Valued Friends of Finland
On this day a year ago, I reported on the NATO mood in Finland at a webinar organized by the Academy of War Sciences. The Riksdag then discussed the government's first defense policy report after NATO membership had been achieved. But the esteemed professor Tuomas Forsberg swore in church: the report should be rewritten, it is debatable whether we can fully trust the USA.
The professor was scolded. Finland should keep a cool head despite the Trump administration's pro-Russia and anti-EU stance. That was the unison line of the foreign policy leadership, the president, and the government.
After Trump's actions on Greenland, the tone has changed somewhat. The foreign and security policy statement will be partially revised. The document will land on the government's table in April-May. I have also noted a cautious new tone in the Swedish government's foreign policy statement this winter.
So what has changed that leads to such a rapid, partly new line-drawing? At least not Russia. Putin's Russia has not reconsidered its intentions with the war of aggression against Ukraine.
The conditions for waging war have certainly changed. Financing the war became increasingly difficult, but then the US came to Russia's aid when the Iran bombings raised the price of oil and gas. Russia has found it more difficult to recruit for its army, while the losses are immense. War fatigue seems to be spreading among the population. But Putin maintains his grip on Russia and there is no will for peace despite participation in the US-led talks with Ukraine.
China's policy has not changed either. China's support for Russia continues. Europe's economic dependence on China in strategic terms is a major dilemma. The US trade policy with tariffs as a political weapon has made our dependence on China even more complicated. Despite the problems with the US, Europe must make itself less vulnerable in its economic relations with China. Sweden and Finland have an important role here with their reserves of rare earth metals, given the needs of the defense industry and the green transition.
It is therefore the United States that is responsible for the changes that require a revision of Finland's foreign and security policy.
It began in Anchorage. Critical analysts concluded that the US attitude towards the war had changed, that the Trump administration was in fact serving Russia’s interests. That assessment has not needed to be reconsidered – quite the opposite.
European leaders managed to negotiate a common transatlantic agenda for a peace settlement with Ukraine. This looked like progress. However, the continued peace talks have shown that the US is putting pressure on Ukraine while Russia is being treated with silk gloves, even as Russia provides assistance to Iran.
The US has refused to grant new funding or arms aid to Ukraine under Trump. Now there is a risk that Europe's purchase of American weapons for Ukraine's air defense will be hampered by the Iran war. We have a paradoxical situation where Ukraine, with its expertise in drone defense, can be considered to be giving more support to the US than it receives. This is with the exception of intelligence support.
However, it was the American threat to use force against Greenland that awakened Europe to the real realization that transatlantic cooperation had entered a new phase. This conclusion was contributed to by the US national security strategy, which did not support the shared values that united the transatlantic partners.
What can we expect from Finland's updated security policy assessment? I do not believe that there will be any hasty or radical conclusions. NATO membership continues to be seen as the necessary line to draw after Russia launched its full-scale invasion and after Russia began to act to limit Finland's and Sweden's freedom of action in the alliance issue. However, the strong public opinion that helped us into NATO has changed – not in terms of membership but in terms of whether we can trust the US to come to our aid when needed.
It is obvious that Finland will push even more strongly than before for the strengthening of NATO's European pillar, so that Europe takes decisive responsibility for its own security. This should take place primarily within NATO but also with the help of the EU. It may also need new arrangements outside the EU's structural dependence on Trojan members such as Hungary. President Niinistö has been trying for 20 years to make Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty workable in practice, for a long time without receiving much response, but now the interest is completely different.
In the EU Commission, Henna Virkkunen leads or coordinates work on important programmes: the EU Security Strategy, the Arctic, offshore cable security, cybersecurity, drone defence, reducing risky dependence on non-European cloud services and greater technological sovereignty in general.
Finland's criticism of the US will, however, remain restrained – for reasons of realpolitik. An indication of this can be read in the vague reactions when the US and Israel began their bombing of Iran, which violates international law.
The central role of the United States in NATO cannot be replaced in the coming years – Europe is seriously behind militarily. This delay became even more worrying after Trump’s recent outburst when European leaders refused to make the Iran war a NATO war. Without exception, European countries urgently need to strengthen their conventional defenses, not only in the classic branches of defense of land, sea and air, but also in cyber and space.
Within the space dimension, there is a need for stronger cooperation between the Nordic countries. I only need to mention Kiruna's growing importance as a support point for European satellite operations and all the opportunities offered by the Finnish company Iceye - it is important that the majority of ownership is maintained in European hands.
Finland does not want to send its own signals to prematurely weaken the US's NATO commitment to security in the Baltic Sea region and the Arctic. Despite rhetorical confusion in the US, the exercises and planning have so far continued as agreed, with a certain American reduction in involvement. The Arctic exercise Cold Response can be seen as a confirmation of continued American participation and will hopefully restore some of the damage caused by the threat to Greenland.
Despite NATO's percentage recommendations, financing enhanced European defense will not be easy. In the case of Finland, which has received so much recognition for its defense capabilities and foresight, it is clear that weak public finances are a security problem. The situation is further complicated by the need to find new solutions to ward off attacks with increasingly autonomous drone systems, something that General David Petraeus and Isaac Flanagan emphasize in Foreign Affairs.
The intelligence services of various countries keep us awake with their warnings about when and how Russia could be prepared to test how NATO actually acts in accordance with its Article 5 through military aggression against a neighboring country. One thing is absolutely clear: Russia can achieve this capability so quickly that the US's decreasing effort in Europe must be done in agreement within NATO. This explains the good-natured pretense of the European leaders in their nasty game with Trump. "We must save what can be saved" is President Alexander Stubbs' latest description of the relationship.
NATO's nuclear umbrella is a particularly sensitive chapter. One would expect that a conversation at Finlandia Hall would show Alexander Stubb and Jens Stoltenberg strong confidence that the US wants to maintain the umbrella over the high north. They referred to the fact that Russia's strategic nuclear capabilities on the Kola Peninsula and in the Arctic sea areas pose a threat primarily to the US. Maintaining credibility also reduces the risk of nuclear weapons spreading to new countries, which would be contrary to existing agreements. In Europe, France's initiative has aroused positive interest. This is an important milestone, but French nuclear weapons cannot replace American ones in the foreseeable future, even through European cooperation.
In Finland, the nuclear weapons debate has flared up in an unfortunate way. The government's intention is to remove the statutory total ban on the transport and storage of nuclear weapons in Finland. The credibility of NATO's deterrence is considered to suffer if the ban is maintained through laws that do not have time to be revised in acute conflict situations. Unfortunately, the government acted so clumsily that the political field was divided. The president has tried to calm the situation in order to promote as broad a consensus as possible. An arrangement according to the Swedish model has been mentioned as a solution, but it seems difficult to reach a consensus with the left-wing opposition.
The US threat against a Nordic ally has made it more than clear that transatlantic cooperation has entered a phase that, in addition to increased responsibility at the European level, also requires the closest possible regional cooperation in the North, in the Arctic and in the Baltic Sea region. Finland's and Sweden's NATO membership led to historically close military cooperation in the Nordic region, which can still be concretized in many ways.
In the grey zone between war and peace, cooperation is also working better. An excellent example is the cooperation between NATO's Baltic Sea countries and within the JEF group on cable breaks. However, the accepted interpretation and application of the law of the sea has prevented sufficiently resolute, preventive measures to prevent the Russian shadow fleet from causing an ecological disaster of gigantic proportions in the Baltic Sea. The Nordic countries should jointly seek an updated interpretation of the law of the sea with regard to the risk of environmental disasters.
Close cooperation is needed throughout the entire total defense. This means that the administration as a whole and political decision-making in all Nordic countries must be united by a common view of total defense. Easier said than done. Therefore, bilateral predecessors are also needed within the Nordic countries. Finland and Sweden should systematically map the possibilities for expanded cooperation between authorities to facilitate total defense and to prevent new border obstacles, for example when EU directives are implemented. Joint supranational authorities could also be considered.
I referred to Finland's weak public finances as a security risk. Professor Martin Hårdstedt of Umeå University has concluded that the other Nordic countries, especially Sweden, in their own security interests, should participate in financing the defense of the frontline state Finland. The most obvious need is easy to point to: the financing of transport routes and infrastructure necessary for military mobility and security of supply. Expanded capacity on the Ore Railway is an urgent issue for northern security, as are other investments in transport routes for military and civil defense needs.
The NATO membership of all Nordic countries was a major step forward for Nordic security. As a Trump effect, Iceland has started a political process aiming for EU membership. After Iceland, we are waiting for Norway. The Nordic benefits of all Nordic countries being members of the EU are easy to imagine, especially after transatlantic cooperation has entered a new, unpredictable phase.