Summary
In recent weeks, there has been a discussion that Russia could possibly win its war of aggression against Ukraine. ISW (Institute for the Study of War) has tried to clarify for Western decision-makers what the consequences would be by posting map images with, among other things, missile ranges (The High Price of Losing Ukraine). Below I present my view regarding the consequences in three specific areas: should Russia succeed in defeating Ukraine, Russian self-image and warfare potential, and military operational consequences. The conclusion is more than clear; it is incomprehensible, bordering on suicidal behavior, that Western politicians can consider, or for party tactical reasons end up in, a policy that could lead to Russia being given even hypothetical opportunities to succeed in its attack on Ukraine.
Introduction
In recent weeks there has been a discussion about whether Russia could possibly win its war of aggression against Ukraine. ISW (Institute for the Study of War) has, by posting map images with, among other things, missile ranges (The High Price of Losing Ukraine) has tried to clarify for Western decision-makers what the consequences would be. Below I present my view regarding the consequences in three specific areas, in the event that Russia were to succeed in defeating Ukraine: Russian self-image and warfare potential, and military operational consequences. The conclusion is more than clear; it is incomprehensible, bordering on suicidal behavior, that Western politicians could consider, or for party tactical reasons end up in, a policy that could lead to Russia being given even a hypothetical opportunity to succeed in its attack on Ukraine.
The term "West" used in the text should be seen as a broad collective term for the European and North American cultural sphere and the values that characterize its political systems.
Russian self-image and the view of the West
From the Russian perspective, both among the political elite and among large parts of the population, a won war would likely reinforce the view that military force serves as a means of reclaiming territories that are considered to have been unjustly lost. War is thus a justified and useful instrument for restoring Russia's legitimate borders, whatever they may be: those of the Soviet Union, Tsarist Russia, or something else, depending on the interpretation of the current ruling regime. This would pose frightening prospects for the Baltic states, Belarus, and Moldova, but also for countries like Georgia and Armenia in the Caucasus. Finland would also have good reason to consider how far Russia's ambitions might extend. The countries of Central Asia would find themselves in a difficult dilemma between possibly trying to deal with Russian imperial ambitions on their own or approaching China.
The prevailing view in fairly broad circles in Russia that the West is degenerate and is ruled by conflict-afraid politicians who will not stand up to Russia will be consolidated.
Overall, the risk of an even more aggressive Russian foreign and security policy, in which military force is a crucial component, will increase.
It is also not impossible that Russian successes in Ukraine, coupled with a lame Western response, could lead to China also perceiving itself as having gained greater freedom of action, for example regarding Taiwan and to assert its interests in the South China Sea by force of arms. Moreover, what does this mean for the West's image and credibility as a partner in the rest of the world at a time when both economic and military cooperation are playing an increasingly important role?
Russian military potential
An occupied Ukraine, albeit with a population largely hostile to Russia, will lead to a significant increase in Russian military potential. Gaining access to an additional 35 million (Ukrainian population in 2024) people means potentially about two million more “Russian” soldiers. With Russian methods of conscription, targeting “non-Russians”, and carried out with brutal means, many Ukrainians will be forced to fight for Russia in a future war.
Ukraine is relatively industrialized, the factories will not disappear in the event of an occupation. The competence to produce military equipment is quite high. The legacy from the past in terms of manufacturing aircraft engines, airplanes, and robots remains to some extent, but new important sectors have also been added, including the production of drones. The capacity to produce ammunition has also increased drastically in recent times. In the event of an occupation, the factories will switch to producing equipment for the Russian armed forces. It is unrealistic to believe that production would cease due to strikes or sabotage. These are only pious hopes of those who do not themselves risk, or have experienced, ruthless repression. The experience of the Second World War is clear. Industry in occupied countries continued to produce the kind of products that Nazi Germany needed. People needed some kind of livelihood. Others were forced to work under threat, against themselves or their families. It will be no different here.
Military consequences
In the event that Ukraine were to be incorporated into Russia, the Russian need to have a strong guard in the south would disappear in the event of an attack on, for example, the Baltics and/or Finland. More resources would be able to be allocated in the direction one chooses to act. Russia would also have overall greater resources at its disposal than the West has had reason to plan for so far.
NATO will need to raise its guard in most directions: the Black Sea region, the Baltic Sea, the Baltics, the Arctic, Eastern Europe in general, Sweden and Finland. Unless a very large rearmament is carried out, the alliance will be, relatively speaking, weaker in every place where it might have to face a Russian attack.
In addition to the fact that the balance of power will generally be affected to NATO's disadvantage, Russia's practical warfare capabilities will also improve. The logistics organization will become more robust by increasing the number of usable railway lines and highways in the east-west direction. The number of airfields that can be used, both for transport and for the dispersal of combat aircraft, will increase. The system of river channels in Ukraine will be able to be used to increase the redundancy of the Russian transport system. The possibilities of "selling terrain" in one direction in order to be able to gather forces in another will be improved. The air defense zone over southern Russia and in the Black Sea will become deeper and the air defense will thus be more effective. The number of garrisons in southern Russia will be able to be reduced and resources will instead be concentrated in other, more prioritized directions. This increases the possibilities of launching attacks by surprise in these locations. The need to carry out extensive and revealing troop movements before an attack will decrease.
If the hypothesis of the Estonian intelligence chief, Colonel Margo Grosberg, from September this year is correct, it will take three to five years for Russia to rearm after the war in Ukraine is over. The fact that it can happen so quickly is partly due to the fact that Russian industry has already largely switched to war production, unlike Western producers of military equipment.
If NATO member states wish to counter such a development, especially if Russia's military potential were to increase with resources from an occupied Ukraine, we are talking about multi-year investments of perhaps 5% of GDP, probably more. Poland is already on its way to that level, while countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and others have not yet reached 2%. When Sweden tried to keep up with the pace of events at the beginning of World War II, just over 10% of GDP was invested in defense. It still took more than five years to implement many of the measures decided in 1941 and 1942. Sweden's and others' starting position today is no better, rather worse. The majority of NATO's European members today lack the ability to wage war on a large scale. The number of units is too small, the units and command functions are poorly trained for large-scale combat, and the availability of ammunition and other supplies is insufficient. Der Spiegel magazine reported last summer that Germany only has enough artillery ammunition for a few days of combat. The rearmament plans in various NATO countries are mostly aimed at eliminating the most serious deficiencies by 2030 or later. The Baltic countries and Poland have higher ambitions when it comes to strengthening their armed forces in the near future. This is probably no coincidence. They are also the countries that, relative to their economic resources, provide the most support to Ukraine.
The adversary the West will have to face will be different from the one that formed the basis for current planning and armament measures. Russian units, especially their commanders, will have extensive war experience. Methods will have been developed to meet modern Western systems. Existing equipment and own methods will have been improved. New technologies will have been introduced. For example, the Russian ability to disrupt an adversary's drones and precision-guided munitions has developed drastically in the past year alone. The Russian military will simply have become larger and more dangerous.
Conclusions
The potential consequences of a Russian victory in Ukraine would mean that the threats to countries that were previously parts of the Tsarist and Soviet empires would increase drastically. Something that would force, from today's perspective, extreme armament needs to balance the increased Russian threat. This would apply to both the directly threatened states and countries that, due to their geographical location, risk being drawn into a conflict. Sweden is a clear example.
Global stability would also likely be affected by the West allowing a democracy to perish in a war against an authoritarian power player. Future declarations that the West stands for, and is prepared to defend, a law- and treaty-based international legal order would ring hollow.
Ensuring that Ukraine does not lose the war is a very cheap investment compared to the risks and costs that a lack of support would lead to.
