This post is the result of a coincidence. Last summer I searched for a quote that I thought was originally in the 1942 Defense Decision, which was the case.
Regarding the manner in which the investigation work was conducted, the Defence Inquiry has stated that it has not found reason, as has generally been the case in previous investigations of the same nature, to have in-depth strategic investigations carried out and to base its proposal on them. For the purpose in question (this defense decision), it seemed sufficient to establish as a principle that our defense organization should receive the highest possible quality".
The similarities between the security policy situation of the time and today are striking. The need to strengthen the defense was then as evident as now. Something that led me to the question, what were people thinking back then – the last time we carried out a radical rearmament?
While reading, I was struck by four things, compared to today's preparations/defense decisions: the then extremely much higher degree of detailed control, the considerably greater breadth of involved data providers, the detailed justifications for various proposals and the short times from decision to implementation. Also striking were the very thorough reasoning regarding the organization's personnel, number, training, salaries, recruitment, positions, etc.
The purpose of this post is no more profound than to get the readers of the blog to spend a moment poring over the 1942 defense decision themselves. A fascinating document of the time about how attempts were made to increase Sweden's defense capabilities.
The post is therefore designed as some "appetizers" which hopefully entice the reader to follow the link at the end and read more. Text in italics is verbatim quotes copied directly from the bill/defense decision.
The breadth of the decision-making basis
Here are some of the authorities that have been asked to comment on the proposals in the inquiry. In the text that follows, it is also clear that the views of the "implementers" on various issues have been taken into account when drafting the bill.
"On the proposal of the defense inquiry, statements have been requested from the following authorities, etc., namely the Commander-in-Chief of the National Defense Forces, the Chief of the Army after hearing the commanders of the first, second, third and fourth army divisions, the Chief of the Upper Norrland troops and the military commander on Gotland, the Chief of the Navy after hearing the commanders of the East Coast and South Coast naval districts, the Chief of the Coastal Fleet and the Inspector of Coastal Artillery, the Chief of the Air Force, the Army Administration, the Navy Administration, the Aviation Administration, the State Treasury with regard to pension issues, ....." etc.
A question that arises is: what competence did the committee have to balance conflicting interests between different parts of the Armed Forces? At the same time, the system was partially “short-circuited” to ensure that the views of the implementation level could be taken into account. Not an entirely simple balancing act.
Operational and tactical reasoning
To justify changes in the organization, the decision contains fairly extensive operational and tactical reasoning with references to experiences from the ongoing World War and Sweden's own assessments.
"The access to armored troops also gives the other (Swedish) army corps the opportunity to an offensive approach, without which successful defense would not be possible. The repelling of attacks across the coast or border often seemed to us to take the character of quickly launched counterattacks. In order for the counterattack units to be able to intervene in time, they had to be very mobile; therefore, motorized and bicycle brigades were well suited for the purpose. But only when the counterattack group also included armored units of sufficient strength, did the counterattack gain the force and weight required for its rapid implementation.”
"In a combat action, where decisive action was sought, the artillery would usually be used of decisive importance. This applied not least to the artillery of larger caliber, with which the enemy's artillery was fought off or held down. The supply of such artillery, united in corps units, would at present be too small within our army to meet the need."
As for the Navy, the following statements in the 1942 decision can be considered to have stood the test of time quite well until the end of the Cold War, with the adaptations that more modern technology, such as robots, entailed. The major deviation is the closure of the destroyer system due to the budget cuts of the 70s and 80s. How will the reasoning in the 2024 defense decision look in connection with entry into NATO?
"The active and passive air defense of the individual ships should be strengthened, i.e. the number of anti-aircraft guns should be increased and the protection of the ship's vital parts against bombs and bomb fragments should be increased. Both of these measures essentially entailed an increase in the size of the ship compared to the size that, without increased consideration of the air hazard, had been considered sufficient to carry certain armament, certain machinery, etc. In addition, air forces should supplement the operations of the warships in a more decisive way than through reconnaissance alone. Interaction and intimate cooperation between naval and air forces appeared to be an increasingly obvious necessity."
"Commander Strömbäck has further stated that the offensive surface combat forces, which could be acquired within a limited period of time and with our limited resources and which could be considered suitable to best fulfill the additional tasks in the new naval defense system, would be of three different but complementary types, namely: cruisers, destroyers and torpedo boats. Ships of these different types should not be grouped together in tactical formations as a rule, but in a number of operational groups, each comprising a cruiser and destroyers and torpedo boats, to which should be added as a reserve and for independent tasks outside the operational groups (reconnaissance, submarine hunting, air surveillance, etc.) a number of destroyers and torpedo boats."
The arguments about the role and potential of the air force are extensive and lead to the conclusion that considerable investment in air defense is required. This applies to both the defense of the population, infrastructure and the country's own combat forces. Here is a brief excerpt.
"The experiences so far from the great power war in terms of air warfare against the homeland could of course not be directly transferred to the relationship between a great power and a small state. However, it could be said that, if both the active and passive defense were well-organized and as strong as the resources allowed, there was a chance that air warfare against the homeland would become a time-consuming and uncertain operation and that the solution would instead be sought in purely military operations."
A Swedish air force must primarily possess such strength that it could, with some prospect of success and together with the air defense, engage in combat with the enemy's air forces. It must also be capable of directly supporting the land and naval forces in their operations with sufficient strength.”
The working methodology seems to have been that the preparation, based on existing organization, previous defense decisions and investigations, war experiences, operational and tactical analyses, developed a preliminary plan for how the Armed Forces should develop. This preliminary plan has then been referred to various authorities and organizational units. Below are excerpts from the investigation's report of some of the referral responses. Not entirely unexpected answers for someone who has participated in various types of balancing processes in the Armed Forces – the same then as now – everyone wants more.
“In some respects, the head of The army has proposed reinforcements of the army's war organization, including an increase in the number of fighter brigades, an increase in the corps artillery and the introduction of assault artillery. These proposals have also led to demands for an expansion of the peace organization, partly in the form of cadre increases and partly by establishing an additional artillery corps.
"The Chief of the Navy has further made a very firm demand on a fighter aircraft flotilla intended for cooperation with the naval forces (primarily the coastal fleet) and the torpedo aircraft flotilla, in addition to those proposed by the defense inquiry.”
"The question of the future status of the Air Force has been taken up for consideration by the head of the East Coast Naval District, who has advocated a division of the air force into two parts, each constituting a branch of the army and navy, and maintaining the commonality only in terms of material procurement and certain parts of training.”
(Excerpt from the Commander-in-Chief's reply) The proposed new defence order was so extremely complex that — despite the admirable work done by the investigators — it was not possible, even where cooperation had taken place with the military authorities, to penetrate all the organisational details sufficiently thoroughly, neither with regard to their structure nor to their costs. It will undoubtedly become apparent during the work on the implementation of the defence order that several questionable gaps were found in addition to those already known, and that in certain cases a super-organisation or unnecessarily costly arrangements had been proposed. It would therefore be highly desirable that — not only with regard to the war organisation but also with regard to the peace organisation — the Riksdag would avoid as much as possible from now determining details.”
Civil authorities also had opinions.
"On the other hand, the county administrative board in Gothenburg and Bohus counties has raised objections to the preparation of a plan for organizational work for as long as five years, stating that the county administrative board for its part would have considered it more necessary, given our dangerous situation during the World War, that plans had now been drawn up for the defense arrangements that, with the utmost effort, could have been undertaken immediately or within the next year."
After the presentation of what various consultation bodies have considered about the proposal, there is a fairly extensive discussion of why A should be prioritized before B, costs, how long it takes to introduce different systems, etc. Something that then leads to concrete proposals regarding, for example, prioritizing different ship types.
Military command
An important part of the design of a military organization is how it should be led. The committee discussed extensively how the top management should be designed. Below is part of the committee's reasoning about centralization versus decentralization, with an interesting psychological angle on why responsibility for the implementation of an operation should not be linked directly to the Commander-in-Chief. The committee also considered ÖB health.
"The size of the Defence Staff could be significantly reduced in this alternative, whereby the working methods of this central staff had to become considerably more streamlined in favour of increased speed and efficiency in handling the essential issues. The heads of the defence branches became responsible in everything to the commander-in-chief for the war preparation work of their defence branches, operationally, personnel, materially and in terms of training. The experience and expertise that a head of the defence branch must be considered to have regarding his own defence branch in the event of a proper selection of personnel, seemed, in combination with the prominent position of responsibility that such a head of the defence branch would assume in this alternative, to ensure that the operational war preparation work became more effective in the decentralisation of this work proposed in this alternative than in alternative I."
"So for example, it would be out of general "From a psychological and also political point of view, it would be happier if, in the event of a possible failure at any stage of the war, an intermediate authority had to take the full and complete consequences of this, than if the commander-in-chief, as the direct commander, had to take such consequences and a change took place during a critical stage of the war in this extraordinarily prominent position in the national defense."
"However, it was important to ensure that the holder of this important office is not already in peace exhausted and consumed by extensive administrative routine work.”
For those interested in operational and strategic management issues, I highly recommend pages 110-130 (in the linked edition). There, principled arguments are presented that are largely timeless.
Detailed control
When it is discussed today to what extent the state authorities do not engage in too much detailed control, perhaps the following directions in the 1942 defense decision may prompt some reflection (and gratitude for the freedom of action that the Armed Forces still have today).
The bill specifies the personnel framework for the Skåne Armored Regiment.
Defend Selected Mj Kn Lt/Fk Fj Serg Fu Krp 1 1 4 14 21 14 20 89 43
Here's what the committee thought about what qualifications a company commander should have.
"Regarding the distribution of training commands among different command categories, the investigation has, "Using mainly the calculation principles used at the time by the 1930 Defence Commission, company commanders (equivalent) have been placed as captains (riding masters), company adjutants (equivalent) as ensigns (juniors), platoon commanders (equivalent) to two-thirds as subaltern officers and to one-third as sergeants, platoon commanders' deputies to one-third as sergeants and to two-thirds as quartermasters, and group commanders as quartermasters and corporals. As a rule, a captain (riding master) should be placed as the head of a platoon commander's school."
The investigation provides lengthy and very comprehensive reasoning about the training, promotion dates, salaries and numerical needs of the various command categories (officers, non-commissioned officers, reserve officers, etc.), taking into account the growing war organization and experiences gained so far from the ongoing rearmament.
Here's how the investigation considered how basic officer training should be structured.
"It is therefore proposed that the officer cadet should complete recruit school, preparatory platoon commander school, platoon commander school and officer cadet school in the same way as those who would become conscript officers. However, the officer cadet school must be completed by the officer cadet on the winter line with regard to continued education. After completing the officer cadet school, the officer cadet should complete troop service as a platoon commander's deputy (equivalent) for 5 months and then for 1 month (regimental exercise) as a rule as a platoon commander (equivalent). After the end of the regimental exercise, the officer cadet, who had the necessary qualifications for this, should be ordered to an officer course common to all troop types at the war school."
According to the investigation, the proposal would entail the following changes to the education at the Military Academy (Karlberg).
"According to the current organization of the military academy, most students had completed about 16 months of service before being commissioned to the school. With the proposed system, officer candidates will receive a commission to an officer course at the military academy after 30 months of service at the earliest. This meant that a significant part of the officer training (largely the first year of military academy) was shifted from the military academy to the officer candidate schools. With this in mind, it seemed that the teaching time at the military academy could be limited to about 2,000 hours or 11 months (including breaks)."
The committee also did not hesitate to engage in detailed calculations regarding command and competence needs linked to its proposals. Here, the War College.
“Ordinary staff with a salary (fee) from the school's state. 1 commander, colonel, 1 adjutant, captain or cavalry master, 1 company commander, captain, 4 cadet officers and instructors from the infantry, captains or lieutenants, 1 cadet officer and instructor from the cavalry, cavalry master or lieutenant, 1 cadet officer and instructor from the armoured troops, captain or lieutenant, 1 cadet officer and instructor from the artillery, assistant instructor in weapons theory and artillery exercises, captain or lieutenant, 1 cadet officer and instructor from the air defence, assistant instructor in weapons theory and artillery exercises, captain or lieutenant, 1 cadet officer and instructor from the engineer troops, assistant instructor in field work, captain or lieutenant, 1 cadet officer and instructor from the infantry troops, instructor in motor service, captain or lieutenant, 1 first instructor in tactics and topography with teaching duties in the subject of defence organisation with war history, major, 2 second instructors in tactics and topography, captains, cavalry masters or lieutenants, 1 teacher in topography, assistant teacher in tactics, captain, cavalry masters or lieutenant, 1 teacher in weapons and artillery exercises, captain or lieutenant, 1 teacher in field work, captain or lieutenant, 1 teacher in gymnastics with weapons and sports, captain, cavalry masters or lieutenant, and 1 company adjutant at the training company, ensign.”
The bill also contains detailed accounts of the need for teachers at the combat schools of the troops, the War College, quality requirements for teachers, etc. The War College at that time partly corresponds to today's HOP at the Swedish Military Academy, but had a very clear focus primarily on tactics and war staff service.
The detailed planning of the preparation was not limited to just the need for people in the organization. The need for horses is also reported in detail, for example, 1.324 horses were required for the artillery.
Time conditions
Perhaps the best illustration of how seriously the situation in the outside world was interpreted, and thus the threat to Sweden, is the extraordinarily tight timeframe for implementing extensive changes. Here illustrated by the Air Force's planned development according to the Defense Decision.
“The Defence Inquiry has emphasised that the expansion of the Air Force, taking into account the desirability of increasing the efficiency of the Air Force as soon as possible, should be carried out within as short a period of time as possible. On the other hand, the implementation of the expansion was affected by the possibilities of satisfying the increased need for personnel and equipment and, when it came to the establishment of air units, the possibilities of preparing airfields and buildings. Training of personnel took up a considerable amount of time. Thus, training to become an officer required a training period of around three years. Training to become a non-commissioned officer and to become a fully serviceable rank and file required seven and three years respectively.
The production of aircraft equipment must be planned for the long term. Work on preparing airfields should begin at least three years before the field is to be put into use. Preparing buildings for an air fleet took about two years. In view of these circumstances, the expansion must therefore be prepared well in advance and the time frame for its implementation must be relatively long. However, studies carried out had shown that the expansion of the air force, as proposed by the defence inquiry, could essentially be implemented within a period of five years.
Based on the estimated situation on July 1, 1942, the Defense Commission has drawn up the following plan for the expansion of the Air Force during the five-year period.
The reorganization and expansion of the Air Staff would begin during the first and be completed during the second year.
The organization of the squadron staffs was to be implemented, the first squadron staff during the first year, the second squadron staff partly during the first and completely during the second year, the third squadron staff partly during the second and completely during the third, and the fourth squadron staff partly during the third and completely during the fourth year.
The new air flotillas were to be established, Bråvalla air flotilla (F 13) and Uppland air flotilla (F 16) during the second and third years, Halland air flotilla (F 14) and Blekinge air flotilla (F 17) during the third and fourth years and finally Västerbotten air flotilla (F 15) during the fourth and fifth years.
The air base area staffs were to be organized, Upper Norrland (= corps staff, F 21) during the first year, Eastern during the first and/or second year, Western during the second and/or third year, Southern during the third and/or fourth year and finally Northern during the fourth and/or fifth year.
The construction of the new central aircraft repair shop was to begin in the second and be completed in the third year.
The newly added educational institutions were to be organized, the bomb and gunnery school and the signals school during the first year, and the technical school during the second year.
The music organization was to be set up with four music choirs during the first year and with three music choirs during the second year.
In connection with this general plan for the implementation of the organization, the defense inquiry has emphasized that in certain respects the Air Force's personnel could not be expanded at the rate that would be required by the new formation of units.
It would therefore be a prominent desire to fill the Air Force's personnel cadres as soon as possible, including through forced training.""The Chief of the Air Force and the Air Administration have had nothing to say against the defense inquiry's proposal for the organization's implementation."
Curious (with today's eyes)
The move of Wende's artillery regiment to Norra Åsum would involve the construction of new barracks, etc.
"Then the new "As the establishment would be located five kilometers from Kristianstad, it seemed necessary from a work point of view and from a disciplinary and security point of view to build housing near the future barracks for the regimental commander, a regimental officer and one officer per battery."
"The Defence Forces Non-Commissioned Officers' Association has noted with satisfaction "The defense inquiry's proposal for new construction of military barracks."
Reading instructions
The above quotes are just small excerpts from a document that comprises more than 700 pages and which, it must be admitted, is quite tough to read in its entirety. My recommendation is therefore to start with the table of contents at the very end to find the parts that seem particularly interesting. Then jump between the interesting sections. Not all readers may be interested in the five pages that discuss military music activities (the content there is that each regiment/fleet/naval base should have its own band).
Royal Maj:ts bill no. 210 (Bill 1942:210) | Swedish Parliament (riksdagen.se)
The exact war organization that the 1942 defense decision entailed was, for natural reasons, classified, and is not stated in the bill, but a decent overview can be found at:
Defense Decree 1942 – Wikipedia
Much pleasure.