Panel discussion on the Ukraine conflict*

Swedish National Defense University Stockholm, 2014-10-06

Participant: Carolina Vendil Pallin (FOI), Bertil Nygren (Stockholm University), Jörgen Elfving (Swedish Armed Forces), Ola Engdahl (FHS), and Kjell Engelbrekt (FHS).

Carolina Vendil Pallin
The panel opened with Carolina Vendil Pallin’s speech on the relationship between Russian domestic and foreign policy and its significance for the origins of the crisis. Vendil Pallin emphasized that she does not consider domestic policy to be entirely decisive over foreign policy, but that Russian domestic policy drastically limits the scope for foreign policy action. She also argued that after the Crimean crisis, there is no longer a return to “normal” in either Russian domestic or foreign policy.

As an introduction, Vendil Pallin highlighted Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech on March 18, 2014. The speech is of particular importance because it contains all the external attributes of a keynote speech (message) which is held annually to the Federal Assembly and which forms part of the presidential executive power. The content of the speech well illustrates the Russian approach to the Ukraine conflict as conveyed to the Russian people, as well as the nationalist spirit that has become characteristic of the discourse. Putin presents his regime as a champion of “the Russian”, the Russian tradition and the “Russian world” or community. Russia is seen as a stabilizing geopolitical force between East and West. At the same time, the decadent and unreliable West is seen as aiming to weaken Russia by spreading Western values ​​such as democracy and human rights, and has also repeatedly misled and betrayed Russia. To quote Putin (in English translation from the Kremlin’s own website):

There was a whole series of controlled “colour” revolutions. Clearly, the people in those nations, where these events took place, were sick of tyranny and poverty, of their lack of prospects; but these feelings were taken advantage of cynically. Standards were imposed on these nations that did not in any way correspond to their way of life, traditions, or these peoples' cultures. As a result, instead of democracy and freedom, there was chaos, outbreaks of violence and a series of upheavals. The Arab Spring turned into the Arab Winter.

A similar situation unfolded in Ukraine. In 2004, to push the necessary candidate through at the presidential elections, they thought up some sort of third round that was not stipulated by the law. It was absurd and a mockery of the constitution. And now, they have thrown in an organized and well-equipped army of militants.

We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration.

(Vladimir Putin, March 18, 2014)

Putin's main goal is clear: “there will be no Maidan on Red Square.”

Statistics from 2012-2013, i.e. before the start of the Crimean conflict, show that at most a third of the Russian people would have liked to see either Putin or Medvedev as president during the next presidential term, while almost 50 percent hoped for new candidates and just over 20 percent chose not to answer. These figures have certainly also been taken into account by the Kremlin. Russia has gradually become increasingly authoritarian, and especially after the extensive demonstrations in major Russian cities in 2012. Control over the media and the internet has been expanded, Russia is now a country with political prisoners, and the alignment of opinions has been strengthened. In Putin's Russia, everyone should go in the same direction and differing opinions are no longer tolerated, as is evident in the above-mentioned speech. Those who disagree with the regime, regardless of whether they are individuals, non-governmental organizations or scientific institutes, can be labeled as "traitors" or "foreign agents". The culture should preferably be Russian, patriotic and not spread the "wrong" image of Russia. In short, control over all spheres of society in the country is increasing.

Since the events in Crimea, Vendil Pallin believes that it is difficult to see a return from the authoritarian path that the Putin regime has chosen to take. This is confirmed not least by the rhetoric it uses, which has also proven to be an effective means of increasing support for the regime and, above all, for Putin personally. Since April 2013, when 26 percent of the population wanted to see Putin as president after the next presidential election in 2018, the percentage had risen to 49 percent in April 2014. Furthermore, a further 13 percent of the population supported Putin's policies, even if they wanted to see someone else take over his post after the next election. From the Kremlin's perspective, the message is clear: to stay in power, aggressive, authoritarian policies are extremely successful.

A potent mix of nationalism and increased authoritarianism has emerged. Given that Putin has nothing to offer in terms of effective political and economic reforms, there is no indication that Russia could return to any kind of “normalcy.” Vendil Pallin therefore believes that we should henceforth relate to an authoritarian Russia that sees itself as a champion of Russian traditions, interests and influence, and as one pole in an information war with Ukraine and with the West.

Bertil Nygren
Following Vendil Pallin, Bertil Nygren presented his view on the foreign policy significance and internal logic of the Ukraine crisis from a Russian perspective. The emphasis was on the Putin regime's goals, driving forces and future prospects.

According to Nygren, since the beginning of his term as prime minister in 1999, Putin has had two primary goals in his political actions: first, to strengthen Russia internally, both politically and economically and socially; and second, to strengthen Russia externally by re-establishing the country's European and global great power role, which was lost in connection with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Geographically, the re-establishment applies primarily to the immediate area and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), secondly regionally in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East, and thirdly as a global power with the capacity to challenge other global great powers.

Nygren believes that the Putin regime is primarily motivated by revanchism and frustration, which relate to memories of a great empire and the loss of this position. The Russian leadership is determined to re-establish “Greater Russia”, not identical to the Soviet Union itself, but with similar external borders and, above all, with corresponding political and economic control over the area. For Putin, this Greater Russia is the real Russia, in the sense that this is the “natural” state of things. In the main, the aim has been to achieve the goal by economic and political means, not so much because the desire to achieve this state has so far been weaker, but because the military means have not been strong enough to enforce it. When necessary, however, military and paramilitary operations have also been used. According to Putin’s view, the driving forces of world politics are pure power and geopolitics, and Russia considers itself justified in playing by the same rules as the USA with regard to, among other things, the above-mentioned (para)military operations.

Russian frustration is linked to having “lost” to the West with the fall of the Soviet Union. The loss of this status and territory is associated with the West’s unwillingness to accept Russia as a great power, with a great power’s sphere of interest and with the right to act as a regional hegemon, for example in matters of territorial expansion. The frustration is reflected in various spheres of society, among which three are mentioned here: the military, the political, and the economic.

The military frustration has been built up by a long series of events and developments in Russia's immediate vicinity. While the US and the rest of the West have promoted their interests with coercive means of power politics, e.g. in Serbia in 1999 and in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, coercive means that Putin has both noticed and adopted, Russia's desire to play by the same rules of the game within its own sphere of power has been ignored. For example, the US tried to put an end to the terrorist hunt for Chechens in northern Georgia in 2003, which in Russia was experienced as a "slap on the fingers" and strongly colored Russian perceptions. Russia has also made paramilitary attempts to gain influence in its immediate vicinity (e.g. with the help of military overflights without nationality designations in the hunt for Chechen rebels) and claimed to "protect ethnic Russians", which, however, e.g. in connection with the attack (or rather the “punitive expedition”) in Georgia in August 2008 has expanded far beyond such objectives. In addition, Russia has supported separatism in neighboring countries, such as in Georgia and Ukraine, while corresponding separatism within Russian borders is combated particularly harshly and equated with terrorism and extremism.

Political frustration has long been expressed verbally in support of ethnic Russian groups in the immediate area, and since 2003 and 2004, pro-Russian political actors have also experienced direct political support, as in Georgia in December 2003, Ukraine in the fall of 2004, Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and later, in the so-called “colored revolutions.” The Putin regime has also wished to thwart Western attempts to support democracy movements in the CIS (and elsewhere, including the Middle East) as these have been viewed as Western conspiracies intended to weaken Russia. Since 2013, support for ethnic Russians abroad has been particularly evident.

Finally, Russia has also been economically frustrated since the mid-2000s. Attempts to control oil and gas exports from Central Asia and the Caucasus to the CIS area and Europe (and further to Far Asia) have largely failed. Today's efforts in Asia can be explained by the failures in Europe, but so far exports to the Asian market have not performed particularly well, apart from China.

Nygren predicts a continued aggressive Russian foreign policy in the future. He emphasizes that “saturation” has not been reached with the destabilization of Ukraine, since it is crucial for Putin that Ukraine is also really forced back into the fold. With the military, political and economic reintegration of Greater Russia that the Putin regime envisions, the rest of the Eurasian Union countries are also in danger, and certain moods in Kazakhstan and even in Belarus are already being raised regarding the risks of getting too close to Russia and its sphere of interest. While military operations in, for example, the Baltic States seem unlikely, Russian destabilization attempts there are very possible, especially in the Narva area, but also in Riga, which according to Putin clearly belong to the Russian sphere of interest. The Baltic Sea can be expected to come back into focus as an area of ​​operation for both Russia and NATO, which remains the main military adversary. Oil and gas extraction in the Arctic is crucial to Russia's economic future, and this industry may eventually be included in Western sanctions. Alternative export routes for oil and gas in particular will be sought in China and the rest of Asia after European trade falters, but in the long run it is likely that Putin will draw the shortest straw in the crisis.

Jorgen Elfving
In his speech, Jörgen Elfving discussed the military dimension, i.e. the actual warfare within the framework of the Ukraine conflict, which began with the Russian annexation of Crimea. When the first images from the area showed unidentifiable “green men”, it was initially unclear what was actually going on in Crimea, which in turn created uncertainty both in Kiev and in the West about how the situation should be handled. This, Elfving believes, suggests major differences with, for example, the actions in the Georgia conflict in 2008, and reveals the development of Russian military thinking and capabilities in recent years.

In connection with the Crimean crisis, demonstrations began in eastern Ukraine, primarily in the Donetsk oblast (region) and Luhansk oblast. The demonstrators occupied administrative buildings and buildings belonging to, among others, the police and the security service, which gave the separatists access to weapons and the opportunity to de facto initiate the armed part of the conflict. However, since this armament was of a rather light nature, the efforts were initially limited to the establishment and defense of roadblocks. In connection with subsequent battles and by raiding Ukrainian supplies, the separatists acquired more qualified equipment over time and the military activity gradually escalated. In April, the Ukrainian government declared that it had launched an “anti-terrorist operation” in eastern Ukraine, and this designation is still being adhered to today. The government probably believes that in this way it can act more freely than it would be able to do in a war situation under the martial law that was then directly applicable.

In May, it was clear that the Ukrainian side had underestimated the separatists, when two Ukrainian helicopters were unexpectedly shot down by the separatists with manned anti-aircraft missiles. Until the ceasefire in June, the Ukrainian side had not had any military success, and it was clear that the superiority of the Ukrainian side over the separatists existed only on paper. In addition to the fact that the armed forces had been underfunded for a long time and had neither money to train nor to buy new equipment, the military leadership was also troubled by organizational difficulties. Involved in the military operations were also the security service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Under the latter were a number of volunteer battalions of varying size and content, the best known of which today is the so-called Azov Battalion, recruited by the extreme right and ultra-nationalist party Right Sector (Right sectorThe consequences of this multitude of actors were lack of coordination, shared responsibility and difficulties in leading the efforts.

The fighting continued after the seven-day ceasefire, which had only served as a respite for both sides, and in July the International Committee of the Red Cross declared that it considered the situation in eastern Ukraine to be a war. Initially, the Ukrainian side was successful and managed to retake areas they had long fought over, including Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. According to Elfving, the Ukrainian strategy was likely to cut off the separatist-held area from the supply lines to the rear, divide it in half and retake it, piece by piece. At the same time, however, the border with Russia was left open, which made it possible for Russia to continue supporting the separatists with reinforcements and equipment. As the separatists were thus supplied with new equipment, the Ukrainian advance was also halted and Ukraine suffered several spectacular defeats in August-September.

The most prominent of the defeats was the battle of Ilovaisk, which was a major Ukrainian setback. The number of casualties is uncertain and varies between the official Ukrainian figure of 108 and the separatist estimates of several hundred. The shortcomings in leadership, equipment, etc. were evident and the incident is likely to remain a national trauma and an open wound in the Ukrainian debate for a long time to come. Internationally, however, the summer's focus was primarily on the downed Malaysian Airlines flight with its nearly 300 civilian victims. The case remains largely unsolved due to the difficulties for experts to work at the crash site. Ukraine firmly claims that separatists or Russian personnel are behind the incident, while Russia claims that a Ukrainian fighter jet was in Ukrainian airspace adjacent to the passenger plane at the time of the accident, suggesting that a mix-up of targets occurred.

Another uneasy ceasefire has been in place since September. However, both sides accuse each other of violating the ceasefire, and the separatists in particular claim that Ukraine has repeatedly aimed heavy weapons directly at civilian targets. The fighting continues locally with great intensity, not least at the airport in Donetsk, where it is still unclear who has control. Elfving believes that it cannot be ruled out that the fragile ceasefire could break down again and that the confrontation would then continue on a larger scale. However, there is currently a stalemate and neither side can be expected to achieve military victory.

Ola Engdahl
Ola Engdahl's analysis of the Ukraine conflict from an international law perspective began with a brief definition of international law: it concerns "international rules that govern the relationship between states and that are established by the states themselves and, among other things, aim to ensure predictability in international relations". States and international organizations are bound by these rules. However, there is a lack of an effective sanctions system, which sometimes leads to states being prepared to take the political cost of violating a rule of international law. International law has the potential to be developed by challenging it with new interpretations, and it is therefore important that states that cannot prevent an action that violates international law clearly criticize the action in order to counteract new interpretations of the rule in question. There is an inherent inertia in the system to change international law, but the content is influenced by international reactions to contemporary political events among political decision-makers.

Engdahl pointed out that according to international law, as expressed in the UN Charter in particular, there is an almost total prohibition of violence in international relations. Violence or aggression can mean various kinds of measures. With regard to the course of events on the Crimean peninsula, aggression can mean—since Russian troops were already on the peninsula under a status agreement—actions that violated the status agreement, which defined where and how the foreign troops were allowed to act. With these conditions as a starting point, Russia can be found to have violated the international law prohibition of violence through its actions in Crimea.

International law recognizes only two exceptions to the prohibition of violence. The first is interventions expressly authorized by the UN Security Council, which obviously cannot be invoked by Russia in this case. The second exception is the right to self-defense, which in some cases may possibly be extended to citizens living abroad who are subjected to abuse or threats, as has been argued, for example, in connection with the American operation in Grenada, the French operation in Libya and the Israeli operation in Uganda. This particular interpretation of the right to self-defense is surrounded by strict criteria, and such a situation cannot be considered relevant in Crimea, where the ethnic Russians or the Russian-speaking population were not Russian citizens. In addition, it is important to distinguish between so-called “in/out operations”, where troops are quickly sent out to protect their own citizens against threats or abuse and then withdrawn, and operations where troops remain and maintain extensive control over the territory of the other state.

However, a sovereign state has the right to invite foreign forces, which Russia could claim that Ukraine did through former President Viktor Yanukovych. However, this interpretation is quite clearly invalid for the Crimean crisis, as Yanukovych, according to the Ukrainian parliament, was no longer a representative of the Ukrainian state at the beginning of the conflict. The Russian violation of the international law prohibition of violence cannot therefore be “cured” with arguments about invitation or consent.

Ukrainian forces can, without violating the prohibition on the use of force, use force against Russian forces on the Crimean peninsula, since such action is taken on Ukraine's own territory. In light of the Russian act of aggression in Crimea, Ukraine, if deemed necessary to repel the Russian attack, could also assert its right to self-defense and thus have the right to act on Russian territory. In addition, Ukraine would also have the right to request assistance from other states, i.e. collective self-defense. While there is an established international law prohibition on annexation of another state or part of its territory, it is not prohibited to declare independence. However, it may be prohibited for other states to recognize a newly declared independent state, and thereby intervene in the internal affairs of another state. In the Kosovo case, the International Court of Justice held that a declaration of independence may not be part of an illegal intervention, which was largely what happened on the Crimean peninsula.

Finally, the nature of an armed conflict, and thus the applicable rules, is influenced by who is a party to the armed conflict. A non-international internal conflict presupposes a struggle between the state and the separatists, while an international conflict involves a state-versus-state confrontation. In the latter case, a Russia that exercised de facto control over the forces in eastern Ukraine would thus be responsible for their actions and further be considered a party to the armed conflict. One case where similar responsibility has been investigated was the US support in the form of weapons, instructors and financing of the anti-socialist militia. Cons in Nicaragua in the 1980s. The International Court of Justice considered this in itself a violation of the principle of intervention, but the United States was not held responsible for Cons actions when Washington lacked effective control over them. The extent of Russian intervention will thus constitute Russian responsibility in the Crimean conflict, obviously to the extent that this involvement can be proven.

Kjell Engelbrekt
The fifth panelist, Kjell Engelbrekt, focused on diplomatic and great power political aspects of the crisis. He initially pointed out that the information about the “little green men” on the Crimean peninsula emerged at the end of February 2014, during the last days of Lithuania’s presidency of the UN Security Council. For Lithuania, a former Soviet republic and a neighbor of Russia with three million inhabitants, of whom just under 200 describe themselves as ethnic Russians, the Ukraine issue was important from a sovereignty perspective and was immediately placed on the formal agenda. The Lithuanian permanent representative, Ambassador Raimonda Murmorkaite, thus took a leading role in the Security Council in holding Russia accountable for its actions. Her statements, although diplomatic and well-balanced in their formulation, became increasingly critical of Moscow over time. Not least, the Russian “humanitarian convoys” were the subject of her criticism, as they directly undermined Ukrainian sovereignty—symbolically as well as actually—because they did not wait for permission from Kiev.

According to Engelbrekt, the Russian convoys reflect the values ​​at stake for Lithuania as well as for other neighboring countries to Russia, and which can be summarized in a "Putin Doctrine" that Moscow seems to want to gain acceptance for in the outside world.

This Putin doctrine has three basic elements. First, Moscow seems to believe that it is unnatural for ethnic Russians to live outside the borders of the Russian Federation, which is why they have the right to demand that territories where they constitute a significant proportion (or even a majority) be annexed to the “fatherland”. Second, it seems to be believed that a country affected by such border changes lacks the right to oppose demands for “reunification”. Attempts by a neighboring country to assert its sovereignty and territorial integrity may thus be met with armed force, or the threat of force, from Russia. And third, international law is thrown out of play in such situations, as the Russian political leadership seems to consider itself the only relevant authority to make assessments of the legitimacy of said demands.

These three elements of the Putin Doctrine mean that a number of countries both within and outside the European Union, but above all Russia's closest neighbours, will be affected by Russian foreign policy in the future. At the same time, international organisations such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe perceive that the Putin Doctrine undermines the European security architecture that has developed over several decades and that Moscow (during the Soviet era) actually helped to build. Until very recently, Russia has often been among the leading countries in defending the right of existing states to territorial integrity and sovereignty, and has therefore strongly opposed, for example, Kosovo's declaration of independence. As the Russian Foreign Minister put it in a speech at the UN as recently as two years ago:

[The international communist must not allow] irresponsible actions dictated by expedient interests to shatter the system of international law. The world order is threatened by arbitrary interpretation of such essential principles as non-use or threat of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and non-interference in their domestic affairs. (Sergei Lavrov in the UN General Assembly, September 2012)

The EU and the US have sought to counter the Russian advances in the spring of 2014 with economic instruments, while military means, including direct military support to Ukraine, have been avoided. The sanctions have been relatively well coordinated and have been tightened in several rounds. At present, these include travel bans and the “freezing” of bank assets aimed at individuals in the Putin circle and a number of companies closely linked to it. The companies affected are primarily gas, energy, defense industry, banking and finance companies. The Putin circle has in turn sought to counter the sanctions in various ways. For example, the central bank for the Putin circle, Bank Rossiya, has been assigned new tasks by Russian state authorities, which means that it will manage approximately two percent of all electricity subscriptions in Russia and will thus be able to benefit from the turnover of enormous money flows. In this way, the Putin circle hopes to be able to isolate itself from the effects of the sanctions.

Question Time
The speeches of the five panelists were accompanied by questions from the audience, which mainly revolved around the sanctions against Russia, the role of the UN, and concessions on the Russian and Western sides.

Why is Prime Minister Medvedev not subject to EU sanctions?
Vendil Pallin: It is important to note that Putin is not on the sanctions list either. The highest political leadership cannot easily be subject to sanctions if negotiations are to continue. Otherwise, it will be problematic when the sanctions are lifted. The sanctions are now instead aimed at hitting the economy hard. For example, Russian loans can currently only be refinanced in Hong Kong, which means that Russian banks will be forced to reduce lending.

Will the sanctions be lifted when the situation stabilizes?
The panelists agreed that a reduction in sanctions is neither appropriate, desirable nor likely. Such actions would send the wrong signals to the Russian leadership. Engdahl also pointed out that, for example, Turkey's occupation of northern Cyprus is still considered illegal and that the same may apply to the Crimean peninsula, meaning that Moscow and the community of states are on different sides of a long-term international law dispute.

How likely is it that Germany would agree to tougher sanctions against Russia?
Engelbrekt: Germany has undergone a foreign policy metamorphosis in connection with the Ukraine crisis, transforming its approach from cautious diplomacy to increasingly prominent and at times relentless criticism of Russia, for example through Federal President Joachim Gauck. Although Germany still tries to be constructive when it believes there is room for this, it is currently in the process of comprehensively reviewing its relationship with Russia.

What is the UN's role in the conflict and its possible development? With the UN Security Council paralyzed in the Ukraine crisis due to the Russian veto, can the General Assembly instead act to resolve the crisis?
Engdahl: No, the General Assembly has no such power, but can only criticize Russian actions and show its moral support for Ukraine. Unlike those formulated by the Security Council, General Assembly resolutions do not have binding force under international law, but only political and moral legitimacy.
Engelbrekt: Although Russia may block the Security Council, the Ukraine issue is now integrated into the agenda that is being kept alive, and will therefore continue to be addressed both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. And since the issue will not be removed from the agenda until the conflict is resolved, Russia is forced to defend itself and may thus be exposed to pressure.

What is the US's role in the conflict?
Nygren: The answer depends on which part of the conflict is meant. Overall, there are hardly any long-term American plans regarding Ukraine.
Elving: First and foremost, the US will increase its troop presence in the Baltics, but in the long run it is difficult to say.
Vendil Pallin: NATO will probably become more active than the alliance has been since 1989.
Engelbrekt: Despite Ukraine, the US will continue to be busy elsewhere in the world and will therefore encourage Europe to become more involved in its own defense.

Are small “buffer states” getting caught up in the conflict?
Vendil Pallin: Russia has its own means of pressure and small states in its vicinity will probably find themselves in a bind.
Engelbrekt: The Baltic Sea countries want to avoid becoming enemies with both Germany and Russia and are therefore unlikely to challenge either of the great powers, which was obvious when they both agreed to build a gas pipeline (Nordstream) across the Baltic Sea despite opposition from most other countries.

What is the separatists' goal? Can any of the other parties accept a "frozen conflict"?
Vendil Pallin: The Ukrainian government had proposed autonomy for eastern Ukraine even before the crisis, so this is hardly a goal that the separatists are pursuing. Moreover, the separatist leadership was replaced by Russia after the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 on July 17, and it is now difficult to see a political goal that would be independent of those pursued by Russia.
Nygren: The separatists are also not a unified group, even though Russia makes it seem that way.
Elving: Neither side in Ukraine really wants a frozen conflict. The Ukrainian government wants to complete its “anti-terrorist” mission, while the separatists could possibly cling to a frozen conflict if no more attractive solution is offered.
Vendil Pallin: At the same time, however, Russia would like to have a frozen conflict, and it is Russia that is actually in charge – not the separatists.
Elving: In my opinion, the longer the conflict simmers and continues, the better for Russia; at least for that long Ukraine will not be able to become a member of NATO, which requires that minority and border disputes have already been resolved!

What concessions can Russia make and still be satisfied?
Nygren: Putin will not let go of Crimea, but he can use its status as a bargaining chip in negotiations. Ukraine will never be able to admit the annexation, but for the rest of us it is probably better to accept it as a fact.

Does Russia have a real reason to feel threatened by Ukraine's rapprochement with the West?
Engelbrekt: For Russia, the Ukraine crisis is probably not about that, but primarily about Putin's need for domestic political support. The leading Western countries actually agreed to postpone a possible Ukrainian NATO membership for an indefinite period already at the Bucharest summit in 2008. Nor did the crisis arise because Ukrainians wanted to ally themselves with the EU against Russia. On the contrary, the crisis was partly caused by the fact that expectations of an association agreement with the EU were raised by all Ukrainian politicians, including former President Yanukovych himself, only to be suddenly abandoned in favor of a far-reaching bilateral trade agreement with Russia. The Maidan movement was born out of frustration over this behavior in the fall of 2013.

Has the OSCE presence had any effective impact on the crisis?
Engelbrekt: Politically, the OSCE is perceived as relatively neutral, which can be useful if there is a need for negotiations and observers.
Vendil Pallin: At the same time, it was not the OSCE that negotiated the ceasefire. The OSCE's actions have not been impressive, and to guarantee security and stability in Ukraine, Kiev desperately needs the support of NATO or Russia.

Could EU troops be used as peacekeepers in Ukraine?
Engdahl: From an international law perspective, it would be possible for the Ukrainian government to request such assistance, even without a mandate from the Security Council. However, the troops could only stay for as long as Ukraine wished.
Nygren: Politically, it would be a bad idea; it is best to keep the EU, OSCE and Russia separate.
Elving: After the extensive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it could hardly happen for political reasons within Western countries.

 

Notes