Conversation: Lars-Erik Lundin and Lars Wedin | 2026-05-27 | Zoom | KKrVA

Sweden has a food self-sufficiency rate of about 50 percent. Gotland must be replenished with supplies daily. More than 90 percent of what we import is transported by sea. And 95 percent of the world's data traffic — including Swedish banking transactions, the military's communication systems, and the healthcare industry's digital infrastructure — runs on fiber cables on the seabed.

It receives too little attention in the political debate, which still thinks mainly about territorial defense, border protection and invasion scenarios when it talks about security.

That was the starting point for a conversation between Lars-Erik Lundin and the member and commander (PA) Lars Wedin — honorary doctor at the Swedish National Defense University, associate member of the Académie de marine in Paris and one of the few Swedish analysts who has worked with flow security as a strategic concept for decades.

A concept that changes what we must defend

Flow security is not just about shipping. It is about the flows that carry the prosperity and functioning of modern society: energy flows, data flows, trade flows, and military mobility. Wedin’s analytical distinction is important: flow security does not ask whether we have assets — it asks whether the system that delivers them can be weaponized.

The difference from territorial security is fundamental. Territorial security protects a geographical space. Flow security protects a functional system — and that system has nodes and bottlenecks that are outside the jurisdiction and control of any single state.

Wedin identifies three global commons: space, cyberspace, and the sea. All three are domains where flows cannot be protected by a single state, and where disruption of flows has disproportionate consequences for societies accustomed to taking them for granted. To make this clear, concrete examples are needed — and there is no shortage of them.

The Baltic Sea bottom: an active battlefield

More than 4,000 AIS-equipped ships pass through the Baltic Sea every day — approximately 60,000 passages per year. Combined with the Baltic Sea’s relatively shallow waters, this creates a specific vulnerability profile for the cables and pipelines that run along the seabed.

Gas and oil pipelines: Baltic Pipe (Norwegian gas to Poland), Nordic Offshore Pipeline (20 percent of energy supply in Skåne, Halland and Västra Götaland). Electrical connections: Baltic Cable (Sweden–Germany), Estlink-2 (Finland–Estonia), Gotland Cables. Data cables: transatlantic and trans-European fiber networks.

Nordstream I and II were blown up in September 2022 — the only confirmed case of state-sponsored sabotage of large-scale European energy infrastructure. Baltic Connector was damaged in October 2023. Estlink-2 was damaged in December 2024. In November 2024, the Arelion/Cinia cable and BCS East-1 were damaged in what the EU assessed as likely coordinated 'deliberate hostile acts.'

The pattern for 2022–2026 is a gradual escalation. Wedin calls it 'preparatory fieldwork' — systematic mapping, testing response times and proof-of-concept for future sabotage. Who is responsible for Baltic Sea bottom surveillance? The Coast Guard, the Armed Forces, NATO? The answer for 2026 is still unclear.

The Houthis: the textbook on asymmetric maritime influence

On November 19, 2023, Houthi commandos stormed the Galaxy Leader in the Red Sea. It was the starting point of a campaign that by October 2024 had reached 193 ships attacked. Suez Canal traffic fell by 50 percent; container freight rates rose by 450 percent. A non-state actor disrupted 12 percent of world trade with relatively simple means.

Wedin points out that the Houthi strategy was not primarily aimed at sinking ships — it was aimed at creating fear, establishing global attention, and forcing a political response. It is asymmetric maritime influence: minimal military cost, maximum economic outcome.

The situation also exposed the interconnectedness of flow domains. Data cables in the Red Sea were damaged by a sinking ship during the conflict. A maritime disruption not only affects trade flows — it simultaneously affects data flows.

Sweden's capacity deficit

Sweden has 572 merchant ships. 121 of them fly the Swedish flag. None of them are container ships.

It is a political and strategic choice with concrete consequences. Only ships under the Swedish flag can be requisitioned in war or in the event of a threat of war. Operation Aspides, the EU's maritime protection operation in the Red Sea, was established in February 2024. France, Germany, Italy and Belgium contributed ships. Sweden contributed a staff officer — in the absence of relevant naval capacity.

It is not a question of will. It is a question of capacity. But the result is the same: Sweden is absent from an operation that protects the trade flows on which the entire Swedish economy depends.

What this requires

The recognition that flow security is a matter of total defense and not maritime policy. The recognition that the Baltic Sea bottom is an active battlefield — not a hypothetical threat. And then concrete measures: a clear mandate for Baltic Sea bottom surveillance (Coast Guard, Armed Forces and NATO in cooperation), a strategy for the Swedish merchant flag, and an active contribution to the maritime dimension of NB8 cooperation.

The question for Sweden today is not whether flow security is important. It is whether there is political will to transform the insight into prioritization.

 

 

 

A comprehensive maritime security strategy for Sweden

In a concluding conversation between Lars-Erik Lundin and Lars Wedin, the need for a Swedish maritime security strategy is discussed - and how it links to the EU's upcoming comprehensive security strategy.

STARTING POINT

The EU has had a maritime security strategy for a long time. The final report from the latest project states that Sweden also needs one – as a component of the new European security strategy and to strengthen Swedish flow security.

Definition

A maritime strategy is the science and art of maneuvering (power) means within the maritime domain with the aim of contributing to achieving the goals set by the state authorities.

 

THREE COMPONENTS OF A MARITIME STRATEGY

•  Value creation (economic-social). State support for maritime industries – the EU's "blue economy": shipping, fishing, biochemical industry, etc. The goal is the greatest possible benefit within strict environmental requirements.

•  Resource creation (infrastructure). Shipyard capacity, ports and training. Sweden currently lacks shipyards that can build ships over 100 meters – hence the frigate purchase from France. Recruitment and training for the blue sector is central.

•  Security creation (marine strategy). The Navy and the Coast Guard should be strategically seen as a unit, as their tasks overlap depending on the situation.

FIRST ACTION

Create a coordinating structure within the state administration that works across the entire maritime spectrum. The 2012 report on “maritime authorities” pointed out the need: all authorities with maritime connections must pull in the same direction. Today, such a superstructure is missing – work is done in silos.

CONCLUSION

A Swedish maritime security strategy should rest on the three pillars of value creation, resource creation and security creation – and the first concrete action is to establish a coordinating authority structure.

Source: Conversation between Lars-Erik Lundin and Lars Wedin, closing discussion.

 

Sources

  • Wedin, Lars. “Flow safety — a concept for our time.” Proceedings and Journal of the Royal Swedish Academy of Military Sciences, January 2025.
  • EU: A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. Council of the European Union, March 2022.
  • NATO: Strategic Concept 2022. NATO, June 2022.
  • European Commission: EU Action Plan for Cable Security. 2024.
  • SvD/DN/Omni: Reporting on Nordstream (Sept 2022), Baltic Connector (Oct 2023), Estlink-2 (Dec 2024), Arelion/Cinia (Nov 2024).
  • Government: Decision on expanded Coast Guard jurisdiction (ISM package), February 2026.
  • Wedin Lars: The sea and its strategy, kkrva Stockholm 2025

 

Lars Erik Lundin