In the early 1990s, one of our distribution managers came[1] again after completing a KFÖ[2] in his war position. He exclaimed indignantly, "I am both blind and deaf to hell with our current management system"!

It was built on wire connections (the Swedish telecommunications company's telephone network) and required the unit to build long stretches of its own cable for the whole thing to work. In addition, it included a large number of standard vehicles, which made the unit difficult to move while at the same time increasing the requirement for mobility.

The distribution staff was simply a colossus on feet of clay that rarely produced orders to the units on time.

There may be different opinions on this. I base my opinion on five years as a division commander and three years as a brigade commander. I have completed two KFÖ as a brigade commander and two as a division commander (division commander). I have also served in the military area staff as head of the ground operations department.

The brigade staff was based on the same principles as the distribution staff and was a product of the same thinking model. It was not only materiel and technology that made the staff slow, but also that it often became more important to follow processes than to lead the units.

As a result of this distribution manager's experience (above), the development responsibility for the distribution management was transferred to the distribution managers in full accordance with VI 90 (same responsibility in war as in peace), which was introduced at that time.

The task was rotated between the distribution managers and responsibility was linked in time to when each distribution would implement the KFÖ.

I, who was then the manager of 4. The distribution was allowed to start the virgin work.

We took out the axe and reduced the staff by half, I think. Broadly speaking, a management position 1 (the boss's), a management position 2 (the deputy) and a management position 3 (the staff) were created.

The management locations would be grouped at or preferably in buildings to be hidden, provide good comfort and quick grouping.

We tested the concept and found that it was a good basis for continued development.

But then came the great slaughter of units, now it was a battalion army that had to be led and international operations. The development of the division was put on hold.

When it woke up two years ago, it had regained its old colossal form during its sleep.

A command organization can grow to any size if it is not given a strict framework. The larger the staff, the slower it will be. Now that we are adapting to NATO and meeting new staffing requirements, we cannot afford unnecessarily large staffs.

After being involved in a number of command support projects over the years, I was looking forward with interest to the KKrVA visit to the 7th Brigade Headquarters during exercise Våreld where the development status of command support was presented.

My hopes were not that high after previous experience with imperfect management systems.

One of my basic requirements has been that the terrain information must not be worse than on a 1:50,000 terrain map. Unfortunately, too many people thought that the space in the command vehicle should be the rule instead of the need for terrain information. I admit that it gets messy in a command vehicle with the division area on the terrain map.

But, what military commander would choose to eliminate 50% of available map information – which is the real result of leading on a 1:100,000 map – Unfortunately, too many chose the easy way out.

How do you communicate in fast situations if you use different map scales? I've tried, it didn't work well

Today's staff concept is not completely different from our "thinking" from 1995

The intention of this post is not to whine about the difference between practice and theory in staff work, but to tell you that I have finally seen the light at the end of the tunnel.

P7 has been tasked with developing the brigade staff according to the motto smaller and sharper.

Mission control, "own resources", thinking outside the box, a driving project manager, a large element of generation Z personnel have created something that is very good and that can be even better. A system that looks after the needs of the units and has no problem absorbing new opportunities.

The system utilizes civilian networks (G4, G5, Internet, etc.) and finds a working path on its own. Everyone can have the same decision-making basis on their personal toads that are connected to the network.

This is the first time I've seen leadership support for the army that I believe in.

I firmly believe in the development method where the users who know what it is about do the work and who can change and try new ideas at short notice from one moment to the next without asking a senior manager. This shortens the development time considerably.

Combat vehicle 90 was developed in a similar way and it turned out very well. It just takes having managers who dare to direct missions and subordinates who dare to exploit the trust from the manager.

Now we look like we can get a command support that can meet the technical requirements for manageability. If we can now just educate our officers to apply day-to-day tactics – not just talk about it, then we would increase the army's effectiveness considerably. You have to stop being locked into formal processes and let the units' need for timely decisions guide you. Starting a battalion takes time and there are few shortcuts in practical operations.

In the decision-making process and order work, however, shortcuts can be used. For example: The manager thinks out loud, Preparatory orders as well as orders afterwards are some techniques that can be better utilized with the new technology. If we are now getting down to the technical side, what do we do about the cumbersome decision-making process?

I have been asked: What was the decision-making process like when we, with the First Bosnian Battalion, decided to stop murder, looting and rape in the city of Vares with force of arms by utilizing the peace-enforcing mandate.

I didn't have a good answer until I saw the movie Top Gun II with Tom Cruise. In one scene he describes how his unit is going to carry out a decisive attack.

One of the pilots objects-

– “Sir, you can't do that!” – “don't think – just do it!” is the answer.

In reality, there is rarely time for cumbersome processes if you want to win.

The author is a former brigade and division commander, KSO, and a member of KKrVA.

Footnotes

[1] Distribution was the former name for the division level within our army.
[2] Abbreviation for combat unit exercise.