War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things: the decayed and degraded state of morals and patriotic feeling which thinks that nothing is worth a war, is much worse. When a people are used as mere human instruments for firing cannon or thrusting bayonets, in the service and for the selfish purposes of a master, such war degrades a people. A war to protect other human beings against tyrannical injustice; a war to give victory to their own ideas of right and good, and which is their own war, carried on for an honest purpose by their free choice, — is often the means of their regeneration.
John Stuart Mill, Dissertations and Discussions, The contest in America, 1862
'Things are only going to get worse for the occupier…'
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, September 24, 2023
At the end of July this year, I wrote that Ukraine had just begun “a long, complex and difficult operation to recapture Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian tactic of focusing on materiel over terrain may, on the surface, seem frustrating. It is slow but it is methodical and Russian materiel and personnel are being systematically combated.”[1] For Ukraine's international partners, Jack Watling wrote in RUSI, the summer would be "...deeply uncomfortable. Losses will mount and successes will take time."[2]
In the article I reminded that the Ukrainian offensive in Kherson took two months, and that the (then) nascent offensive faced a significantly more complex situation in southern Ukraine than the one in Kherson. The important thing for Ukraine was that the West continued to support the country.
Two months after I wrote this, it is now partly possible to evaluate what the Ukrainian offensive has achieved and what we can expect Ukraine to achieve ahead of the autumn and winter.
Gradual successes
Back in November 2022, I wrote that “..things are not going well for Russia.”[3] Russian forces had been unable to conduct any major offensive operations since the autumn, and despite months of attempts to capture Bakhmut, they had failed. The city, seemingly strategically insignificant, only fell to Russian forces around May 2023.[4] Today, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) estimates that Ukrainian forces launched a counteroffensive as early as June and have since tied up against two of Russia's four VDV divisions and three of the four separate brigades.[5] In mid-September, the 72nd Motorized Brigade was reportedly “completely annihilated” in battles with the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade in battles around Andriivka, a small village south of Bakhmut. Russian losses were reported to amount to over a thousand men.[6]
By keeping up the pressure around a city that lacks clear strategic value in itself, Ukraine has managed to tie down Russian troops that could otherwise have participated in the defense of Zaporizhia and Donetsk Oblast. ISW describes how Ukraine, by conducting several different operations in several directions at the same time, has forced the Russian military to “prioritize certain sectors of the front and carry out lateral movements that have created opportunities that Ukraine can exploit.”[7]
Michael Kofman, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment, has described Ukraine’s counteroffensive as “trending in a positive direction… Russia has constructed a defense in depth in southern Ukraine but has spent most of the counteroffensive not using it.”[8]
According to Viktor Kivliuk, a retired Ukrainian colonel and now at the Center for Defence Strategies think tank, Russian tactics have not exploited the defensive lines dug along the so-called Surovikin Line. Instead, they have repeatedly attempted to retake territory that Ukraine has regained through immediate counterattacks. Russian tactics have involved sacrificing men and equipment in order to slow down the Ukrainian advance.[9] Ironically, this may have been a tactic that suited Ukraine well, as they have mainly focused on:
...to combat Russian logistics, command posts, reconnaissance and artillery systems. Second, to force Russia to use its reserves, in order to identify weak points in the Russian lines. Third, to initially attack as widely as possible to increase flexibility in where the main force will be deployed, and to spread the Russian troops out and ensure that they cannot defend in depth.[10]
This is evident, among other things, in how Ukraine has continued to combat Russian artillery. On July 8, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense stated that it had knocked out 4346 different Russian artillery pieces,[11] on September 29 they stated that the number was 6409.[12]
The result of the Russian tactic was that the first line of defense was difficult to break through and has made it difficult for Ukraine to build momentum. But according to Michael Kofman, it has been a “costly strategy” and Ukrainian commanders have said they expect fewer minefields as they continue to advance south.[13]
It is perhaps therefore not surprising that in mid-September the British Ministry of Defence was able to report that Russia had begun to strengthen the defences around the city of Tokmak. Following the Ukrainian (local) breakthrough at Robotyne on the southern front, fighting is now continuing just north of Tokmak. The city is important to the Russian occupation as it is used as a railway junction and is a logical intermediate objective for Ukraine. In an interview with CNN on 23 September, Ukrainian General Oleksandr Tarnavsky, responsible for the counter-offensive in southern Ukraine, said that a breakthrough had been achieved around Verbove in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Although the advance was not as fast as had been hoped, he assessed that the “big breakthrough” could come after Ukrainian troops took Tokmak.[14] In the same interview, Tarnavsky stated that the minimum goal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive is to capture the city, even if the goal is to liberate all occupied territory.[15]
On September 17, the British Ministry of Defense wrote in an update on X (formerly Twitter) that Tokmak was being prepared to become the cornerstone of the Russian second line of defense, which would indicate concerns about Ukrainian tactical successes.[16]
Barely nine days later, on September 26, ISW assessed that the situation around Verbove was unclear, but Russian sources with connections to the Russian Airborne Forces claimed that Ukrainian troops controlled half of the town. Verbove is located about forty kilometers northeast of Tokmak. In the same report, ISW was able to report that Russian military bloggers (who generally tend to be better truth-tellers than the Kremlin) had written that Ukrainian troops were in the northern parts of Novoprokopivka, about twenty kilometers north of Tokmak.[17] The distance is consistent with what CNN previously reported on September 21.[18]
If Ukrainian forces manage to get to Tokmak, they could cut off the rail hub and strangle Russian logistics, which is largely dependent on rail. Russia has invested a lot of energy in building defensive positions around Tokmak for this very reason, and taking or cutting off the city will be a difficult task. But if Ukraine succeeds, they are only a little over sixty kilometers from Melitopol. That is within range of HIMARS.[19] If Melitopol can be reached, Ukraine could threaten to cut off the occupied southwestern parts of the country and the Crimean peninsula from Russian logistics.[20] It is worth remembering here that Crimea lacks its own water supply.
Continued offensive goals
A central objective of the Ukrainian offensive is to cut off Crimea from the rest of the occupied territories in southern Ukraine. Retired US General Ben Hodges has said that it is “obvious” that this is the goal of the offensive.[21] Hodges, in explaining the Ukrainian objectives to Newsweek in late August, said, “..it’s about decisive terrain. It’s about isolating Crimea and then moving enough long-range weapons forward to make the situation in Crimea untenable for the Russian navy and air force.”[22]
Jan Kallberg, Senior Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Analysis, pointed out in early September that Ukraine does not need to reach all the way to the Sea of Azov to cut off Russian lines of communication. By the time Ukrainian forces reach Melitopol, Russian options will have been “significantly affected” and Ukrainian troops do not need to reach the Sea of Azov before “logistics starts to break down on the Russian side.”[23]
The Ukrainian struggle is thus no longer about defending itself alone, or tying down Russian forces around Bakhmut, for example. The goal is to liberate all the occupied parts of the country. Ironically, the full-scale invasion has given Ukraine the best opportunity to liberate Crimea since the occupation in 2014. “It started with Crimea, and it will end with Crimea,” was Ukrainian President Zelensky’s message back in the summer of 2022.[24]
Hodges agrees. In his comments to Newsweek, he lists a number of reasons why Crimea is crucial for Ukraine – and Russia. If Crimea remains occupied, the area could be used by the Russian navy or air force to strike Ukrainian ports. The Ukrainian economy will be dependent on Russian goodwill as they can quickly strike Odessa, Kherson or Mykolaiv. Even if Berdiansk or Mariupol are liberated, Russia could control the Sea of Azov if it continues to occupy Crimea.[25]
As part of the larger operation to liberate the occupied territories of southern Ukraine, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been purposefully attacking military targets and installations around Crimea using patrol robots, kamikaze drones, British Storm Shadows and French SCALP-EG[26]Ukraine has also further developed its own missiles and in at least one case a modified R-360 Neptune anti-ship missile was reportedly used to knock out a Russian S-400 system in Crimea.[27] It was the same type of missile, in unmodified form, that is said to have knocked out the Russian cruiser Moskva in 2022.
Since the start of the counter-offensive, attacks on targets in Crimea have increased in number. In mid-September, the port of Sevastopol was attacked, where a large landing ship of Ropucha class, Minsk, and the submarine Rostov-on-Don, an attack submarine of Kilo-klass, should have been knocked out.[28]
The Black Sea Fleet headquarters was also attacked with British Storm Shadows, in an attack where Ukraine tried to knock out the commander of the Black Sea Fleet. At the time of writing, the outcome was unclear.[29] According to the New York Times, the goal of the attacks is part of Ukraine's campaign "to strike deep behind Russian lines with the aim of cutting off Moscow's logistical supplies and undermining Russia's ability to strike against Ukrainian territory."[30]
What Ukraine needs
In August 2022, I wrote that Ukraine “with the right equipment and support from the West, can win the war against Russia. It is now up to us in Europe, together with the United States, to prove that Western democracy, the European security order, and Ukraine’s independence are worth defending.”[31]
Retaking Crimea, “will be difficult, but is possible,” according to Dr. Scott Savitz of the American RAND Corporation.[32] By continuously attacking targets on the peninsula, it becomes militarily untenable for Russia to remain. One of the keys to liberating Crimea is continued Western support. The American ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) and the German TAURUS (long-range cruise missiles) are at the top of the list of capabilities in demand.[33] Phillips O'Brien, professor of Strategic Studies at the University of St Andrews, wrote back in March that long-range weapons needed to be a priority to "destroy Russian logistics, command, naval and air power..." rather than preparing Ukraine for a mechanized attack.[34]
It is therefore gratifying that the US decided at the end of September to send ATACMS to Ukraine. With a range of up to 300 km, they will be a much-needed addition to combat Russian positions in the occupied territories.[35]
Ukraine, which is currently waging a war of attrition against the Russian military, remains in need of support from the West. The attrition tactic “reflects a deliberate attempt to maintain Ukrainian forces and wear down Russian forces and materiel at the expense of territorial gains,”[36] takes time.
Meanwhile, Ukraine is using combined arms at a lower tactical level with RPAS linked to individual platoons working with artillery. By attacking on multiple fronts simultaneously, they are trying to overwhelm Russian forces, with smaller groups of infantry advancing supported by tanks and combat vehicles.[37]
Ukraine should, according to Major Robert Rose, see the offensive and the campaign of attrition as a larger part of a strategy of attrition in which Russia loses militarily, politically and economically in the long term since there is no "perfect alternative."[38]
This type of warfare is not something the West is used to. Outright strategic exhaustion and military attrition as a war-winning method has not been used since World War I. And although it may sometimes seem frustrating to the West, it has been successful. Ukraine has the initiative, they have adapted their warfare, been supplied with new equipment, and are moving south.
It is therefore time for the West and Ukraine's partners, as Nataliya Bugayova at ISW writes, to step up their military and diplomatic efforts and ensure that Ukraine can maintain its momentum.[39] In what can be seen as part of this, Britain recently confirmed its intention to send soldiers and officers to train Ukrainian forces in Ukraine.[40] and Ukraine is preparing for a long, brutal war.[41]
Sweden continues to have an important role here, and the support of various governments to Ukraine is commendable. But we can do more. Our security, the security of Europe, and Ukrainian lives depend on it.