There is a lot of talk these days about the strategic importance of the world's oceans. This is about the indispensability of the water surface for transport and flow security. But also and not least about the great and rapidly growing importance of the seabed, which enables other types of flows, primarily oil and gas pipelines in the world's energy supply system, but also internet cables and other expressions of the global spread of digitalization and other technological developments, an indispensible element of globalization but at the same time a subject of growing concern for increasing vulnerability and therefore protection value, in a competitive and potentially tense context. As exemplified by recent sabotage incidents, including Nordstream 1 and 2.
And between the surface and the bottom are the waters themselves, which strategically enable a covert presence, something that has been significant in varying ways throughout the post-war period, with an ongoing power struggle both between the main players in geopolitics and between submarine and anti-submarine technology development, a constant duel over means and countermeasures, with implications not least at the nuclear weapons level.
Our current focus on these issues brings to mind what happened in the early 80s, when the relative nuclear stability (based on MAD) and tentative detente policy of the 70s (the Helsinki Agreement, etc.) had been replaced by significant strategic anxiety and uncertainty, and when neutral Sweden was subjected to persistent submarine violations, continuing well into the period after the end of the Cold War. A unanimous special commission, the Submarine Protection Commission under the leadership of former Prime Minister Sven Andersson, surprised the world with its clear language and by pointing out the Soviet Union as the guilty party. The submarine violations and the “submarine issue” came, despite the commission (and despite a series of subsequent investigations, to put Swedish security policy and the national consensus on it under significant strain, an important mark on Sweden’s path from neutrality/non-alignment to today’s goal of NATO membership.
Michael Sahlin, who was secretary of Sven Andersson's submarine protection commission and has since followed this issue, is interviewed in this podcast about different stages in this security-critical process and what we have to learn from it today. He talks in the podcast with Consilio International's CEO Andreas von der Heide.
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