On Monday, November 20, Ukrainian Army Chief Lieutenant General Serhiy Popko and three colleagues gave a picture of the development of the army forces in the country during the period 2014-2017. Thus, fresh experiences from a war against a stronger antagonist.
War experiences from Ukraine
by Tommy Jeppsson
The Swedish Hall was quite full when the Ukrainian Army Chief, Lieutenant General Serhiy Popko, together with his Swedish host, Major General Karl Engelbrektsson, visited the National Defense University, where the Ukrainian delegation gave those present a picture of the development of the army forces in the country during the period 2014–2017. Thus, fresh experiences from a war against a stronger antagonist.
It became clear that initial resistance to the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was weak, the cause of which could be sought to a large extent in the focus on international operations that had dominated for a number of years. This had made the Ukrainian Armed Forces incapable of meeting the hybrid operation concept that the Russians applied. Experience of large-scale, multifaceted operations was thus lacking. This was also contributed to by the fact that commanders and soldiers showed a reluctance to engage in armed struggle against the invading Russian forces, the cause of which can at least partly be traced to a mentality that had developed during training for international operations.
The shortcomings on the Ukrainian side were both too small unit volumes and an insufficient level of training, as well as material deficiencies which together reduced the ability to fight with versatile units at both the tactical and operational levels. Thus, a question of the balance between qualitative and quantitative, where it was clear that numbers continue to be relevant.
A conclusion that could be drawn from the lecture and that has been drawn several times before was linked to the truth that several wars have demonstrated, namely that when the quality factors of training/exercise, materiel and volume increase, the operational ambitions can be raised to a significant degree and the opponent's capability is reduced. Achieving this during an ongoing war is of course more difficult than if the capability had been developed in peace, while few if any wars have escaped "transformation under fire". As always, one of the dark sides of war is the loss of human life and casualties. So far, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have lost 2 killed and 500 wounded.
Since the fighting began, Ukraine has significantly expanded its defense forces. The army is strongly dominant, while the air force and navy can be seen as support functions for land operations. An extensive modernization program is being implemented with the aim of the country's combat forces achieving NATO standards, including interoperability with NATO countries, while the country's strategy document clearly states an aspiration to become a member of the Atlantic alliance. The realism of the latter can be questioned given the Kremlin's position on the issue and the caution of NATO countries in response. On the other hand, the force buildup seems to have proceeded relatively well, which has been greatly facilitated by a qualified defense industry that has been able to meet most of the needs.
Regarding ground forces, the following units have been newly established:
- Two mechanized brigades
- Four motorized infantry brigades
- A mountain brigade
- Three artillery brigades
During the question period, the view emerged clearly that the brigade level is absolutely crucial for achieving maximum effect from so-called combined arms.
In 2016, a joint operational command for all combat forces and four operational commands for territorial command were organized. The ground combat component is divided into:
- Reaction forces
- Follow-up forces
- Reserve forces
This division illustrates the need for both volume and reserves in war. The latter are needed to achieve success or avoid defeat.
In connection with the initial period of weakness in 2014 as well as during the force buildup, the expansion of fortifications/strong defensive positions has been a priority area, the results of which can be seen in the form of a stabilization of the military situation. The strong expansion of the army's mechanized capabilities should reasonably aim to achieve increased mobility in combat. The focus on artillery and rocket artillery also demonstrates once again the truth of the crucial importance of indirect fire.
The overall conclusion of the meeting demonstrates the validity of a number of so-called old truths which, although they can be derived far back in time, have proven to hold true in the past as well as in the present. They in turn generate the partial conclusion that changes without thorough impact analyses can easily lead to mistakes.
The rapporteur is a lieutenant colonel, member of KKrVA and editor of its Proceedings and Journal.