The future is a mirror of our history.
In the fifties there were no regular TV broadcasts in Sweden. Germany produced cheap toys and Japanese products were pure rubbish. England was Europe's technological stronghold and the future appeared like a bright sunrise in an otherwise cloudless sky.
Someone had the idea of sending people to the moon, but no one could say what they would do there. A communications project was started that meant that all defense units in the United States would be able to communicate with each other even if the bad Ivan were to drop an atomic bomb somewhere in the country. The project was called Arpanet and was initiated by the Advanced Research Projects Agency in the United States. Arpanet is the basis for what we call the internet today. The interesting thing about these stories is that they clearly describe the basis for our future development. The Arpanet project was driven by reality and the needs of the Cold War.
The lunar landing project was driven by one thing only – the desire of humanity to travel to the moon. Interestingly, humanity was prepared to invest significantly more resources in putting a man on the moon than in developing a communication system that was essential for the safety of the time.
These two examples from our recent history show that our visions and fantasies often mean more to development than our immediate needs. Necessity is no longer the mother of invention, but rather our vision of the future.
How does it affect us and what does it mean for our preparedness and our security work? It goes without saying that even in the small perspective, it is our will to achieve things that increasingly governs our development. In practice, this means that for every useful system or product, ten are developed that do not meet the standards of the future. In a world where the development of the last five years has meant more than the previous hundred, it is important to choose the right path. This does not apply to lost unit development and investments in society's military security.
Science uses the concept of “the frame of reference.” Everything that happens happens in the eyes of the observer. In a more extended interpretation, this means that our ability to interpret events is in a direct relationship to the references we have. This means that rules and perceptions do not have to be true in another observer’s frame of reference!
Now what does all this have to do with our military security?
The Chief of Staff at FMV, Mikael Frisell, has coined the term “administrative clearing of the firing range”. It is a wonderful approach because it can be interpreted in so many different creative ways. The important thing is to find both ends of this delicate string of thoughts and actions. Ends that are a clear common start and a common goal in the implementers’ frames of reference! In other words, a common starting point is just as important as a common goal.
The big question is how all actors who build our future security should act. What is the interaction between the Armed Forces and the client, the government and the Riksdag? What are the frames of reference and perceptions behind the decisions? How are our frames of reference affected by developments in the world, not least by the war in Ukraine and our membership in NATO?
As an officer, you learned the process/content model. In Industry, you learned that the ability to manage processes and not least decision-making processes is many times more important than the content of the decision. It is important to find an approach where decision-makers broaden their frame of reference so as not to make predestined decisions based solely on their own knowledge or their own reality. This is especially important in areas where most employees or idea generators work in the same environment. Hans Werthén is said to have said that every board must include a “car dealer”. Someone who can challenge preconceived notions without prestige and break the fear of presenting one’s own opinion even if it may be perceived as stupid.
Decision models
The board and management team of companies generally handle two different decisions:
- Change decision
- Operational management decisions
This can be translated directly to the decision-making process around military security. Decisions for change cannot be based on routines, while operational decisions should be based on routines and the creativity of the moment. Routines are created through one's own experiences and knowledge combined with external knowledge and the experience of others. The prerequisites are that everyone has the ability to develop and learn.
Decisions to change are based on our ability to be flexible with developments and our vision of future development. It can sometimes be a difficult balance where too much flexibility can lead to dangerous event management and incorrect visions can lead to development that does not create value. The board's operational product becomes strategic instructions and documents and the management team's product becomes action plans. We make the action plans and working methods to fulfill the strategic instructions and we make these to achieve our goals. The industry has learned this from the military!
Our decisions are a mix of emotions and preferences
No decisions can be said to be bad, but they are different in different situations. We are talking about analytical decisions and intuitive decisions. Analytical decisions involve collecting information, evaluating the consequences, assessing the possible scenarios that may arise and then choosing the alternative that seems best.
Intuitive decisions are not nearly as structured. The obvious logic is set aside and we know how it is without knowing why. Our intuition feels very sure even if the method is uncertain. For analytical and rational decisions, it is the opposite. There you are sure of your way of making a decision but not as sure of the outcome. This means that decisions made on an emotional basis sometimes feel more sure and are more convincing.
Knowledge can influence intuition. It is something that firefighters, pilots and military personnel train to be able to make quick and correct intuitive decisions in situations where concrete decision-making data is lacking.
A management team that understands its own decision-making process becomes much more effective.
Decision-making in the management team
When asked how decision-making works, many management teams answer "We have no problem making decisions – it's driving and completing the development work that is the challenge." Once you start unraveling, it often turns out that the management team did not agree on the decision from the beginning, but the decision was made because it was the only decision that could be made.
When management teams encounter a tough decision where the group disagrees, they often expect the boss or someone with an informal leadership role to make the decision. A decision is forced and no one knows in retrospect exactly how the decision was made. Those who initially disagreed feel they were outmaneuvered and are disappointed by the outcome if it does not align with their personal preferences. The Defense Committee report and other papers usually report some of these discrepancies, but probably not all.
Entry thresholds
In a broader perspective, the reasoning must be linked to production or, more accurately, value creation – what the military calls “warfare capability”. Here, it is important to be able to handle different types of entry thresholds. These can be influenced and uninfluenced. The economy is important for both defense and industry. The industry’s solution is often to create development and production readiness in order to be prepared when the threshold is lowered. It is also common to spread large investments over time so as not to drain the lifeblood (profitability and cash flow). This also means that projects can be canceled that become uninteresting or far too expensive over time. This is undeniably a common problem in large and complicated military equipment projects.
The Amphibious Corps – a good and at the same time bad example
The analysis carried out in the 2016 amphibious study showed a significantly greater need for amphibious capability than what we find in perspective studies and the ÖB's advice. The third and fourth battalions and a command resource for amphibious operations jump in and out of the plans like an indecisive suitor. There may of course be more reasons, but it is ultimately about finances. This may in turn depend on a number of factors. It is likely that the navy, in the decision-making basis, wants to create serial units with a large proportion of employed personnel. It will be costly and give rise to conscious or unconscious entry thresholds. Then it is easy to lose the war for funding. That war that everyone says does not exist but which always exists. The unit will simply be too expensive and will be subject to a red cross.
In the Defense Committee's report, Strengthened defense capabilities, is to read:
The Defence Committee, in line with the Swedish Armed Forces, believes that the development of the two sea-mobile amphibious battalions should continue. The Defence Committee also believes that a third sea-mobile amphibious battalion should be considered after 2030.
So now the previously decided third battalion has been demoted to being considered? Here there is reason to review the frame of reference and look at how the business community handles entry thresholds. One proposal could be to establish a third and fourth battalion as well as a slimmed-down command unit by staffing these with mainly conscripts and reserve officers and supplying materiel and personnel over time. One could also, as during the "Cold War", supply suitable war-positioned materiel to establish a capable, stockpiled war unit that can be mobilized at a very short notice. This would create good preparedness for producing important units that can be produced both tactically and materially here and now! It could also be implemented in the perspective of a changed frame of reference (doctrine) for the overall decisions that will form the basis for establishing sustainable military security. Where, not least, the ability to rotate units already at an early stage of the war becomes possible. Our amphibious regiments are also attractive for conscript service, something that benefits the entire Armed Forces.
In a conversation with the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, Brigadier General Patrik Gardesten, on 18 April, the possibilities of staffing any additional battalion units with mainly GSS/P (conscripts) at levels up to and including OR5 (sergeant) as well as Reserve Officers who complement officers and specialist officers were discussed. He says that the conditions for such a development are very good.
A superficial analysis of the Defence Committee's report and to some extent the actions of the Armed Forces indicate that decisions are being made with an old frame of reference? There are no fundamental changes in this report compared to the one that came out five years ago, despite a major war in Ukraine and a radically changed external situation. Experience shows that you cannot make the wisest decisions with an old or outdated decision-making basis. The committee's decision-making processes generally seem logical, but important sections seem to have a subordinate importance because the area of activity still receives a decent allocation according to a frame of reference that is implicit but perhaps not always common? There is not enough money to do everything - but what should be done?
In the Minister of Defense's speech during Folk och Försvar last winter, he said:
"As Russia puts itself on a war footing, methods from a time when money was scarce and time an unlimited resource must not hinder us. Slow and cumbersome processes that hinder military capability development are fundamentally a threat to our national security in this grave situation."
There is therefore every reason to build new frames of reference that both govern and lead the change process.
The newspaper Kustjägaren did an interview with Lieutenant General Michael Claesson in Kustjägaren a few years ago. Among other things, you can read:
Michael Claesson believes that the Swedish Armed Forces still need to develop both military concepts and military doctrine. He speaks of an increased self-confidence in the Swedish Armed Forces after many years of cuts and a previous strong focus on international missions. At the same time, the “international era” has sharpened leadership, combat-technical capabilities and the ability to cooperate with other countries' units.
It is actually only with MSD 16 (Military Strategic Doctrine 2016) that the Armed Forces have developed a modern doctrine based on national security.
Michael Claesson says that we have not had a tradition of writing military doctrines. Instead, it was mainly the operational plans that constituted a kind of doctrine at different levels of command. He also says that the doctrine's concept of "warfighting capability" should be interpreted in the light of all three described "pillars", i.e. resting on both physical and conceptual and moral factors. This does not always mean that you can immediately solve every military challenge with new equipment alone, but also by analyzing how to solve the task with tactical, operational and strategic cunning and how an operation should be led..
The Armed Forces need a sustainable, common, functional and developing (new?) doctrine. In other words, a frame of reference which governs and guides development. Michael Claesson's statements above are very wise, not to say insightful.
Now it's just a matter of finding a start, goal and meaning to the work of maintaining peace and resisting an aggressor. It requires a great deal of change and creative thinking. Despite everything, our preparedness is good, but all change work requires a moment, even a short moment of reflection beforehand! The industry calls the impact analysis the five whys! Without a deeper analysis on several levels, you can't get to the heart of the matter.