to have difficulty replacing the US commitment with equivalent resources, even if the level of ambition is limited to conventional defence. That would be costly and in some cases would challenge our technical capacity. The good news is that we may not need to replace the US – function for function, gadget for gadget. American warfare is developed for global power projection with minimal own losses, at high economic cost. Europe’s bar is set at a different level – we should be able to deter an economically impoverished Russia on our own home turf. A European model would likely need to have a more limited military ambition and probably accept a higher human cost. The lessons from Ukraine – around drones, innovation cycles and civil preparedness – provide certain starting points. Our Nordic total defense, more endurance and a more economically manageable model are other input values. The question is how such a culture and doctrine actually develops – and whether something like a European Command Transformation to give it a charter. It is clear in any case that a European way of war will not be able to look, or need to look, like the American way of war.

Plan for change, not regression

European security has been profoundly affected by the ongoing war, the growing Russian threat, and the broader American challenges. In the latter case, we tend to overestimate policy changes and underestimate the change in US policy – ​​a political system in transformation – and the structural consequences that this entails.

Overall, it is difficult to see how we will return to the transatlantic link that was the basis for the NATO we joined. In the face of this challenge, Europe must be both robust and visionary – and this requires security policy planning that is based on change, not regression.

The author is a PhD and a member of KKrVA.