Today's external situation is known to everyone. It is also known that the anorexically (un)developed Swedish Armed Forces must be armed. The Armed Forces are receiving a rapidly doubled budget, which is largely eaten up by a weak Swedish krona and increased prices from suppliers of defense equipment due to the war in Ukraine. However, that is not the whole truth. The Swedish army, like most armies in Europe, has been underequipped. Europe's navies are in somewhat better condition, but here too, a number of ships are missing. The Norwegians lost one of four Nansen frigates in 2018. The only thing European armed forces have in abundance is aircraft. For economic reasons, one can then question why the new Gripen E must be built when the Gripen versions C/D have not been flown yet, i.e. there are many unused flight hours left in previous aircraft systems.
The end of the last century was filled with disputes between the branches of defense, where the percentage of the defense budget was a major point of contention. The Navy, as well as the Air Force in particular, had the ability to overdraw their budgets. The Army's financial allocation mainly went to the peace organization's conscription training. To put an end to this, the Government appointed an investigation called LEMO, the result of which was that the power of the heads of defense was reduced. Then came the total defense slaughter in 2000, where Sweden made a collective mistake - especially with regard to civil defense. Now the heads of defense have once again regained some economic power, which will naturally lead to hidden friction.
Personally, I believe that the army must be equipped. However, if Sweden is to be able to man three brigades, 10.000 conscripts per year will not be enough; calculations show that to meet the personnel needs of all categories within the Armed Forces, at least 16.000 conscripts will be required annually.
It goes without saying that the Navy needs resources to monitor and manage thousands of ship movements in the Baltic Sea, especially in a grey zone situation. In addition, resources are needed for naval combat and mine clearance. There is an old saying within the Navy that says, “give us ships and we can talk about what we can do.” Actually, the Navy’s tasks should be the guiding ones.
The Navy has chosen to solve its tasks with five Visby corvettes and a hope for 4 new much larger corvettes, two of which are planned to be completed in 2030. Furthermore, two new submarines have already been ordered in 2015, initially called A26, now called the Blekinge class. The Swedish submarine project has become considerably more expensive and much delayed in delivery. Delivery is currently planned for 2027-28. The finances between FMV and SAAB-Kockums are an uncertain factor until this date.
The aviation sector's share of the defence budget is the largest at around 34%. The Army gets 29% and the Navy 16%. The remaining 21% goes to Operational Management, Logistics etc.
Sweden's defense is today based on the Defense Decision 2020 (FB20). The threat from Russia had been observed at that time, but we were still non-aligned - which in turn should have required a greater defense. According to our then Minister of Defense, we would never join NATO in 2021. We thought we had time - 5 to 10 years to arm our defense if Russia became threatening. As soon as someone mentioned that Sweden could go to war (Brännström/Göranson), the person was politically keeled over. The army can be happy to have had powerful leaders like Engelbrektson and Frisell who created the pace of armament that the army has today, even if everything did not go as planned.
Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022, although several countries in the West did not believe (or did not want to believe) that this could happen. The Social Democrats, who have claimed Swedish neutrality and non-alignment since 1948, quickly sought membership in NATO. But before these, many bilateral agreements had been concluded with the United States, Great Britain and Finland, which will be worth their weight in gold if a new American president changes the United States' participation in NATO.
A new government took office in 2022 and the need for a faster rearmament of Swedish defense has become increasingly clear since the development of the war in Ukraine. Putin's harsher imperialist rhetoric, in which he intends to wipe out Ukraine as a country and reclaim the areas (read countries) occupied by the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union, has also shown that Swedish defense plans - to have a stronger defense by 2030-35 - risk being obsolete.
Creating a defense faster is not easy in the rule-heavy Sweden. The government proposes a budget (with political budget instructions) to the Riksdag based on the data they received from the Armed Forces. However, everything is currently based on the defense decision 2020 and the plans that were established at that time. Since then, we have donated ammunition, artillery pieces, combat vehicles, etc. to Ukraine. Weapon systems that are not only to be replaced but also expanded in volume. FMV and the Armed Forces are locked in the procurement processes of the last century when the 2020s show new experiences with unmanned weapon systems and a changed picture of the need for tanks.
The above is of course known to the Armed Forces, FMV and defense politicians. We have all heard about the need for civil defense. The Armed Forces and FMV do not currently purchase any development projects, but for several years they have wanted to buy proven solutions. Patria (Ptg 300), Black Hawk (Hkp16) and Patriot (Air Defense System 103) are all examples of this. But the Armed Forces and FMV are the most finely controlled agencies within the Swedish state administration. Until recently, they were only allowed to procure for 200 MSEK. Now, the Government in BU 24 has increased this to 700 MSEK, FMV requested 1000 MSEK in the budget documents. That change alone can save up to a year of delivery time in the procurement process. Added to this is the Public Procurement Act (LOU). Changing it would be a multi-year project. Just understanding the basis in BU 24 that the Armed Forces and FMV were expected to deliver would turn a civilian CEO of a large listed company grey. Gustav Vasa and Axel Oxenstierna are probably smiling in their graves. But the Government can change decision-making processes through the Authorization Acts – in the event of a threat of war.
The government has tasked the Swedish Armed Forces and FMV with investing in procuring systems that can have an effect HERE and NOW, i.e. no later than 2025-26. But it is difficult. The Amphibious Corps has procured an artillery platform (BE2023) through FMV 1. In Swedish, this means a fast, slightly larger combat boat with a 12cm grenade launcher that fires while underway. A Swedish shipyard on the west coast has already built and exported such a vessel. They have also built a ship on the same hull that can fire missiles. The Amphibious Corps is to replace its Rb 17 (which is in Ukraine) with a system that can fire further, but that combat boat has not been ordered. The ordered artillery platform is not to be delivered until 2027-28. If you compare this process of 5-6 years until the first shot can be fired in an amphibious battalion, it is, in my opinion, too long. When analyzing the process, you quickly find at least two limiting challenges. Firstly, the Swedish defense economy – despite the goal of a future defense budget of 2% of GDP. Initially, 12 ships were to be ordered, but now the economy only allowed 8, and secondly, some subcontractors had not manufactured the weapon system for several years, which is why new manufacturing processes must be certified, which currently creates considerable delivery times.
The Navy has not yet ordered its desired four new corvettes. In 2020, the then government considered that there was no economy, but in January 2021 SAAB managed to get an order for a so-called product definition phase. The open sources that should be taken with a pinch of salt are that 4 hulls will be ordered in the UK and sail on their own keel to Karlskrona where SAAB will equip them. Coordinating the purchase with the Finns who ordered four similar hulls from the Rauma shipyard in their project Flottilj 2020 did not work. Despite Robin Häggblom's excellent article in KkrVa 4th Feb 2019, but it may be just as much because the Finns did not want to meet Swedish wishes. SAAB in any case received an order for the control system for the new Finnish corvettes. But these ships will not be ready until around 2028-29. How Sweden will manage to build the unordered four new corvettes before 2030 will be a challenge.
However, there is an alternative.
The government wants FMV and the Armed Forces to buy what is on the "shelf" commercial-off-the-shelf, abbreviated COTS. In addition, the Navy probably wants new corvettes before 2029 and FMV does not want to develop new systems. Why not buy 4-6 ten-year-old, well-proven corvettes from the USA? The type of corvette that would be relevant is the Freedom Class (LCS) that the US Navy has mothballed. It cannot be ruled out that the USA would sell these for a price that could be below FMV's authorization of 700 MSEK.
I can spare all naysayers to the above idea. Despite operational problems with the transfer case, which have now been resolved, the Swedish Navy would get something that no other corvette has in the Baltic Sea. The Freedom type is modularly built for different tasks – attack, mine clearance, submarine hunting, etc.
A comparison between Freedom Class and Visby G2 is not possible, but it is possible to compare it to Visby as it looks today.
The task of buying used is probably neither the Armed Forces nor the FMV today. But through the personal initiative of then-General Sverker Göranson, Black Hawk was purchased when we couldn't get HKP 14 to work. So it's possible if the will is there, but new thinking is required within the Navy.