During the Winter Symposium, the speakers attempt to place Sweden's and Europe's security policy situation in a larger strategic context and at the same time point out the next steps for research, policy development and practical capacity building on the basis of SV-A-R's final report.
Project SVAR and next steps
The introduction by Governor Björn von Sydow emphasizes Sweden's ability to mobilize in times of crisis: the pandemic, the migration crisis of 2015 and the reception of Ukrainian refugees are highlighted as examples of generosity, improvisational skills and responsibility in society, as well as the restructuring of industry and civil society efforts. The aid to Ukraine since 2022 is seen both as solidarity and as part of safeguarding Sweden's and Europe's own security, linked to the rapid reconstruction of military and civil defense.
The SVAR report does not claim to provide all the answers but is described as a basis for continued dialogue, research and studies on, among other things, the time gap between threats and capability building, Europe's dependence on the US and the balance between military armament, civil preparedness and other societal needs. It also underlines the need to strengthen democratic resilience without compromising the principles of the rule of law. A new project is announced: “Sweden's role in a multipolar world with multi-domain battlefields”, where the aim is to broaden expertise with external researchers, work both openly and in smaller circles under Chatham House Rules, and focus on, among other things, optimizing Sweden's geopolitical position, innovation capacity and future multi-domain operations within NATO and the EU.
The pyramid: from global world order to national responsibility
Project leader Lars-Erik Lundin places SVAR in a broader security landscape where it is difficult to simultaneously keep a pandemic, a full-scale Russian invasion, NATO membership, changing US policy and European responsibility in mind. The Academy has organized three expert groups and six departments that have tried to break the deadlock, with extensive reference networks, podcasts and seminars.
He introduces a “pyramid” where many Swedes spontaneously focus on the top – world order, great power relations, climate – and concludes that Sweden is too small to have an impact. This is called a dangerous assumption; the report points to at least four reasons for this, including the risk that an “incorrect” outcome in Ukraine will push the threat north towards us, the increased importance of hybrid threats and the central issue of the relationship with the US.
The pyramid is therefore turned “right”: NATO Article 3 and own responsibility are placed at the bottom – Sweden must do its utmost to build national capability, with clear benchmarks for what is actually achieved, faster decision-making, new legislation, reformed procurement and implementation power. Will to defend and open debate are pointed out as crucial during the election year, and the academy sees its role in providing decision-makers and opinion leaders with qualified information.
On top of that, a regional “hub” is added – the Nordic-Baltic region, preferably with Poland and Germany – where they want to see deeper defense cooperation. At the European level, they talk about “differentiated autonomy”: the EU can become more independent in certain areas, but will for a long time be dependent on the US and global raw material and trading partners. At the same time, Europe must maximize American involvement without adopting a subordinate stance. Finally, it is stated that deterrence and resilience must be seen in a global system framework, where Sweden cannot act alone but also not passively.
USA, Trump and European responsibility
An audience question (Mikael Holmström) revolves early on around the development of the US under Trump and NATO's Articles 1–3 – could the US become an enemy or indifferent rather than a guarantor? Several speakers (Michael Sahlin and others) emphasize that the question is central but analytically difficult; the report provides provisional answers and highlights the need for continued, in-depth study of the US dimension.
Ursula von der Leyen's relief after Senator Rubio's assurances in Munich is being questioned, as concrete policy continues to move in a worrying direction. There is a warning against letting short-term signals hide a deeper change in the US's strategic direction, where national interests and "interest politics" trump the rule of law. The military chapter has therefore conservatively assumed that American support for Europe's close defense may not be forthcoming, which leads to the conclusion that Europe itself must be able to handle a conventional attack, especially in the east.
On the civilian side, the consequences of the US's reinforcement assumptions not being met are pointed out: the geography of reinforcements is changing, the North-South axis and the EU's role are growing, and the EU must become a major player in economic and political support. At the same time, it is noted that US domestic politics – including mid-term elections, the risk of impeachment proceedings and the balance of power between Democrats and Republicans – are driving a jittery tone rather than a completely new strategic doctrine, but that the long-term damage to US institutions may be difficult to repair.
In the defense industry chapter, this has a concrete consequence: a ready-made American fighter jet (F-35) is no longer considered a realistic long-term alternative, since a system that is to last 50 years cannot be based on a supplier that cannot be trusted politically. The EU's own defense industry strategy (50–60 percent European purchases by 2030/35) and players such as Saab are pointed out as indicators of a trend towards increased European equipment supply autonomy.
Europe, system collapse and the global south
Gunilla Herolf paints a dark picture: Europe is in a worse situation than at any time since World War II, with Russia waging a full-scale war against Ukraine and hybrid influence against other European countries, while the US interest in Europe is “very moderate.” She emphasizes that while support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia are having an effect, the EU is still paying more for Russian energy than it is giving in aid to Ukraine.
Readiness 2030 with 800 billion euros for new weapons is seen as a powerful step, but large industrial projects such as the Franco-German aircraft project illustrate how national interests and lack of information can lower European ambitions. The new US doctrines suggest that Europe should be able to fend for itself conventionally and that Russia is not seen as a decisive threat even in the event of an attack on Eastern Europe, which ties back to the demand for European self-sufficiency.
She points to a divided European map:
- The North/Northeast is the largest contributor to Ukraine per capita and has the highest resilience to Russian influence.
- The South provides less support and has a milder view of Russia.
- The Southeast is characterized by energy dependence, cultural and religious ties to Russia, and Chinese investments.
Hungary is cited as an example of rhetoric where Brussels is portrayed as a greater threat to freedom than Moscow.
In response, the following are proposed: continued and increased support for Ukraine, flexible mini-coalitions (E3, E6, coalitions of the willing) for rapid and politically legitimate action, and reforms of the EU's veto power in foreign and security policy to enable more effective sanctions and enlargement. According to her, Ukraine, Moldova and possibly Georgia should be integrated into the EU/NATO, despite Russian reluctance, since failure would be a victory for Russian imperialism. At the same time, the need to “stand tall” towards the US is emphasized: the US is not the enemy, but Europe should not duck for unfair demands or trade policy measures.
Mikael Holmström and other questions trigger a discussion about global system collapse (Michael Sahlin) as an umbrella concept – the international subsystems (trade, health, arms control, legal order) built after 1945 and the Cold War are eroding as revisionist powers (Russia, etc.) and a “Trumpian” USA leave or undermine institutions and rules. The future of New START and the weakening of the nuclear weapons regime are highlighted as key examples.
At a global level, there is also a criticism of the Western powers' handling of the global South: insulting leaders like Modi or Lula is seen as having a price, as many states and movements have historically been prepared to take great losses to resist perceived imperialism. The report therefore advocates a more partnership-oriented approach, especially towards Africa with its demographic weight and future knowledge resources, where, according to the speakers, Europe has a potential advantage over the USA.
The Baltics, the Arctic and Swedish military capabilities
The military sub-study (Karlis Neretnieks) analyses how Sweden can best contribute to deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic area under the assumption that US involvement in Europe will be strongly limited. Two strategic directions are identified: the Arctic/Arctic and the Baltic Sea/Baltic, with completely different Russian motives – military benefit in the north, imperial ambitions in the Baltic.
The question is asked what we should primarily deter: the cause (imperial expansion) or the military benefit; the conclusion is that both must be addressed because they may coincide. Today's Swedish efforts are considered to be relatively beneficial to the Arctic, while the contribution to deterrence around the Baltics is insufficient.
A three-step model is outlined:
- Units on site in the Baltics.
- Early Nordic reinforcements (Sweden, Denmark, possibly Norway).
- Later long-range reinforcements (Canada, Great Britain, France, etc.).
At present, Sweden cannot fulfill the stop-gap role in stage 2; therefore, it is proposed that additional funds in addition to the 2024 defense decision should primarily be used to cover the deterrence gap in the Baltics. Specifically, the proposals include 2–3 new army brigades to be able to operate as divisions in the Baltic Sea area, expanded naval capabilities for maritime security, strengthened amphibious corps with a focus on critical islands (e.g. Saaremaa–Daugava) and the use of the air force for early support, including ground target combat and operations against targets on Russian territory within a NATO framework. In addition, European solutions are required to address enabler deficiencies (satellites, aerial refueling, strategic transport aircraft) when the USA cannot be taken for granted.
The nuclear weapons issue and European deterrence
Lars Wedin, via Lars-Erik Lundin, presents the main conclusions in the nuclear weapons section. Sweden should not acquire its own nuclear weapons, both for reasons of international law (NPT) and due to cost and vulnerability problems during the transition period from a threshold state to a fully operational nuclear weapons power. The experiences of France and the United Kingdom show that nuclear weapons are displacing conventional investments, while the requirements for delivery systems, protection against preemptive strikes and line security are extreme.
Nuclear sharing is not considered a path for Sweden, as dual decision-making and political complexity limit its benefits. However, Sweden should fully participate in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, in relevant exercises using conventional means, and build expertise in FOI, the Swedish National Defense University, the Swedish Armed Forces, and academia.
An important idea is to increase Putin's uncertainty also from the European side, as a complement to the US nuclear weapons, including by supporting French and British initiatives to more clearly articulate a European deterrence dimension. Macron is mentioned as a leading figure; the point is that Putin's actions risk driving forward a stronger European nuclear weapons ambition, which in itself should act as a deterrent.
Defense industry, pace and culture
In the defense industry chapter (Thomas Engevall), war is likened to “material sports” but also to team tempo or biathlon: both materiel, personnel, psychology and will are required, and money is not enough if it is not converted into rapid capacity increases. Despite greatly increased funding, the process is going too slowly – orders with delivery in ten years will not help in the near future.
A debate between, among others, Captain Braw (who believes that managers are “misprogrammed”, more of a savior for the auditor than for the Russian) and researcher Silverup (who emphasizes that the processes are misdesigned) is used to illustrate that both leadership and regulations must be changed. The speaker agrees somewhat more with the need for strong drive at management level, since motivated managers can “influence the processes” even if the regulations are sluggish.
Proposals include easing procurement regulations, expanding opportunities for direct procurement with reference to essential national security interests, raising limits in LUFS, greater mandates for the Armed Forces and FMV, and a culture that rewards fast delivery to combat units over process correctness. It also highlights the need to let units work more directly with industry, inspired by Ukraine, but warns of disorder – a Swedish model must combine decentralized innovation with cohesive governance.
Civil defense, hybrid threats and urgency
The final session on hybrid warfare and civil defence presents a picture of a fragmented system with many actors, overlapping rules and EU directives that create paralysis. Examples are given from electricity and frequency stability where the division of responsibilities between Svenska kraftnät, PTS and the Swedish Energy Agency is unclear, while the market is flooded with insecure, connected products without reasonable cybersecurity requirements. NATO Article 3 underlines that Sweden must be able to guarantee functioning infrastructure and electricity supply when allied troops are in the country.
The speakers (Björn Körlof, Lars Nylén and Johan Wiktorin) call for clear political guidance on what civil preparedness capabilities Sweden should have, at what level and at what cost, as well as the courage to set aside secondary guidance signals when building up total defence. They also point out that other countries (e.g. France) are leading the way in demanding secure hardware, which illustrates that national action is possible despite EU frameworks.
In conclusion, Johan Wiktorin reminds us of historical timescales: from the campaign in Poland to the attacks on Norway and Denmark it took 187 days, and only another 31 days until the offensive against France, the Netherlands and Belgium began. The point is that Sweden cannot assume that it has “plenty of time”; the security situation is assessed in the discussion as at least “eight out of ten” in terms of seriousness, and the speakers open up the possibility that a future Swedish coalition government may be needed to bear the political responsibility for the necessary change.