The motto "Everything for the war units"[1] was the guiding light for what was probably the most comprehensive and capability-enhancing process that the Armed Forces underwent during the Cold War. It was the guiding light for the reform that General Bengt Gustavsson, ÖB 1986–1994, implemented under the name VI 90 (Operational Idea 90). A reform that meant that the combat units were cadre-organized[2] and that the commanders of combat units were given responsibility for the combat readiness and development of the units. Their increased opportunities to control manning, training and material turnover contributed to a radically increased combat readiness of the units. Those who were primarily affected were the brigade commanders (corresponding to), but the reform had the consequent effect that battalion and company commanders also became deeply involved in the status and development of their units – my unit, my responsibility. "But I'm supposed to have a Krigsbro 4 in my mobilization supply, it's gone, where is it? Well, on loan to the 6th company of the basic training battalion, ok then I know where to get it when there is an increase in readiness".[3]
The reason why the concept was coined, and had such a strong impact, was primarily the changed threat picture, where the surprise attack became dominant. Something that required that the units must be able to be deployed quickly, without time-consuming preparations. Deficiencies in the economic follow-up, complicated control of production and unclear responsibilities with accompanying deficiencies in the units' combat capability also underlined the need for a radical reform.
The reform was implemented in a surprisingly short time, approximately three years from the time the ideas were presented to the time the Riksdag made a decision, and implementation began on a large scale. The basic direction was given in the ÖB program plan 89–92, which had been preceded by the partial investigation FU 88 (Defense Forces Investigation 1988).
What were the changes? Here are some excerpts from FU 88 that should give a sense of the spirit of the reform:[4]
"The prerequisite for a change in this direction is that the combat units are placed at the center of the operations. They must be the foundation and starting point for the organization of the Armed Forces. The readiness and capability of the combat units in a broad sense must therefore be central to the activities of the Armed Forces in peacetime."
"An important purpose, in addition to those previously mentioned, of a cadre-organized defense force is to strengthen the position of the commanders of combat units. If they are to be able to exercise their responsibilities and utilize increased powers and resources, they must be present at all levels where operations are conducted in peace. For this reason, the position and responsibility of brigade commanders, among others, must be strengthened within the army."
“The purpose of decentralization and delegation is, as part of management development, to create a system where tasks and problems are solved at, or as close as possible to, the level at which they exist. Such a system provides ample scope for creativity and initiative at all levels.”
"The person giving the assignment must clearly formulate goals and frameworks for the activity, but must limit the number of governing rules to what is absolutely necessary. Within these frameworks, the person receiving the assignment has the freedom to choose their own method, adapt the organization, and make trade-offs and priorities in order to achieve the set goal."
How radical the reform was was evident not only from the new direction for how production would be controlled and the organization developed, but also from the fact that the budgeting and planning system, FPE, was adapted to the new way of conducting business in peace.
"When the cadre organization is introduced, the application of the FPE system must be adapted to this. The assignments must be given in so-called war unit terms, i.e. they must specify the activities in peace that the war units must conduct in order to maintain readiness and combat capability."[5]
In parallel with the 1988 Armed Forces Inquiry, the 1988 Parliamentary Defence Committee (comparable to today's Defence Committee) worked on reviewing, among other things, the future size and structure of the Armed Forces. The committee adopted the ÖB's proposal to give the commanders of military units greater responsibility in peace production. It also expanded the analysis of the shortcomings of the existing command system to include more factors than those specified in the ÖB's programme plan.
"The Commander-in-Chief has proposed in FU 88 a comprehensive change in production management, where commanders of higher military units are already given a large and unambiguous responsibility for the activities carried out to maintain the units' readiness and combat capability, even in peacetime."
"A significant explanation for the shortcomings in defense planning should be found in organizational sociological factors that have to do with the actions of the parties. The planning system that the defense has today was created in the rationalist and partly mechanistic spirit that characterized the 60s. Understanding and taking into account organizational sociological phenomena also now appears to be a necessary complement."[6]
The committee's conclusion, that the system should be changed so that the combat units were put at the center, was shared by the government and also became the proposal in the bill that was submitted to and approved by the Riksdag.
"The committee believes that the direction proposed by the Commander-in-Chief, that the commanders of combat units should be given greater responsibility for the development of their units, creates better conditions for unit turnover to take place with due consideration for the combat capability of the units than the current system. I share this view."[7]
Directions from the ÖB and the government are of course important when it comes to describing the operation, but what did it mean as a commander of a combat unit to act based on the new operational concept? I asked a brigade commander from that time to highlight some aspects of the “VI 90 environment”.
Colonel Lars Josefson, commander of the Älvsborg Brigade:
“As head of the Älvsborg Brigade, I was able to devote a large part of my time to war preparation work, as my deputy, as head of training, took care of most things related to basic training.
My DUCs (Directly Subordinate Commanders), six battalion commanders and five independent company commanders, also put a lot of time and effort into their units. During a spring and autumn week, they reported on both the personnel and materiel situation in their units to the brigade commander and staff. After that, various support functions, such as the materiel unit, were given tasks to solve.
I also had two war planning weeks annually with staff and DUC. My battalion commanders usually served in the regiment and had frequent contact with their company commanders. One weekend a year they also had a gathering of their management staff, when reserve and conscript officers also participated.
As brigade commander, I “owned” the bulk of the brigade. However, for training reasons, there were exceptions. My howitzer battalion, for example, was set up and trained by A 9. This required close cooperation between me and the leadership at the artillery regiment. As a small example of how the cooperation worked: one day I received a call from the commander of A 9 who told me that my artillery commander at the brigade was on his way to a new war position. He then suggested another major for the task, presented his CV, and asked if it was acceptable to me. I also visited A 9 on a few occasions to follow the training of the parts of my artillery battalion that were then being trained there.
My own experiences of VI 90 as head of MekB 18 on Gotland are very similar to those reported above, perhaps with the addition that I had it easier. P 18, A 7 and LV 2 were co-located on the Visborg plain outside Visby, with Militärkommando Gotland as the nearest neighbor. Putting together coordinated personnel, training and turnover plans could be done over a cup of coffee at the fair, maybe not quite, but close.
Here is a small anecdote to describe the freedom in how to adapt education to new ideas.
When I took over as brigade commander, I discovered that the basic training battalion at P 18 did not participate in the “Armored Exercise” at Revingehed, which was arranged by PS (Armored Troop School) during the month of April every year. I contacted the PS commander and asked why that was. He replied that P18 was welcome, as long as we got there. This happened in the autumn. After checking with the commander of Gotland Military Command and the Military Staff in Strängnäs whether it was acceptable from a readiness point of view for us to leave the island for a fortnight in the spring, I gathered the company commanders (they were the ones who practically had the money in the form of; driving miles, unit training days, overtime, ammunition, etc.) and asked if they would like to go to Skåne at the edge of spring. The prerequisite was that during the winter exercises they could save a few pennies to finance the transport of the battalion’s personnel, combat vehicles and cars to Skåne. Other costs were roughly the same as what an already planned battalion exercise, at the same time, on the island would cost. Yes, the company commanders did their part – we rented a ferry and went to Skåne, and thus had the opportunity to practice with and against other armored battalions within the brigade.
The reform also created a change in mood so that even previously existing routines were carried out with greater energy and seriousness. For example, the traditionally mandatory war planning weeks in the army every year, always weeks 23 and 24, became even more sacred. Woe to the officer at a staff or school who tried to schedule a conference, training or anything else that disturbed the war units during those weeks – he was ashamed, and was ordered in clear terms to find another time. The recruitment process was also affected. It had always been the case that it was the regiments that selected who would be sent to Karlberg, to then return to the unit as officers. But here too the process was affected by the changed mentality that the cadre organization led to. Of course, company, battalion and brigade commanders had always placed great importance on selecting suitable candidates, but now the whole thing was reinforced by the very tangible feeling "it's future commanders in my own (possibly my successor's) combat unit that I now have to select - is NN a future tank company commander that I want in my battalion?".
Although VI 90 was carried out in a different environment than today, perhaps there are still some ideas that both defense planning and the Armed Forces could pick up on, about how changing responsibilities and peacetime routines can increase the organization's effectiveness in war - now that we are once again building a defense force intended for large-scale combat against a qualified adversary.
The author is a major general, former rector of the Swedish National Defense University, Operations Leader in the Eastern Military District and brigade commander. He is a member of the Swedish National Defense Council.
Footnotes
[1] Although it is unclear who originally coined the motto, it was Lieutenant General Erik G. Bengtsson, Army Chief of Staff 1984-1990, who made it the guiding principle for the army's operations.
[2] Cadre organization meant that all war units were given a small skeleton of permanently on-duty personnel who would follow up on the status of the unit, e.g. manning, the training status of different units, the availability and condition of the equipment in the mobilization stores and plan the development of the unit. At company level, this could be a single person, at a battalion usually the battalion commander plus one or more assistants, at brigade level the brigade commander with parts of his staff.
[3] War Bridge 4 was a quickly constructed trench bridge with a span of 15,2 m and a load capacity of 50 tons. It was organizationally located at the armored battalions.
[4] The quote is an excerpt from ÖB Program Plan 89 – 92/FU88 pages 25-27
[5] Ibid
[6] SOU 1989:46 The development of the army and the defense planning system: partial report
[7] Bill 1989/90:9, page 12 (“I” in this context is the Minister of Defense who in the text of the bill is the one who recommends the bill to the government).