MILITARY CONSEQUENCES – from the Interim Report of the SV-AR project Part II

Summary

This report assesses the potential military consequences of a shifting security landscape, particularly concerning a possible reduction in US engagement in Europe and the implications of the war in Ukraine. It analyzes the interests that may drive Russian actions in the Nordic-Baltic region, and how the conflict in Ukraine might affect Russia's behaviour.

Here is an executive summary of the key findings and recommendations:

Reduced US Engagement: The report is based on the assumption that the United States may reduce its military commitment to Europe, which would significantly impact the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. This is due to the US reorienting towards Asia to counter the growing Chinese threat, and also potentially due to a shift in US political priorities.
Russian Threat: A key conclusion is that Russia remains a significant threat with imperial ambitions. The report suggests that a Russian victory in Ukraine would considerably bolster Russia's military capabilities, due to the additional resources and industrial capacity they would gain. The report presents two scenarios, one where Russia attacks the Baltic region in 2028 following a short period to recover from the war in Ukraine and another where Russia launches a simultaneous attack in the High North and Baltic regions in 2032 after a thorough military reorganization.
Time Sensitivity: There is a critical time gap in the next five years. This is due to a potential decrease in US support and before European countries, such as Germany, Sweden and Norway, can substantially improve their war fighting capabilities. This makes the next five years particularly dangerous, and constitutes a window of opportunity for Russia.
Nordic-Baltic Vulnerability: A review of the military capabilities of the Nordic and Baltic countries shows that US support is crucial for both regions. In the north, this support is needed for sustainability, while in the Baltics, it's vital to prevent rapid occupation [9, 10]. The report stresses that without American support, it will be necessary to trade land, to a large extent, for time if attacked by Russia [14]. The Baltic states do not have the capacity to defend against a Russian attack without substantial help, primarily from the US.
NATO Under-Resourced: The armed forces of European NATO members are significantly under-resourced to fulfill their obligations to the alliance, even if the US maintains its current level of support.
Urgent Need for European Action: The report underscores that Sweden and most European NATO members have for too long delayed necessary military investments. It is imperative to take immediate action to bolster their defense capabilities.
Potential European Defence: The report suggests that a credible European deterrence capability in the Nordic and Baltic regions could be achieved if member states increase their defense spending to around 3.5% of their GDP. Increased UK and French capabilities to intervene in the Nordic-Baltic area, especially with ground forces, would be a crucial factor.
Key Recommendations for Sweden: The report recommends that Sweden should supplement its 2024 defense resolution by establishing two division commands (one for the Nordic region and one for the Baltics), increase the army by two light brigades, double the number of combat units on Gotland, expand the navy, and improve air defense and long-range combat capabilities. Furthermore, the report proposes that officer training should be shortened and to a much larger extent focus on combat training and education, this to allow for immediate assignment to positions in the war time organization. It also states that larger investments in equipment and infrastructure should be detached from a gradually increasing defense budget and should be allocated through an immediately tangible "defense investment fund".
Gotland's Importance: The report highlights the strategic significance of Gotland, which it identifies as a potential target in the event of conflict. It stresses the need to increase the number of combat units on the island.
Scenarios and Implications: The report presents two scenarios, one focusing on a Russian attack on the Baltics and Gotland in 2028 and another a broader attack on both the High North and Baltic regions in 2032. The scenarios show that Russia may launch an attack before the European nations' military rearmament plans have been fully implemented.
US Strategic Interests: The report states that the US is unlikely to completely withdraw from Europe due to its strategic interests, such as monitoring Russian strategic nuclear submarines and maintaining bases for operations in the Middle East and Africa.
Need for a European Solution: The report suggests the need for a common European defense solution or regional solutions to compensate for potential reductions in US presence. It proposes that Europe should develop the ability to protect transport routes, especially across the seas.
Nordic Cooperation: In a situation with reduced US engagement, a close Nordic cooperation is vital and a joint Nordic command should be considered as an alternative or a complement to parts of today's command structure in the alliance.
Importance of early action: The report highlights that the earlier Russia attacks, the greater the chances of success. This increases the urgency for the European countries to increase their defense capabilities.

In conclusion, this report stresses the urgent need for European nations, Sweden among others, to strengthen their defense capabilities, enhance cooperation, and adapt to a changing security landscape where the US may reduce its military involvement in Europe.

Conclusion

The starting point for this interim report is that US involvement in Europe may decrease. Based on this, it analyzes which interests may guide Russian actions in the High North (the Northern Nordic region with surrounding sea areas) and the Baltics, as well as how the outcome of the war in Ukraine may affect Russian actions. One conclusion here is that a possible Russian victory in Ukraine would significantly strengthen Russia's war potential by gaining access to Ukraine's population and industry as a resource base.

An inventory of the Nordic and Baltic countries' military capabilities in the near future and five years ahead, based on current planning, shows that American support is crucial for the defense of both the High North and the Baltics in the event of a Russian attack. In the North, primarily to create endurance, in the Baltics to prevent the countries from being occupied fairly quickly.

One worrying aspect is that a serious capability gap may arise between the time that any American support decreases in the coming years and before the armaments measures of various European countries, to compensate for the American absence, lead to any substantial improvements in their warfighting capabilities. The next five-year period therefore appears to be particularly dangerous.

An analysis of various factors that could influence American decision-makers to continue to have a presence in Europe suggests that it is unlikely that the United States would give up the ability to act against the activities of Russian strategic nuclear submarines in the High North from Norwegian and British territory, and that it would probably also want to retain certain bases in Europe for operations in the Middle East and Africa.

Based on the above analyses, two scenarios have been constructed. One where Russia attacks the Baltics (and Gotland) as early as 2028 after only a limited recovery period after the war in Ukraine ended, and one where there is a simultaneous attack on both the High North and the Baltics in 2032, then with a reorganized and modernized Russian military. In both scenarios, it is clear that American support constitutes a crucial component in several ways to ward off the Russian attacks. In the High North, primarily to create the necessary endurance, in the Baltics, in addition, to avoid losing crucial land areas early.

Based on the scenarios and previous analyses, a number of conclusions have been drawn, the most important of which are:

It's a hurry. Sweden and most European NATO members have for far too long avoided taking the concrete rearmament measures that security policy developments have required, and now we are in retrospect.
Even if the United States maintains its current ambitions to contribute to the defense of Europe, based on current plans, the defense forces of the vast majority of European NATO members will be significantly undersized in relation to the tasks they may face, both in the short and long term.
In the event that the war in Ukraine were to end in the near future, in a year or so, there is a glaring time and capability gap, Russia versus NATO over the next five years. Something that could be tempting for Russia to exploit for military operations in the Nordic-Baltic region.
It might be possible to partially replace the American presence and create a credible, mainly European, deterrent capability linked to the High North and the Baltics, something that would, however, require defense spending in the order of 3,5% of GDP, or more, in most member states and for Britain and France to develop their capabilities to intervene in the Nordic-Baltic area, primarily with ground combat units.
It is probably easier to build up the necessary European resources in the form of military units, civil preparedness, etc. than to create the framework required to replace the overall leadership exercised by the United States in the alliance.

For Sweden, regardless of the degree of American presence in Europe, the 2024 repository decision should be supplemented with, among other things, the following measures:

Another division management with divisional resources is being organized, so one could be focused on the Northern Areas and one on the Baltics.
The army is being expanded with two “light” brigades for combat in the Northern Areas.
The number of military units on Gotland is doubled.
The fleet will be expanded with four to five surface combatants optimized for maritime security and increased mine clearance resources will be added.
The Air Force is primarily provided with resources where the absence of American support would be particularly noticeable, such as radar reconnaissance and aerial refueling.
Air defense capabilities against all types of aircraft are being greatly enhanced.
Both ground-based and airborne long-range combat capabilities are being significantly expanded.
The use of and protection against drones is prioritized so that all field units, and the Home Guard, have a basic capability within two years.

To implement the current defense decision and the measures proposed here in a short time, until around 2032, fairly drastic changes to current thinking and processes are required, for example:

that the number of junior officers eligible for war deployment is rapidly increased by changing officer training towards a more targeted education and also shortening it, and that the Armed Forces are given authority over admission to, and the focus and implementation of, basic officer training,
that the use of reserve officers in the war organization be greatly increased,
that the incentives for both undergoing officer training and remaining in the profession (and possibly returning) are dramatically strengthened,
that the so-called sequential deployment of units is transitioning to a model where the deployment of units takes place on a large scale and simultaneously,
that the equipment procurement processes are given a focus that means that the time factor is prioritized when it comes to the delivery of equipment, rather than "good enough" in the near future than the most modern at some point in the future, and
that investments in materiel and infrastructure over the next few years will be decoupled from a gradually strengthened defense budget, where orders must be placed with regard to when funds become available in the future, despite the fact that there is an urgent need and prospective suppliers exist. One method to largely avoid this delay would be to immediately create a large investment fund that is separate from the Armed Forces' need for funds for ordinary operations such as exercises, turnover of materiel at a normal rate, maintenance of properties, etc.

Introduction

Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election, together with the war in Ukraine, developments in the Middle East and America's ongoing security policy reorientation towards Asia to meet an emerging Chinese threat, means a number of genuine security policy uncertainties for Europe, where the outcome can only be predicted to a very limited extent. The significant disarmament, bordering on disarmament, that took place in many countries, including Sweden, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union is a good illustration of the difficulty in making long-term assessments. Especially if the events on which the decisions are based are judged to lead to a positive development.

Decisions about what is required of more comprehensive military capabilities to deal with an uncertain future cannot therefore be based on events, even if they may seem revolutionary, but must be largely based on historical empirical evidence. For example: what can great power rivalry, imperial ambitions and long-standing cultural conflicts lead to? Such often elusive factors, not infrequently too abstract to arouse public interest, must then be weighed against more physically measurable factors such as countries' economic, geographical and industrial conditions for exercising military force.

Despite the difficulty of predicting which developments are most likely, it is necessary to make decisions about long-term directions when developing military capabilities. The lead times for implementing more extensive organizational changes or acquiring qualified equipment are years, sometimes even decades.[1] Military capability cannot be built on immediate events, such events must be handled with the resources created by previous decisions. Estimates of how long it will take to rebuild capabilities are often overoptimistic.[2] It is therefore necessary that policy decisions are sustainable against different developments, and that one is prepared to take the risk that some decisions may be wrong. One must therefore start from rough hypotheses regarding external developments and avoid being blinded by details – not seeing the forest for the trees. Uncertain basis must not lead to fear of making decisions.

Despite the need for a long-term perspective, a state leadership must not be locked into this when developments drastically change direction, or when it is obvious that previous decisions were wrong. There must always be the power to take action outside the “box” when such situations arise. Sweden is facing such a situation today, both in terms of the risk of continued Russian aggression in Europe and the possible reassessment of the US role in NATO that may be relevant in the near future.

The external developments described in Part I of the report “In the near future” indicates two overarching developments, when it comes to American involvement in Europe. They could be described as the extremes of a scale, and neither can be excluded:

The US is radically reducing its involvement in Europe and NATO. Europe is essentially left to manage its own security.
The US's commitment to Europe remains, but Europe's counter-performance consists of NATO developing towards an alliance with global capabilities.

In addition to these two possible overall trends linked to American security policy priorities, the conclusion must also be drawn that Russia remains a great power with imperial ambitions. If that basic premise did not exist, the question of an American military presence in Europe would be moderately interesting.

For Sweden, this means that we ourselves and our European allies within NATO must plan to be able to handle both options regarding American involvement in Europe, and that Russia will still be the defining threat.

In addition to the fact that the outcome of the war in Ukraine greatly affects the size of the threat that must be met, there is also a time dimension that must be taken into account. What might the threat look like in the short term, compared to the longer term? Does it affect the design of the Armed Forces, the necessary growth rate and Sweden's role in NATO?

An immediate conclusion is that we will need to create a defense force structure and develop collaborations that cannot be optimized for just one imagined course of events.

The threat image

This report presents the threat picture to the Nordic-Baltic area only very briefly. A more detailed description can be found in the document “Operational Assessment” previously published by the project.[3]. This general description is, however, deemed necessary to provide an image of what American presence, or alternatively absence, in Europe could mean for NATO's ability to defend its northern European members. The significance of the outcome of the war in Ukraine is, however, described in more detail.

The Northern Areas

Here, the Norwegian expression “Northern Areas” is used as a collective term for the northern Nordic region and surrounding sea areas. The Russian nuclear-armed nuclear submarines based on the Kola Peninsula constitute the core of Russia’s second-tier capability. They mainly patrol the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The protection of these submarines is a vital Russian strategic interest. The area also contains the bases for the resources, primarily ships and aircraft, that could be tasked with trying to influence NATO’s relations between the US and Europe. In a Nordic context, it should be noted that even if Russia’s resources were not sufficient to cut off relations across the Atlantic, the lower level of ambition, to cut off relations to Scandinavia, cannot be ruled out. Something that would drastically affect NATO’s opportunities to strengthen the Nordic countries and the Baltics. The area's great importance from a Russian perspective may well justify an attempt to move air defense resources westward and also improve the conditions for operations with naval forces and aircraft in the Norwegian Sea and possibly even further westward.

Baltic states

With the Baltic countries’ historical heritage, which is part of both the Tsarist and Soviet empires, the reawakened Russian imperial ambitions pose a tangible threat to the Baltic states. Unlike the motives for conducting military operations in the High North, where the reasons are fundamentally military rationality, an attack on the Baltics would aim to conquer and retain territory. A military operation directed at the Baltics could also be a means of dividing NATO and, by extension, the entire West. If NATO, with the US as the dominant member, fails to defend the Baltic states, the credibility of both the alliance and the US as a security guarantor will most likely be called into question.

Ukraine

Because the outcome of the war in Ukraine is largely influenced by the US presence, or alternatively non-presence, in Europe, there is reason to highlight some military consequences of different possible developments in Ukraine. Here, with special emphasis on the consequences for the alliance's ability to defend the Nordic-Baltic area.

A clear Ukrainian loss with the result that Ukraine is incorporated into Russia would mean something that must be described as a security policy disaster for Europe. Russia would have it confirmed that violence and terror are a useful instrument to achieve political goals. The risk would be imminent that this principle would then be applied to other places as well. The idea of recreating the Tsarist/Soviet empire would be strengthened. The threat to the Nordic-Baltic area would increase drastically.

The military resources to pursue such a power policy would also be radically strengthened. An occupied Ukraine, albeit with a population largely hostile to Russia, would lead to a significant increase in Russian military potential. Gaining access to an additional 35 million people (residents of Ukraine in 2024) potentially means about a million more “Russian” soldiers. With Russian methods of conscription, targeting “non-Russians”, and carried out with brutal means, many Ukrainians would then be forced to fight for Russia in a future war.

Ukraine is a relatively industrialized country, the factories will not disappear in the event of an occupation. The competence to produce military equipment is high. The legacy from the past in terms of manufacturing aircraft engines, airplanes, and robots remains in part and has also been developed in part during the ongoing war, but new important sectors have also been added, including the development and production of qualified drones.[4]The capacity to produce ammunition has also increased drastically in recent times, not least of calibers that are standard in the Russian army.[5] In the event of an occupation, the factories will switch to producing equipment for the Russian armed forces. It is unrealistic to believe that production would cease due to strikes or sabotage. The experience of the Second World War is clear. The industry of occupied countries continued to produce the products that Nazi Germany needed.[6] The workers needed a livelihood of some kind. Others were forced to work under threat, against themselves or their families. It will be no different here.

Likewise, there will be little reason to keep large Russian forces in southwestern Russia to guard against a possible revanchist Ukraine in operations in other directions. It is unlikely that NATO would launch a major “relief operation” against southern Russia in the event of a possible Russian attack on, for example, the Baltics. The resources for such an operation do not exist, especially as extensive support from the alliance to the Baltic states will be required in such a situation.

A compromise peace with Ukrainian land cessions as a result would also mean that Russia will receive confirmation that it is possible to achieve political goals with unrestrained military force. In the event that Russia then considers military actions elsewhere, it will have at its disposal a fairly large, combat-experienced military force, especially with regard to the officer corps. Of the approximately 600 currently deployed[7] Russian soldiers in Ukraine, perhaps half of them could be used in other directions, about 300, if one is to maintain a guard against a Ukraine that one probably distrusts. Depending on when in time another new direction of operation may become relevant, or when a renewed attack on Ukraine is planned, there is the possibility that existing units can be supplemented with newly trained personnel to a greater or lesser extent. It depends a lot on the time one believes one has, something that is linked not only to one's own preparations, but also to what the presumptive adversary is doing in the meantime.

There is therefore a time aspect here which must be taken into account. In Western debate, many alternative theories have been presented about how long it would take for Russia to regain sufficient military capability to pose a threat to, for example, the Baltic states.[8] The fundamental principle that sufficient military superiority is a function of the relative capabilities of the parties, not the absolute capabilities of one or the other party, is often ignored. In this case, a large, moderately capable army can be superior in aggregate effect to a small but good army. In a Nordic-Baltic context, a compromise peace that means that Russia can redeploy a couple of hundred thousand men from the war in Ukraine to our immediate area, even if the Russian units are of second-rate quality (which they currently are), would pose an acute threat. NATO currently does not have the resources required to stop an attack of such magnitude against any Baltic state. See the section NATO military potential below for approximate available forces in the Baltics. The fact that the Russian units also have extensive war experience should also be taken into account. The current pace of Russian production of military equipment means that it would be possible to quickly replenish existing units with equipment as soon as the fighting in Ukraine ends.[9]

There is thus a time gap of a few years that Russia could exploit for military actions in our vicinity, before Sweden and other allies have time to implement planned rearmament programs. In Sweden and in most other NATO states, these programs very often have a focus that means that they should have had an effect around 2030, or later.[10] The risk of Russian actions in the near future is accentuated by the Part I of “In the near future” described external developments where Russia may be tempted to test NATO's, and ultimately the United States', willingness to intervene forcefully in support of its alliance members.

From a Swedish perspective, there are therefore strong reasons to accelerate the ongoing rearmament, where extraordinary measures may be required in the area of personnel and the possibilities for investment in the near future, for example. The current implicit hypothesis for Swedish, and also many other defense planning, that there is a "grace period" until 2030, and perhaps beyond, entails great risks for both Sweden and our neighbors.

NATO's military potential in the Nordic-Baltic region

This section aims primarily to highlight the importance of an American presence in creating a reasonably high deterrent potential, or if this were required to ward off a Russian attack. The following is therefore only a very rough outline of the forces that NATO could have at its disposal in the Nordic-Baltic region in the near future, in a few years, and in the longer term, a few years after 2030. In both cases, it is assumed that the alliance has received a few weeks' notice and that the necessary political decisions have been made to put the units on a war footing, for example to mobilise reservists.

The Northern Areas

In the coming years Norway and Sweden will each have their own incomplete brigade in the area plus some rifle units, one or more battalions.[11] Finland will likely be able to field a brigade plus a number of rifle battalions.[12] In terms of naval combat forces, only Norway of the Nordic countries can practically contribute to the High North, and then with around three frigates and three submarines.[13] It is not possible to report the strength of air forces in a particular area, as their high mobility means that they should be considered a resource for the entire Nordic-Baltic area. In total, it is estimated that the Nordic air forces, after a week or so of preparations, will be able to jointly deploy approximately ten air divisions, approximately 150 aircraft.[14] The fact that the number of ships and aircraft does not correspond to the countries' total holdings is due to the fact that availability is assumed to be around 75%.[15]

In addition to the resources reported above, reinforcements from other alliance members may be added. The Defence Committee states "After the necessary decisions have been made, the Defence Committee assesses that it may take days to weeks for allies to effectively deploy air forces in our part of Europe. Naval forces may take weeks to months and army forces months to be deployed to a relevant extent."[16] The exact extent of the reinforcements is impossible to specify as they depend on whether there are other areas where they may need to be deployed, or are deployed, at the given time. The vast majority of American units that may be relevant have more prepared tasks, in addition to the Northern Areas.

In five to ten years' time, it is primarily the availability of ground combat units that will increase, where Norway, in addition to reinforcing Brigade Nord, will set up an infantry brigade in Finnmark. In general, support functions such as artillery, air defense, etc. will also be strengthened.[17] The ships in the Norwegian Navy will be replaced with new ones by 2036, possibly also expanding with another frigate and a submarine.[18] The extent to which the Finnish combat forces in northern Finland will be expanded is unclear, however, there is reason to assume that the units' equipment will be modernized over time, for example through the supply of drones, more modern artillery, etc.[19] For the Swedish part, there will be a mechanized brigade available in the area in the early stages, two Norrlandjäger battalions and some smaller territorial defense units.[20] It may also be appropriate to deploy a mechanized brigade (MekB 4) from southern Sweden for operations in the High North.[21] Regarding air forces, they are assessed to be of the same size as previously (above) but have been gradually modernized in terms of armament, countermeasures, etc. The air defense function has probably been generally strengthened in all countries.

How large, mainly American, reinforcements can be expected will always depend on the bigger picture, Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean region and perhaps even Asia. However, an approach could be in the order of two or three brigades and various reinforcement units, such as attack helicopters.[22] In addition, perhaps a British brigade could also be considered. This would be consistent with exercise patterns and advance storage of equipment in Norway. Regarding reinforcements with air units, it is considered that aircraft carrier-based aircraft are mainly relevant. Here too, the assumptions are fraught with great uncertainties, but operations from a dozen air divisions with a total of just over a hundred aircraft could be possible.[23]

Regarding reinforcements, especially from the USA, will there be clear and well-prepared reinforcement alternatives? If so, the timing may be somewhat more favorable than in the near future, as more careful planning has been carried out and certain equipment may have been pre-stocked. This requires continued American involvement in the defense of Europe. Otherwise, if reinforcements can be expected at all, will they have to be improvised, something that cannot be calculated in advance, several months? The march for Operation Desert Storm in 1991 took in practice five months in an environment where there were no threats to sea or air transport and no other operational directions needed to be handled.[24]

The overall assessment is that there is a time gap in the coming years where NATO's defense of the High North is weak, which offers Russia the opportunity to achieve success with a military attack. This is assuming that the war in Ukraine can be ended quickly and forces can be released for such an operation, and that the units to be used in this direction are prioritized in terms of the supply of personnel and equipment. In the event that the Nordic armament plans are fully implemented, that is, in the early or mid-2030s, and the US remains prepared to intervene on a fairly large scale, it is doubtful whether Russia can create sufficient capability to succeed in an attack. This is assuming that the Nordic countries have units that can be seized early to such an extent that American reinforcements can be supplied before the endurance of the Nordic units has declined too far.

Baltic states

The Baltic states' own forces and the presence of allied states in the near future can be roughly summarized: Estonia barely two brigades and an allied battalion battle group plus a fairly extensive territorial defense organization[25]; Latvia an incomplete brigade and four battle groups for territorial defense with a total of about 12 soldiers as well as an allied battalion battle group and also reinforcement units from various countries, for example air defense[26]; Lithuania three brigades of varying quality, with a German battalion combat group included in one of the brigades.[27]

Extensive rearmament and modernization programs are underway in all countries. However, it is uncertain whether the volume of units will increase to any significant extent in the future, as the countries' low population numbers constitute a limitation.[28] However, the units will probably undergo a significant improvement in quality.

The aim in the Baltic countries is to organize a division in each country by around 2030.[29] The current allied battalion battle groups will grow to be able to constitute an allied brigade in each country.[30] In Lithuania, preparations are underway to have a German brigade based there permanently.[31] Regarding future reinforcement possibilities, the picture is unclear, but a reinforcement option with an American division seems reasonable. It should be noted here that a combination of sea and air transports across the Baltic Sea will then be required, which will require support from naval and air forces. An operation that will also require Swedish participation. In conjunction with repelling a Russian attack on the Baltics, American air support is a vital component, something that will most likely also affect Swedish territory.

Another option for bringing reinforcements to the Baltics is via the so-called Suwalki Corridor. Poland, with its six divisions planned for 2030, would be an important contributor there. American units arriving in Europe via northern German ports could also be part of such a solution.[32] However, Russia's ability to seriously hinder an advance through the Suwalki Corridor from the Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus makes it questionable whether help can arrive in time.

All three Baltic states have begun fortification measures of various kinds to strengthen border defenses against Russia and Belarus since spring 2024. The measures include preparations to blow up roads, build combat vehicle barriers, etc.[33]

Finland[34]

Finland is undoubtedly the country in the Nordic-Baltic area that is best prepared to fight a war. Depending on how brigades are counted and defined, the Finnish field army could be said to comprise around eleven brigades plus a large number of functional units such as air defense, field work, logistics, etc. The Finnish artillery is strikingly strong with its approximately 700 pieces and the same number of mortars. In addition, there are 200 - 000 trained reservists. The navy with its eight surface combat ships, etc. and the air force with 300 F 000 Hornets are modern. In addition, four of the ships and all aircraft will be replaced by 64.

JEF -Joint Expeditionary Force[35]

Despite its name, the JEF is not a force in the sense that it is a unit with a certain predetermined composition. Instead, it is an association of ten countries: the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, the Netherlands, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which, under British leadership, are prepared to allocate military resources to deal with different types of crises. The JEF is not formally affiliated with either NATO or the EU, and operations do not need to involve participation from all countries; in principle, 1+1 is sufficient. Since operations will thus be tailored to each occasion, and do not require consensus, the JEF is probably best suited to meet different types of hybrid attacks. This may apply to attacks where there are divided opinions about how such an attack should be met, or where there may be legal and political obstacles in one of the countries. Its ad hoc composition means that the JEF is not optimal for quickly meeting a military attack.

Assessment of the importance of American support

American support is crucial to warding off a Russian attack on the Nordic-Baltic area.

In the northern regions This affects, above all, the difference between having to give up terrain and repelling an attack. That is, the Nordic countries can in the future, around the mid-2030s, assuming continued rearmament measures, with their own resources probably delay a breakthrough for a fairly long time, but will ultimately be forced to give up large areas of land if American support is lacking. The latter will probably lead to Russia achieving the operational goal of expanding its air defense zone a few hundred kilometers westward.

The Russian chances of success are also time-dependent. The earlier an attack can be carried out, the greater the chances of success. An attack in, for example, 2028, even with second-rate units, is likely to have a greater chance of success compared to an attack a few years into the 2030s with better units. In both cases, it is likely that American support with a few brigades and attack aircraft (or equivalent drone operations) would contribute greatly to reducing the areas of land that Russia could potentially conquer.

In the Baltics, American support could make the difference between the countries' survival or their incorporation into Russia. The countries do not have and cannot be expected to create their own ability to repel a Russian attack. The only country that has the ability to help the Baltic countries with substantial resources in time, before so much terrain has been lost that reinforcements can no longer be brought in, is the USA. Initially with flying systems of various kinds, then with qualified ground combat units which must, however, be able to be brought in fairly quickly. Here, as in the High North, the threat is most acute in the coming years, before NATO member states have had time to implement their rearmament programs around 2030 or later. However, here the threat will only decrease to a limited extent despite the alliance's increased strength. The problems of bringing allied reinforcements in time will remain and the geographical depth for conducting operations will still be dangerously small. Russia's ability to easily and quickly bring in large forces will always be better than NATO's.

The threat to Finland is primarily linked to the threat to the High North. Southern Finland will also be exposed to various forms of attack linked to a conflict in the region, although the Finnish combat forces there are considered to have such good capabilities that the need for American support is not urgent. However, it must be ensured that military supplies can be supplied as they are consumed.

Sweden and Norway will most certainly be drawn into a war that takes place in the High North or in the Baltics. American support in various forms would then be needed, especially in the short term, a few years. In the longer term, both countries could acquire sufficient capability to defend their own territories for a certain period of time, and also be able to contribute to the defense of their closest neighboring countries. Something that is considered entirely possible if the will is there. At the end of the report, some measures that should be taken are outlined. At the same time, the effect of the Nordic defense forces' capabilities would increase if American so-called "force multipliers" also formed part of the alliance's potential in the Nordic-Baltic area, for example, air refueling, various qualified intelligence systems such as satellite reconnaissance, etc.

American choices – an analysis

Reduced American involvement in Europe

A clear need for increased joint European defense capabilities is required if no or only very limited American assistance can be expected. Of course, there is a risk that countries will choose different models of defense solutions due to the lack of the overall direction that a stable alliance creates. Hopefully, however, all capitals will realize that one is not strong alone. Planning for larger European countries such as France or the United Kingdom to be able to replace the support that the United States can deliver is, however, moderately realistic. This requires that these countries expand their military organizations to a very large extent, and then with capabilities that are suitable for fighting a major ground war. Something that does not only apply to ground combat units but also requires, for example, refueling and radar reconnaissance aircraft, transport aircraft, protection of maritime transport, etc. Capabilities where Europe is currently heavily dependent on the United States. A possible remaining European NATO or EU must then also develop into fully-fledged military alliances, with all that this entails in terms of joint planning, command, etc. Perhaps not entirely straightforward with the different perceptions that already prevail today regarding the view of Russia. Depending on how seriously a reduced American involvement in Europe is judged to affect the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent, there may also be a need to replace it with a European one. At the same time, the question arises, what is the alternative? If the will exists, it is nevertheless realistic that countries such as the UK and France could implement rearmament programs that could partly replace the American presence in Europe. The necessary, practical conditions exist. The question that remains is whether it is a realistic goal to try to reach a common "European solution" or whether the focus in the near future should be to create regional solutions within the framework of a downsized NATO to compensate for a possible reduced American involvement in Europe. What will have the fastest effect?

In addition to greatly developing the ability to fight a war primarily in Eastern and Northern Europe, Europe would also be required to radically increase its ability to protect transport flows, primarily over the seas. A task that is currently mainly being solved by the United States. Creating that capability within a reasonable time frame, a couple of years, coupled with a significantly reduced American commitment in and for Europe in the near future, is an impossibility.

From a Nordic perspective, a reduced American commitment in Europe would mean that all Nordic countries would be forced to greatly strengthen both their endurance and the volume of units. This would require significantly more ground combat units, a greatly increased ability to challenge Russia's naval dominance in both the Norwegian Sea and the Baltic Sea, and generally stronger air defense. Logistics in the form of stockpiling various supplies such as ammunition and fuel would need to be radically expanded, as pre-planned and fairly quickly implemented support in these respects from the United States could no longer be a planning requirement. In addition, it would lead to a need to build up capabilities in areas where the United States is in practice the "system owner", for example senior management and certain intelligence functions, including satellite reconnaissance. In addition, it would probably be wise to reduce dependence on American weapons systems. This is well illustrated by the restrictions imposed on Ukraine regarding the use of American long-range missiles.

From a European perspective, the consequences would be similar to those in the Nordic countries; all countries would need to significantly strengthen their combat forces in order to help deter Russia from using military means to realize its imperial ambitions. This would compensate for the deterrent factor that is currently in some respects decisive (apart from nuclear weapons) – American troops stationed in Europe, which, if attacked, would automatically engage the United States in Europe's defense.

The command structures would need to be Europeanized. MARCOM in Northwood and AIRCOM in Ramstein and MCLCC in Mikkeli would have fewer units at their disposal and some vital capabilities, such as intelligence, would disappear.[36] The tasks to be solved would, however, remain essentially the same. It would also possibly be necessary to create a common Nordic command structure capable of leading all types of combat forces. The need for such a Nordic command level would depend mainly on the extent to which the leading European countries would be prepared to join something resembling a European defence alliance. The less there is of that will, the greater the need for regional solutions.

However, from an American perspective, what a greatly reduced involvement in Europe would mean, it can be stated that a number of problems arise for the United States as well.

The most serious is likely to be a significant reduction in the US ability to monitor the activities of Russian strategic nuclear submarines. The submarines are mainly based on the Kola Peninsula and operate in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. Both Norway and the UK play an important role in both peace and war in keeping these submarines under control. China's growing interest in the Arctic, and the increased opportunities for shipping in the Northeast Passage, are also problems that it is in the US's interest to be able to deal with. It is difficult to believe that the US would want to give up the opportunity to use British and Norwegian territory in both peace and war.

Europe's importance as a hub for US operations in other parts of the world should not be underestimated either. For example, the US headquarters for operations in Africa is located in Stuttgart. Sigonella in Sicily is an important base for drone operations in the Middle East.[37] Ramstein in Germany, with its 56 people in various subordinate units, is a transportation and logistics hub that supports American operations globally.[38]

Likewise, it would probably be quite difficult for American decision-makers to put themselves in a situation where they would only have limited insight into planned major European military operations, and where they would jeopardize well-established cooperation models on which they themselves are heavily dependent.

Overall, there is reason to assume that the United States will continue to have a fairly extensive presence in Europe in the future. The greatest danger in an American withdrawal, even if limited, is if it occurs in the near future – before various European countries have had time to implement their rearmament plans, both those already planned and those that will become necessary as a result of the American presence decreasing.

Continued American involvement in Europe – NATO more active “out of area”

It is obvious that the US will bear the brunt of the burden in the defense of Europe. It is not only a question of a reasonable distribution of costs, but also a need for investments in other directions. Especially in the Pacific region, where China has become a serious threat to the security architecture that has prevailed there since the end of World War II.

From an American perspective, reallocating resources from Europe to Asia may then appear tempting. However, Europe's lack of will and ability to convert its economic and industrial strength into military hard currency, that is, the ability to deter Russia from using military force against European states on its own, puts the United States in a dilemma. What is more worthwhile: continuing to invest large resources to contribute to the defense of Europe against a potential aggressor who, in American eyes, is a second-rate nation but can also count on support in dealing with China, or gathering its own resources to deal with an increasingly strong China, the only real global competitor?

In addition to the reasons outlined above, to be able to handle the threat from Russian strategic nuclear submarines and to utilize Europe as a platform for operations in the Middle East and Africa, there are a number of other factors that speak in favor of continued close military cooperation between the United States and Europe:

There is a commonality of values between the United States and Europe that means that the United States can often count on European support in various security policy contexts, such as sanctions against rogue states and the fight against terrorism.
The US military strength is declining relative to the rest of the world, which increases the need for support from allies.[39]
The US defense industry no longer has the capacity it had during the Cold War, neither in terms of production nor domestic access to necessary components. The US is dependent on allies.[40]

For the European side, this opens up the possibility of supporting the US militarily in various contexts where the US's own security depends on allies in exchange for a substantial American presence in Europe. Militarily, this could include supporting US operations aimed at protecting common European and American interests. This could include safe sea routes (freedom of navigation) or combating global terrorism. The European members of NATO would have to adapt parts of their defence forces to "out of area operations".

From a Swedish and Nordic perspective, the countries' armed forces would then need to be provided with capabilities that allow operations far from their home countries. If we look at what the Nordic countries could contribute, it should primarily be capabilities where we can supplement what larger states have. This could involve naval capabilities adapted for more coastal operations, "brown water capabilities". Special units of various kinds, including units with certain advanced technology, or which apply methods that differ from the American ones. Transport aircraft and other air units with special characteristics that may constitute a shortage should also be part of the Swedish palette for "out of area operations".[41].

The need for permanent personnel, primarily soldiers and sailors, would also increase, as it is difficult to imagine that Sweden would send conscripts to fight abroad if Sweden was not at war. The need for personnel could be partially met by people who were employed for a shorter period of time, for example conscripts who have completed their basic training. In principle, this type of task would not be new for the Armed Forces. They could be compared to the Swedish operations in Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden. An important point when assessing which capabilities it may be appropriate to develop specifically for this type of operation is that they can also be used in the event of a crisis or war in the immediate area.

Overall, a sustained American presence in Europe must be seen with both American and European eyes. It must be beneficial to both parties. This means that the design of the American presence in Europe does not only depend on unilateral American considerations and actions, we can also influence American assessments through our actions.

Two scenarios

To illustrate a reduced American involvement in Europe in two time perspectives, two scenarios have been created.

The first is if Russia were to choose to immediately after the war in Ukraine ends (this does not take a position on how the war ends, only that Russian units can be freed up for an attack in another direction) choose to utilize the resources available at that time to exploit the situation that has arisen because the US no longer intends to contribute to any greater extent to the defense of Europe. Here designed as a scenario which involves an attack on the Baltics, plus Gotland, in 2028. It is also a time when the ongoing rearmament programs in most NATO countries have not had time to be completed.

The second The scenario implies that Russia, after the war in Ukraine has ended, carries out a comprehensive reorganization and also a numerical reinforcement of its military force. The scenario is therefore set for 2032 and covers the entire Nordic-Baltic area. At this stage, most European NATO countries are also considered to be fairly advanced in their rearmament programs. An analysis of such a scenario can therefore provide an idea of Europe's possibilities to handle the Russian threat itself in a situation where American support is limited.

The conclusions drawn from both scenarios will primarily concern factors that affect Sweden.

Scenario 1 – Baltics 2028

Purpose

The purpose of the scenario is to, in conjunction with a reduced American involvement in Europe, attempt to illuminate the consequences of a Russian attack based on the principle: it is better to attack with moderately qualified units when the opponent is unprepared than to attack with high-quality units when the opponent is well prepared.

Background

The new administration in the US has declared that the defense of the alliance's European members is primarily a European responsibility and has canceled plans to reinforce Europe with ground forces. Some units have also been brought home to the US. The US remains in the alliance, but sees its new role mainly as supporting the Europeans with "force multipliers" such as refueling aircraft, satellite information, and limited air and naval operations. This is while waiting for Europe to build up its own similar capabilities. In Moscow, this development is interpreted as meaning that the risks of incorporating the Baltic states into Russia by military means are limited. Military, since there is no need to count on any more extensive American efforts and the probability of an American response with nuclear weapons is considered very low.

Since the ceasefire imposed on Ukraine in 2026, Russia has been very purposefully preparing for the eventuality that the new American administration would reduce its involvement in Europe. This was one of the reasons why Russia accepted the ceasefire; it would open up opportunities to decisively “crack” the credibility of both NATO and the United States as a security guarantor. Two years later, the Russian forces that were withdrawn from Ukraine (risk-free, as Ukraine is unlikely to attack Russia), approximately 300 soldiers, have therefore been supplemented and equipped with new equipment. The measures have been aimed at ensuring that the units are “good enough”, that is, achieving the level of quality that is possible within two years with weapons systems that are already mass-produced, not the most modern imaginable. Something that is considered sufficient to meet a (European) NATO that is only halfway through its rearmament, where many programs are aimed at 000 and beyond. At the same time, the large-scale “Armament Plan 2030” has been clearly trumpeted to the outside world. This is to convey the image that it is only after 2032 that Russia would be capable of carrying out a new military operation on a larger scale. The “good enough” units are now available to carry out an operation against the Baltics at a few weeks’ notice.

Various types of hybrid actions, primarily in Europe, have also been intensified with the aim of creating internal contradictions in different countries, but also to make decision-making more difficult within both NATO and the EU. For example, both left-wing and right-wing extremist groups and also extreme religious groups have been actively helped to carry out attacks of various kinds. In order to contribute to dividing NATO's attention as much as possible, a campaign has also been run in the past six months in which Ukraine is accused of violating the peace agreement and where Russia is now threatening military action. China has also contributed by increasing pressure on Taiwan and the coastal states in the South China Sea, thereby helping the US shift its focus towards Asia.

In January 2028, Russia assessed that the relative strength between NATO and Russia was such that an attack on the Baltics had a fairly high probability of success, as Western rearmament, mostly aimed at 2030 and beyond, had not yet led to any radical improvements in the alliance's military capabilities. The advantage Russia has, primarily in terms of numbers and war experience and partly also in terms of technology, for example in telewarfare, will also decrease over time, making it better to strike now. The various hybrid actions are also considered to have contributed to undermining the political ability to make decisions, especially in Europe. The upcoming US presidential election in the fall of 2028, linked to the major security challenges in Asia, is also considered to contribute to the fact that NATO's still leading member will not react decisively and with great force in connection with an attack on the Baltics.

The Russian leadership therefore decides to carry out an operation directed at the Baltic States in the spring of 2028. As part of this operation, Gotland will be taken to hinder any reinforcement transports to the Baltic States. The Swedish Navy and Air Force's ability to intervene will be limited as far as possible.

Development

About three weeks before the attack, there are indications that Russia may be preparing an attack on the Baltics. However, the signals are by no means unambiguous, as there are also ongoing military provocations against Ukraine and various diplomatic overtures and disinformation campaigns in the media, which make it difficult to create a sufficiently unambiguous picture to justify large and costly increases in readiness within NATO. However, some increases in readiness are taking place in most Eastern European countries.

About a week before the attack, the intelligence is so clear that Poland and the Baltic countries are mobilizing parts of their defense forces. The western NATO members (including Sweden) are more hesitant to take such drastic measures but are taking certain measures to increase readiness. The countries, including Great Britain and Canada, that contribute to the multinational brigades in the Baltics (one per country) begin transferring the components of the brigades that are not in the Baltics permanently. An American request is also received from Sweden to base about twenty American fighter jets and some tanker aircraft in Sweden within the framework of the DCA agreement. Something that is approved by the government. All in all, measures that are estimated to take about a week to implement. The purpose is to have a crisis-reducing effect and to emphasize that the alliance stands behind the Baltics. In Sweden, the Supreme Commander orders "Givakt", that is, that readiness is increased within the framework of the peace organization's resources. Among other things, aircraft and ships are dispersed to reduce the impact of a possible attack. The Swedish battalion in Latvia is also raising its readiness.

Three days before the attack (which no one in the West knows for sure if it will come), an American aircraft carrier battle group arrives in the southern part of the Norwegian Sea. In Sweden, the government orders the mobilization of a small number of units, including the two air defense battalions and units intended for Gotland. The units have 78 hours of mobilization time.[42]

The units on Gotland largely consist of half a mechanized battalion, a reduced rifle battalion and one anti-aircraft, artillery and engineer company each.[43] In addition, there are also home guard units. The status of the units varies as the organization will not be fully developed until 2030.[44] Of the two mobilized air defense battalions, one is grouped to protect the base area that the American air force will use and the other to protect the Stockholm area.

The attack on the Baltics and Gotland will begin simultaneously with extensive missile attacks on the morning of May XX, 2028. The battle plan for the Baltics is not reported here.

The operation against Sweden includes missile attacks against the base(s) where the US Air Force is based, Swedish air bases and against known military infrastructure such as aircraft workshops, fixed radar stations, etc. Attacks and sabotage operations are also directed at civilian infrastructure such as electricity and water supplies. Drones of various types are also used in these operations.

Two submarines are located west of Gotland with the task of sinking any transports from the mainland to the island.

For the attack on Gotland, the following is planned:

a Spetsnaz company,
a mechanized airborne battalion,
a reduced marine infantry brigade,
two "drone companies" (with both drone and anti-drone capabilities, including EW),
an attack helicopter company,
an anti-aircraft missile battalion,
a coastal robot battalion,
two ro-ro vessels, and
four landing craft.

The operation is initially supported, for about twelve hours, by air forces from Kaliningrad and continuously by long-range drones for reconnaissance and weapons operations.[45]

The Russian plan for the attack on Gotland roughly involves the following elements.

In connection with the initial missile attacks

extensive air movements are being carried out with bombers and attack aircraft, which appear to be heading towards southern Sweden, the Stockholm area and Bornholm (the operations are generally carried out at high altitude to avoid being fired upon by air defenses grouped in the Baltics), the aim is to mislead NATO as to where a possible Russian attack could take place,
two civilian ro-ro vessels deviate from their course and run into Slite and Kappelshamn respectively about an hour later. Together they carry two naval infantry battalions and an air defense and a coastal robot battalion,
sets four landing ships and four corvettes that are exercising in the southern Baltic Sea on course for Gotland, where they can be expected to arrive within approximately five hours, carrying a naval infantry battalion,
takes off about ten IL-76 transport aircraft from Kaliningrad with an air landing battalion and begins the air landing on Gotland just under an hour later,
The attack helicopter unit also takes off from Kaliningrad and arrives at Gotland about an hour later (it is accompanied by some large transport helicopters carrying fuel and ammunition), and
The Spetsnaz unit carries out a number of sabotage and attacks, primarily targeting military stores and the island's electricity supply. It also operates a number of drones.

The Russian plan is of the nature of win or lose, where the initial operation must lead to a decisive success. Ideally, it should lead to the occupation of the whole of Gotland within a few days, but at least to the northern part of the island being used for the grouping of air defense and naval missile units. The attacking force can hardly be expected to be reinforced after more extensive fighting begins in the Baltic Sea area. Only after the Baltics have been occupied can it be assumed that the units on the island can be reinforced.

The attack on the Baltics is initially carried out with around six divisions plus corps and army resources such as missile units, etc., a total of around 150 men, in addition to extensive air forces. The battle plan is not presented here. However, it is obvious that the force ratio of around 000:2 in general, Russia versus NATO, is unfavourable for NATO since it is Russia that chooses the time and place for the attack. In the chosen direction of force concentration, the Russian superiority can easily be 1:3. If various types of Baltic local defence units are also included, the force ratio may appear to be more favourable, but these units lack the mobility required to be able to quickly redeploy in the direction where the attacker is concentrating forces. Overall, without the support of another one or two reasonably qualified divisions and strong air support, the risk is imminent that Russia could occupy most of the Baltics within a few weeks.

Although assumptions about notice periods, political willingness to make inconvenient decisions, etc. will always be associated with great uncertainties, there is much evidence that Gotland requires special solutions in order to be able to meet several of the scenarios that could be conceivable for an attack on the island. Being dependent on the supply of units and supplies from the mainland in order to be able to put the units on the island on a war footing is not acceptable. Solutions should be considered here where, among other things, the units on the island are staffed mainly with people who also live on the island. This could mean that the mobilization time for the majority of the units on Gotland could be 24 hours. This would certainly mean that the relative conscription on the island would be higher than on the mainland, but this "injustice" can probably be reduced with a suitable incentive system, and must be weighed against what a loss of the island could mean.

The number of units on the island is not sufficient. A prospective attacker, depending on the context in which an attack is carried out and the willingness to take risks, can deploy a total of around a “light” mechanized brigade against the island. In order to make the risk of failure unacceptably high, the Swedish units on the island should therefore be doubled based on current planning. The supply of, among other things, an air defense battalion with mixed high-altitude and low-altitude capabilities appears to be a given. Even if we could count on American support, it appears risky to count on, for example, American air defense units being supplied to the island in time. With the development of drone capabilities that has occurred in the Russian organization during the war in Ukraine, it is more than urgent to provide Swedish ground combat units with various types of countermeasures. This on Gotland as well as elsewhere in the organization.

To ensure that several NATO countries feel a personal commitment to the Baltic Sea region, Gotland should also have a permanent allied presence. Preferably from countries that have units stationed in the Baltics and that thus have an interest in maintaining connections to the Baltics. In this time perspective (2028), Sweden lacks opportunities to strengthen the Swedish presence in the Baltics in any tangible way, beyond taking limited measures to increase the combat value of the Swedish battalion that is there on a rotational basis.

Scenario 2 – The entire Nordic-Baltic area in 2032

Purpose

The scenario aims to, in conjunction with a reduced American involvement in Europe, highlight the problems NATO may face in the Nordic-Baltic area in a time perspective when Russia can be assessed to have rebuilt its military capabilities on a large scale, and introduced lessons learned from Ukraine widely into the organization.

Background

After the war in Ukraine ended (no position is taken here on how, only that Russia can now gather forces in other directions), the focus of the Russian rearmament program, since the US has essentially withdrawn from the task of participating in the defense of Europe, is now to incorporate the Baltic states into the Russian empire and to split the EU and what is seen in Russia as “remainder NATO”. The overall principle for the development of the Russian military in the period up to 2032 has therefore been to strengthen the offensive capability in the northwest, the Nordic-Baltic region, and otherwise be able to repel an attack in the west, towards Poland and Germany. The reform in 2024 to recreate the Leningrad military district and to restructure the 14th Army Corps (Northern Areas) and the 11th Army Corps (Kaliningrad) into armies may have been a first step in that direction.[46] [47]

Various analysts have given the time frame for a Russian rearmament program, after the war in Ukraine ends, as between five and ten years.[48] In addition to this, Russia has also announced that the army will be expanded to 1,5 million people, an increase of approximately 300 since previous goals.[49] In this scenario, the Russian combat forces in the High North are estimated to include around thirty submarines (of which 20 are attack submarines), also around thirty surface combat ships, ten landing ships, a total of approximately 200 fighter and attack aircraft, aircraft and helicopters for anti-submarine warfare, as well as a marine infantry brigade and the 14th Army with two motorized/mechanized divisions and corps units.[50] In the direction of the Baltics, it is assumed that in the order of six (Baltic) plus three divisions (Kaliningrad), plus corps and army resources, can be deployed initially.

Many European rearmament plans cover a similar time span, just over five years or more, for example the capability goals in the Swedish defense decision of December 17, 2024.

The US has now regrouped most of its former combat forces in Europe to Asia or to America. However, it has not left NATO. Only certain staff and logistics functions remain in Europe, mainly focused on supporting US operations in the Middle East and Africa. However, the US conducts fairly extensive naval operations in the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean to monitor the activities of the Russian Northern Navy. This is done in close cooperation with Norway and the UK. American aircraft and ships regularly use bases in both countries. The possibilities of redeploying larger forces to Europe at short notice are limited as the previous supplies of pre-stored equipment and other supplies such as ammunition have been dismantled.

NATO's European members gradually increased their defense investments in the late 2020s to adapt their capabilities to meet an aggressive Russia and compensate for the sharply reduced American military presence. Most NATO allies have at this time reached a level where they allocate approximately 3,5% of GDP to defense purposes. It should be noted here that seven years is a fairly limited time to acquire new qualified systems such as ships and aircraft, to the extent that they are not already fully designed at the beginning of the period. Of the defense forces that are of greatest interest from a Swedish perspective, the United Kingdom is assumed at this time to have the ability to allocate five to six brigades to the Nordic-Baltic area within a month (assuming that one or more of these are not needed elsewhere).[51] An aircraft carrier group and a number of frigates may also be deployed in the Nordic area. The Norwegian defense plan from 5 April 2024 proposes significant reinforcements of the Norwegian defense by 2036, including a total of three brigades (currently barely one), the frigates having been replaced, the air defense having been expanded, etc.[52] It is assumed here that most of these measures have been taken in response to security policy developments. The Finnish Defence Forces' maneuver units have increased to twelve modern brigades by providing modern equipment to former "local defence brigades". In addition, the local defence forces, comprising a large number of independent battalions and companies, totalling just over 150 people, have also been provided with new weapon systems. The Finnish artillery, with its approximately 000 pieces, has been modernised over time.[53]

The Baltic states are believed to have been able to create through forced rearmament programs: Estonia, two modernly equipped brigades and a number of local defense battalions comprising approximately 18 people[54]; Latvia, one brigade and some independent battalions and four “local defense brigades” with a total of about 12 people[55]; Lithuania three brigades and six local defense battalions[56]. In each country there is also a mixed allied brigade and a divisional staff. In all the Baltic countries, the border defense has been strengthened with various fortification measures on a fairly large scale. In addition to destroying communications, extensive mining, which can be laid over a period of a few days, has also been prepared as a measure to delay the advance of an attacker.

Overall, this means that the aggressor, Russia, will be twice as superior to the forces deployed in the Baltics in terms of qualified field units. Here, the Russian superiority in artillery systems and air forces must also be taken into account.

In this time perspective, Poland is estimated to have six divisions, three of which could be deployed in the Baltic direction.[57] Germany is considered to have completed the organization of three divisions. [58] However, for the units to be effective in the Baltics, they must be able to successfully attack and advance through the "Suwalki Corridor".

All of the above countries are estimated to have introduced various types of drones on a wide scale in their organizations by 2032.

For the Swedish part, it is assumed that the defense decision from 2024 has been fully implemented, and that the measures proposed at the end of this document have hopefully also been taken.

Development

The Russian leadership will decide in the New Year 2032 to incorporate the Baltic states into Russia. In connection with this, they want to make it more difficult for NATO to intervene against the Russian base systems on the Kola Peninsula and naval forces in the Barents Sea.

During the spring and summer of 2032, several extensive military exercises will be carried out in Russia, mainly in three directions, Ukraine, the Baltics and the Arctic. Several are interpreted in the West as possible preparations for possible attacks. NATO takes certain measures to increase readiness at each opportunity. This also applies to the exercises that begin at the end of July, but to a more limited extent than before.[59] A week into August, it is starting to look more likely that there may be real attack preparations in all three directions. However, it is difficult to determine to what extent everything that is seen is part of a real buildup and what may be parts of a sham operation aimed at keeping NATO in uncertainty about the real direction of attack, or whether the activity is once again aimed at putting pressure on Western politicians to take unpopular and costly contingency measures such as mobilizing reservists, now in the middle of the European holiday month. Throughout the year, various types of sabotage and influence operations have been carried out in large parts of Western Europe, power cables both on land and at sea are destroyed, the media is flooded with “fake news” etc.

On 11 August, the available information appears so worrying that several NATO countries decide to increase their military readiness. In most cases, however, these are measures within the framework of the peace organization's resources, including preparations being made to transport planned reinforcements from Great Britain to the High North and the Baltics. It is holiday season in Europe and it is still uncertain whether a war is imminent, which is why the political will to call up reservists is limited. In the Baltic states, Poland and Finland, however, fairly extensive call-ups are taking place. In Sweden, the Supreme Commander orders "Givakt" which, among other things, means the distribution of more important equipment, increased mobilization site readiness, increased command and staff readiness, etc. However, no one can yet be sure that there will really be an attack, and if so, where. Opinions are divided.

On 18 August, it appears that an attack may be imminent against the Northern Areas and the Baltics. The available intelligence indicates that the Northern Areas appear to be primarily threatened, among other things, the majority of submarines and surface combatants based there have gone to sea, loading appears to be underway at the landing ships, the units in Pechenga and Alakurti appear to be leaving their peacetime deployment areas and moving towards the Finnish border. In connection with the Baltics, including Kaliningrad, military activity is also high, but there has been no advance of larger units to directly adjacent to the border areas. In this situation, Finland is mobilizing a number of its field units and some local defense units (here the mobilization time is assumed to be around 78 hours). Norway is mobilizing both of its northern brigades, etc. Great Britain is beginning the transfer of a brigade to Northern Norway and a brigade to the Baltics (both are expected to be in place within a week as they are well-prepared alternatives). The British, German and Norwegian navies begin anti-submarine warfare operations in the Norwegian Sea and the North Sea (however, without permission to use force). Sweden is carrying out partial mobilization, which broadly means that: in the army, Mekb19, the two air defense battalions and units on Gotland, as well as resources to support the Swedish presence in Latvia, are mobilized; in the navy, the base units and an amphibious battalion, in the air force, the base battalions and combat control units. The mobilization time for the units is assumed to be 78 hours.[60]

The Russian plan of attack is broadly as follows:

August

– Surprise/coup attack on Gotland (see previous scenario).

– Robot and aerial combat of air bases and other military and civilian infrastructure in both the Baltics and the Nordic countries, in the latter case concentrated on cutting off land connections to upper Norrland.

– Sabotage and IT attacks against the electricity grids in the Nordic countries and the Baltics.

August

- Initiated attack through northern Finland towards northern Sweden with the aim of advancing the air defense zone around the bases on the Kola Peninsula to a line: western Finnmark - Kiruna - Luleå.

– Attack to “close” the Suwalki Corridor.

– Began attack against all three Baltic countries with a concentration of forces in the direction of the Latvian Baltic coast in order to prevent the transport of Allied reinforcements as early as possible.

– Continued missile and air strikes on military targets and civilian infrastructure.

August – September 15th

– Continued attacks in all directions.

– Gradually transporting additional units from both the Moscow Military District and the Central Military District.

– Preliminary date for when the goals will be achieved: September 15th.

Analysis

NATO is inferior in strength in both directions, the High North and the Baltics, both in the short and long term. An inferiority that could have been largely remedied later, if American support had been available. However, the situation could be made manageable even within the framework of purely European efforts if there was the ambition to implement expanded armament measures compared to current planning.

In the North, the problem is generally the lack of ground combat units and long-range combat systems, and the fact that reinforcements that can be provided by allies take a long time to get there. This means that the Nordic countries must initially be prepared to delay a Russian advance with their own forces. In the scenario outlined, a few more brigades that can be seized early, perhaps two or three, would make a big difference. In order to have sufficient endurance and also the ability to strike the attacker, further reinforcements are required. Here, Britain in particular stands out as the country that could meet that need, possibly also France. Functioning connections via Sweden are a prerequisite for successful operations in the High North. The geographical distances also mean that long-range combat systems, which are generally in short supply, could be a decisive contribution.

The defense of the Baltics is more problematic. Russia has better opportunities there to deploy large forces and there is also no depth for NATO in the sense that it could sell terrain for time. The military geography in terms of roads and railways that facilitate an attacker's advance and logistics is also more favorable here from a Russian point of view than in the High North. The approximately three divisions that NATO would have in total in the Baltics after a week or so of warning (and decision on measures), before reinforcements are provided from other allies, is insufficient to ward off an attack, especially as they cannot be used collectively as a "corps" for combined efforts due to the very long border with Russia and Russia's ability to choose the direction of attack. There is therefore an urgent need for units capable of carrying out counterattacks, and that they can be provided by allies at an early stage. This assumes that the alliance has good opportunities to protect sea transport across the Baltic Sea. Various types of early aerial operations with aircraft and drones are a necessary contribution to a successful ground battle.

In both cases, the High North and the Baltics, strong air defense, perhaps primarily against drones, is a must.

When it comes to contributing ground combat units, Sweden and the UK appear to be the prime candidates, possibly also France. Sweden, with its geographical proximity, could also be first on site, thereby creating the time required for British and possibly French reinforcements to arrive.

A rough outline of what Sweden could (need) to contribute to make a "European NATO" credible in a scenario that takes place in the early 2030s, and where the US has largely wound down its involvement in Europe, could very roughly look like the following.

In addition to what is already stated in the defense decision of December 17, 2024, the war organization should be expanded with

two additional “light” brigades optimized for combat in the Northern Areas,
long-range combat systems primarily intended for combat in the north, including rocket artillery, drones, attack robots for the JAS system,
significantly expanded air defense for communication protection and for protection of the combat units,
divisional command and divisional units (artillery, engineers, etc.) to be able to lead and support the operation of two Swedish brigades in the Baltics,
long-range drones based on Gotland for operations in the Baltics,
four additional surface combatants optimized for maritime security,
four additional minesweepers to keep routes and ports open in the Baltic Sea area, and
two additional aviation divisions for primarily air defense tasks,
two more radar reconnaissance aircraft,
and air refueling capability.

The list may seem long, but in very rough terms it means approximately a fifty percent increase in the Swedish organization in relation to the current defense decision.

Conclusions

Generally

A reduced American commitment to NATO's defense of Europe would mean a significant reduction in NATO's conventional deterrence capabilities, which could entice Russia to test the alliance's cohesion while also incorporating countries that were previously part of the Russian empire.

Of particular concern is if an American reduction in the ability to act in Europe were to occur quickly, over a period of a few years. This would give Russia the opportunity to exploit the time gap that would arise between an American withdrawal and before European armament measures produce a concrete outcome in increased defense capability.

The European members of the alliance could, in about five years' time, without unreasonable sacrifices, take a series of measures that would largely compensate for the loss of American capabilities. However, this assumes that the political leaderships of the European members of NATO are prepared to very quickly increase defense spending to levels that were relevant in the 1980s, 3,5-4 of GDP.[61] The Baltic states and Poland are already there.

From a Northern European perspective, the biggest shortcomings are linked to the possibilities of reinforcing the Northern Areas to create endurance, and in the Baltic case to be able to stop an attack before losing the possibilities of receiving help. The difficulties in reinforcing the Baltics are probably the biggest and most serious military problem in the region, and thus the most serious concern when it comes to peace and stability in the Nordic-Baltic area. In addition, there is the problem of being able to meet an attack early, something that is fundamentally not a problem linked to the American presence, but a result of the Nordic and Baltic countries' lack of access to their own units. In the Finnish and Baltic cases, because the countries' potential has already been largely utilized, in the Swedish and Norwegian cases, because of a lack of willingness to contribute according to their ability.

The countries that could be considered to largely replace the American presence in the Nordic-Baltic space are the United Kingdom and France. In addition to having the potential to fairly quickly build up division-sized forces that could be deployed in the region, they are also nuclear weapons states, which can be seen as a major advantage in the event that the American nuclear deterrent were to lose credibility in Russian eyes. In this context, it will be very interesting to see what the British Strategic Defence Review, announced for spring 2025, will say about how the United Kingdom views its role in the defence of Europe.

In a situation where the American presence in Europe is expected to decrease, very close Nordic cooperation appears to be even more urgent. Here, a joint "Nordic command" should be considered, as the American-led JFC (Joint Force Command) in Norfolk may no longer be the optimal command function for the Nordic area in all respects.

Even if the American involvement in Europe may be radically reduced, the United States will continue to have security policy interests to protect in Europe. Having control over the Russian submarine-based second-strike capability in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean is primarily an American interest, less a European one. The possibilities for the United States to have bases in Europe to be able to act in the Middle East and Africa must also not be neglected. Europe and the United States have overlapping interests when it comes to, for example, combating terrorism, functioning trade flows and dealing with “rogue states”, which is why it is difficult to see a total decoupling between Europe and the United States in the security policy area.

For the Swedish part

The seriousness of the security policy situation, which could become even more difficult to manage in the event that American involvement in Europe were to decrease, and the slowness with which the previous defense decision (2020) was implemented, leads to the conclusion that the current defense decision (2024) should, roughly described, be supplemented as follows. With the goal of units and functions being fully organized by around 2032:

The army is being expanded with two brigades specially equipped and trained for combat in the High North, another divisional structure is being created with the aim of operating in the Baltics, air defense capabilities are being drastically expanded, the introduction of drones and countermeasures against drones is being aimed at ensuring that all field units and the Home Guard have a primary need for drones suitable for their type of operation within two years, and that the defense of Gotland is being strengthened with another mechanized battalion and an air defense battalion.
The navy is being expanded with another naval combat flotilla optimized for maritime security, mine clearance capabilities are being expanded with a number of additional ships, and another amphibious battalion is being organized.
The Air Force is expanded by retaining more JAS 39s so that it becomes possible to organize two more fighter divisions, two more radar reconnaissance aircraft are acquired, and aerial refueling aircraft are acquired.
The logistics function is being developed to be able to support a Swedish division in northern Finland and a reduced Swedish division (two mechanized brigades, etc.) in the Baltics.

Implementing the above changes, in addition to what is already stated in the 2024 defense decision, requires a different view of the implementation of operations than the current one.

Below are some changes that are probably required.

A crucial problem for implementing both current defense decisions and a further expansion of the war organization is the shortage of officers. This is both in the short and long term. Today, it takes four years to train an officer from scratch. It often then takes another year or two before the newly graduated officer is deployable. A total of perhaps five or six years. In today's security policy situation, this is unacceptable. The purely military qualifications for deployment to lower officer positions, such as platoon commander, should be obtainable through targeted training of the order of 2½-3 years (including an initial year as a conscript). Officer training must therefore be changed so that officers are deployable immediately after completing basic officer training and can also be completed in half the time compared to today. This requires significantly clearer recruitment towards and targeting of training towards intended war positions.[62]

The use of reserve officers in the war organization should increase sharply to free up active officers for positions that require their broader military expertise. The incentives for both training and remaining (and possibly returning) must be dramatically strengthened, preferably in a way that attracts attention within and outside the Armed Forces.

The so-called sequential establishment of units is not appropriate in today's security policy situation. The entire envisaged organisation must be trained simultaneously and as quickly as possible. The units may be set up gradually as personnel and materiel become available, with the units and their usefulness growing gradually. This will often lead to personnel being available but materiel being lacking to a greater or lesser extent. This must be managed as far as possible by using substitutes, or in a transitional phase by adapting the tasks of the units. Furthermore, it is difficult to see that the Armed Forces could have too many personnel in the foreseeable future in the event of war, with the need for replacement personnel that would then arise. Both in order to more quickly set up the units proposed in the defence decision and to lay the foundation for the additional units proposed in this report, the forms of current soldier training will probably have to be changed to some extent. For example, basic soldier training could be partly outsourced to the training groups that have the conditions: instructors, camps and training areas. Östersund, with the Grytan shooting range with its fairly good infrastructure, could perhaps be an example here. The experiences of how the training of Ukrainian soldiers, operation Interflex, took place in recent years could perhaps be partly utilized to organize this type of training.[63]

When it comes to the acquisition of equipment, several different measures will probably have to be taken in order to quickly set up more units. Forced production by working in multiple shifts where possible is one way. This will often involve hiring and training more personnel, but the state will have to take on the financial risk if, in the long term, there is a surplus of people and machines that are not needed. Increasing the pace of modification work on the JAS 39 C/D and allowing the modifications to cover all planes may be an example of where such a measure can be considered. Likewise, renovation work on existing combat vehicles, but also for new production. The purchase of foreign fully developed, possibly also operational equipment must also be considered.[64] With the threat that exists and that can quickly worsen, we must be prepared to accept that some of the equipment that we urgently need may not be the most modern, but it will be useful.[65]

Should the situation arise that equipment is delivered before the staff is trained, it should not be a major problem to have it in stock for a year or two. The main thing at present is that it is ordered as soon as possible, for the earliest possible delivery.

The above measures cannot be taken within a reasonable time with a system where orders are dependent on a gradually strengthened defense budget. This means, among other things, that orders must be placed with consideration for when funds become available at some point in the future, even though there is an urgent need and prospective suppliers exist. One method to largely avoid this delay would be to immediately create a large investment fund that is separate from the Armed Forces' need for funds for ordinary operations such as exercises, turnover of equipment at a normal pace, maintenance of properties, etc.

It should be noted here that the need to implement the measures outlined above is not only due to a reduced American commitment in Europe. The measures should be taken even if the United States continues to actively contribute to Europe's defense. This would provide the endurance required to cover the time gap that will most likely exist between a Russian attack and the arrival of any reinforcements from the United States.

Major General (PA) Karlis Neretnieks has previously been the Director of the Swedish National Defence College, Operations Director Milo Mitt and Director of MekB 18 mm. He is a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Military Sciences.

[1] An example could be the Gotland class submarines that were ordered in 2015 with a delivery date of 2022 and will be delivered in 2027. https://www.fmv.se/aktuellt–press/aktuella-handelser/kontrakt-a26/

[2] Compare the number of brigades in FB 2020 and FB 2024 (the number of brigades in FB 2020 could not be achieved, the same promise of four brigades was therefore repeated in FB 2025, although slightly strengthened)

[3] https://kkrva.se/hot/2024:2/11-neretnieks-NATO-och-den-nordiska.pdf

[4] death from above, The Economist,, December 7 2024, page 24, the article describes drone development in Ukraine

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base

[6] An example is the production of the Hetzer anti-tank gun carriage in then German-occupied Czechoslovakia. Between April 1945 and April 1945, the Czech companies BMM and Skoda produced 2584 of these combat vehicles for the German armed forces. Hetzer - Wikipedia

[7] Kateryna Hodunova -intelligence-says/ The same article states that Putin put the number of Russian soldiers in Ukraine at 700.

[8] Andrew A. Michta and Joslyn Brodfuehrer, NATO-Russia dynamics: Prospects for reconstitution of Russian military power, https://kyivindependent.com/nearly-580-000-russian-troops-engaged-in-combat-against-ukraine-military //www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/NATO-russia-dynamics-prospects-for-reconstitution-of-russian-military-power/

[9] Nick Reynolds and Jack Watling, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024 Even though Russian production has and will have problems replacing the equipment consumed in the fighting in Ukraine, the production rate of various systems means that it would be possible to replenish units with equipment very quickly once the fighting ends.

[10] Total Defence 2025-2030, Bill 2024/25:3, pages 75-82, which clearly shows that many major projects will indeed be started by 2030 but will be completed considerably later,

[11] Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2024, FOI-R-5636-SE, page 56, Stockholm 2024

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid page 58

[14] Ibid

[15] 75% availability is the US Navy's target for aircraft, but in reality it appears to be considerably lower. Navy, Air Force struggling to keep planes ready for take off – Breaking Defense , regarding ships in the US Navy, the target is set at 80% availability but seems to be very difficult to achieve Can the Navy Achieve 80 Percent Surface Force Surge Readiness? | Proceedings – December 2024 Vol. 150/12/1,462 The availability of the Nordic air and naval forces has been set to be around the American target values, the figures probably vary quite significantly between different countries and different systems.

[16] Strengthened defense capability – Sweden as an ally, DS 2024:6, page 105

[17] Defense pledge - for Norway's security https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/0faae3f9efcf4c2fa0f43e2a15bfbc1d/no/pdfs/forsvarsloftet.pdf sd 9

[18] Ibid

[19] Western military capability in Northern Europe 2023, FOI-R-5527—SE, page 79, Stockholm 2024

[20] Total Defence 2025-2030, Bill 2024/25:34, pages 71-77

[21] Ibid

[22] Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2024, FOI-R-5636-SE, page 56, Stockholm 2024

[23] Carrier-based air divisions are often smaller, around 12 aircraft, than land-based air divisions.

[24] Comprehensive Timeline of Operation Desert Storm Events, https://totalmilitaryinsight.com/timeline-of-operation-desert-storm/

[25] Western military capability in Northern Europe 2023, FOI-R-5527—SE, page 87, Stockholm 2024

[26] Ibid, page 99

[27] Ibid, page 111

[28] Population, approx.: Estonia 1,3 million, Latvia 1,8 m, Lithuania 2,8 m

[29] The Baltic (R)evolution in Military Affairs – Foreign Policy Research Institute

[30] Ibid

[31] Ibid

[32] Defender Europe 20“: US-Streitkräfte entladen Panzer in Bremerhaven

[33] Border Fortifications https://www.mod.gov.lv/en/border-fortification

[34] The strength data is taken from Western military capability in Northern Europe 2023, FOI-R-5527—SE, pages 76-77, Stockholm 2024

[35] Tony Lawrence The Joint Expeditionary Force: Baltic Interests – ICDS, https://icds.ee/en/the-joint-expeditionary-force-baltic-interests/

[36] MARCOM (Allied Maritime Command), AIRCOM (Allied Air Command), MCLL (Multi Corps Land Component Command)

[37] John Vandiver, New drones at Sicily's Sigonella base extend NATO's surveillance reach | Stars and Stripes

[38] 86th Airlift Wing > Ramstein Air Base > Fact Sheets

[39] Unpacking China's Naval Buildup Unpacking China's Naval Buildup

[40] Mark Bowden, The Crumbling Foundation of America's Military – The Atlantic , 17 December 2014

[41] Swedish aerial reconnaissance in Libya in 2011 https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libyen_FL01

[42] Since the exact mobilization times are not clear data, the same times have been set here as the majority of the qualified units in the Swedish Armed Forces had during the Cold War: 78 hours for the qualified field units, where prioritized parts of these often had 24 hours of mobilization time (e.g. a battalion in a brigade).

[43] https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gotlands_regemente_(nya)

[44] Ibid

[45] Quite soon after the outbreak of war, the airfields in the Kaliningrad exclave are deemed unusable, or at least too dangerous to use, given that they are within artillery range from both Poland and Lithuania.

[46] Michelle Grisé, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/07/russias-speedy-military-rebuild-doesnt-tell-the-whole.html , 05-07-2024, the article analyzes various factors that may affect Russian strength growth.

[47] Leningrad Military District - Wikipedia

[49] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/putin-orders-russian-army-expand-war-ukraine-rcna171429

[50] Kataryna Zysk, Russia's Forces in the High North: Weakened by the War, Yet Still A Multidomain Threat , High North News, 16-01-2024, the forces included in the scenario represent a possible development of what is reported in the article in the event that Russia prioritizes the High North until 2032.

[51] Nicholas Drummond, https://x.com/nicholadrummond/status/1799425702682407200

[52] https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/new-norwegian-long-term-plan-on-defence-a-historic-plan/id3032878/

[53] Because Finnish plans regarding the war organization are generally not public, this is an assumption based on what the authors believe would be a reasonable development linked to increased funding and a negative security policy development.

[54] The strength data is taken from Western military capability in Northern Europe 2023, FOI-R-5527—SE, page 90, Stockholm 2024, in the scenario it is assumed that there has been a certain increase in volume and a clear improvement in quality.

[55] Ibid, page 104

[56] Ibid, page 116

[57] The strength data is taken from Western military capability in Northern Europe 2023, FOI-R-5527—SE, page 131, Stockholm 2024

[58] Ibid, page 145

[59] Here, parallels can possibly be drawn with the Egyptian actions during the period before the October War of 1973, the “wolf comes the model”. When you have reacted to something a couple of times but nothing happens, there is a great risk that you will not react when something similar happens again, you have become accustomed to a new “normal”.

[60] Since the mobilization times of various units are not public, it is assumed here that future Swedish mobilization times will be approximately the same as those that applied during the Cold War.

[61] https://www.forcesnews.com/news/how-has-NATO-defence-spending-changed-over-time

[62] A focus with this objective is not without problems with today's officer training system, where the Armed Forces do not have control over admission to and the direction of officer training. Here, it should be considered, among other things, whether the more academically oriented training that is part of today's basic officer training should not be separated from the military vocational training that is required of an officer to be able to operate at lower command levels.

[63] https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokalt/jamtland/hemvarnet-i-jamtland-ska-utbilda-ukrainska-soldater

[64] The defense's emergency solution: Emergency purchase of 15 automatic weapons from the USA | SVT News

[65] In 1940, a year after the start of World War II, the two destroyers Romulus and Remus were purchased from Italy to cover the fleet's urgent need for ships. Although they were built in 1934 and thus did not belong to the most modern generation, they were put to good use during the years of preparedness. We already know today that the fleet will have an acute shortage of ships in the event of a war involving the Baltic Sea.

https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Romulus_(27)

MILITARY CONSEQUENCES – from the Interim Report of the SV-AR project Part II

Summary

Conclusion

Introduction

The threat image

The Northern Areas

Baltic states

Ukraine

NATO's military potential in the Nordic-Baltic region

The Northern Areas

Baltic states

Finland[34]

JEF -Joint Expeditionary Force[35]

Assessment of the importance of American support

American choices – an analysis

Reduced American involvement in Europe

Continued American involvement in Europe – NATO more active “out of area”

Two scenarios

Scenario 1 – Baltics 2028

Purpose

Background

Development

Scenario 2 – The entire Nordic-Baltic area in 2032

Purpose

Background

Development

Analysis

Conclusions

Generally

For the Swedish part

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