NATO's fundamental objective is to act as a deterrent. Failing this, the alliance must have such a warfare capability that an attack against one or more of its members can be repelled.
The direction is clear, but is Sweden living up to it when we are designing our defense policy as part of this NATO strategy?
To have a good ability to face a conceivable, perhaps even probable, attack[1] in the event of a war does not have to be the same as a functioning deterrent against what an attacker sees as the reason for starting a war in the first place. The reason, that is, the political goals that someone wants to achieve by starting a war, should also be taken into account when considering how this someone should be deterred from carrying out an attack. The question then becomes, can Sweden contribute to the alliance's deterrence capacity in such a way that it affects the Russian will to start a war in the first place, what about the possibilities of achieving political goals in our immediate area? Here it feels like something is missing in the Swedish analysis if you consider the current direction of the development of the Swedish Armed Forces.
The connection between defense capability and deterrence was simpler for Sweden during the Cold War. Even though the presumptive aggressor was still Russia (the Soviet Union), Swedish defense and security policy at that time lacked the dimension that we would actively contribute to deterring the Soviet Union from starting a war in our part of the world at all. The deterrence factor was instead strongly linked to an attack on Swedish territory “it would cost too much to attack Sweden in relation to the gains that stand to be gained”. In a second step, there was the idea, “the battle should be able to be waged so persistently that it would give NATO time to help Sweden”. Although this latter orientation was rarely put forward publicly in Sweden, it was an obvious part of Soviet considerations.
Today we are members of NATO and must see Sweden's role in a larger context. Unlike before, we must now consider how we can contribute to the alliance's collective deterrence, where the ultimate goal is to convince Russia of the futility of attacking one or more alliance members, that is, starting a war at all.
In the Nordic-Baltic region, there are two areas, or directions of attack if you will, where Russia may see reason to carry out major military operations: the High North (to use a Norwegian expression) and the Baltics.
The question therefore becomes, how should we view these two directions in relation to NATO's overall objective of deterring an attack on the alliance in general and the need to be able to repel an attack in either or both directions if war does break out?
The Northern Areas, here defined as the northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden and Finland with adjacent sea areas, the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The threat to the High North is mainly due to two factors: Russia's desire to protect those of its weapons systems based on the Kola Peninsula and to increase their ability to be effective. The bulk of Russia's submarine-based nuclear second-strike capability is located there and the submarines have their patrol areas - in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. There are also the combat forces that may have the task of cutting off sea connections between Europe and the US, but also connections to Scandinavia.
From a Russian perspective, there are therefore good reasons to expand the defense zone around the bases on the Kola Peninsula by moving various types of air defense systems as far west as possible on the Arctic Circle. Something that would affect Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian territory. There is also the desire to make it more difficult for NATO to act in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean with primarily naval combat forces and airborne systems.
The extent to which Russia will in the foreseeable future have the ability to seriously threaten sea and air links across the Atlantic with naval forces and aircraft based on the Kola Peninsula is debatable. It is doubtful whether the necessary resources will be available. However, the Russian possibilities to threaten sea links to Scandinavia will be quite good as the distance from the Kola Peninsula to the North Sea is considerably shorter than to the North Atlantic. The dangerous passage through the GIUK gap (Greenland – Iceland – United Kingdom) will then not need to be forced. A purposeful, more limited Russian strategy of this kind would significantly complicate reinforcement transports to the Nordic countries and by extension to the Baltics. Another factor should also be considered here: the possibilities of using very long-range missiles, several thousand kilometers, to combat ships. Target data would be obtained from satellites. Such a concept could potentially reduce the need for weapons carriers such as submarines and aircraft to travel out into the Atlantic or the North Sea to operate. The Norwegian Navy's submarines and corvettes already have cruise missiles that can reach all of Scandinavia. The ability to combat ships with ballistic missiles is also being developed, perhaps primarily driven by the Chinese desire to be able to combat American aircraft carriers in the Pacific.
From NATO's point of view, the defense of the High North involves two fundamental problems: preventing Russia from moving various types of weapons systems westward to protect the bases on the Kola Peninsula and thereby also increasing the possibilities of supporting its naval and air operations in the Norwegian Sea, and preventing Russia from being able to operate in the North Sea and the Atlantic.
Although the protection of the second-tier capability may be a strong incentive for Russia to expand the protection zone around bases and patrol areas, this is primarily a problem linked to a possible conflict with the United States. The need to protect the second-tier capability against NATO's European nuclear powers is limited. The latter do not have the ability to seriously threaten the Russian nuclear submarines and do not pose an existential threat to Russia that would justify initiating extensive military operations to protect the strategic nuclear weapons. However, the desire to be able to protect – or interrupt – sea and air links to Europe and Scandinavia will always exist in the event of a major conflict in Europe.
Europe's dependence on oil and gas from the Norwegian Sea should also be weighed into the calculation, both by Russia and NATO. Depending on the possibilities of replacing Norwegian oil and gas from elsewhere, for example from the Middle East, this factor could be part of a Russian calculation regarding the benefits of an attack in the High North. Here, a "land grab", for example occupying Spitsbergen with the aim of discrediting NATO as an alliance, could also be a factor that could be considered by the Russian side. However, here too the question arises - is such an action worth a possible war with NATO, and the threats that then arise to both the second-tier capability and the base complexes on the Kola Peninsula?
Another question from a defense and security policy perspective is to what extent a Russian attack in the High North, even in connection with a limited war in Europe, for example an attack on the Baltics, is a rational measure? Certainly, a Russian attack in the North could provide advantages in terms of supporting operations aimed at cutting off sea and air connections over the Norwegian Sea, the North Sea and possibly also the Atlantic. Something that would make it more difficult for NATO to transport reinforcements to Scandinavia and the Baltics. At the same time, such an attack would lead to counter-reactions from NATO such as submarine hunting in the Barents Sea and base control on the Kola Peninsula. Probably a situation that both Russia and NATO would probably want to avoid due to the risk of escalation that Russia could perceive as a threat to its second-tier capability.
A factor that Russian decision-makers also have to consider is the limitations associated with geography – few roads and long distances mean more extensive ground operations in the Arctic. This is especially true in light of the developments we are seeing in Ukraine regarding the use of drones and other long-range systems for combating ground targets.
The Russian analysis before a possible attack on the Arctic is not straightforward when it comes to weighing the pros and cons: an attack is likely to trigger countermeasures from NATO that could affect my second-strike capability; if I do not attack in the north, will NATO still attack my bases and combat forces in the area or not; does NATO have the resources and the will; will an attack in the north significantly increase my ability to cut off US sea and air links to Europe; is it necessary to block sea transport to Scandinavia in order to achieve success in the Baltics or elsewhere in Europe; do I have enough resources to conduct operations in the north at the same time as a larger operation in another direction?
Overall, is an attack on the High North itself a reason for Russia to start a war against NATO (with or without the US), or are the High North more to be considered as a direction of attack which only provides advantages, or alternatively creates a need for protection, linked to an attack in another direction? The latter would mean that it is more important to deter Russia from carrying out an attack in these other directions if our, NATO's, primary purpose is to deter war at all?
Baltic historical heritage, where both Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were previously parts of the Tsarist and later the Soviet empire, means that the revived Russian imperial ambitions constitute a tangible threat. In contrast to the motives for carrying out military operations in the High North, where the reasons are primarily based on military rationality, an attack on the Baltics would aim to conquer and retain territory. A successful Russian military operation directed at the Baltics would likely irreparably split NATO and the EU. There are three independent states that are members of both NATO and the EU, which would then be incorporated into Russia. The alliance's credibility as a guarantor of its members' security would be exhausted. Something that would make Russia a power factor in Europe. What this would mean for the EU economically and politically can only be speculated about.
The conditions for Russia to achieve decisive successes here in a short time are considerably greater than in the High North. The combined border of the Baltic states with Russia/Belarus is approximately 1700 kilometers. The border is crossed by more than fifty roads. The freedom of action to choose attack directions is great and thus also the defender's problem of having sufficient resources available to be seized where the enemy might attack. Likewise, the geographical depth, from the border areas to the Baltic Sea coast, is small, mainly between 300 and 400 kilometers.
The Baltic states' own forces and the near-term presence of allied states can be roughly summarized as follows: Estonia has two brigades and an allied battalion battle group plus a fairly extensive territorial defense organization; Latvia has its own brigade and four territorial defense battle groups with a total of about 12,000 soldiers plus an allied reduced brigade; Lithuania has its own three brigades and a German battalion battle group that is about to develop into a full brigade. All countries are undergoing extensive rearmament and modernization programs, all of which have the goal of allocating about 5 percent of GDP to defense by 2026.
The aim is to organise a division, consisting of national and international forces, in each country by around 2030. The current Allied battle groups are growing to brigade size, but with parts of the units being rotated between the Baltic States and their home countries at regular intervals. However, the German brigade in Lithuania is to be permanently stationed at full strength from 2028.
Even a very rough comparison of forces between what could be initially grouped in the Baltic states in a situation where no more extensive reinforcements have yet been added, and what Russia could dispose of for an attack, indicates that the need for reinforcements from NATO allies will be great. An armistice, or peace agreement, in Ukraine would mean that Russia, after a year or so of preparations, would be able to dispose of in the order of ten divisions for a military operation against the Baltics. This compares with perhaps just over three NATO divisions. Although the units' equipment, training position, morale, etc. play a major role - it is impossible to ignore numbers.
If we try to weigh up the Russian incentives and the possibilities of using military force to achieve political goals in the Nordic-Baltic region, it is difficult to come to any other conclusion than that NATO's most pressing deterrence needs are in the Baltics. At least if the aim is to make the main, perhaps only, cause of war in the region a less attractive reason to start a war.
This is not to say that the High North can be neglected; the alliance also needs a warfare capability there, but not primarily for deterrence purposes but to be able to meet an attack that is a function of the failure of deterrence in the Baltics or elsewhere in Europe.
Here, one might intuitively think that the deterrence need in the Baltics should be able to be solved by Germany and Poland. In both cases, countries that are building up a powerful ground combat capability that could be utilized to contribute to the defense of the Baltics.
The problem is the difficulty of passing through the Suwalki Gap, that is, the 60-kilometer border between Lithuania and Poland. The entire gap can be reached by artillery and drones from both Kaliningrad and Belarus. Bringing thousands of vehicles and tens of thousands of soldiers that way without taking the areas from which these systems can operate appears to be a very dubious option in light of the experience from the war in Ukraine. This means that large parts of the Kaliningrad exclave and also parts of Belarusian territory must be taken before substantial Allied forces can act in the Baltics. The problem is partly similar when it comes to carrying out more extensive air operations from Central Europe. The risk is great that large parts of the Baltics will be lost before Allied help can take effect.
It is unlikely that only longer-distance reinforcements via the Baltic Sea or to a lesser extent by air transport, for example from the UK and France (possibly the US), would solve the problem. This is for two reasons: it takes a long time for them to arrive in the Baltic Sea area, months, months, and the number of units that can be captured will also be limited. France expects to be able to operate abroad with a division around 2028, the UK also with a division around 2030 (possibly two divisions if large additional financial resources are provided). Furthermore, there is nothing to say that all these resources will be earmarked for operations in our part of the world.
Overall, there are strong reasons for the current Defence Committee to consider how Sweden could contribute to increasing the alliance's deterrence capability in the Baltics. This would likely be the measure with which Sweden could contribute most to the alliance's deterrence capability – acting as a deterrent to war – in the Nordic-Baltic region. Although Finland has an impressive defense force in many respects, we should also consider how Sweden could support Finland in a more protracted conflict. In the Baltic case, it is obvious that our ability to act on the other side of the Baltic Sea is insufficient. This applies above all to the possibilities of being able to intervene early with substantial resources. This applies to the possibilities of acting with airborne systems, contributing with ground combat forces, and maintaining necessary connections across the Baltic Sea.
The author is Major General (PA), former Vice President of the Swedish National Defense University, Operations Leader Milo Mitt, Brigade Commander, etc. He is a member of KKrVA.
Footnote
[1] By attack scenario here we mean: where and how an attacker would attack NATO, and thus also Sweden, in the event of a war in our immediate area. It could, for example, be an attack with the aim of taking the Baltic Sea outlets or all or parts of the North Sea.