The Soviet Union is not now nor will it be during the next decade in the throes of a true systemic crisis, for it boasts enormous unused reserves of political and social stability that are sufficient to endure the deepest difficulties. The Soviet economy, like any gigantic economy administered by intelligent and trained professionals, will not go bankrupt. It may become less effective, it may stagnate, it may even experience an absolute decline for a year or two; but, like the political system, it will not collapse.
- Seweryn Bialer & Joan Afferica, 1982 in Foreign Affairs
At the time of writing, it has been almost a hundred days since Donald Trump became President of the United States again. Since then, the war in Ukraine has continued, with no signs of abating. Russia continues to mercilessly murder civilian women and children. On Palm Sunday, two missiles hit Sumy. At least 34 people died and 117 were injured.[1] It is just one in a series of continuing Russian war crimes and the single worst attack on Ukrainian civilians since 2023, according to Ukrainian authorities.[2]
The previous agreement not to attack each other's energy infrastructure has not led to any lasting results – according to Ukraine, Russia has launched more than thirty attacks on energy infrastructure in the country since the agreement in March.[3] The agreement was seen as a first step towards potential peace talks. Ukraine has accepted US proposals for a broader ceasefire, while Russia has blocked potential progress by placing additional demands on Ukraine.
Today, the war continues along a thousand-kilometer front.
The Kremlin claimed in mid-April that there is still no clear plan for a Russian-American agreement on Ukraine, but that the “political will is there.”[4]
It is of utmost importance here to highlight what Russia sees as a potential agreement, or what Putin considers an acceptable peace. In mid-March, Putin and Trump discussed Ukraine by phone, with, for those who have followed the Kremlin line since before the war began, predictable results.
Putin repeated his demands on Ukraine that he has held since the beginning of the invasion. At the same time, he accused Ukraine of committing “barbaric terrorist crimes” in Kursk. One of the main demands from the Russian side is that all Western support for Ukraine cease.[5]
Russia continues to de facto demand that Ukraine be transformed into a vassal state. The Kremlin is believed to be hoping that the US will withdraw from Ukraine and move closer to Russia – “The best outcome for Putin is that he achieves his goals in Ukraine and can normalize relations with the US,” according to Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a former US intelligence officer and now an analyst at the Center for a New American Century.[6]
Trump, who has made no secret of his disdain for Ukrainian President Zelensky, chose to scold him in front of the world press in late February when he visited the White House. Trump threatened Zelensky – “accept a deal, or we’ll pull out. If we pull out, you’ll have to fight and it won’t be pretty…”[7]
An analysis in the New York Times at the end of April found that although Trump has “warmly embraced” the Kremlin, little has been received in return, despite Putin’s alleged willingness to negotiate.[8] Not only has Russia continued to bomb civilian Ukrainian targets, but Putin has also suggested that Ukraine should be temporarily governed by the UN, and that new elections should be held. Trump, in response to Putin, therefore warned Russia – “if Russia and I are unable to make a deal to stop the bloodshed in Ukraine, and I believe that it is Russia’s fault – which it doesn’t have to be – but if I believe it was Russia’s fault, then I will impose secondary sanctions on Russian oil, on all oil from Russia.”[9]
If we ignore the fact that Russia unilaterally invaded Ukraine in complete violation of applicable international law and order, the message from the US appears to be scattered. Trump has never unilaterally condemned Russia or Putin. Russia's continued demands for Ukraine include, among other things, that the "root causes" of the war cease, which according to Russia include NATO's expansion eastward and demands that Ukraine remain "neutral" and that a pro-Russian regime be installed in Kyiv.[10]
The fact is that at this point (mid-April 2025), we do not know exactly how the Trump administration will act. Conflicting messages from various individuals in the administration provide an overall unclear picture.
On the one hand, it is a fact that the current administration “appears to be the most pro-Russian in decades”[11], and questions are rising about whether it is prepared to punish the Kremlin. At the same time, it may be that “we are moving closer to a tipping point where Trump understands that Putin is not interested in any agreements and instead keeps putting new demands on the negotiating table,” according to Stefan Meister, a Russia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin.[12]
On April 18, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio finally threatened that “if it is not possible to end the war in Ukraine, we will move on. We need to determine very quickly, and I mean within a couple of days, whether it is feasible or not.”[13] According to an American government official, this will mean reviewing what the United States should do next – “it's time to get serious.”[14]
The same government official explained that this means that the US could be forced to make “significant policy decisions.” However, it is unclear what exactly this means, as Trump has threatened Russia with potential sanctions, while also saying that the US will not fund Ukraine “indefinitely, and that Europe must get more involved.”[15]
On X (formerly Twitter), Journalist Michael Weiss has listed a number of unanswered questions about what could happen when and if the US withdraws from negotiations.[16] Even if the US were to stop providing military aid packages to Ukraine, would Ukraine be able to buy American equipment? Are European countries allowed to buy American equipment and donate it to Ukraine? Could Trump try to lift US sanctions on Russia, and what would Congress say? What difference does it make when Europe is discussing strengthening current sanctions? Moreover, it is not guaranteed that Russia would immediately see tangible positive effects. American imports from Russia were only ten percent in 2024 of what they were before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but have never been more than $40 billion in the past 14 years.[17]
Weiss concludes by stating that Europe cannot be easily sidelined; and this at the same time as Ukraine's independence grows. Ukraine currently produces just over forty percent of its own military equipment.[18] Along with growing European realism regarding the need for strategic autonomy, the US's ability to unilaterally force Ukraine, or Europe, into concessions to Russia is diminishing.
However, on a positive note for Ukraine, given the country’s relationship with the US, a previously cancelled mineral agreement appears to have been revived and could be close to being signed. Ukrainian Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko has described that “there is a lot of work to be done, but the pace and the great progress made make us believe that the document will be very beneficial for both countries.”[19]
But even if the US and Ukraine reach an agreement, the elephant in the room remains. Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine continues, despite heroic efforts from Ukraine. US support for Ukraine currently appears frozen, and with an increasing focus on the Pacific, China and Taiwan, the US is likely to turn its attention away from Europe.
This is the current situation, and has really always been, Europe's war.
At the end of March, European ministers agreed that Europe must be fully capable of defending itself against Russia by 2030. Poland's Donald Tusk noted that the five-year timeline is in line with the analysis made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. At present, it is assumed that it will not be until 2030 that Russia will be able to rebuild the offensive capabilities it lost (and is losing daily) in Ukraine.[20]
At the same time, EU countries will support Ukraine with over €23 billion in 2025[21], and the EU is preparing a seventeenth package of sanctions against Russia.[22]
A potential schism between the EU and a more Russia-friendly US therefore appears not inevitable, but a definite possibility. The choices that Europe and the EU make now become decisive. The question is what should be done.
I want to highlight the thesis I put forward at the end of January[23]:
"Could it be that it is actually the West, and Ukraine, that benefits from dragging out the war, thereby wearing down the Russian economy and its military power?"
The short answer is the same as I stated in the same article – “I would argue that this is the case – while support for Ukraine must continue, deepen, and the supply of military equipment must increase.”
At the end of February, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) released a report stating that the problems facing Russia during the year offer an opportunity to secure crucial concessions.
ISW concludes its report by saying that Russia will likely have to deal with material and manpower constraints and a deteriorating economy in the coming months. All of these factors will limit Russia's ability to wage war against Ukraine in the medium to long term – if Russia continues to suffer losses at the current rate. [24]
Limitations in the Russian military industry make Russian losses unsustainable in the long term (something I have previously discussed, among other things) here Oh here). As early as November, Marc R. DeVore wrote in Foreign Policy that Russia “will not be able to continue the war beyond late 2025, when the country will begin to run out of crucial weapons systems.”[25]
Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported in early February that Russia has lost 10,000 tanks in Ukraine since February 2022. The Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) has estimated that Russia has lost 1400 tanks – in 2024 alone. The Russian military industry cannot build new tanks, combat vehicles and artillery pieces at the same rate that Ukraine is knocking them out.[26] The same military-industrial complex cannot produce enough ammunition in the medium and long term. ISW claims that Russia’s previous artillery advantage over Ukraine has been decimated, from 5:1 in the past to 2024:1.5 in December 1. And the trend is not positive for Russia (although the use of drones may be a factor). Between December 2024 and February 2025, North Korea is said to have accounted for sixty percent of all artillery ammunition used by Russia.
Russia also appears to be struggling to recruit enough soldiers to maintain the current pace of offensive operations. By mid-April, according to Ukrainian sources, Russia had suffered close to 940,000 personnel losses. In January 2025 alone, Russia is said to have suffered over 48,000 personnel losses. Russia can no longer recruit from prisons, as there are no prisoners to recruit, and in at least one Oblast, the governor has lobbied to reduce their recruitment quota.[27]
Last but not least, the Russian economy is in worse shape than the Kremlin can openly admit. The increased inflation may have been known for some time, but the Russian State Investment Fund shrank by twenty-four percent in 2024. Between January 2024 and January 2025, the Russian budget deficit increased more than tenfold. ISW states that some economists predict that Russia’s liquid reserves will run out in the fall of 2025.
Although Putin reportedly admitted that inflation in Russia is 9,9 percent, the real figure is probably higher – the price of butter rose by almost 30 percent in 2024, the price of potatoes by 56 percent. The shortage of labor (unemployment is said to be 2,3 percent according to Ukrainian sources) hampers potential growth for domestic industry, and for the Russian military.
There are thus great opportunities to exploit Russian weaknesses. Putin may be lying, but the macroeconomic factors clearly show that Russia cannot continue the war forever.
There is room for Europe to act and play a central role, something that the previous American (and German) administrations seem to have shied away from. But today, European support for Ukraine appears more robust than ever. Minna Ålander, at Chatham House and CEPA, among others, explains that over the past three years, Ukraine’s role in Europe has fundamentally changed. In 2014, Ålander writes, the annexation of the Crimean peninsula gave Europe a “sense of inconvenience” while Ukraine is now seen as absolutely central to European security; According to EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Ukraine could become a member of the EU before 2030. [28]
In an article published in early March, Ålander proposed four concrete measures for what Europe and partner countries (Great Britain, Norway, Canada, etc.) can do to demonstrate credibility towards Ukraine, Russia and the United States.
First, provide Ukraine with sufficient and credible financial support – even if the US withdraws completely. An addition here could be to release the confiscated Russian assets and give them to Ukraine.
Second, free the European defense industry from bureaucratic obstacles, offer more long-term contracts, and combine current support for Ukraine with a long-term plan for European rearmament.
The third proposal is in the same vein, where European companies should join forces with Ukrainian companies. The aim is to support Ukraine in the short term but to build a long-term military-industrial base.
The fourth proposal is that Europe simply must invest in the Ukrainian defense sector. National (or “local”) production capacity for Ukraine is of central importance for the country’s own credibility, but also when it comes to reducing dependence on others.
Barely two weeks after Ålander's article, the EU Commission presented "ReArm Europe", a project which aims to "unleash" the European defense industry with the help of €800 billion in defense investments.[29] The aim is for member states to purchase equipment together and increase interoperability between countries. European companies will be given priority, and Ukraine will be able to participate in the procurement. This is an excellent first step.
In an increasingly uncertain world where the US administration’s attitude towards Europe is cool to say the least, European strategic autonomy (which includes Ukraine) is crucial. If Europe wants to, we can afford to support Ukraine. Europe should strengthen sanctions against Russia, unilaterally if necessary, demand that the “Russian question” be raised in discussions with China, and be clear that the requirement for doing business within the EU is that you do not do business in Russia. Russian citizens could be banned from entering Europe, and embassies forced to reduce their staff.
Europe has the means to act, with or without the US. If we are to stand alone, we must stand alone strong.