Sweden's contribution to NATO's deterrence capability – ahead of the Defense Committee's report

Background

What should the defense force that Sweden will contribute to NATO's joint deterrence capability look like? The Defense Committee is due to answer that question in a little over a month, on April 26. Here are some suggestions that I would like to see in the committee's report.

The 2020 Defense Decision was a far-sighted decision. Even then, the foundation was laid for Sweden to be defended together with others, and for us to be able to contribute to the defense of our neighboring countries. We therefore already have extensive cooperation with these countries, primarily Finland. We have also been participating in various NATO exercises for several years. Interoperability, that is, being able to cooperate with other countries' units, also became a requirement. NATO accession is therefore not a revolutionary change that turns all previous decisions on their heads. Rather, our membership institutionalizes that Sweden is defended together with others and makes it clear that the defense of Sweden now begins at NATO's external border. Something that is most clearly illustrated at the North Sea and at the eastern border of the Baltics. Two vulnerable land borders, where extensive efforts will be required from the alliance to ward off a possible Russian attack.

NATO's biggest military problem in the region, and Europe in all respects, is the alliance's general lack of ground forces, and the time constraints and transportation challenges involved in bringing them here, especially from the US and Canada. It will be a month or so, perhaps a few months, before we can expect them to be in our immediate vicinity to any significant extent.

The type of reinforcements that can reach the Nordic area the fastest are air forces. They can play an important role in meeting attacks against both Finland and the Baltic states in the early stages, but will not be able to stop an attack on the ground alone.

Sweden's contribution to the alliance's ability to deter Russia from attacking any alliance member in the region therefore primarily concerns two capabilities:

to generate units that can act early, primarily in the Arctic and the Baltics, to create time for other countries to bring reinforcements to the region, before Russia has achieved decisive successes,

to constitute a hub and staging area through which reinforcements and supplies can be brought to Finland and the Baltics, and to create conditions for foreign, primarily air, but also naval forces to base themselves in Sweden.

In addition to determining which tasks may be relevant and which capabilities are required to solve the tasks, there is another extremely important factor that must be included when we talk about the development of the Armed Forces: how much time do we have to create these capabilities? The defense ministers of Germany, Estonia, and Denmark have assessed that it could take around five years for Russia, after the war in Ukraine has ended, to recreate a military force that could threaten other neighboring countries, such as the Baltic states.

The general conclusion, which should hardly arouse any debate, should therefore be that the focus of the upcoming defense decision should be to implement what was already decided in the Defense Decision 2020, and where possible to accelerate implementation. The question is rather what new demands the security policy situation that has deteriorated since 2020, NATO accession and the fact that we have had an ongoing major war in Europe since 2022, pose. Below I point out some of the measures that I believe should be taken.

The branches of defense

If we start with the Army. The 2020 Defense Decision meant that the Army in 2030 would consist of three versatile brigades plus half a brigade for the defense of Stockholm and a battalion battle group on Gotland. In addition, there would be a number of independent rifle battalions, two air defense battalions, engineer and command units, etc. That goal has been shattered. The plan will not be able to be realized without fairly large financial contributions. Sweden has donated equipment to Ukraine for over 20 billion kronor, equipment that was planned to be included in Swedish units, it must be re-acquired. It will cost large sums, far more than the previous acquisition value as the prices of defense equipment have increased dramatically in the last two years. However, improved decision-making processes are also required. For example, the 2020 Defense Decision stated that the Dal Regiment would be re-established. Still, three years later, no construction has begun, partly due to investigations into soil conditions and environmental impact. The problems in Falun are not unique.

What should be done then, apart from the general need to implement what has already been decided and speed up implementation?

When it comes to ground combat units, we should focus on, together with our neighbors, covering the time gap that exists between a possible Russian attack on any country in the region and the time when reinforcements from primarily the United States and Canada could arrive. That is, a few months.

If we look at what the "frontier states", Finland and the Baltic countries, can be expected to contribute, including the units from other allied states that are permanently there, an operation of the order of two Swedish brigades in each direction would be an important addition. Possibly large enough to be the tipping point in preventing Russia from winning decisive successes before further reinforcements can arrive. Here it is not just a question of what effect the units can develop when the attack is a fact. The existence of units that are prepared to be deployed in a certain area also affects a prospective attacker's risk calculation. Will the risk of failure be too great if he has to include these possible reinforcements in his calculations? In other words, just preparing an operation in a credible way can contribute to increased deterrence, and thereby prevent an attack.

In order to create a credible concept of this kind, the previous defense decision lacks one of the two Swedish brigades that should be able to operate in the North Cap, mainly in northern Finland. However, the conditions for setting up a brigade capable of operating under the special climate and terrain conditions that prevail there were already established in the previous defense decision by re-establishing the garrisons in Östersund and Sollefteå. This also opens up the possibility of re-creating a unit type that existed previously, the Norrland Brigade. A versatile assault unit that had a particularly good ability to operate in poor terrain under harsh climate conditions. A unit type that would be a very valuable complement to the mechanized brigade that is being set up by I19 in Boden, and to the Finnish and Norwegian units that will also operate in the area.

If we look at all the brigades, we would then get a picture where the newly formed Norrland Brigade and the brigade from I 19 in Boden would be earmarked for operations in the North Cap and the brigades set up by P 4 in Skövde and P 7 in Revinge would be focused on operations in the Baltics. In addition, the current planning that in peacetime, on a rotational basis, we should have a battalion stationed in Latvia will probably be very difficult to realize if it is only the P 7 brigade that is responsible for that task. This also suggests that the two southern mechanized brigades should focus on the Baltics and handle that task both in peace and war. Here there may be reasons to dismiss the argument that reinforcements from Sweden are only of limited importance, it is the German-Polish corps, Multinational Corps Northeast (MNCNE), which should be the one that, via the so-called Suwalki Gap, should be responsible for the early reinforcements to the Baltics. This is a very uncertain planning assumption. In the event of war, breaking through the only 60-kilometer-wide Suwalki Gap between Kaliningrad and Belarus, which Russia will do its best to close as a first step in a war in the Baltic Sea region, will probably be a time-consuming and resource-intensive affair. Probably a considerably longer operation than the time it takes to bring reinforcements across the Baltic Sea, by air and by sea.

Apart from the fact that it is urgent to carry out the organisation of the battle group on Gotland, it can hardly wait until 2030, there is reason to review the planned unit structure. A reduced mechanised battalion, plus a smaller air defence unit and an artillery company is not much. Russia's clearly stated ambition to incorporate former parts of its empire poses a very tangible threat to the Baltics. The need for the alliance to be able to reinforce the Baltics has thus become even more obvious. From there, Russia could use long-range weapon systems to protect military operations against the Baltics, primarily by making it difficult for NATO reinforcements to reach the Baltics. The island has become a sugar cube for Russia.

Since an attack on the island would very likely be the first (plus blocking Suwalki Gap) to occur in connection with a Russian military operation in the Baltics, there will not be much warning for us, or our allies, to have time to bring reinforcements there. This suggests that the mechanized battalion on the island should be a significantly reinforced mechanized battalion in terms of ground combat capability, not a reduced one, and that the air defense on the island should be the best we have, i.e. Patriot. As harsh as it may sound, it is considerably more important to defend Gotland than to protect any facility or location on the mainland. In the one case, it could mean that the alliance fails to defend one or more of its members, while in the other case, it could mean that important Swedish infrastructure or equipment on the mainland might be destroyed – sad. But that is probably a very moderate problem compared to NATO having to try to recapture all or part of the Baltics. Or, in the worst case, conclude that the alliance lacked the ability to protect its members, with incalculable consequences for the alliance's credibility and cohesion.

Linked to Sweden's role as a hub in the region for transport and basing, there is a great need for, among other things, air defense and liaison units that will operate on Swedish territory to protect and restore vital infrastructure. Here, for example, it should be borne in mind that there are ten rivers that must be crossed on the route from Mälardalen to Luleå. The number of connections over each river is not large. When it comes to railway bridges, in most cases there are only two. Here there is a clear weakness in terms of the possibilities of transporting mechanized units and large quantities of supplies from Central Sweden to Norrland. The connections must be protected and there must be a high level of readiness to repair or replace damaged bridges.

The Navy's role is already now, and will be even more so in the future, to ensure functioning sea connections in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. This is a prerequisite for both Swedish and other countries' reinforcement transports to the Baltic States and Finland. Sea transports across the Baltic Sea are also crucial for the supply of Finland and the Baltic countries. Neither the number of ships in the fleet nor their capabilities are currently sufficient to solve the extensive need for maritime security.

All currently available surface combatants: five of the Visby class, two of the Stockholm class and two of the Gävle class should therefore be renovated and modified as far as possible. For the Visby class, it has already been decided that they will be equipped with qualified air defense missiles. All ships should be kept in service as long as possible, as the lead time for acquiring new ships is long, 5-6 years, and it would otherwise take too long to increase the number of ships in the Navy. The introduction of the planned Luleå class ships should be accelerated if possible. With their qualified air defense and anti-submarine warfare systems, they will be a crucial addition to the Navy's maritime security capabilities. The possibilities of further increasing the number of ships in the near future should be investigated, primarily by purchasing fully developed ships from abroad.

The navy's mine clearance capability must be developed through the introduction of new technology and the addition of more ships for this task. This is a prerequisite for keeping ports and routes open, which in turn is a prerequisite for Sweden to function as the hub for NATO reinforcements and logistics transport, which will be one of our roles in NATO.

The defense of Åland is, for geographical reasons, in practice a joint Swedish-Finnish problem. Given the great importance of the archipelago in keeping an attacker out of the Bothnian Sea (sea connections to Finland must not be interrupted), Sweden should be on high alert from the outset to participate in the defense of Åland. This suggests that a third amphibious battalion should be set up, in addition to the current two, with the primary task of contributing to the defense of Åland.

The great, and increasing, importance of various cables and pipelines on the seabed suggests that the Navy should be given the ability to monitor and protect these, something that will require new skills and new technology.

Sweden is the country with perhaps the best knowledge of the Baltic Sea's hydrography, and with an already highly qualified navy in many cases. In addition, Sweden, as the largest coastal owner in the Baltic Sea, has the best conditions of all coastal states to create good basing opportunities for its own as well as allied naval units. The Swedish archipelago is a great asset there. Sweden should therefore offer to host a NATO "Baltic Sea Command".

The Air Force will probably be the branch of defense that will be most closely integrated into NATO's operational command system, and will also interact most closely with various NATO functions. Much will be a question of becoming part of various alliance-wide technical systems and functions. These will certainly be costly measures, but they will contribute to one plus one becoming more than two when air operations can be coordinated in a NATO context. From a Russian perspective, this will mean, among other things, that in the Nordic area you will be forced to face coordinated efforts from all four Nordic air forces, a joint force that corresponds to the British Royal Air Force or the German Luftwaffe.

The latest version of the JAS 39 Gripen is currently being delivered. What Sweden will need after that is not clear. While waiting for the answers from the investigation that looks at our future air defense, which is due to report in 2027, funds should be reserved to be able to begin more practically oriented measures, such as in-depth studies, design and trials. Measures that will need to be taken independently if we intend to develop aircraft ourselves in the future, participate in a somewhat larger collaborative project or purchase a ready-made foreign aircraft.

The number of air base battalions should be increased to enable increased dispersion of our air forces and thereby increase their survivability on the ground, but also to create greater flexibility with regard to basing our own and allied air forces. Likewise, certain air bases, and civilian airfields, should be developed to be able to quickly receive extensive military logistics transports with all that this requires in terms of fortification preparations, protection, cargo handling systems, etc.

The decided introduction of the flying radar and combat control system S106 (GlobalEye) in the Swedish Air Force will certainly involve some overlap with NATO's AWACS but will also add unique capabilities. Poland has also decided to acquire this type of system. Here, the possibilities of creating a joint Nordic flying combat control and reconnaissance function, by acquiring a few more aircraft of this type, should be investigated as a possible joint Nordic project. In addition to creating increased redundancy in the region, it would constitute a certain safeguard for a situation where the US may not be able or willing to allocate extensive resources to the Nordic-Baltic area in the future.

Finances

The above approach, despite the increased ambition in relation to the 2020 defense decision, must be regarded as rather modest in view of the external situation. This year, Estonia is allocating 3% and Poland 4% of GDP to defense purposes, compared to Sweden's 2% (according to NATO's calculation model). It is hardly to blame that they are "frontline states" and thus run a greater risk of being attacked than Sweden, we are now part of the same alliance, if they are attacked, we are also in the war. But in return, their, and the alliance's in general, defense efforts constitute a significant part of the defense of Sweden. Here the moral question arises as to why these, relatively poor countries compared to Sweden, should contribute considerably more to our common defense than we do? Our threat assessments are also very similar.

Implementing what was decided in the Defence Decision 2020, and the ambition increases that are now needed, will require significantly increased appropriations. Whether this is a level of appropriation of 2,9% or 3,2% of GDP is impossible to state at this time. Only the Armed Forces and the Defence Materiel Administration can provide a detailed account of how the various proposals can and should be designed in terms of personnel content, materiel, etc., and are therefore the ones who must be given the task of making more detailed cost calculations.

However, this must not prevent the Defence Committee from clearly pointing out the capabilities that the committee deems necessary to build a defence that can make a positive contribution to NATO's deterrence capability in the region, and if necessary also ward off a Russian attack.

In addition to assessing what is required financially in the longer term, a "start-up grant", in addition to the regular defense (state) budget, of the order of SEK 100 billion should be considered in order to immediately begin re-procurement of such equipment that has been donated to Ukraine and the procurement of things that are in acute shortage, for example different types of ammunition and spare parts. And not least such basic things as uniforms, body armor and personal firearms for the individual soldier. Large sums are also required to, in some cases, alleviate long repair queues.

The need to quickly acquire large quantities of equipment means, among other things, that we must free ourselves from certain habitual ways of thinking. For example, that we think in economically optimal turnover cycles and that we focus too much on the long term. The latter we have sometimes called conscious risk-taking. Today, that argument feels moderately viable. Rather, we should think as we did during the rearmament during the years of preparedness 1939-1945: it is urgent, the equipment may need to be used, we must accept that it costs a lot “up front” and that we create “turnover humps” when a lot of equipment that becomes old at the same time is to be turned over at some point in the future.

Finally, despite the great needs that we ourselves have, support for Ukraine must not be reduced, on the contrary, it should be increased. Should Russia collect profits, large or small, from its offensive war against Ukraine, the risk of Russian military adventurism also increases in our immediate vicinity, and thus the need for dramatically greater Swedish defense investments than what has been outlined here.

*****

The author is a major general, former rector of the Swedish National Defence University, commander of the Gotland Regiment, member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Military Sciences, etc.

The article is in a slightly revised version published in Smedjan March 22, 2024

Sweden's contribution to NATO's deterrence capability – ahead of the Defense Committee's report

Background

The branches of defense

Other questions

Finances

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