With 2,000 years of examples behind us we have no excuse when fighting, for not fighting well.
E Lawrence[1]
Things are not going well for Russia. After the Ukrainian counter-offensives in northern Ukraine in the fall, Russian forces have not carried out any major offensive operations. Despite months of trying, they have not yet taken Bakhmut, a strategically insignificant city after Ukraine's offensive around Kharkiv. According to Ukrainian sources, Russia has lost eight thousand soldiers in its attempts to take Bakhmut over the past month and a half.[2] The Russian mobilization that took place during the fall does not seem to have led to an increased offensive capacity, but only to more Russian soldiers killed and captured. US Defense Chief Milley stated on November 100,000 that more than XNUMX Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded since the invasion.[3]
Since February 24, Russia has escalated the war on several occasions, including through “artillery attacks in Donbass, Russian mobilization, illegal annexations, and a state of emergency in four Oblasts, probable sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, and massive attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.”[4] According to the Atlantic Council, this had two purposes: to achieve advantages on the battlefield, and to break the Ukrainian will. Both have failed.[5]
Putin's new general in Ukraine since October 8, Sergei Surovikin, was previously responsible for Russian bombing of civilians in Syria. Both Kadyrov, the dictator-on-pardon in Chechnya, and Prigozhin, the increasingly visible head of the Wagner Group, have praised the appointment.[6] In addition to his role as commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, Surovikin remains commander of the Russian Air and Space Forces, which may explain some of the new Russian tactics used this fall.
Since his appointment, Russia has systematically focused on degrading and destroying Ukraine's energy sector and infrastructure. Attacks with cruise missiles and patrol boats have increased significantly, and RUSI describes several potential reasons for the new tactics: Russia wants to force Ukraine to protect its home front, limit the possibilities for offensive operations, and force Ukraine to the negotiating table.[7]
So far, Russian tactics have not succeeded, and as I argued in mid-August, Ukraine can emerge victorious from the war – if support from the West continues.[8]
On November 11, the day after General Milley reported on the enormous Russian losses, the Ukrainian flag once again flew over Kherson, the only regional capital that Russian forces had managed to occupy since February. Ukrainian forces, after their successful offensive in southern Ukraine, have now forced Russian forces back east of the Dnieper. Putin’s press spokesman Peskov, in an attempt to distance Putin from this loss of prestige, said that the decision to withdraw from Kherson was entirely up to Defense Minister Shoigu and Surovikin.[9] On September 30, in a ceremony in the Kremlin, Putin formalized the annexation of, among other things, Kherson, claiming that the annexed territories and their citizens now belonged to Russia “forever.”[10] Forever turned out to be forty-two days. Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser, described the loss of Kherson as “the biggest geopolitical loss for Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.”[11]
From the Russian side, it was not meant to be this way. On February 27, three days after the invasion, former Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Andrei Fedorov said that Putin's initial order was that the "special military operation" would be completed by March 2.[12]
The Russian failures since the full-scale invasion are too numerous to describe in one article. But with the appointment of Sergei Surovikin, it is worth examining one central aspect of Russian warfare and its particular failures – the air force.
Russian Air Force Tactics in Ukraine
Three months into the invasion, Philip Payson O'Brien and Edward Stringer observed in The Atlantic that Russian air power had failed in Ukraine. They called the Russian air power's failures "perhaps the most important, and least discussed" aspect of the entire war.[13]
The authors describe the Russian modernization of the air force as “mostly for show,” and Russia “wasted money and energy on corruption and inefficiency.”[14] According to Payson O'Brien and Stringer, the air force suffers from poor logistics and unrealistic exercises. Like much of the rest of the Russian military, it lacks flexibility and has been used mainly to support the army or bomb civilian infrastructure.
Despite this, the authors can state that the single biggest factor in the Russian failure is the Ukrainian resistance, which they describe as cohesive, creative and inventive. They conclude their article by stating that Ukraine may not be able to win the war, but that they have revolutionized how the next war will play out.
A more detailed and in-depth analysis was released last week by The Royal United Service Institute (RUSI), which in its report "The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence" reviews how the Russian air forces have performed and how Ukraine has fought back.[15]
The report describes how Russia used significantly more attack aircraft at the beginning of the invasion than previous analyses have claimed and was successful in Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) in the initial stage.[16] Russian fighter jets have been technologically and numerically superior and close to the front line Russian fighter jets have been very effective, particularly the SU-35S and Mig31-BM. At the same time, Russian ground-based air defences, Ground Based Air Defences (GBAD), have been successful, particularly the S-400 SAM system supported by the '48Ya6' Podlet-K1.[17] During the first week of the invasion, Russian troops used telewarfare to disrupt Ukrainian GBAD, S-300, and SA-11 BUK in northern Ukraine.[18]
We will return to why, despite the above-mentioned factors, Russia never managed to establish air dominance over Ukraine.
Russian cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and patrol robots in Ukraine
The Russian use of ballistic and cruise missiles has gone through several different stages since the invasion. During the first three months, Russia fired over two thousand different cruise missiles into Ukraine, often in groups of 4–12 at a time. The most common types were the 3M-54 Kalibr, Kh-101, Kh-55, and Kh-555. The Russian missiles are estimated to have hit within 3–10 meters of their intended targets, if not affected by Ukrainian telewar.[19]
During the first three days of the invasion, the aim was to degrade or destroy Ukrainian air defense capabilities, permanent radar stations, fixed air defenses, command posts, air bases, and ammunition depots. However, on the same day of the invasion, Ukrainian mobile air defense units were able to regroup and thus escape combat.[20]
Thanks to Ukrainian countermeasures from mid-March, only cruise and ballistic missiles were able to strike deep into Ukraine. From June, Russia changed tactics and struck fuel storage facilities, oil refineries, and railway infrastructure. However, this did not have the effect that was hoped for, as Ukraine managed to reorganize and regroup its air defense to better protect against missiles. In March and April, Ukrainian air defense shot down about 20-30 percent of the missiles. By mid-June, it shot down almost 50-60 percent.[21] By using several different types of air defense systems, Ukraine was able to place S-300 systems closer to cities to protect against all types of cruise missiles, something the systems have proven to be “very effective” against. Especially when combined with data from Ukrainian or partner country sensors.[22]
Due to the lack of Russian industrial capacity and Western sanctions, the number of Russian missiles fired from June to September decreased compared to the first months of the war. Combined with Ukrainian improvements in its air defenses, the Russian ability to strike in depth was hampered, leading to several “significant measures” by the Russian military leadership.[23]
Among other things, several types of missiles began to be fired at Ukrainian targets. Older missiles such as the Kh-22 were used to a greater extent, but also new missiles such as the P-800 anti-ship missile. Since it is not optimized for ground targets, it not only has reduced accuracy but can also go to the wrong target when activated.[24] Another measure Russia took in July was the purchase of Iranian Shahed-136 patrol missiles with a warhead of 20-40 kilograms. The first attack with the system came in September.[25]
On October 136, days after General Surovikin was appointed head of the “special military operation” in Ukraine, Russia’s new strategy in Ukraine began. Cruise and ballistic missiles rained down on Ukraine, including Kyiv. The attack was combined with about a dozen Shahed-XNUMXs. The new strategy of “depriving the Ukrainian civilian population of light and heat as winter approaches through large-scale attacks on infrastructure” had begun.[26] Since then, several strikes against “power stations, infrastructure and facilities” have been carried out using the Shahed-136, while more expensive missiles such as the Kh-101, Kalibr and 9M723 Iskander have been used against larger infrastructure targets. So far, over 400 Shaed-136s have been used since mid-September.[27] Under the leadership of General Surovikin, the new strategy is to use more expensive missiles along with patrol drones to systematically attack civilian electrical infrastructure. While the report notes that the new tactic is unlikely to change the outcome on the battlefield, it does create major problems for Ukraine, which in turn places new demands on Ukrainian air defense capabilities.[28]
Lessons learned and the future
Despite the fact that Russia had a “clear quantitative and qualitative” advantage over the Ukrainian Air Force before the invasion in February, they have never managed to establish air superiority.[29]
Why?
From early March, just a few weeks into the invasion, Russian aircraft were forced to fly at low altitudes, failing to conduct SEAD over time as Ukrainian SAM systems were dispersed and mobile.[30] At the same time, the presence of various types of MANPADS and other mobile air defense systems meant that Russian air operations beyond the front line became “prohibitively expensive” as early as March and ceased as early as April. In addition, Russian air operations have been mainly directed against predetermined targets using free-falling aerial bombs and rockets. The Kh-29 and Kh-59 have also been used against fixed targets.[31] Other limitations include the fact that Russian air defense units such as the SA-15 “TOR” and SA-17 “Buk” that were stationed in Ukraine lacked a functioning communications plan. They did not move in conjunction with the units they were supposed to protect and operated under restrictive ROE that meant they assumed everything that flew was Russian.[32]
The contrast with the Ukrainian solutions is striking. Among other things, Ukrainian soldiers use Kropyva, an app that can be installed on any Android tablet. The system links users on a large network where they can add Ukrainian and Russian forces. It is used both to call in artillery and air defense systems to complement the radar image. The Ukrainian air defense systems have a significantly better situational awareness than their Russian counterparts – even though they sometimes use basically the same system.[33]
Partly due to the above factors, Russian helicopters have suffered relatively heavy losses, with confirmed losses reported as eight Mi-24/35 “Hind”, six Mi-28 “Havoc”, and 23 Ka-52 “Alligator”. However, RUSI states that actual losses are “undoubtedly” higher.[34] The number of MANPADS available to the Ukrainian forces is cited as one of the main reasons, with the British Starstreak and the American Javelin reportedly being “particularly effective.”[35] Since April, Russian helicopters have therefore been used “extremely cautiously,” essentially as flying rocket artillery. Despite this, they continue to be regularly shot down by MANPADS, Javelin, and ATGM.[36]
In fact, as early as early March, the Atlantic Council was able to describe the losses of Russian air forces as “surprisingly high and unsustainable.” Among other things, because they had not even managed to create local air dominance over Kyiv.[37] The Ukrainian air defense was virtually unaffected and was thus able to inflict Russian losses from the first day of the invasion.[38]
Wetzel, in a commentary at the Atlantic Council, outlines some of the lessons that the United States (and thus by extension the West) should learn from the war. First, that the focus should be on finding and destroying mobile air defense systems, especially those with longer ranges.[39] Conversely, a lesson should be the importance of having a sufficient amount of mobile air defense, with different ranges to meet specific types of flying platforms.
Wetzel emphasizes the importance of counter-UAS and the recently introduced Shahad-136 reinforces his argument that we in the West must develop unique weapons, doctrines, tactics and training aimed at defeating smaller UAS and patrol drones. The expansion of UAS and the development of mobile technologically advanced air defense systems will make air superiority more difficult to achieve in the future. Wetzel also suggests the use of drone swarms, patrol drones, and autonomous airborne systems and highlights, among other things, how Ukraine has used the Turkish TB2 Bayraktar system. The war in Ukraine, Wetzel writes, provides a glimpse into a future where air warfare is conducted almost exclusively from a distance and where ISR and kinetic capabilities are on the same platform.
There are several reasons why the Russian invasion of Ukraine has failed.[40] Among the more well-known factors are the almost total absence of effective logistics, the Russian underestimation of the Ukrainian will to resist, the difference in leadership and planning at all levels of Russian and Ukrainian officers, and the Western support for Ukraine. Interestingly, Bronk, Reynolds and Watling in their RUSI report suggest that the JAS C/D Gripen is the flying platform that best meets Ukraine's operational needs. The authors cite the system's relative ease of maintenance, its ability to operate from dispersed bases similar to how Ukraine currently operates, the Meteor missile, and the Gripen's telewar capabilities.[41]
Among the lesser-known reasons is the Ukrainian struggle for air power. The wars of the future will be fought according to the lessons we learn from today. As this article has tried to demonstrate, but only scratched the surface, it is a struggle worth studying.