This post is a shortened, slightly edited, Swedish version of a speech I gave at a conference in Helsinki on March 29. The conference was organized by the Finnish Institute of Foreign Affairs with participants from NATO Headquarters in Brussels, the NATO Defence College in Rome, SIPRI, the US Army War College and other organizations. Topics discussed included Sweden's and Finland's future roles in NATO, the NATO-EU relationship and the US's relationship with China. My summary conclusion is: Swedish political and military thinking will need to take place in radically new directions for us.

Speech

Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO does not change the fundamental threat picture. The bases on the Kola Peninsula with Russia's nuclear-armed submarines and the combat forces with which it can influence NATO's connections across the Atlantic and to the Scandinavian Peninsula will be as worthy of protection for Russia in the future as they are today. Russia's possible ambitions in the Baltics will continue to constitute a threat that must be met. What will change is NATO's ability to defend its members in the region. This will increase as all the Nordic countries can be included in a common defense plan for the entire region.

In what way could Sweden and Finland contribute to the alliance's defense capabilities in the region?

The first thing we should make clear is that we are talking about two different situations, signaling in peace and contributing in war. This difference is most clearly seen in the Baltics.

NATO's concept, Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), of having a limited multinational troop presence in the Baltics on a rotational basis, is not intended to be able to defend the countries against an attack. The forces are too small to stop a Russian attack. They are mainly intended to highlight that the entire alliance will be involved if Russia were to attack any of the Baltic countries.

Of course, Sweden as well as Finland should contribute to the EFP, for example with air forces and some ground combat units. This is primarily to politically mark solidarity with the most vulnerable members of the alliance.

But with what and how should Sweden and Finland be able to act in the event of war to contribute to the alliance's ultimate purpose – to defend its members? Even though each member should be prepared to contribute to the best of their ability anywhere within NATO's area of ​​responsibility, it seems reasonable that we primarily look at efforts in our immediate area. This is probably a prerequisite for our contribution to be given such a scope that it really makes a difference.

A major and important step was taken a week or so ago when the air force commanders in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark signed an agreement that means that the countries' air forces will eventually develop into a joint resource from an operational point of view. That is, they can be led as if they were an air force, have good opportunities to use each other's bases, develop joint tactics, etc. This means that an attacker will have to face around 250 highly modern fighter aircraft which will be able to act in a coordinated manner in both air defense and attack operations, in the event of a possible conflict in the Nordic area. A force about the same size as the German Luftwaffe. A fairly powerful instrument, also seen in a larger NATO context.

Although the joint capabilities of the Nordic air forces will be considerable, there are reasons to prepare for the stationing of other countries' air forces in the region, perhaps primarily in Sweden. Not primarily to participate in the defense of Sweden, but more to be able to operate in Finland and the Baltics.

There will be a great need to protect maritime transport of both military equipment and personnel as well as civilian supplies across the Baltic Sea, especially from Sweden to Finland and the Baltics, which will require extensive coordination of NATO naval resources in the Baltic Sea. It would therefore be a great advantage if it were possible to create, within the framework of NATO, a similar arrangement between the navies of the Baltic Sea states as is now the case between the Nordic air forces.

In addition to protecting maritime transport in the Baltic Sea, it is at least as important to secure maritime transport to Scandinavia, especially to the Swedish west coast. Gothenburg is the most important port for Sweden as well as Norway, and could also become so for Finland if maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea becomes difficult to carry out. The question, however, is who should bear the main responsibility for protecting shipping in the North Sea and Skagerrak? These are large sea areas that must be patrolled, a task that will require many ships with good endurance. Something that will require very large financial and personnel resources. Here, one should perhaps consider whether the German Bundesmarine should not pull the heaviest load, in exchange for the Swedish, Finnish, and Polish navies being the ones that mainly handle the Baltic Sea.

However responsibility for the Baltic Sea is divided, it is clear that the number of ships currently planned to be added to the various navies in the Baltic Sea area will be too small to be able to conduct effective maritime security. Since the threat will likely primarily consist of Russian submarines, mines and various types of missiles, airborne or land-based, the ships planned for the future should be given a pronounced ability to deal with this type of threat.

Now to the alliance's biggest problem in the region. The lack of ground combat units. In addition to the fact that there is already a lack of sufficient ground combat units in the "frontline states" bordering Russia from the start, it is also the resource that takes the longest to provide from other allies, to the extent that such units exist in any significant numbers at all.

Northern Scandinavia – the area that could be at risk if Russia were to expand the protection zone around its bases on the Kola Peninsula is much larger than most people imagine. The combined land area of: the Norwegian counties of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark, Norrbotten and Lapland in Sweden, and Finnish Lapland covers an area of ​​approximately 421 square kilometers. An area that is considerably larger than the whole of Germany or Poland, 000 and 357 square kilometers respectively.

Should war break out within the next five years, the area will be defended by the following: a Norwegian brigade, a Swedish brigade (both are currently incomplete) and a Finnish brigade with some additional resources. How and when any reinforcements can be brought to the area will always be associated with great uncertainty. The picture is further complicated by the fact that Norway's main task within the alliance has a clearly maritime focus: to prevent Russian naval and air forces from passing through the Norwegian Sea and then out towards the Atlantic, together with the Royal Navy. The possibilities to invest heavily in ground forces will be limited. The defense of the northern Nordic region will mainly be a task for Sweden and Finland. Something that will require more units than is currently planned.

The Baltics – no Baltic country will be able to field sufficient forces to repel a Russian attack on its own. The populations and economies are too small. There are basically only two ways to solve this problem: that the forces included in the Enhanced Forward Presence are drastically strengthened, so that there are always a couple of allied brigades in each Baltic country. However, this is an expensive and very demanding solution in terms of personnel. The alternative is to create a model where the Baltic countries can be supplied with substantial reinforcements, several brigades, very quickly.

Sweden's geographical location means that Swedish units could be among the first, probably the very first if we are talking about sea-borne reinforcements, to be in place in the Baltics in the event of a threat of a Russian attack, or in the event of an attack. The time to transport units from Nynäshamn to Liepaja with, for example, a Gotland ferry is approximately 10 hours.

Two Swedish brigades that would be in place early in a Baltic country could constitute a "tipping point" to deter an attack in a crisis, or in a war situation create time for other countries to provide additional units.

There may also be reasons for Finland, despite being a frontline state itself, with a great need for ground combat units, to consider whether it should still plan to be able to quickly transfer certain units to Estonia.

Overall, the overall direction for how Sweden and Finland should develop their defense forces to best contribute to the alliance's deterrence and warfare capabilities, summarized in one sentence, could be as follows:

Sweden should create an organization with a clear focus on participating in and supporting operations in Finland and the Baltics, while Finland should continue to prioritize the defense of its own territory.

The author is a major general, former rector of the Swedish National Defense University, operations commander in the then Eastern Military District and brigade commander. He is a member of KKrVA.

*****

In the subsequent discussion, the following were raised by the audience, among other things:

"The idea of ​​being able to quickly, very quickly, reinforce the Baltics with larger ground combat units in the event of a crisis or war is entirely in line with NATO's ongoing planning. This for two reasons: to be able to hold ground to enable continued reinforcements, but also now, in light of Russian war crimes and the extreme recklessness in Ukraine, to be able to stop an attack as close to the border as possible."

"The Arctic's increased importance in terms of shipping, natural resources and the general risk of political friction in the Arctic area suggests that Norway will likely be forced to prioritize that region, partly at the expense of other desirable capabilities, which is why Sweden's and Finland's ability to "protect Norway's back" will become even more important."

"Sweden will be of great importance to NATO as a transport and logistics hub - shouldn't that lead to considerations on how to increase the protection of infrastructure against various types of missile attacks?"

 ______________