“Battles are fought in trenches but won in factories” – this statement is often attributed to Joseph Stalin, and regardless of its exact origin, it highlights a central insight into modern warfare. The gist is that in protracted conflicts, the outcome is not determined by differences in combat tactics, existing equipment when the war breaks out, and courage on the battlefield, but by a country’s ability to maintain and strengthen its military capacity through industrial production and innovation, i.e., by its ability to rapidly scale up its production capacity, develop new technologies, and create operational advantages.

Production and innovation systems cannot be built up in the midst of a raging war. Most of it must already be in place in peacetime, which makes production and innovation systems strategic targets for those trying to engage in long-term influence or hybrid warfare. The health care system can be overloaded and exhausted over time without having to be attacked in the same way as production and innovation systems. A strategic and patient adversary does not only strive to strike at units and weapons systems, but also tries to weaken the very foundation on which all technological and industrial armament rests in the long term.

Hostile power can engage in anything that undermines, for example, energy supplies, infrastructure, education systems and access to strategic raw materials. Measures that can include everything from cyberattacks and economic influence to political destabilization and trade restrictions. The measures do not have to be large-scale and all-encompassing. Just think of the concern that all the events in the Baltic Sea have caused our society in recent years. It is often carried out in a way that makes it impossible to prove that it is really sabotage. Good examples of this are broken locks to waterworks and the like. The key thing is that the attack takes place below the threshold of what is traditionally perceived as war, but with the intention of both scaring countries into submission and weakening their ability to defend themselves in the event of open armed conflict. This can be described as “sabotage by proxy”. In this context, criminal gangs become useful proxy actors. They are already in place and are already antagonists to the society that is to be disrupted.

Production and innovation power needs to rest on a broad base in the form of a functioning education and research system, human capital and entrepreneurship, venture capital, raw materials, machine development, and robust infrastructure for communication and transport. This also includes a well-functioning health and medical care system, which can ensure that human capital is as prosperous as possible. But the most crucial thing is the energy supply: without energy, everything comes to a standstill. Not least, the war in Ukraine testifies to how much focus hostile powers can be expected to put on trying to knock out the energy system. The war's impact on energy prices in Germany, among others, and indirectly on the German production and innovation system, also makes us aware of the need to build robust energy systems that are not dependent on states that clearly express their antagonism.

It is in light of this that we should try to understand what is happening in the United States today. Perhaps we are now approaching the culmination of a power struggle that has been going on for many years, even if it has previously played out a little more covertly, in which China has gradually strengthened its position vis-à-vis, primarily, the United States. Instead of starting, like Russia, by arming its military, China started by building up its production and innovation system, and only recently has it invested large resources in also strengthening its direct military capabilities and increasingly seriously threatening Taiwan. China today controls a decisive share of the world's production and processing of so-called critical raw materials, such as rare earths, tungsten, lithium and graphite – all central to the manufacture of advanced weapons systems, electronics, batteries and sensors. Through strategic investments in mines around the world and control over processing capacity, China has built up a structural advantage vis-à-vis, among others, the United States. This advantage not only provides economic strength, but also creates geopolitical leverage in the event of a conflict. At the same time, China has worked purposefully to strengthen its innovation system. In addition to investing in its own education and research, the country's innovation system has been strengthened by strategic investments in market-leading companies in Europe and the United States. This has also included investments in the global transport network, through the acquisition of ports and the mega-project BRI (Belt and Road Initiative). In other words, China has worked for many years to build a strong production and innovation system. This not only gives the country power and influence over other nations in peacetime, but also the ability to maintain and strengthen its military capacity in the event of war.

The shift in power between China and the United States has not only affected the situation in the South China Sea, but has also likely contributed greatly to Russia's increasingly bold actions in Europe and Iran's advancing positions in the Middle East. Republicans in the United States in particular have for many years painted China as the major threat to the United States. The perceived threat from China in no way justifies Donald Trump's current actions, but helps us understand a little of what is currently driving foreign policy in the United States. Through tariffs, export restrictions and technological sanctions, the United States is trying to slow down China's access to advanced microchips and other key components. The aim is to protect the United States' technological lead (the innovation system), but also to reduce dependence on China in its own production system. At the same time, it was revealed how deeply dependent the Western world is on Chinese supplies – not least in raw materials that are essential for the defense industry.

Donald Trump seems to be trying to meet the threat from China by partially imitating what China has done for decades. The difference is that Trump lacks the patient and long-term action of the Chinese regime, but seems to be trying to do everything during one term of office. In a very short time, the Trump administration is trying to gain control over everything from rare earth metals in Ukraine to unexploited natural resources in Greenland and important infrastructure (the Panama Canal). Finally, Trump also wants to redirect all world trade with the help of tariffs and sanctions. All of this results in an increasingly chaotic situation, where Europe and Sweden are drawn in regardless of whether we want it or not.

For Europe and Sweden, it is important to strengthen their own production and innovation systems now. Again, impairing a country's access to important raw materials is a low-intensity but potentially decisive form of warfare. If the adversary manages to prevent a country from securing its supply chains in peacetime – through economic blackmail, disinformation or political influence – then the war has in practice been won before it even began. But perhaps the most vulnerable target is human capital. Providing skills in technology, healthcare, production, logistics and research requires long-term investments and a societal focus on education, innovation and a will to defend. Here, not only natural science and technical education become important, but also social studies and the humanities are important. The whole of society must function in order for the production and innovation system to develop. A society that is demoralized, divided or undermined in its belief in the future and its own institutions is easy prey – even without a single shot being fired. Modern defense begins in university halls, in logistics centers, in mines, in production facilities, in the health and medical care system and energy systems – far from the trenches. The nation that wants to be able to defend itself tomorrow must already today protect, strengthen and develop its production capacity and innovative power, and create a well-functioning medical and health system that can be switched up when needed. This requires strategic thinking, coordination between the public and private sectors, and an awareness that it is in peacetime that we can build our defense capability by forming strong production and innovation systems.

Therefore, it is important now that Europe and Sweden are to rebuild their defense capabilities, to include both the production and innovation system in the discussion and not just talk about purchasing war material and training soldiers. As part of this, the various agreements that the EU is trying to achieve regarding the supply of "rare earth minerals" and other initiatives should be seen.

Daniel Ekwall is Professor at the University of Borås and the Swedish National Defence University, Freddy Jönsson Hanberg is Director Security of Supply Centre of Excellence, Jan-Olov Svärd is Chief Physician at Värnamo Hospital and Major at Ing 2 in Eksjö, Daniel Hjelmgren is Associate Professor at the University of Borås and Anders Jonsson is Professor at the University of Borås and scientific leader in the Swedish Armed Forces.