Part 3 – If the war organization is to rule, the organization must change
In the two previous articles I have argued for the need for a clearer command structure in the Swedish Armed Forces and explained how strategy, operational art and tactics relate to each other according to Swedish and NATO doctrine. If these command levels fulfill different functions, a natural question arises: are they also reflected in the organization of the Swedish Armed Forces?
My firm opinion is that the answer is no.
In the previous article, I described how operations constitute the link between strategy and tactics. The operational level is to translate military strategic objectives into multi-domain operations, while the tactical levels use their units to create the desired effects. If we accept this logic, the organization must also support it.
The problem is that the organization of the Armed Forces has for a long time developed based on other driving forces than the doctrinal leadership levels. Despite several reorganizations, we still live with the tension between operational activities and production – or, if you like, between the war organization (KRO) and the basic organization (GRO). Responsibility, resources and mandate do not always follow the same logic as strategy, operational art and tactics.
This is not a new discussion. For several years, the Armed Forces have tried to translate the issue into various operational discussions and games at headquarters, with the support of the branches of defense and combat forces. Despite this, the discussions have not led to the change in the command structure that the situation requires or clarification of the different parts. Most recently, in the spring of 2026, C J5 at the Operations Command was tasked by C OPL to conduct a command needs analysis of ground operational, ground territorial and logistics command.[1] There is an obvious risk that this analysis will also arrive at the same conclusions as previous work – that the problems are identified, but that the solution in practice will be an adaptation of the current structure rather than a change to it. In that case, it is not an expression that the problems lack solutions, but rather that we have difficulty thinking beyond the organization we already have and what task each level should solve. If we are serious about a credible organization and leadership, strategy, operational art and tactics cannot remain in doctrines and training halls. They must have consequences for how the Armed Forces are actually organized and led. The change must happen now, rather than later.
In support of the above discussion, there are several interesting articles and debaters who have raised the need for a reform of both the Armed Forces and its command structure. Robert Johansson has in the article The regiments are dead – long live the combat units! pointed out several of the problems and asked the central question: who actually leads the combat units, and what mandates do the combat unit commanders have over personnel, materiel and operations?[2] Johansson argues that the war organization should be governing even in peacetime and describes a model where field units and military bases constitute the organization's fundamental building blocks. Erik Unogård in the article, Dismantle the operations command – for the sake of the combat units, in turn, has argued for a changed command structure with, among other things, the military regions subordinated to the army and a merger of the Operations Command and the Defence Staff.[3] In addition, Tomas Nybom, A developed leadership on the ground, specifically discussed the leadership on the ground based on his own observations during Immediate Response 2024.[4] All articles are well worth reading and even though the articles differ, they all point to the same fundamental problems regarding the organization of the Armed Forces.
My starting point is that we need to start at the doctrinal levels of command. Because if strategy, operational art and tactics form the basis for how we conduct military operations, the organization should also be built to support these levels – not the other way around.
Some concrete suggestions. The first step for this should be to create a cohesive headquarters where the Operations Command is integrated with the Defence Staff in a joint, numbered staff. Here I have some faith in Commander-in-Chief Michael Claesson's work with central command, although at the same time I see a risk that an overly centralised headquarters will develop a detailed management approach. But the organisation must also change further down the structure. If we are serious about the principle of organising, training and practicing as we will fight, the peace organisation must to a greater extent reflect the war organisation.
The war organization must therefore be governing. The Armed Forces should be organized based on the units that will solve the tasks in war, not based on administrative organizational units (OrgE) created for peacetime operations. At the same time, we must abandon the notion that production and operational activities are two separate activities. A war unit is not produced for its own sake. It is produced in order to be used. Therefore, the war unit commander should also have significantly greater influence over personnel, materiel and training than the current division allows.
This is where the military bases, or their equivalent in the Air Force and Navy, become particularly interesting. They are already war units with tasks in mobilisation, supply, host country support and support for other units. From a NATO perspective, their importance becomes even greater because the reception and support of allied reinforcements is based on functioning military bases and logistics nodes. The challenge with the military bases is that they are only activated after mobilisation, which means that it is the OrgE that solves the tasks while waiting for that. We cannot have it that way, but military effect must be able to be delivered here and now, based on a grey area problem, where mobilisation or activation can be delayed. Against this background, it seems natural to let the peace organisation be based on the same structure as it is to operate in the war organisation.
Here I recommend everyone to read the Navy Chief's decision on the direction of the Navy's future organization.[5] The decision states that today's (navy) organization is largely a result of previous defense decisions with a focus on rationalization and cost-effectiveness. Instead, the decision points out a different direction where the organization should be based to a greater extent on the combat units, strengthen the tactical command level and create clearer responsibilities between central, regional and local levels. Of particular interest are the underlying principles for management. The central level (in the navy) should lead naval operations, planning and long-term development. The regional level should coordinate operations, while the unit level should carry out operations, training and preparedness. The organization is designed based on the functions to be solved, responsibility and mandate follow the command levels and the combat units are placed at the center. This is also precisely what I believe should be the starting point for the continued development of the Armed Forces. If strategy, operational art and tactics are to govern how we lead military operations, the organization must be built to support these functions. Therefore, I believe that the same basic principles, adapted to the conditions of the army, but also other branches of defense, should be able to be applied there as well.
If the organization is designed based on the functions that are actually to be solved in war, better conditions are created for clear responsibility, more effective leadership and stronger combat units. The regiments in the army would thus no longer have to constitute independent organizational units. Instead, they could be organized as training units, centers of expertise and tradition bearers within the military bases, which take over the role of organizational unit even in peacetime. Robert Johansson uses the Skövde garrison as an example, which also illustrates my reasoning. The crucial difference, however, is that I do not see the military bases as subordinate to the military regions within the framework of a territorial staff, but as the natural backbone of the army's combat units. Here there is also reason to be inspired by the development currently taking place within the Navy. In practice, this would mean that P4 and T2 are organized as training units within the Skövde military base, while the 4th brigade remains as its own combat unit, subordinate to the military base in terms of deployment. The military base is responsible for training, mobilization, supply and support, while the brigade can concentrate on its main task – developing and maintaining the ability to fight and win the battle.
This is not about moving boxes in an organizational chart. It is about letting the peace organization reflect how the Armed Forces should actually function in war. At the same time, fewer organizational units and staffs, which would be a consequence of the proposal, would reduce administrative interfaces and free up personnel for the combat units – a resource that the Armed Forces currently lacks.
The same reasoning applies to the military regions and the Home Guard. No one questions their importance, but today's division between production and operations creates unnecessary organizational boundaries. The Home Guard is subordinate to the National Home Guard Staff and the National Home Guard Commander in production, while the military regions are responsible for operations or operations. The Home Guard should therefore be integrated to a greater extent with the branches of defense based on their respective domains, with the main part thus falling to the Army Commander. At the same time, the role of the National Home Guard Commander and the Home Guard's special position need to be preserved in order to protect popular support. Instead of what Johansson suggests, we should take a look at what Unogård and Nybom have described in their articles. Both agree that the military regions should be subordinated to the army and Nybom speaks for the logic in connection with the Immediate Response 2024 exercise. I share the view and believe that the military regions should develop into the army's regional command level with responsibility for territorial operations, regional coordination and support for the units operating within the respective regional area. Military bases, home guard units, maneuver units and territorial resources should be seen as parts of a coherent system rather than separate organizational solutions that all operate in the land domain. Such an organization would create a clearer connection between peace and war organization, reduce the artificial division between production and operation and clarify responsibilities and mandates. Above all, it would be based on the reality that awaits in war – not on administrative structures that have emerged during peacetime.
But even if the organization changes, perhaps the most important question remains. Organizing units is one thing. Leading them is another.
When brigades, military bases, home guard units and allied forces operate simultaneously on Swedish territory, someone is needed to hold the operations together on the ground. Who will do that is still an open question.
This is also where the discussion of land territorial management begins in earnest, which is the starting point of my next article.