Sweden's membership NATO has contributed to a better security policy environment in Europe. Integration has proceeded smoothly with a focus on delivering defense benefits. The good news in the Defense Committee's interim report Heightened situation – current situation in the total defense and the outside world, However, it goes hand in hand with the bad. Therefore, it is premature.
Russia has neither given up its goal of forcibly subjugating Ukraine nor its desire to establish a sphere of influence in Europe. Hybrid warfare is escalating and increasingly risk-taking. The report warns of the possibility that, under favorable political circumstances, the Russians may choose to test the viability of NATO's Article 5 – that is, an attack on one member is considered an attack on all.
The Defense Committee (FB) also has no hope that Russia after Putin will be anything other than Russia under Putin.
Between the lines it is clear Moreover, NATO is like Schrödinger's cat. The alliance both exists and does not exist. Certainly, military cooperation is ongoing, and it is assured that the United States is both committed to Article 5 and that the nuclear umbrella is kept extended over Europe.
But nobody knows what tomorrow holds.
The US is a key ally for Sweden and the report praises bilateral military cooperation. At the same time, Trump's policies are captured with expressions such as "unpredictable", "transactionalism" and "harsher rhetoric". The wording is wrapped up but the warning subtext shines in neon.
The FB emphasizes the need for a new burden-sharing in NATO, which should lead to Europe taking the main responsibility for conventional defense while the US remains as the nuclear guarantor. But the US is therefore not to be trusted.
FB writes about the important role that the EU plays in Ukraine's survival and the ongoing work on a security strategy for Europe, but not much else.
It is certainly stated that Sweden should actively participate when the EU develops its policy portfolio, but more in-depth reasoning would be needed than that. Not least, it concerns economic security, such as investment and export controls, customs policy and conflicts with American tech giants. These are areas where the EU is in conflict with the US.
The war organization and the war units are the focus of the development of the military defense. This is obvious against the background of both the security situation and commitments to NATO. However, the FB has little to say about what is the decisive test of the implementation of the policy. That is, how the operational capability of the military defense develops.
Total defense has been strengthened but in a forced rearmament process there is a lot to be managed – and preferably in the right way. An insight into the complexity is given in the report Follow-up of the implementation of the Total Defence Decision 2025 from the Swedish Agency for Total Defence Analysis. MFTA has identified approximately 600 positions in the Defence Decision 2025–2030, which have then been followed by government decisions addressed to the authorities with requirements for implementation.
Based on the annual reports for 2025, an examination has been made of how the various authorities in the total defence have worked on the various decisions. For the authorities in the military defence, high activity is noted in just over half of the cases and some activity in a quarter. In the remaining cases, it is unclear what has been done.
MFTA has also analyzed traceability, i.e. the follow-up information provided by the military authorities. Only just under a third is considered good, limited in almost half of the cases and otherwise insufficient.
Previously, total defense was characterized by a lack of money and plenty of time. Now the opposite is true. Nevertheless, it is important to also keep track. The analysis is an ongoing effort to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that the billions allocated are used in a way that achieves the goals and that this is done in a cost-effective manner.
So there certainly is There is much to look forward to when the Federal Assembly presents its regular report this autumn. This also applies to the issue of the Arctic, whose increased security and military importance is rightly highlighted. Unfortunately, nothing is said about the need for a new research icebreaker. That is, an icebreaker that the government did not include in its recent Arctic strategy. The Oden has served Sweden well but needs to dock after almost 40 years.
I Serious times for Sweden FB 2024 pointed out the seriousness of the situation after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The tightened situation makes it clear that the situation has not become safer since then. It is good that it is stated that the path to increased security for Sweden is through a stronger total defense, integration into NATO and that Russia does not win in Ukraine.
It is stated that: “With Russia as a looming threat and the transatlantic link in flux, Europe needs to strengthen both its defense capabilities, competitiveness and geopolitical role.” In short, it is needed a broader discussion about how Europe should be able to defend itself on its own.
And it should also take place outside the closed room of the preparation.