Photo: Swedish Armed Forces.
This post should be seen as a follow-up to Ola Palmquist's post "Mission tactics - a Swedish paper tiger", published on the KKrVa blog on June 15. As Ola Palmqvist clearly highlights, it is one thing to profess mission tactics, but mere lip service does not create mission tactics. In this post, I propose a number of concrete measures that I believe would contribute to creating managers with a mission tactical "mindset". Sometimes I may be slamming open doors. I therefore ask the reader for indulgence if she or he will exclaim "but we already do that!" on certain occasions. At the same time, every such reaction is something to be happy about, it shows that the journey towards creating mission tactics has begun.
Background
The Swedish Armed Forces' Military Strategic Doctrine (MSD) clearly states that mission tactics are the leadership culture that should characterize the activities of the Swedish Armed Forces. This applies both to the main task of defending the country against armed attack and to the preparations required to create that capability:
"The Armed Forces shall maintain and develop a military defense that can ultimately meet an armed attack. The basis for this shall be the ability for armed combat." (Mission of the Armed Forces, MSD 16 page 40)
"This will place very high demands on all of us to be able to handle the unpredictable and to be able to operate under very stressful conditions. It is therefore of utmost importance that we practice and train for this and that we base our management philosophy on mission tactics. Mission tactics enable managers at all levels to use initiative to solve their tasks even under the most difficult conditions" (MSD 16 preface)
The meaning of mission tactics is developed later in the text, including the following statements:
“But the whole point of mission tactics is to allow well-trained commanders to have far-reaching mandates for implementation to counteract the inevitable effect that warfare is often chaos due to friction, interaction, and hostility.” (MSD 16 page 68)
“The manager and the leader. Good leadership and mutual trust between the manager and subordinates are a prerequisite for effective management through assignments. The manager leads subordinate units, formations and joint functions with the assistance of his staff. The manager is responsible for solving assigned assignments and bears the full responsibility that the position entails. The commitment, ability and willingness to take responsibility constitute one of the most important managerial qualities at all levels. The manager must be able to make decisions, be clear and consistent. (MSD 16 page 69)
There is no doubt about this. The Armed Forces have clearly stated what applies. However, the consistency between doctrine and reality seems to have shortcomings, in some cases serious ones.
In his post on the KKrVa blog on June 15, Ola Palmquist gives a worrying picture of managers who are tied to plans and methods in their actions – instead of proactive task tactics who take their own initiatives to exploit opportunities that arise during the battle.
In a supplement to KKrVa Handlingar och Tidskrift 2/2020, six students at FHS, in connection with "Field Exercise Ardennes", have analyzed Swedish mission tactics in relation to German actions during the battles in May 1940. There too, the conclusion is quite clear - it is doubtful whether Swedish thinking and actions today are characterized by a mission culture.
Since it is unlikely that Swedish officers would be born incapable of thinking and acting tactically, the question arises, why don't they do so and how to deal with the problem? Here are some thoughts and suggestions.
Self-image
People's actions are influenced by how they and those around them perceive what is expected of them. It is therefore crucial to make it clear what an officer's task(s) are, and what they entail. This affects both the officer's self-image and the training and position planning required to create a capable officer. How does the Swedish Armed Forces describe an officer's tasks? If you are interested in applying for a job in the Swedish Armed Forces, the officer profession is described as:
"Your task as an officer is to formulate goals and plans for how the organization's resources and capabilities should be used in the best way. You set guidelines, initiate governance and follow up on the work."
https://jobb.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/jobba-i-forsvarsmakten/tre-inriktningar/officer/officer/
A description that is not entirely easy to associate with an officer's role in war – the reason why there are officers at all. The text also hardly gives any immediate associations to a leadership position where decision-making, willingness to take personal responsibility and the ability to improvise are the qualities that should characterize her or his actions. It suggests no connection whatsoever to the main task of the Armed Forces, to be able to meet an armed attack, and the central role of officers in that context. The task description could just as easily refer to virtually any senior official in state or municipal administration. Even in the rest of the text on the recruitment page that describes the qualities that an officer should have, the words war or battle are not mentioned once. Is this the image of an officer that the Armed Forces wants to give, and with which prospective mission tacticians should identify themselves?
A first step should therefore be to reshape the Armed Forces' message, both internally and externally, to make it clear that the officer's primary task in all respects is to be a commander in war, with the demands that this entails. Here is a suggestion for another way of describing an officer's duties:
An officer's primary task is to lead combat or other combat-related activities in war, in various leadership positions. In peacetime, the work shifts between unit and staff service with the aim of, as a leader at various levels, developing the Armed Forces' warfare capabilities. At times, the work can also involve being a military expert in organizations other than the Armed Forces.
Handbooks
In unexpected situations, most people (even officers) usually act based on what they have been taught or have experienced before. The more stressful and unpredictable the situation is (usually in war), the more one tends to fall back on what one “can”, that is, consolidated theoretical knowledge and practical experience. If a mission-tactical mindset is not the “mental baggage” one carries with them, it is unlikely to be what one applies when the unexpected occurs.
The methods for planning and management described in various manuals form the basis for both theoretical training and practical exercises. It is therefore absolutely crucial that what is said in the books contributes to mission-oriented thinking and action. The serious criticism that Ola Palmqvist (and FHS) directs against the planning and management methods described in various manuals should therefore be taken very seriously.
"In summary, the working group believes that the methods described in the tactical command manuals are based far too largely on the assumption that it is possible to predict the course of events in a dynamic battle with a qualified opponent through planning. The methodology is complex and time-consuming, which requires relatively extensive staff work even at the battalion level."
The planning also risks to a large extent locking subordinates into the implementation of the plan instead of taking their own initiative, based on the intention of the battle, to exploit unforeseen situations to reduce their own frictions and maintain a high tempo. The methodology also means that the importance of the battalion commander's personal leadership of the battle has been given too little importance. The methodology described in the manual therefore does not support leadership through mission tactics against a numerically superior qualified opponent.”
(From Ola Palmquist's post, excerpt from a statement on the Battalion Method Manual)
The Army Staff, the Swedish Land Forces Academy and the Swedish Military Academy should therefore urgently establish a joint working group to quickly produce a Tactical Command manual in which mission tactics, with all that this implies for planning methodology and commanders' actions, are the guiding light for the methods described. This would then form the basis for new manuals and changes to existing publications. The overall guidance required already exists in the form of Military Strategic Doctrine.
Corresponding work should also be done in the Navy and Air Force.
Here it is important to note that the conditions for, and the possibilities for applying, mission tactics differ between the branches of defense. This depends on, among other things, technology, the environment in which the units operate and a different adversary. However, this does not mean that the need to take initiative, make decisions and improvise based on the situation will be less, the methods for how to prepare for this will, however, be different.
From these more centrally taken measures to some more down-to-earth suggestions that can help create officers with mission-tactical thinking and action.
Exercises
Field exercises and staff duty exercises are golden opportunities to develop mission-tactical thinking. Although these types of exercises primarily have other purposes, concretizing tactical principles, practicing methodology, etc., they provide a framework that can and should be used to develop the participants' willingness to take initiative and ability to improvise.
In field exercises, the method for achieving this is reasonably simple. When a plan has been developed, the trainees are presented with the task “now this happens – the commander’s orders and actions, with a brief justification – time XX minutes”. It is moderately time-consuming and can be varied infinitely with the same plan as a basis. Such elements can therefore be carried out many times during the same exercise. The important thing here is not to test the battle plan that the person, group or staff has developed, but to “train” decision-making in large numbers. The trainees should be given the experience that it is their obvious role to make decisions, and that a plan must constantly be adapted to the development of the situation.
This does not mean that the feasibility of plans, or the value of new methods, should not be tested, for example: does the availability of artillery ammunition allow the battle to be fought in the manner specified in the plan, is there enough time before the enemy is expected to reach the area to carry out the planned field work, etc. However, this is a different element in the exercise, and with a different purpose. The latter obviously has greater weight if the field exercise constitutes sharp war planning. But even then, elements should be included where the commanders and staffs are faced with the unexpected. If nothing else, it is a reminder that plans rarely last longer than until the battle begins, when new decisions must be made and improvisation must be made.
A bonus effect of this type of element is that in exercises where the commander has a staff at his disposal, the staff members can also be involved. They are forced to quickly analyze what the new situation means for different branches of service. This is in order to be able to give the commander adequate advice, and not least find new solutions when it comes to how to redirect logistics, intelligence, etc., depending on how the original plan changes.
When it comes to staff service exercises, it is better, in my opinion, to carry out more smaller exercises instead of a few large-scale staff service exercises, where commanders and staffs are forced to act on unexpected developments on several occasions. Large staff service exercises have an inherent inertia that means that they rarely give a good picture of the dynamics of staff work that reality will require. More small staff service exercises also mean that less time can be spent practicing staff methodology "working off the ring rust". The exercise can instead concentrate on the real purpose of staff work, producing good orders to the units.
Overall, both field exercises and staff duty exercises should be conducted in such a way that they contribute to creating a mission mentality among the participants. That is, practicing how to handle and utilize the chaos that combat/operation/war will always entail.
Having said that about field and staff service exercises, there are more steps.
The best method to create officers with initiative, a willingness to make decisions and the ability to improvise is “unscripted” two-sided exercises, where fairly large units, battalions or larger, are pitted against each other. This provides the opportunity to exploit terrain unknown to the participants, creates a tactical situation where many different parameters affect the course of events and also shows the consequences of different measures over time. For economic reasons, land damage considerations, availability of units, etc., such exercises can only be carried out relatively rarely. But even smaller exercises, such as a company attack at home on the training field, can and should be used to develop commanders’ decision-making ability and initiative. A lively B-force is a good instrument for forcing active action from group commander to company commander. Today’s battlefield simulators also provide the opportunity to reinforce the experience that “it is better to act than to stubbornly stick to the plan”.
Here, as in decision-making moments during field and staff service exercises, it is extremely important that it is allowed to make “mistakes.” The goal is not to find the perfect solution, but to create a willingness and ability, in managers at all levels, to act when faced with the unforeseen.
Peace versus war
In the officer profession, unlike most other professions, there is a built-in contradiction between how one is expected to act in war, the main task for which one exists, and the largely rule-governed and rather sluggish peace operations. A rigidly led operation in peace can lead to a mentality that inhibits the qualities we want to see in an officer in war. If you live in an environment where the operation is perceived as "the plan applies (despite new circumstances)", "someone else decides", "the rules say", "there is no routine for it" etc., it is unlikely that overnight you would find it natural and obvious to act forcefully on your own and improvise unplanned and untested solutions.
This contradiction has always existed. Peace is not war. However, there are measures that can help remind everyone that it is the ability in war that should guide the work in peace as well, and that create space for, and encourage, initiative in peace work as well.
Here are three "old" methods that fulfill such a function. Even though they are, to a greater or lesser extent, already part of the Armed Forces' operations today, I think they are so significant that there is reason to mention them.
Previously, weeks 23 and 24 (at least in the army) were earmarked for war preparations. This applied to both staffs and units. All “peace activities” were put on hold. War planning was reviewed, often in the form of field exercises, senior commanders (and their war staffs) had the opportunity to meet their directly subordinate commanders, DUCs (with staffs), the state of mobilization stores was checked, etc. Activities that not only provided clear feedback on what the peace activities were aimed at, but often also provided impetus for measures to increase the war capability of the units or how to improve existing planning. They also provided personal knowledge “aha, are you my counterpart in staff xx”, quite useful knowledge for the day it might be necessary to cooperate to handle an unexpected situation.
All (with few exceptions) officers rotated between unit service and staff service. Both perspectives are necessary to create regulations, routines and take measures that contribute to a culture where the needs of the combat units are put at the center. But also to create an understanding in the units of the opportunities and limitations that govern the decisions of senior commanders. Something that will likely lead to initiatives at the local level to solve problems where senior commanders have limited opportunities to help. Likewise, there should be a corresponding rotation between being teachers at schools and unit activities. Otherwise, there is a risk that a gap will arise between what is taught and what is practically possible, or appropriate.
The military unit commanders should be given far-reaching influence, and responsibility, over the development of their own unit. Something that also contributes to creating a mission culture as it gives room for initiative and local solutions. Here there may be ideas to be found in Operational Idea 90 (VI 90), introduced by the then ÖB, Bengt Gustavsson.
Impulses from outside
There are civilian organizations that constantly deal with the unforeseen, or if you like, the unplanned. An example would be airlines that routinely have to quickly redirect aircraft and crews due to events such as bomb threats, technical failures, bad weather, etc. Another could be trading of various kinds where the opportunity to make a good deal can disappear as quickly as it appeared.
In both cases, there are certainly some overall guidelines within the company, but how do you train, prepare and select the people who will practically solve the tasks? Here, and in other companies, there may be ideas and methods that could provide inspiration for how to create good mission tactics. The reserve officers could contribute here, both with their own experiences and by providing contacts to companies where "battle command" is an important part of the operations.
The Swedish National Defence College should be given research assignments (but also carry out student projects) where they investigate how different armed forces have designed or are designing training, personnel planning, etc. to create officers with a mission-oriented mindset. This, combined with modern leadership research, should result in proposals for methods that can be used both in the Armed Forces and in their own teaching.
The Recruitment Authority also has a role here. Already today, assessments are made of "commander's assessment" of both conscripts and prospective officers. Can this develop? A highly personal speculation; could it be that people who have been a bit rowdy and oppositional at school have thus shown personal qualities that could be good in a mission tactician?
Conclusion
There are many additional measures that can and should be taken. There is no Alexander blow that creates mission tactics in one fell swoop. It is a question of creating a culture that consists of a combination of mental attitude, regulations, training methods in schools and during exercises, selection and, not least, role models and attitudes in daily work.
Here I have primarily highlighted the role of the officer from a mission-tactical perspective. But if the Armed Forces are to be characterized by a mission culture, it places high demands on everyone in the organization. Officers, specialist officers, soldiers and civilian employees. Everyone must see it as natural and obvious to take initiative and improvise based on the situation they find themselves in. This is so that, in both war and peace, they can contribute to achieving the purpose of their activities.
My hope with this post is therefore that many will contribute ideas, large and small, both in the debate and in their work, about how to create a Armed Forces characterized by a strong mission culture.
Maybe someone else has also received some ideas on how to develop the business they are already doing.