Summary:

The High North has gained increasing strategic importance as great power competition in the Arctic and the North Atlantic intensifies. The region can no longer be considered a peripheral low-voltage zone, but is now a central part of global security policy interaction, characterized by military presence and deterrence, intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, and the protection of critical infrastructure. Russia's long-term military interests in the area remain despite a temporary reduction in ground capabilities as a result of the war in Ukraine, while the allied presence in the North has increased significantly. The military increased attendance strengthens deterrence but places higher demands on coordination and escalation control. In parallel, China's interest in the High North is growing, primarily through scientific, economic and institutional engagements with potential security policy dimensions, further strengthening the region's global importance.

Sweden's and Finland's NATO membership has created new conditions for deeper Nordic defence cooperation and given NATO's northern flank increased strategic depth. The ambitions for increased Nordic integration, especially in the air and maritime domains, are considered strategically relevant but remain dependent on progress in command, communication and interoperability. Nordic cooperation is important as a complement within the NATO framework, while the connection between the Nordic and Baltic countries is becoming increasingly central to the regional security balance.

For Sweden, developments in the High North mean increased responsibility as a new NATO member and Arctic state. It is necessary to integrate security, resilience, climate issues and the protection of critical infrastructure into security and defence policy, as well as in the updated Arctic strategy ahead of the Swedish chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2027. Overall, Arctic and Northern issues must be seen to a greater extent as an integrated part of Swedish and allied security policy.

Introduction

On December 10, 2025, the Atlantic Council's Northern Europe Office and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs jointly hosted a workshop at the Government Offices in Stockholm with a focus on the High North in a new strategic context. The workshop was aimed at officials at the Government Offices, members of parliament, and Swedish experts, while the speakers were invited experts from Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Greenland. The purpose was to analyze how the changing security political situation in the Arctic and the North Atlantic affects stability, deterrence, and cooperation in the High North, as well as what consequences this has for Sweden as a new NATO ally and Arctic country. The discussion, which was held under “Chatham House rules,” focused on three key areas:

  • Great power rivalry
  • Nordic defense cooperation
  • Consequences for Sweden

The following describes the main features of the discussions based on these three areas.

Great power rivalry in the High North

The High North is undergoing a strategic transformation characterized by intensified geopolitical competition and changing military positioning. As global powers adjust their presence and strategic focus in the Arctic and North Atlantic, the region has gained increased importance for deterrence, military presence, intelligence gathering and protection of critical infrastructure, with direct implications for military stability and the balance of power in Northern Europe.

The participants emphasized that Russia continues to view the High North as a strategic core area, closely linked to nuclear-based second-strike capabilities and the protection of the Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula. Over the past decade, Russia has modernized its military capabilities and bases in the region, including through new strategic and multi-purpose submarines, upgraded air bases, and extensive missile and weapons tests, with security policy implications also beyond the Arctic. At the same time, the war in Ukraine has temporarily reduced Russia's land-based capabilities in the north, as large parts have been redeployed and consumed in the fighting, while naval and airborne capabilities and nuclear-related infrastructure remain at the same level. Russian military activity has thus become more defensively oriented and concentrated eastward, partly as a result of threats from Ukrainian drone operations. Several participants emphasized, however, that this development is likely temporary and that in the long term, Russia can be expected to rebuild and strengthen its military presence in the Arctic, with possible repercussions also for the security situation in the Baltic Sea region.

In parallel, it was noted that the allied presence in the High North has increased significantly since 2022. NATO allies, in particular the United States, the United Kingdom and France, have intensified their naval, airborne and intelligence-based activities in the region from a low starting level, including through recurring American aircraft carrier presence and increased submarine activity. The development was assessed to strengthen deterrence but at the same time highlight the need for improved coordination and clearer frameworks for allied activities, especially regarding geographical scope, visibility and the balance between deterrence and intelligence gathering, in order to reduce the risk of incidents and unintended escalation.

China was identified as a long-term but growing player in the High North. Although the Arctic is not a high-priority area compared to China's immediate surroundings, China is systematically investing in future freedom of action in the region. Chinese engagement was described as resting on four pillars: science, economy, governance and, more implicitly, security. Scientific knowledge building on Arctic conditions was highlighted as central to enabling future activities, while economic interests primarily concern natural resources, shipping lanes and fisheries. These are currently often pursued in close cooperation with Russia, but participants noted a clear Chinese ambition to reduce this dependence in the long term through investments in its own capacity, including in icebreaking and Arctic technology. In governance, China is seeking increased influence in international forums and regulatory frameworks relating to the Arctic. It was also noted that the security dimension of the Arctic is increasingly present in Chinese military and security policy analysis, including in connection with nuclear deterrence, satellite coverage and future submarine operations. China's satellite infrastructure in Sweden and research presence in Iceland were highlighted as examples of activities with potential dual-use dimensions.

The discussion about the US role in the region was framed by the Trump administration's stated focus on the Western Hemisphere and Greenland as a US national security interest. Against this background, the US view of the High North was assessed to be increasingly characterised by competition with China, where Europe and the Nordic region are seen as part of a broader strategic context and where European allies are expected to take greater responsibility for their own security. At the same time, a strong US focus on Greenland, the North Atlantic and the protection of critical infrastructure in the Arctic remains, although priorities may shift depending on developments in the global power game.

Nordic defense cooperation

With all Nordic countries now members of NATO, the alliance's northern flank has gained increased strategic depth and new responsibilities. The participants noted that this has fundamentally changed the conditions for Nordic defence cooperation and created new opportunities for joint planning, interoperability and operational coordination in the High North and the Baltic Sea region. For the first time, all Nordic countries are integrated into the same alliance, under common strategic leadership and with common planning frameworks and operational objectives, which has strengthened both the political and military conditions for coordinated defence planning in the region.

Ambitions for a more integrated Nordic defence were assessed as high, particularly in the air and maritime domains. The vision of being able to act as a cohesive Nordic air force was highlighted as strategically attractive, potentially cost-effective and inherently deterrent. At the same time, it was highlighted that significant obstacles remain to deeper integration, including differences in national priorities, legal frameworks, defence models, decision-making processes and political culture.

A recurring theme was the need for strengthened joint command, intelligence management and communication. The lack of secure, classified communication solutions between Nordic armed forces was identified as one of the most acute obstacles to integrated operations and risks limiting ambitions for deeper operational coordination.

The discussions also touched on the relationship between Nordic cooperation and NATO's broader 360-degree perspective. Nordic defense cooperation was emphasized as a complement within the NATO framework, not an alternative to the alliance, and as a means of strengthening NATO's collective deterrence and defense. At the same time, it was emphasized that it is not just about minilateral cooperation, but about a deeper integration of combat forces where joint planning, interoperability, and in some cases joint use of capabilities is necessary. In this context, the importance of specialization and role distribution between the Nordic countries, rather than complete uniformity, was also emphasized. Several participants pointed out that an integrated Nordic structure can contribute to credible deterrence through rapid reaction capabilities, especially in a situation where US attention and resources may be directed towards other regions. Such a Nordic "first responder" capability was considered to be in line with American expectations of increased European responsibility.

Against this background, the connection between the Nordic and Baltic regions was highlighted as strategically central, as from a Russian perspective these regions are increasingly linked together as a common military area of ​​operations that affects the regional balance of power. However, several participants warned of the risk of competing for American attention through parallel initiatives, underscoring the need for clear priorities in the use of limited resources.

Consequences for Sweden

The strategic transformation in the High North means that security issues increasingly coincide with climate change, critical infrastructure and economic interests. For Sweden, as a new NATO member and Arctic state, this means increased responsibility and a more active role in shaping security policy for Northern Europe, where resilience, protection of underwater infrastructure and climate, energy and military integration need to be addressed collectively in close cooperation with Nordic and allied partners.

The government's work on a new Arctic strategy was highlighted as both necessary and time-critical. The strategy, which builds on the 2020 Arctic strategy but with a clearer security policy focus, is scheduled to be adopted in 2026. It was considered to be of great importance both for Sweden's national direction and ahead of the Swedish chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 202, especially in a situation where the council's work is partly limited by Russia's war against Ukraine.

Militarily, the need to strengthen Sweden's contribution to air and sea control in the Baltic Sea and the High North was identified, as well as investments in interoperable systems together with Nordic and other allies. At the same time, the importance of less visible but crucial capabilities, such as command and communication systems and space and satellite capabilities, was emphasized.

On the broader security policy level, the protection of critical underwater infrastructure, resilience against hybrid threats, the relationship with indigenous peoples and sub-state actors in the Arctic, and the need for strengthened coordination between civilian and military actors were also discussed. Here, Sweden, with its tradition of total defense and civil-military cooperation, was considered to have special opportunities to contribute experiences of relevance to both the Nordic region and NATO as a whole.

Overall, it was underlined that the High North can no longer be considered a low-voltage region on the sidelines of global security policy. For Sweden, this means that Arctic and northern issues increasingly need to be integrated into overall security and defence policy, in close cooperation with Nordic neighbours, NATO and the EU.

Anna Wieslander is a PhD, director of the Atlantic Council's Northern Europe office and a member of KKrVA.
Louise Blomqvist studies Global Governance and Diplomacy at the University of Oxford and is a project coordinator at the Atlantic Council's Northern Europe office.