Summary

This document discusses Sweden's defense industry and material procurement in light of its recent NATO membership and evolving global security concerns1. It emphasizes the need for a dual approach to planning, with short-term (1-3 years) and medium-term (5-6 years) goals.

Keypoints:

  • Dual Planning Horizons: Sweden needs to prepare for a potential war in Northern Europe within a few years while simultaneously planning for substantial long-term growth. This means moving away from a sequential approach to defense development.
  • Impact of US Engagement: The document highlights two possible scenarios; a radical reduction of US engagement in Europe, or a continued US presence with increased European responsibility. Sweden needs to be prepared for either situation.
  • Material Procurement: Sweden's materiel procurement is based on a 12-year investment plan (IP) managed by the Swedish Armed Forces and a corresponding Production Plan within the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV). The IP is currently fully allocated, although it has significantly increased due to the war in Ukraine.
  • Strengths and Initiatives: The Swedish defense industry is strong and has successfully met increased demands. There are numerous international initiatives to strengthen defense capabilities, such as the NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge and the EU's European Defense Fund (EDF). Sweden holds key positions in international forums like EDA and NATO.
  • The FMV APP: The document discusses the existence of an "Alternate Production Plan" (APP) within FMV, designed to address scenarios where the standard production plan is not sufficient. The APP considers different timelines for the outbreak of war and proposes alternative actions for material production and acquisition using a boundary value analysis as an additional tool.
  • Industry and Military Involvement: It is important to involve both large and small companies, as well as the armed forces in the discussions. The Swedish Air Force Chief's five-step plan for increased innovation could be applied to all military branches.
  • Risk Management: The document stresses the need to balance the risks of not being ready in time against the risks of not following standard procedures. It argues that strict adherence to all regulations can hinder rapid action, using Ukraine's drone development as an example. The interpretation of procurement regulations should also be reviewed to enable more direct procurements.
  • Importance of US Relations: Regardless of US leadership, it is crucial to maintain and strengthen the existing bilateral and trilateral (with Finland) agreements with the United States. Sweden has unique strengths such as its strong defense industry, intelligence capabilities, and collaboration with the US.
  • Actions to Signal Strength to the US: The document suggests clear signals that Sweden is prepared to take action, such as committing to Saab as the lead system integrator for future fighter jets with a strong US involvement, reconsidering pilot training in Italy in favor of a US collaboration on the T7A program, and accelerating the delivery of the Blekinge class submarines as well as kicking off the work with the next submarine generation after Blekinge.
  • Urgency and Prioritization: There is an urgent need to accelerate material growth and ensure it translates into strengthened military capability. This requires clear prioritisation, calculated risk-taking, adjustments to procurement rules, financial flexibility, and strong collaboration between all stakeholders.

Conclusion:

The document emphasizes that Sweden's NATO membership, along with the volatile global security environment, necessitates a proactive approach to defense planning, material procurement, and international partnerships. The focus needs to be on rapid capability growth and not just following established procedures, while taking calculated risks.

Conclusion

This paper discusses Sweden's defense industry and materiel acquisition in light of its recent NATO membership and changing global security issues. It emphasizes the need for a dual strategy for planning to achieve maximized capability enhancement in the short (1-3 years) and medium (5-6 years) term.

Important points:

  • Double Planning Horizon: Sweden needs to prepare for a potential war in northern Europe within a few years while planning for significant long-term growth. This means toning down a sequential strategy for defense development.
  • Impact of US Involvement: The document highlights two possible scenarios: a radical reduction in US involvement in Europe, or a continued American presence with increased European responsibility. Sweden must be prepared for both situations.
  • Material procurement: Sweden's materiel procurement is based on a twelve-year investment plan (IP) managed by the Swedish Armed Forces and a corresponding production plan managed by the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV). The IP is currently fully allocated, although it has increased significantly due to the war in Ukraine.
  • Strengths and Initiatives: The Swedish defence industry is strong and has successfully met increased demands. There are many international initiatives to strengthen defence capabilities, such as NATO's Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge and the EU's European Defence Fund (EDF). Sweden holds key positions in international forums such as EDA and NATO.
  • FMV's APP: The document discusses the "Alternative Production Plan" (APP) developed between FMV and the Swedish Armed Forces and which proposes alternative measures within the existing production plan depending on when a war is assessed to occur. The document points out how today's APP can serve as inspiration for further accelerated capability enhancement in the Swedish Armed Forces given both time horizons (1-3 and 5-6 years respectively) with the support of a limit value analysis model.
  • Industry and military participation: It is important to involve both large and small companies, as well as the Armed Forces, in the discussions. The Chief of the Air Force's five-step plan for increased innovation capability is recommended to be utilized in all branches of defense and combat forces.
  • Risk management: The document stresses the need to balance the risks of not being ready on time against the risks of not following standard procedures. It argues that strict adherence to all rules can hinder rapid action, using Ukraine’s drone development as an example. The interpretation of procurement rules should also be reviewed to allow for more direct procurement.
  • The importance of relations with the United States: Regardless of American leadership and degree of commitment to NATO/Europe, it is crucial to maintain and strengthen existing bilateral and trilateral (with Finland) agreements with the U.S. Sweden has unique strengths such as its strong defense industry, intelligence capabilities, and cooperation with the U.S.
  • Measures to signal strength to the US: The document suggests clear signals that Sweden is prepared to act, such as engaging Saab as the main supplier/system integrator for future fighter aircraft with a clear American element and seeking collaboration with the US Air Force regarding pilot training with support from the T7A program, and accelerating the delivery of the Blekinge-class submarines at the same time as work on the submarine generation begins thereafter.
  • Urgency and Prioritization: There is an urgent need to accelerate material growth and ensure that it translates into strengthened military capabilities. This requires clear prioritization, calculated risk-taking, adjustments to procurement rules, financial flexibility, and strong cooperation between all stakeholders.

Conclusion:

The document emphasizes that Sweden's NATO membership, together with the volatile global security environment, requires a proactive approach to defense planning, equipment acquisition and international partnerships. The focus must be on rapid capability growth and not simply following established procedures, while taking calculated risks.

Introduction

Within the framework of this report, it can be stated that the scope for outcome with regard to Swedish security as a newly allied nation within NATO is very large.

It is difficult to pinpoint a clear "best path" because we do not know where we are going and the "destination" and the conditions on the journey there will be largely influenced by both the US and the other EU nations, Russia, China, etc.

In an attempt to condense some reflections and recommendations for the defense industry and equipment procurement, a starting point can be taken from some of the report's supporting elements.

Firstly recommendation in Part I of the interim report, two parallel planning horizons:

NATO, the EU and Sweden must prepare for the worst-case scenario, for Sweden primarily a war in Northern Europe within a few years.

Swedish planning and implementation must therefore simultaneously work with dual time horizons:

A quick one, within 1–3 years, to increase defense capabilities mainly within the framework of existing and initiated organizations.

Another, within 5–6 years, which paves the way for substantial growth, for example through extensive equipment orders, officer training, expansion of infrastructure, etc.

The current approach of so-called sequential growth, first doing one thing and then the other, is basically turning a blind eye to the risks posed by external developments.

Second the two-part approach outlined in this part of the report, Part II, on Military consequences on possible paths for US action under President Trump regarding military engagement in Europe:

The two overall developments, linked to the security policy reasoning above, which are considered the most disruptive, but still reasonably likely from a military point of view, and thus must be able to be handled, are considered to be:

  • The US is radically reducing its involvement in Europe, and NATO is radically reducing it, leaving Europe essentially to manage its own security, and
  • The US's commitment to Europe remains, but Europe's counter-performance consists of NATO developing towards an alliance with global capabilities.

 

Basic factors and planning methodology

Procurement of materiel has been carried out for a few years based on the Swedish Armed Forces' twelve-year investment plan (IP) and is charged to appropriation 6.1.3. For 2025, this appropriation amounts to SEK 59,5 billion and is divided into two appropriation items, 6.1.3.1 which is managed by the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) and 6.1.3.2 which is managed by the Swedish Armed Forces. The larger systems such as JAS 39E, submarine Blekinge, divisional artillery, etc. are in principle all managed within 6.1.3.1 which is the clearly dominant appropriation item with SEK 46,9 billion in 2025.

Apart from some reserves, the investment plan is fully filled for the entire period and for the next four to six years, very large parts of it have also been ordered by industry. This is a limiting, but not an inhibiting factor when studying alternative possibilities in the short term. It must also be borne in mind that Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has led to the total scope of the plan increasing drastically in recent years and what has been added early is largely that which is assessed to be able to be delivered from industry and also to have a rapid effect on the combat units.

The fact that primarily FMV and the Swedish-based industry have been able to respond to these increasing volumes is impressive in itself and is proof that Swedish industrial capability and our ability to make extensive international procurements are a great strength and asset.

 

Ongoing good initiatives and work

The government, in principle independent of the change of government that took place in 2022, has also strongly pushed the issue of international cooperation and initiatives. As a result of both political and government-driven initiatives, Sweden has obtained important positions in several international forums. Thus, since 1 January 2024, the Director General (DG) of FMV has been the Chairman of the EDA (European Defence Agency) Board in materiel director format, EDA CNAD (Conference of National Armaments Directors). The corresponding position in NATO CNAD is held by the Finn Tarja Jaakkola. Lieutenant General Dennis Gyllensporre is another example when, on 1 January 2025, he took office as Chairman of NATO's DIANA, which is tasked with supporting civilian companies to contribute to the development of military capabilities using new technology (DIANA = Defence Accelerator for the North Atlantic).

There is no shortage of initiatives to try to increase the pace and results in the defense industry and innovation in various ways, the latter not least inspired by what Ukraine (and indeed to some extent also Russia) has managed to achieve during the ongoing war. The clearest example of this is the somewhat explosive use of drones on both sides of the conflict, where drones have gone from being an exclusive resource to becoming a consumable item like ammunition. Unlike ammunition, however, the function and areas of use of drones are developing at a breakneck pace and the struggle between means and countermeasures is becoming very clear.

 

Some of the initiatives that should be mentioned are:

NATO

NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge – aims to strengthen defense cooperation within the alliance and to strengthen the capabilities of alliance members while continuing to provide support to Ukraine.

NATO Defence Critical Supply Chain Security Roadmap – aims to secure the supply chains of raw materials, materiel and supplies to the alliance to avoid impacting deterrence and defence capabilities.

NATO Production Action Plan – aims to coordinate needs, address industrial challenges and increase interoperability. This is done, among other things, through so-called High Visibility Projects.

NATO Industry Fund (NIF) – aims to finance startups and companies engaged in “deep tech” such as AI, quantum technology, nanotechnology, etc. advanced technologies. It should be noted that the USA, Canada and France do not participate in NIF.

EU

European Defence Fund (EDF) – aims to support research and development in the defence sector by promoting defence industry collaborations (including small and medium-sized enterprises – SMEs), increasing capability development through investments and helping companies develop high-tech capabilities and systems.

Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement (EDIRPA) – aims to achieve joint procurement in the wake of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine to address urgent capability needs.

European Defence Industry Strategy (EDIS) – Aims to strengthen the competitiveness and readiness of the European defence industrial and technological base and to strengthen security of supply in the internal market. In addition, the strategy also aims to strengthen Ukraine's defence technological base.

Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) – aims to immediately increase the production capacity of artillery ammunition and missiles within the EU, including securing the supply chains for these types of products.

Sweden-USA

Statement of Intent (SoI) – signed bilaterally between Sweden and the USA in 2016. The agreement regulates joint efforts in five main areas: achieving increased interoperability, training and exercises, defense equipment cooperation, research and development, and common issues in multinational operations.

The bilateral SoI with the US was supplemented in 2018 with a trilateral SoI that also includes Finland. This was updated as recently as March 2023.

DCA (Defense of Cooperation Agreement) which enables more continuous cooperation by regulating the conditions for American forces to operate in Sweden and on Swedish territory. DCA entered into force in August 2024.

In 2024, the Swedish Armed Forces also signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) with US EUCOM within the framework of advanced cyber defense.

Sweden nationally

Regarding national documents that affect materiel supply, there are a number of governing documents with high relevance that can be highlighted.

"Orientation for military defense 2025-2030" - which applies to all seven defense authorities and has a chapter that handles materiel supply and a chapter that handles research, development, defense innovation and digitalization.

"Direction for civil defense 2025-2030" - which has been issued to 61 authorities. It is clear from the drawing that it is the armed attack that is the determining factor for planning and measures to strengthen civil defense.

Upcoming Defence Industry Strategy "FINDUS" – which is considered to put NATO and EU strategy documents in a national context. The strategy was stated before Christmas 2024 to be close to completion.

As for a pure strategy for materiel supply, there is none in place. The issue was thoroughly investigated and the proposals were presented in SoU 2022:24 under the heading “Materieelförsjönstrategi – För vår gemmessällning”. However, due to time constraints, the investigation had to delimit the consequences of Swedish NATO membership, which has contributed to no materiel supply strategy being established in a formal sense. That said, the chapters in the above-mentioned “Orientation Decision for Military Defence 2025–2030” contain the core of the proposals from SoU 2022:24 supplemented with the consequences of NATO membership, which is why it is not a direct shortcoming today that the strategy does not exist.

 

Does the forest hide the trees?

Overall, there is no shortage of overarching strategies, directions and policy documents. If you put them all together, they almost form a forest of opportunities and priority needs for the Armed Forces, FMV, FOI and the other main actors. The question therefore becomes – how do we find the trees in this forest that actually have the potential to provide faster total capability growth than just letting the activities roll on across the board.

The ability to find and prioritize the right initiatives, measures and procurements is therefore very important, not least in light of the time pressure we find ourselves in.

In the same spirit, we must also ask ourselves what changes we would need to make in connection with the United States' continued involvement in NATO/relatively Europe under President Trump's leadership.

 

FMV APP as a source of inspiration?

Within FMV, the question of an “Alternative Production Plan” or APP was raised a number of years ago. It is not found on the “Appstore” but is in the secret cabinets within both the Armed Forces and FMV. The existence of the plan is not secret, but the content is.

The basic idea of ​​an APP was (and is) to have a well-thought-out action plan for different possible situations when the regular production plan is no longer fully relevant.

The APP is based on the regular production plan but places it in a number of different time perspectives, of which the following are three basic examples.

  1. War breaks out in the very near future.
  2. War is expected to break out in 4-6 months.
  3. High risk that war is expected/may break out in x years.

Based on these time perspectives on the outbreak of war, a number of different alternatives are outlined for the ongoing and planned production for individual materiel systems/individual orders with the aim of being able to focus production resources on such measures that will be ready in time to have an effect in the war. Below are five examples of typical measures that can be discussed:

  1. Continue as planned.
  2. Force completion.
  3. Cancel the execution in whole or in part.
  4. Implement as time permits.
  5. Implement measures that are not in the plan but that are effective and meet the time requirements.

A theoretical example used when the plan was first discussed around 2020 was that in cases 1 and 2 above, most of the resources at Saab that were then dedicated to the Gripen E and the Blekinge (A26) submarine should be redirected (in principle discontinued) to maximize availability, additional weapon integrations, etc. on the Gripen C/D and the existing Gotland and Södermanland type submarines. The reasons behind that proposal were simply that neither the Blekinge type submarine nor the Gripen E could have contributed any operational benefit whatsoever in a war that was estimated to break out a maximum of six months from now. Analogously, RENO/REMO type overhauls on combat vehicles should be accelerated and additional spare parts procurement/manufacture should take place as soon as possible in order to keep the fleet of Combat Vehicles 90 in operation to the greatest extent possible.

Initially, these discussions were conducted internally within the defense authorities, although the execution of such a plan naturally requires agreements with the defense industry in advance in order to be implemented.

The extent to which the APP has been used in the context of the current security situation and Russia's full-scale attempt to take Ukraine by force is not known to the author of this report. If it were known, it would in any case be classified information and cannot be commented on here.

 

What could be done?

Despite previous planning, there is still much that could be done if the degrees of freedom in the system could be increased and the combined power between authorities and industry could be “unleashed”.

Such an effort involves seriously challenging the processes that have been built up over a long period of time by both government and industry to provide good control in a number of aspects. These are not least economic but also functional and safety-related, where we simply could not "afford" to fail.

Risk management will thus play a crucial role in achieving success.

We must be clear about setting different risks against each other. What is the risk to our ability if we are not ready on time (three or six years) needs to be set against the risks that may arise from not following all processes and other regulations such as regulations. Economic regulations, regulations on accreditation and IT security, training requirements and certifications, etc. All permissible individually and if time permits, but together directly hindering rapid handling. It is important to point out that it is not about being stupid and careless but about daring to use your common sense and not slavishly follow all the risk-minimizing regulations we have largely imposed on ourselves. It can be considered that if Ukraine had followed our regulations on IT security and accreditation in its drone operations, the system of rapid innovations and adaptation to the battlefield, which we all praise, would not have existed in principle. It is worth thinking about.

For increased speed, the interpretation of the regulations surrounding procurement also needs to be reviewed, and in the long term perhaps even modified. The Materielförsjönsutredningen (SoU 2022:24) states that the view of what should be a significant security interest for Sweden is “The ability to defend Sweden individually and together with others, within and outside the country, against armed attack”. As the report was written before NATO entry, the interpretation of this can be expanded and instead ends with “…defend Sweden and NATO against armed attack…”

Since, in terms of procurement, an essential security interest falls within Article 346.1(XNUMX) of the EU Treaty, it allows, if handled correctly, a targeted procurement. With this support, the government could, in light of the external situation, give the contracting defense authorities (primarily the Armed Forces, FMV, FortV and FOI) a mandate to decide for themselves which of all procurements can be carried out as targeted procurements, not only to Swedish-based industry. Should this be questioned by anyone, it is important to stand firm at all levels and say that "we do what we believe the situation requires to protect Sweden, NATO and Europe".

 

An approach

A method used in engineering contexts is to study boundary values ​​in the form of maximum and minimum input data within a given problem. Beyond the boundary values ​​there are no solutions, but between them there can be many different solutions.

In practice, it is never possible to maximize all outcomes with finite resources, it is always a question of finding the right balance. However, the study of the limit values ​​is still interesting because there may be components that can be maximized even if they were not intended that way from the beginning.

This is certainly the case in the current twelve-year investment plan and it will be equally certain in the investment plan that the Armed Forces will submit in early March within the framework of the budget basis for 2026.

An approach to finding alternative solutions should complement the regular work. The group that undertakes this needs to be composed of all actors, i.e. the Government Offices, the Armed Forces, FOI, FortV, the Defence Materiel Administration and current suppliers.

Here it is important not only to work with the large companies, but also smaller companies need to be included in the discussions. The two industry organizations SOFF (Swedish Security and Defense Companies) and SME-D (industry association for companies with fewer than 250 employees) should be given a coordinating role here.

The questions that should be asked at these types of meetings are:

Pending orders

  • Is the delivery plan for what has already been ordered for the next three and six years in place?
  • For the equipment where the plan does not hold, what would be required to make it hold? Consequences for other equipment (in order to be able to prioritize from a capability perspective)?

 

Pending and non-existent orders (both systems/spare parts/replacement units) until 2028

  • What could you deliver that will have an impact in the Armed Forces in 2028 even if it is not ordered today but you received an order no later than June 2025?
  • Corresponding question but handling increased orders in quantity or earlier deliveries orders where the agreed delivery time is beyond 2028.
  • What factors do you see as limiting and how can these limits be minimized/eliminated (downprioritization of other deliveries, lengthy review processes, etc.)?
  • What consequences would this have on other production?
  • Is there any production that can/should be completely discontinued?
  • How can this be handled commercially/legally?

 

Pending and non-existent orders (both systems/spare parts/replacement units) until 2031

Basically, the same questions can be asked for the longer time perspective of five to six years as above and then focus on what the differences would be compared to the shorter time perspective of two to three years.

 

Follow-up work and decisions

Once these threshold analyses have been carried out, there is a good basis for making well-considered decisions about adjustments and/or additions to the current plan. Here, the government should be prepared to make decisions about additional financial packages for activities that cannot be accommodated in the immediate economy. Similarly, the contracting authorities must manage the commercial/legal risks involved in abandoning laboriously negotiated contracts and weigh them against the capacity gains that can be achieved by adjusting the order in question.

 

The branches of defense and the combat forces

In the same way that it is important to include the smaller companies, it is very important to include the branches of defense and the unit level in the dialogues. Many problems and challenges that exist and are identified in unit operations have difficulty reaching the larger processes. In a very interesting article published on December 20, 2024 on the blog "Military Debate", the Chief of the Air Force Jonas Wikman has pointed to "A plan for strengthened innovative power". With little or no changes, it could be applied to other branches of defense and combat forces and constitute an effective way for the Armed Forces to drive innovation and capability development. The Chief of the Air Force outlines a five-step plan:

  1. More innovation days and meeting places at unit level.
  2. Strengthened structures for culture and innovation.
  3. Method and process support for innovation.
  4. A fast track with dedicated resources for innovation.
  5. Ensure that innovation capability is part of the capabilities of war units.

Is all of this affected by what the US does?

Of course, Western Europe's actions will be greatly influenced by how US involvement in NATO develops under President Trump's leadership.

The fact that the Swedish defense needs to be strengthened as soon as possible does not change, but the requirements for the military content with associated material content may certainly change. However, it is difficult to see that any branch of defense/combat force could be downgraded, rather the requirements for significant increases will occur across the board, army, navy, aviation, command and logistics. We will then very likely find ourselves in a situation that will require 4–5% of GDP for military defense.

Compared to many other smaller countries in Europe, Sweden is in a better position in that we have not built our entire defense on actually being members of NATO.

Our cooperation with the US has been built on a bilateral basis (and trilaterally with Finland). The existing agreements will increase in importance if the US reduces its footprint in NATO. It is therefore of great importance to actively nurture these agreements with substance, regardless of which administration is in office in Washington.

With President Trump, however, it is important to be very clear about the exceptionally strong ties that have existed and exist with the United States for a long time and the positive effects the United States receives from these.

The list could be long, but a few things should be clearly highlighted.

BAE Systems, headquartered in Falls Church just outside Washington DC, sits at the top of a multinational company that includes both BAE Systems Bofors and BAE Systems Hägglunds. In other words, two of our most important defense companies are “Swedish-American” from the start. In this context, BAE Systems Bofors has played a very large part in the development of the intelligent artillery shell M 982 Excalibur together with American authorities and companies.

Saab and its high-tech cooperation with the USA on many levels. The fact that Saab, together with Boeing, developed, and contributes to the production of, the advanced T-7A training aircraft for the US Air Force has received far too little attention in Sweden but is a very big achievement. The US Air Force has purchased 350 aircraft. In addition, Saab has had great sales success on the radar, sensor, and training side with the US Navy, US Marine Corps, US Army and US State Department.

In addition to the industrial cooperation that can of course be developed further, both with larger companies and with smaller ones, Sweden is where we are in relation to Russia and our ability to gather intelligence via FRA together with resources from the air force and navy will always be an exclusive and valuable asset.

 

Self-confidence and strength

Sweden has a proven strong defense industry and we often emphasize that we are unique as a small country but still have the ability to develop and produce fighter aircraft, submarines, missiles and qualified combat vehicles, which have later proven to be more than adequate on the Ukrainian side in the war against Russia.

That type of strength is something that the leaders of the great powers respect, and it is a strength that, in the security policy situation we now find ourselves in, we need to build on with offensive and confident action and absolutely not question ourselves.

In relation to the USA, it is important to continue to be an interesting and competent industrial partner that can contribute to the USA's own capabilities and at the same time provide our own defense with unique capabilities and systems that cannot be obtained anywhere else.

There is a tendency in Sweden to be extremely worried about Donald Trump and what he might or might not do. There may certainly be reasons for that, but we will in any case be better equipped to deal with him and also other world leaders if we act with confidence and strength and show that we have something to offer and also commit ourselves to action – and not just fine words.

If the US were to seriously reduce its involvement in NATO, we must be able to increase exchanges with the US even further, based on existing agreements and agreements, and also develop them. But above all, we must fill the agreements and activities with content that benefits both countries' national security interests (and also include Finland in the discussion).

In doing so, we could send some very strong signals to the US already in the next two years. Examples of messages that could be considered are that we are prepared to:

  • Forced production (successively increased shift times, etc.) of the JAS 39 E in order to increase the Air Force's total number of JAS 39 C/D and 39 E as quickly as possible.
  • An early foot reduction in Fighter aircraft route selection where we clearly declare that Saab will be the responsible system integrator and supplier for the aircraft generation after Gripen E, but that we are also seeking close cooperation with Boeing that builds on the results achieved and trust created within the T7A program.
  • A reconsideration of the direction that fighter pilot training should take place in Italy and place it in the USA in collaboration with the US Air Force on the T7A – of which we could also “borrow” a number.
  • A clear step down in the submarine issue that clearly declares that the next generation of submarines will be developed by Saab Kockums while maximum efforts are made to deliver the Blekinge class as soon as possible with a gradually increased shift schedule (with the goal of working 24/7 in production) at the shipyard in Karlskrona. The active cooperation between the Swedish Navy and the US Navy in the Baltic Sea is thus secured for the foreseeable future.
  • Launch continued development in the ammunition and weapons area within the BAE Group.
  • Promote a joint program to replace the CV-90 family with a combination of manned/unmanned combat vehicles from sometime in the 2040s.
  • Dress up the agreements on expanded cooperation in the cyber area with tests and trials as well as unit introduction of capabilities and advanced technology, including in AI.

 

Conclusion

Sweden's security policy conditions have been significantly improved through our NATO membership. We are now part of an alliance with a musketeer idea: "One for all - All for one".

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and the imperialist statements coming from President Putin also show that it is urgent to strengthen our and the alliance's capabilities.

At the same time, there is concern that the alliance's strongest partner, the United States, is turning more inward and in the direction of China/Asia and, to varying degrees, may hand over Europe's security significantly more to Europe than has been the case since 1945.

One of Sweden's strengths is our existing defense industry. We must act in a way that increases this strength even more.

It is urgent. We need to review the possibilities of further accelerating material growth and also ensure that it leads to strengthening military capabilities as soon as possible.

Joint discussions, analyses and active measures between politics, the Armed Forces, FMV, other defence authorities and industry can facilitate this if

  • we are prepared to clearly prioritize deliveries in terms of time,
  • we dare to take calculated risks to a significantly greater extent in a number of areas in order to achieve rapid capability growth,
  • we adjust our interpretation of the procurement regulations,
  • we create increased financial flexibility over/between years,
  • we are prepared to allocate additional financial contributions beyond what was recently decided in the Defense Decision,
  • we cherish and actively pursue our agreements with the US (regardless of what the US does in connection with NATO),
  • we utilize and prioritize the tools and mechanisms available within NATO and the EU, as well as
  • We take initiative on a number of major issues and show self-confidence and strength.

 

 

 

 

Rear Admiral (PA) Thomas Engevall is currently active as a board member and advisor to a number of defense companies. He is also a part-time reserve officer employed at the Defense Staff. He has previously been Chief of the Command Staff at the Defense Materiel Administration and Head of Defense Logistics within the Armed Forces. He is a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Military Sciences and an honorary member of the Royal Swedish Naval Academy.