Books for Better Defense – September 2021

Every month in 2021, David Bergman, Carl Bergqvist, Andreas Braw and Tobias Christensson will present literature that is recommended for reading. In addition, a specially invited person with an interesting career and experience will participate on each occasion. This time, Major General Karlis Neretnieks.

This will hopefully mean an interesting mix of non-fiction, fiction, memoirs, biographies and historical accounts that can contribute to the spread of knowledge and motivation for more reading within the Armed Forces. Reading is not a solution to everything, but it can help avoid old mistakes, broaden our knowledge, create intellectual challenges and make us better equipped for the demands of a possible war.

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Tobias Christensson recommends:

David Hackworth, Julie Sherman, About face: the odyssey of an American warrior
Number of pages: 875, Language: English

Shortly after the end of World War II, David Hackworth, aged just 15, enlisted in the US Army using false identity papers. This was to be the start of a long and interesting military career, and in the book About Face (p(written with Julie Sherman) Hackworth tells his story.

Hackworth climbed the military career ladder mainly based on experience and practical knowledge. He started as a soldier in Trieste in the aftermath of World War I but was then deployed to the Korean War. During his two periods there he was promoted to sergeant and group commander, to ensign, to lieutenant and finally to captain and company commander. After the Korean War, a short civilian period followed, but in 1956 Hackworth returned to the army. This was followed by a number of positions where he, among other things, participated in the reinforcements sent to Berlin in connection with the crisis of 1961. Hackworth then volunteered for Vietnam where he served, among other things, as battalion commander. After being promoted to colonel in 1971, Hackworth took part in an interview in which he strongly criticized the American leadership for their mistakes in the Vietnam War. This was not well received by the higher-ups and angry, disappointed and disillusioned he ended his military career to write books, among other things. David Hackworth died in 2005 and is buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

Hackworth was a controversial figure. As a reader of his book, I have a mixed opinion of him and he certainly gives the impression of both complacency and buffoonery. He committed repeated misconduct, he stole, broke rules and in the book expresses a rather sleazy view of women. At the same time, he was honest, militarily innovative, energetic and demonstrated genuine concern for the soldiers he commanded. Hackworth was awarded around 90 medals (including 10 Silver Stars, 8 Purple Hearts and 2 Distinguished Service Crosses) and was undoubtedly a very capable leader and warrior.

A common perception of the Vietnam War is that the US won the battles but lost the war. According to Hackworth, this is incorrect and the book highlights extensive tactical mistakes that led to thousands of deaths in just random combat. According to Hackworth, there was too much distance between American leadership and training and the war that was actually fought, and experiences from the field were not taken into account. Officers generally served too short a time in their positions to be able to implement changes, and many also saw their service only as a career step. This meant that American warfare was characterized by too much conventional thinking that was not suitable for guerrilla warfare. Basically, the reasoning is about the importance of adapting methods and implementing necessary changes at the right time, which is also recognizable from other wars and conflicts.

When Hackworth himself took command of the 4th Battalion of the 38th Infantry Regiment, he implemented drastic changes. It was soldiers, not helicopters and technical gadgets, that would win the war. The battalion thus implemented its own guerrilla tactics in which the Viet Cong would be defeated using their own methods. Surprise, deception, imagination, mobility and terrain knowledge were the watchwords and the companies specialized in specific methods such as fire assault and fighting in depth with smaller units and snipers. The battalion's unconventional methods combined with superior firepower were documented as successful. Despite this, the changes were not implemented on a broad front within the army and Hackworth felt that his ideas were not being heard.

About face is packed with interesting and thought-provoking experiences. Many times I stop while reading to think about how I myself would have acted in a certain situation or in what way these experiences are valid today. With over 800 pages, the book is very comprehensive and covers most of the things between the firing squad and the Pentagon. The stated purpose of the book was to improve the army and it therefore contains sharp criticism of great things such as officer training, military leadership, career paths and the military industry, but also of individuals who Hackworth believed did not do their job well enough. Sometimes there is a feeling of "everyone is wrong except Hackworth" and it can then be difficult to put your finger on what the real problem was. Despite this, the book is very readable from both a military and historical perspective. Hackworth put practical knowledge at the center and the book is definitely written from the warrior's perspective.

History has shown that the mavericks – the Jacksons, Grants, Pattons – whom peacetime shunted aside, were the ones who could wage and win the wars the dancers and prancers had bungled in the opening rounds; it is high time this wartime cycle of lost opportunity and waste, which invariably is measured in the lives of young men, be broken.^[1]

For those who would like a further summary of About Face It is discussed in episodes 2, 249 and 250 of the podcast "Jocko Podcast” with Jocko Willick who also wrote the foreword to the latest edition of the book.

Not

[1] Hackworth, David H. & Sherman, Julie, About face: [the odyssey of an American warrior], Paperback edition, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1989, p. 822.

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David Bergman recommends:

Bo Hugemark, The story of Operation Garbo
https://timbro.se/app/uploads/2017/01/berattelsen-om-operation-garbo.pdf
Number of pages: 36, Language: Swedish

September 4th recently passed. The date when the Soviet Union attacks Sweden in the fictional world that is treated in Operation Garbo. Most of those reading these book recommendations have most likely already read the somewhat cult trilogy. Many, like me, have probably read it in their youth but reread it at regular intervals. Nowadays it is still interesting, but for slightly different reasons. A book that many have missed is Bo Hugemark's "The Story of Operation Garbo", which was published by Timbro in 2009. It contains several parts worth thinking about, and which may provide a new perspective for the event that you choose to reread the books.

I will swear by the church right away and say that the trilogy is not a literary masterpiece from a linguistic perspective. Even the authors, in reflecting on the collaboration between themselves, admit that the text is not at all as unified as one could have wished. What it did, however, succeed in extremely successfully is to capture something that no one had done before in a Swedish context. When it came out, it was relatively (if not completely) alone in its genre. But there are several other aspects that probably contributed to its success.

Above all, the books are a good example of what fiction can achieve where other forms cannot. Hugemark vividly describes how difficult it was to get a sensible debate about Sweden's security and defense. The rational arguments that non-fiction and debate articles could put forward were simply not something that the target group could absorb. But what fiction can do is create a context with characters that we can bring to life for our inner selves and whose situation we can relate to. Books that manage to hit this "something" that lies beneath the surface in the social debate are often the ones that become successful.

Another relevant issue is the choice of the authors to write under a pseudonym. The main reason highlighted was a pronounced fear and a reminder of how low the ceiling was in the defense debate. All of the trio of authors had in some way been reprimanded for having thought “wrong” even in issues where there is no absolute right or wrong and which clearly need to be discussed. Something that would be recognized a generation later with anonymous defense blogs. That people feel compelled to write under a pseudonym for fear of reprisals is not new and unfortunately just as sad whenever it happens.

A less universal lesson that actually still makes me smile is the authors' description of how to write a book: "There is only one way to write a book, and that is to get started and write a book." This is in line with the English saying "A writer is someone who writes" and emphasizes that it is both easy and difficult to write a book. But regardless, there is only one way to get there. Hopefully, it can help aspiring writers along the way to take up the baton.

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Carl Bergqvist recommends:

Ann Scott Tyson, American Spartan
Number of pages: 400, Language: English

Now, a few weeks after the fall of the Afghan government and the Taliban takeover, the question on many lips is how this could happen so quickly and why 20 years of intervention in Afghanistan could not go further. There is no simple answer to these questions, but lack of strategy was definitely a big factor. When the strategy is bad, it doesn't matter much if you win most of the battles on the battlefield.

In Sweden, there is a perception that American soldiers in particular are poor at understanding their operational environment and cultural factors in what we in Sweden (less thoughtfully) have chosen to call international operations. That may be true, but at the same time there are American units that have embedding with domestic units in an area of ​​operation as a specialty, in which case a high degree of cultural understanding is required if one is to be successful. The clearest example is the American Army Special Forces with these different Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA).

American Spartan is written by American journalist Ann Scott Tyson with a background as a war correspondent and Pentagon reporter. In 2010, she took a leave of absence from the Washington Post to go to Afghanistan and be with the then head of ODA 316, whom she had met the year before. Gant had previously written a highly acclaimed paper on a new strategy for Afghanistan, One Tribe at a Time, which received very strong support from General David Petraeus, among others. Gant had been in Afghanistan in 2003–2004 and then a number of tours in Iraq and had come to have second thoughts about how the US could best wage an irregular war.

I American Spartan Scott Tyson describes Major Gant's unconventional methods where he and his squad really "go native" and thereby gain great success. Both against the Taliban, but also in the trust of the local tribes. However, it is not a sunny story and it is not for nothing that Gant was subsequently compared to Colonel Kurtz in the film Apocalypse NowAt the same time, Gant has also been called a “Lawrence of Afghanistan”.

After 22 months in Afghanistan, it comes to an abrupt end. During that time, Gant has had Scott Tyson living with him as "his wife", has abused both alcohol and painkillers, used very unconventional methods - but at the same time achieved great success that has led to him being held up as an example by both high-ranking managers and American politicians. A complaint from a newly minted lieutenant about misconduct in the unit leads to extensive investigations, which ends with Gant being demoted and finally dismissed.

So after the rapid collapse of the Afghan army and the rapid fall of the government, American Spartan an interesting perspective on the American strategy in Afghanistan, although of course it is not comprehensive or the whole truth. The book also gives an insight into the culture in Afghanistan and why people fight or do not fight, as well as how they view honor and justice, which in many cases stands in stark contrast to Western perspectives and values. American Spartan is an interesting story about morality, conviction, leadership and culture.

In addition to the book, it is also interesting to read later interviews with Gant and General Petraeus, such as this report by ABC News.

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Andreas Braw recommends:

John Bolton, The room where it happened
Number of pages: 577, Language: English

John Bolton has long been one of America's most high-profile neoconservative politicians. As such, he has advocated a tougher foreign policy, primarily against Iran but also against other states.

Many, including John Bolton himself, were surprised when Donald Trump appointed Bolton as national security adviser. He succeeded General HR McMaster, who succeeded the disgraced former General Michael Flynn. Of course, Bolton was just another in a series of ministers, advisers and officials that Trump absorbed, favored, grew to resent and eventually got rid of. Bolton was not allowed to serve more than 453 days in the position.

The room where it happened is a compilation of Bolton's memories and reflections from the White House, often with a sarcastic undertone. The book is thus a good opportunity to gain insight into how foreign and security policy is created and implemented. With Trump's almost parodic carelessness and total nihilism in foreign policy, the book becomes farcical. But there is much to learn from it. Although the childishness, the twists and turns and Trump's narcissism are embarrassing to read about, that is how security policy was created! Other governments will have a different inner life, but there will also be other problems and tensions. Even in Swedish governments, factional battles arise.

Bolton is hardly Trump's harshest critic, even though they almost always have opposing views. Instead, he seems almost astonished that Trump's entire political idea is to secure his election victory in the next election. Trump asks foreign heads of state for help ("I need help getting the farmers' votes, can you buy American soybeans?"), always rewards blind loyalty over competence, and is sensitive to any kind of criticism. He is obsessed with what people think of him. The group dynamics in the administration are chaotic at best, and conflict is something Trump encourages. The "generals," that is, the former military men in the administration minus Michael Flynn, get several blows from Bolton, who seems to think their idealism and moralism towards Trump was stupid and naive.

Why then should you read? The room where it happened? I think it should be read to understand how politics at the highest level works, when it works at its worst. Bolton certainly exaggerates a bit (Secretary of State Mike Pompeo says the book is “full of lies,” which only makes it even more exciting), and the group around Donald Trump is certainly not representative of how other countries’ governments work. But these are people who made decisions that the entire world needed to relate to and, in turn, counter with its own decisions. When our century is summed up, I wouldn’t be surprised if a possible paradigm shift in security policy will be traced back to Donald Trump.

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Karlis Neretnieks recommends:

Martin van Creveld, Fighting power: German and US army performance, 1939-1945
Number of pages: 198, Language: English

When I was asked if I could recommend a book that could spark thought in someone who is currently involved in the development of the Swedish Armed Forces, I replied – no problem. It turned out to be a bit hasty.

I thought about a whole bunch of good books I've read about security policy, operations, tactics, organization, logistics, leadership, individual experiences, technology. I also considered some works of fiction. But how to choose just one?

The Taliban solved my problem. Why do some units fight better than others, even though in quantifiable terms the odds are heavily against them? The Six-Day War of 1967, the October War of 1973, Vietnam of 1975 – Afghanistan is no exception.

The Armed Forces are in the midst of a process of increasing, in some respects recreating, the ability to wage war. We buy artillery pieces, submarines, aircraft and much more. But no matter how much we arm ourselves, we will in most situations be the numerically inferior party, materially and personnel-wise. There is therefore reason to ask how much thought and resources we are putting into creating structures, methods and a culture that would give us officers and soldiers whose practical ability and way of thinking and acting could partly offset this imbalance? What factors are important there?

There is a book that in my opinion stands out here both in terms of clarity and analytical sharpness, Fighting Power by Martin van Creveld, an Israeli professor of military history. A book that many have probably already read. The latter is no excuse not to read it again, however. I myself have read it three times, when I served in the army staff, when I was a brigade commander and when I was the principal of FHS. Each time with increasing enjoyment. Or to put it another way, the more experience and more knowledge I gathered, the wiser the thoughts in the book appeared.

For those of you who haven't read the book, or have forgotten.

The book is an analysis of why German units generally had significantly higher fighting power than American units during World War II, despite the fact that the German units were often numerically inferior and poorly equipped.

van Creveld attempts to answer the question by trying to identify and analyze whether differences between German and American military thinking could be the explanation. Where he sees such differences, the question naturally becomes, is there something we should take into account in our work to recreate the ability for national defense – to be able to successfully wage war?

Here are some of the areas where van Creveld sees differences which, in his opinion, significantly affected German and American capabilities.

There was a clear difference between the views on war as a phenomenon. In the German case, the battle was seen as a series of largely unpredictable events that had to be quickly handled as they occurred. Something that affected both tactics and organization, but above all the role of the leader at all levels, i.e. gave a very strong emphasis on qualities such as initiative, improvisational ability and willingness to take responsibility. In the American case, the battle was seen more as an industrial process that could be planned in detail and where the role of the individual was to solve a fairly well-defined task as best as possible. van Creveld makes an interesting comparison here between the American and German regulations where he shows how subtle, almost imperceptible, differences in otherwise similar writings indicate these different views, and thus also the differences in what was expected of leaders at different levels.

van Creveld devotes a lot of space to describing and analyzing how the organizations tried to get the kind of officers they wanted. He compares, among other things, how selection and training differed in the German and American armed forces. The question of how to distribute personnel, officers as well as "other ranks", between different functions and how this affected the organization's combat value is also analyzed in a thought-provoking way.

The book also highlights the two countries' grading systems, and the qualities that were rewarded there. It also makes comparisons between the size of the staffs, their working methods and how they were staffed.

The handling of various incentives is also discussed, for example the view on the awarding of (bravery) medals, and leave, and how it likely affected the motivation of the personnel and thus the morale of the units. This is also an area where the principles differed between the German and American armed forces.

In conclusion. It is a book that shows how to translate, probably timeless, experiences into concrete, obviously successful, measures. Perhaps something to keep in mind when the new Armed Forces are to be created.

"Strategy is a system of expedients. It is more than a science. It is bringing knowledge to bear on practical life, the further elaboration of an original guiding idea under constantly changing circumstances.” Helmut von Moltke d.ä.

"In war, moral power is to physical as three parts out of four." Napoleon Bonaparte.

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Recommended books

Allen, John R., Hodges, Ben & Lindley-French, Julian, Future war and the defense of Europe, Oxford university press, Oxford, 2021.
Agrell, Wilhelm, Stig Wennerström: the myth of a Swedish spy master, First edition, Appell Publishing, Stockholm, 2020.
Lee, Peter, Reaper force: The Inside Story of Britain's Drone Wars, John Blake Publishing, London, 2019.
Seierstad, Åsne, The Bookseller in Kabul, [New ed.], MånPocket, Stockholm, 2003.
Hegar, Mary Jennings, Shoot Like a Girl, Penguin USA, 2018.

Previously recommended books:

 

Tobias Christensson (editor of the post) is a major at the Southern Skåne Regiment, P 7. He is currently completing the Senior Officer Program at FHS.
David Bergman is a major and doctor in psychology and a member of KKrVA.
Carl Bergqvist is a lieutenant colonel and head of the development section at the Air Staff. He is a member of KKrVA and KÖMS and owner of the blog Wiseman's Wisdoms.
Andreas Braw is a captain and platoon commander in the Armed Forces.
Karlis Neretnieks is a major general and has previously served as rector of the Swedish National Defence University. He is a member of KKrVA.