Departments II and III will carry out joint work in 2023 with the aim of contributing to a discussion on how Sweden should relate to the ongoing change in the military strategic conditions in our immediate area. Read member Per Edling's report from the seminar here.
Background
Departments II and III will carry out joint work in 2023 with the aim of contributing to a discussion on how Sweden should relate to the ongoing change in the military strategic conditions in our immediate area. The initial question of the work is vWhat opportunities does Swedish NATO membership bring for a new Swedish or allied military strategic idea in the Baltic Sea region in the form of an A2/AD concept?
The goal is to present a draft of a Swedish A2023/AD concept in the Baltic Sea area at the military strategic and operational level in November 2. The concept is being developed within the framework of or coordinated with NATO's integrated air and missile defense. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
The work is based on the assumption that the army and navy will also receive a significant air defense capability, that Sweden will become part of NATO defense, the current military strategic concepts and ongoing technological development, as well as the experiences from Ukraine. Another fundamental value is that the military strategic conditions in our immediate area are changing and that possible new military strategic and operational concepts should be identified.
On KKrVA's blog Defense & Security, member Anna Wieslander and others also proposed on 2023-01-31 that NATO should create so-called deterrence bubbles over Northern Europe.
Introduction (member Per Edling)
We live in new times, according to member Commander Per Edling. From a human perspective, the Russian aggression and the ongoing war in Ukraine are nothing short of horrific, but from a professional military perspective, the current situation is very interesting. There is much to learn from the fight against our tentative main adversary.
The security situation is changing for several reasons, but primarily due to the demands of openly aggressive adversaries, a larger area of operations and being part of a defense alliance. Our strategy needs to change. One of the cornerstones is that we must strive to control our environment, instead of being content with contesting the adversary's control. This change means that questions are being put to the forefront and that
Many perspectives are being challenged. One such is the control of the air domain, which was the topic of the seminar.
In Sweden, the operational level has made it quite easy for itself by distributing responsibility over the sea to the Navy Chief and the air to the Air Force Chief. Up until now, this distribution has been entirely adequate, since weapon ranges have been relatively short and air defense has primarily been a matter of self-defense. In addition, we have lived in peace. The main problem with the chosen approach has been that certain sensors, especially at sea, have not contributed to building the air situation.
As sensor and weapon ranges increase, objectives, interests and capabilities will overlap, which means that priorities need to be set. If the work is done correctly, larger areas will be able to be controlled and Sweden will thus become a stronger participant in NATO's integrated air defense.
Thoughts from a cockpit perspective (member Lars Helmrich)
Member Brigadier General Lars Helmrich shared his thoughts from the cockpit perspective through insights from new and old wars, exercises, theory formations and military theory. He initially referred to a previous joint exercise between the Navy and the Air Force where the importance of collaboration, rapid decision-making and surprise was illustrated.
Helmrich also presented RUSI's analysis of the air war in Ukraine. Important conclusions are that technical superiority is important in air duels and that a well-coordinated and tactically developed air defense can create de-escalation zones for modern combat aircraft. Parallels were also drawn to the Yom Kippur War that took place 50 years ago. In that war too, a de-escalation zone could be created which Israel was able to gradually degrade by having its own ground forces attack Egyptian air defense positions.
Helmrich continued by referring to member Carl Bergqvist who traces the origin of the A2/AD theory to a Chinese and Russian response to the American successes in the Gulf War in 1991. Bergqvist believes that Sweden has the components required to create its own de-escalation zone; e.g. Meteor and Patriot missiles together with upcoming new anti-ship missiles and air defense for the ship units. Bergqvist also points out that the establishment of such de-escalation zones requires long and complicated chains of action as well as relevant doctrines and methods. Helmrich continued his presentation by addressing conclusions from the FOI report Bursting the Bubble. Here it was stated that the effect of A2/AD bubbles may be overestimated with reference to the systems' actual capabilities in the field in e.g. Syria and that countermeasures and the radar horizon limit the systems' operational range. Helmrich noted that the US already in 2010 in its Air-Sea-Battle concept defined operational principles through the integration of capabilities from multiple domains to meet A2/AD bubbles, and that reporting from Ukraine indicates that Russia now has over-the-horizon capability with its S-400 system.
Helmrich concluded by recalling Clausewitz's familiar trinity but that future concepts must take into account that war, by its very nature (still) is unpredictable. Helmrich finally makes four claims:
- The difference in military geography between Sweden and Ukraine must be taken into account when drawing conclusions from the war
- Even modern military concepts must take into account that war is inherently unpredictable and non-linear.
- Sweden has and will soon receive the components required to create its own deregulation zone over the Baltic Sea.
- The problem we thought Russia would create for us, we can create for the Russians and thereby achieve a considerable threshold effect
Carrier Strike Group Operations – a Danish perspective (kk Ken Nielsen)
In the discussion about an integrated Swedish air defense, Commander Captain Ken Nielsen, who is the Danish liaison officer to the Chief of Operations Command at Headquarters, gave a presentation on American operations with the Carrier Strike Group (CSG).
The draw was made in light of the Danish participation in this activity and was intended to provide information on how the defense around a CSG is established.
The defense around a CSG is built according to the principle of “layer upon layer”. A CSG is composed of several essential subsystems, where all must work together and be integrated. Together, these different subsystems provide more than an individual part. The subsystems largely consist of the aircraft carrier, the various aircraft systems, associated escort ships and submarines and their defense systems, the on-board command and an advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. It is these subsystems, together with the use of adequate doctrines, procedures and external support, including in the form of communication, navigation and surveillance satellites, that provide the force with a robust defense.
Effective defense of a CSG requires, in addition to weapons, sensors, communication and information systems, an effective command and control (C2) structure. The C2 structure in a CSG is established following a clear chain of command and with a distribution of responsibility for the different domains to designated leaders.
When a CSG is involved in joint operations or is to operate with other aircraft, the activities are coordinated. This is done by using tactics, techniques and procedures that are developed according to a set doctrine. It is clarified who is supported and who is supporting, so that the command is simple and clear. To achieve the best possible coordination, a naval coordination element is established at the air military operations center and corresponding elements reinforce the command in the CSG.
Conclusion: The defense around a CSG consists of a system of systems, a clear command and control structure, and personnel who have insight into doctrine and understanding of their own and others' roles.
Kk Ken Nielsen in Naval Academy pose.
Swedish A2/AD concept in a joint operation – do we already have the methods? (member Jon Wikingsson)
A2/AD is a controversial subject, said member and commander Jon Wikingsson. There are different views on whether it is only a possibility in the air domain, whether it is a purely military issue or whether it is an issue that encompasses all domains and can only be achieved by using and taking into account both military and civilian capabilities and aspects. Regardless of the answer to the question, it can be stated that no combat force can solve A2/AD on its own, but capabilities from other combat forces will be required. Likewise, civilian capabilities or aspects will be part of it – directly or indirectly. Therefore, A2/AD must be attacked in a joint operation. A method is a formalized and structured approach. The question is then whether there is a method in the doctrines and regulations of the Armed Forces that provides the conditions for carrying out a joint operation? The short answer is yes. There is a common thread from the military strategic level down to the tactical level that enables the planning and execution of a joint operation. In addition, the methods of the Swedish Armed Forces are largely interoperable. This means that the doctrines and regulations of the Swedish Armed Forces provide good conditions for Swedish staff personnel and Swedish combat forces to be able to quickly be part of a multinational joint operation, which is necessary when we are NATO. But one method is not enough. There must be staff processes that make it possible to follow the method. The staffs at different levels of management must be faithful to their tasks. Therefore, the entire organization must understand what decisions are made at each level and relate to this. Furthermore, technical systems are required that enable the operation, everything from staff support systems, data link systems to sensor and weapon systems. The technology is on the way and by 2030 the technical conditions will be better than today. Therefore, it is important to learn the method now and relate to it. This is best done through joint training, training and training.
Necessary decisions at the various management levels.
Discussion
The subsequent discussion began by pointing out that the seminar used many different concepts and words to describe what A2/AD actually is. Some examples are de-escalation zones, air-sea battle, defense in depth and shell defense. The Israelis talk about Iron Dome. The need to box in and define the subject is therefore great.
The reasoning showed that Sweden largely has both the technology and methods to coordinate several different systems with the aim of creating its own A2/AD capability, even if the functional chains become long and complicated. The possibility is strongly dependent on the right decisions being made at each level of command and access to a common command support system. Agreed procedures must be developed, among other things, to bridge the cultural command differences between the centralized air forces and the more decentralized naval forces. Circumstances such as contributions from the rest of the total defense and the endurance of the system, but also psychological factors such as fear and mental fatigue, will need to be taken into account in the continued work.
In addition, the seminar participants agreed that the basis for creating a Swedish A2/AD capability is ultimately about will. Most of it is already in place, provided that we have a common command system, can sustain it and really want to create our own de-escalation zones by allocating qualified training time, coordinating the subsystems through command and increasing the system's readiness.