Part 1 – The Armed Forces' biggest challenge is not a lack of combat units but military leadership
These are interesting times to be an officer in the Swedish Armed Forces. A lot is happening right now — but after almost twenty years in the organization, all the advanced training and service in several different units, staffs and at different levels, I have arrived at a conclusion that I want to test in this series of articles: The greatest challenge for the Swedish Armed Forces is not the lack of combat units. It is the lack of effective military leadership and organization.
During these years, I have asked myself the same question over and over again: How does everything really connect? How are political goals translated into military operations and tactical actions? How does the individual combat unit contribute to the larger whole? And since Sweden's entry into NATO in 2024 — how does Sweden contribute to the alliance's collective defense?
Many of these issues I thought would become clear the higher up in the organization I went. Instead, I have come to the realization that the problem is not a lack of will, competence or even military units. The problem lies rather in how we organize, lead and control the operations.
The leadership levels of the Swedish Armed Forces are often unclear and the responsibilities are often problematic. This has become even more apparent since Sweden became a member of NATO. Try explaining the Swedish leadership structure to an allied colleague. The conversation often ends with the joking statement:
"In Sweden, we have a system."
The joke, however, contains a serious point.
The organization and command structure of the Swedish Armed Forces do not always reflect the principles and command levels found within NATO. Here we have a lot to learn from, for example, our Nordic neighbor Finland. For our organization, this creates challenges both internally and in cooperation with our allies. But this is not a new problem; for a long time, the Swedish Armed Forces have struggled with issues of responsibility, leadership and control — characterized by the two so-called pipes: operational operations and production operations, or as we call it today, basic organization and war organization. Responsibility, mandate and resources have not always followed the same logic. Who leads, who is responsible and who makes decisions has repeatedly become the subject of discussion.
Although the Armed Forces have carried out several reorganizations and investigations to solve this very problem, especially in recent years: Leadership for a Stronger Defense, L23, the structural measures — and now an upcoming review of the central leadership, to name a few parts, the purpose of which was to create a clearer leadership structure and better conditions for leading the Armed Forces in peace, crisis and war.
The question we should ask ourselves is why we believe this reorganization will be better when others have not fully succeeded.. Especially as long as the Armed Forces do not dare to make the uncomfortable decisions or address the "legacy" between production and deployment.
Some of the changes that have been implemented were that the Production Management and the Command Staff were merged into the Defence Staff and that the defence branch staffs were further strengthened through transferred responsibilities and mandates. The Defence Staff thus became the Commander-in-Chief's primary staff and command resource with responsibility for supporting the strategic management of the authority and coordinating the long-term development, readiness and availability of the Armed Forces. At the same time, the Operations Management was reorganized into the Operations Management with a clearer focus on planning, leading and following up on operations and efforts.
Unfortunately, this did not result in the Armed Forces having a cohesive headquarters, but there are still two different headquarters that do not talk to each other but continue in the two different pipes, production and operation.
The Home Guard also has an organizational division between production and operations. Since the Home Guard Unit was established, the Home Guard Chief and the Home Guard Staff within the Defence Staff have been responsible for the production, development and maintenance of the Home Guard. However, when the units are to be used, the management responsibility is transferred to the military regions, which are directly subordinate to the Operations Command. Here too, responsibility, mandate and management are divided between different organizational levels depending on whether the activities are conducted in production or operations.
Don't get me wrong. The changes were both necessary and in many ways welcome. But the question remains: did they really solve the fundamental problems?
My view is that many of the issues previously discussed still remain. The division between operational activities and production lives on, albeit in different forms. The problem is deeper than organizational charts and name changes. As long as the Armed Forces consider the production of combat units as something separate from their use, we will continue to create friction between different parts of the organization. Combat units are not produced for their own sake. They are produced to be used, and commanders of combat units must be given more say.
The Supreme Command of the Swedish Armed Forces is now conducting another review of the central command on behalf of Commander-in-Chief Michael Claesson. The same Commander-in-Chief who has repeatedly raised the message "everything and everyone for the war units".
It is an ambition that is difficult to object to.
But if the combat units are truly to be the focus, the command structure must also be designed to support them. Not only in peacetime, but also in crisis, war and as a member of NATO. Sweden cannot afford levels of command that do not create effect. We cannot afford responsibilities that are unclear or organizational solutions that make command more difficult rather than easier. Something that is exemplified primarily in ground territorial command, ground operational command, logistics command and host nation support.
In recent years, I have participated in and followed the Swedish Armed Forces' efforts to clarify responsibilities related to ground territorial command, ground operational command, logistics command and host nation support. Despite several investigations, operational discussions and very high-level games in the Swedish Armed Forces to clarify roles and mandates, many of the fundamental questions and challenges with our command method remain.
Most recently, the task has landed on the Brigadier General and the head of OPL J5 to try to sort out these concepts. Unfortunately, there is a risk that he too will fail the task just as many have done before him, even though it should be relatively simple. Because I believe that the problem is fundamentally simpler than we sometimes make it out to be, but that it will definitely not get better if we do not dare to question our own management method and division of responsibilities.
On the contrary, responsibility, mandate and leadership relationships become relatively clear if we start from NATO's doctrines and leadership principles. The problems arise when we try to adapt these to a Swedish organizational structure that is based on different historical conditions and a different approach to leadership and obedience. Therefore, we must dare to change our organization and stop internal power games based on which general or admiral gets the most power, or which domain is most important.
NATO membership not only means new defense plans and new collaborations. It also means increased demands for a coherent command system where strategy, operational art and tactics are tied together through clear command levels and a clear responsibility for who leads what. But before we can discuss how the Armed Forces should be organized, we first need to understand the concepts that underlie military command.
What really distinguishes strategy from tactics, and what role does the art of operations play?
And why are these concepts crucial to how modern defense forces organize and lead their combat forces?
In the following articles I will develop this reasoning. First, I will discuss the concepts that underlie military command – strategy, operational art and tactics. Then I will discuss how the organization of the Armed Forces can better reflect the needs of the war organization. Finally, I will address the issue of land territorial command and why the responsibilities in the land domain need to be clearer. My starting point is simple: organization and command must support the combat units and be designed based on the same logic on which NATO bases its operations.