British General and former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Sir Richard Shirreff, gave a very interesting lecture on the ongoing war in Ukraine to an audience of around eighty on 23 March. This was a joint event between the Swedish National Defence College and the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and was held in the school's auditorium, the Sverigesalen.

Sir Richard began by pointing out that the war against Ukraine began in March 2014 and that the Russian president's intentions were made clear in a speech he gave in the Kremlin that month, where he expressed the view that the most appropriate solution for Eastern Europe was a new Yalta, which meant incorporating these countries under Russian suzerainty. The aim is thus Ukrainian subjugation, annexation of the eastern parts of the country and the Black Sea coast, and the installation of a puppet regime in a so-called rump state. [1] controlled by Moscow. The Kremlin can then turn its sights on other former Soviet republics such as Moldova, Georgia, as well as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with the ambition of neutralizing NATO and disengagement of the United States from its European security commitment.

The general's perception of the situation at the time the lecture was given was that Russia had not succeeded in accordance with its intentions. The blitzkrieg was not successful, which is why we are seeing a transition to a war of attrition. The misjudgment is related to:

  • An underestimation of the will to resist and the capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
  • An overestimation of the capabilities and effectiveness of the Russian military.
  • An underestimation of the reactions of the international community.

The Russian units have not managed to capture a number of important strategic cities where the majority are now engaged/tied. For success, additional units need to be added, resources that the general expressed doubts about were available. The question then arises whether we are approaching the Russian culmination point at the same time as the country is losing the information war, which risks having negative consequences for its own public opinion. There is then a risk that Putin will create problems elsewhere, which could be an attack on some NATO territory, an attack with chemical or biological weapons or a nuclear escalation with the aim of deescalating the conflict.

At the same time, Sir Richard warned against taking the Russian incapacity shown so far for granted and as a source of future assessments. The chaotic historical experiences from Operation Barbarossa in 1941 quickly changed to its opposite, however, with changing morale in the units. The daily record regarding the latter is a clearly poor morale in the Russian units. However, there are question marks regarding the Ukrainian ability to achieve significant tactical exhaustion of the Russian units. However, to achieve decisive effect, the Ukrainian forces need to carry out counter-offensives at the operational level.

What likely outcomes are discernible?

In the best case scenario, Russia loses, followed by a ceasefire and withdrawal from Ukrainian territory, resulting in the collapse of the Putin regime. Ukraine regains occupied territories from Russia, and a massive aid effort from the international community follows to rebuild damaged infrastructure and the country's economy.

In the worst case scenario, Ukraine is defeated and subjected to Moscow's rule, including the annexation of the eastern parts of the country and the Black Sea coastline, a puppet government is installed in Kiev and the country becomes a so-called rump state. This includes a violent guerrilla war. After that, Putin can turn his attention to NATO territory, with war with the Western defense alliance as a result.

In the most likely case, a war of attrition will take place to the point of pain for both the attacker and the defender, with a ceasefire agreement being reached. Russia will retain as much of the eastern part of the country as possible, as well as the southern coast. Zelenskyy's government will retain power in what remains of Ukraine. The implications of such a solution could be a resistance movement in occupied territory and a deterrent force from NATO between the Baltic and Black Seas.

Finally, what can NATO and the West do according to Sir Richard Shirreff? Firstly. Continued support for Ukraine both with military equipment and humanitarian aid. Secondly. No no-fly zone was recommended unless NATO is prepared to go to war with Russia, which could be nuclear. Thirdly. Reinforce the alliance's eastern flank with forces that have the ability to deter. Fourthly. Inform and educate the people of our societies about the real threat of war and make them aware that the only way to maintain peace is to prepare for war. Fifthly. Prepare for a protracted conflict and rebuild the military capabilities that have been neglected for decades on our continent. Sixthly. Be honest about NATO's shortcomings in waging war and see to it that this is changed. Sixthly. Do not expect rationality from an autocracy, which means that the only language such a regime understands is the language of power.

The rapporteur is a lieutenant colonel, member of KKrVA and editor of its Proceedings and Journal.
Photo: Göran Pettersson

Not

[1] A state that has lost large parts of its territory through war or secession but survives.