The Academy of War Sciences has for a number of years conducted research and studies on the Swedish total defense and its future development. The research and studies are documented in the final report of the KV21 project, A credible total defense[1]The Academy notes, after analyzing the Defence Committee's reports, Resistance and Defence Force, that the preparation has carried out thorough work and submitted important proposals for our defense capabilities.

Based on the Academy's work, there are a number of circumstances that the Academy would like to highlight. The reason is that the serious security situation in the world presents our overall security policy with major challenges, combined with the fact that our country is not equipped to face an armed attack. We are now facing a period of great uncertainty and difficulty in assessing, something that constitutes a basic assumption for the Academy's current ongoing project. SES[2].

The report describes well the problems our country may face, especially in an even more tightened security policy situation, or in the worst case war. Based on a situation where in practice we only have crisis preparedness for everyday events in civil defense and a defense force that is far too small and not yet formed for a credible national defense, the report has formed its proposals. Admittedly, they will lead to Sweden's preparedness and defense capability being improved, but not to the level and at the pace that corresponds to the needs described by the report in today's, and even more so tomorrow's, security policy environment.

The Defence Committee notes that the world situation has not been as unstable as it is now for a long time and that the security situation globally and in our immediate area is serious. If a security crisis or armed conflict arises in our immediate area, an armed attack against Sweden cannot, according to the committee, be ruled out. Russia poses a threat to our country, among other things because it continues to undermine the fundamental principles of the European security order.

The committee notes that parts of our country are of particular military strategic importance to Russia in making it more difficult for NATO to defend the Baltics, which contributes to increasing the likelihood of Sweden being drawn into a possible future conflict between these parties. Furthermore, the committee is clear that our defense is undersized, unbalanced and not built to protect Swedish security in such a conflict. The Academy fully shares this assessment, but also wants to point out the importance of northern Sweden for Russia in protecting the Kola Peninsula and access to the Atlantic connections, as well as the importance of the Port of Gothenburg and our maritime transport along our entire coast.

The unstable world situation is also expressed in the daily conduct of influence operations, cyberattacks, etc. by the Russian state or actors close to it, including in connection with democratic elections in other countries. A major conflict cannot be ruled out today, and history shows how quickly a tense situation can turn into war.

In order for our country to be equipped to face a possible future conflict, a number of operational needs must be met. In the following, the Academy would like to point out the additional reinforcements that must be made, in addition to what is proposed in the report. Defense force. Regarding the report Resistance The academy fully shares what is being said, but implementation tends to drag on for too long and funding needs to be resolved. What is to be achieved in Resistance is a prerequisite for our military defense to be able to operate at full strength.

Our country must have the ability to detect and protect ourselves against the operations of a foreign power during a gray zone situation, as well as have a resilient society that is robust and can maintain critical systems, not least in terms of cybersecurity, food and energy supply. In Defense force There is no guidance given on how to handle a grey zone situation and what military resources should be used for in such a situation. This requires development because military resources in this context must be an integral part of total defense.

A central task for total defense is to be able to protect society's increasingly interconnected systems, where cyberattacks against them are a constant threat. Already today, in peacetime, attempts are made daily to penetrate IT-based systems at authorities, universities, operations centers and industries, with the aim of obtaining classified information but also to prepare for disruption or shutdown of systems as a way to harm our society. The committee's reports have not sufficiently addressed this problem, which requires powerful measures to identify attacks and protect systems critical to society.

To increase the chances of our soldiers and sailors surviving in a war situation, our systems for detecting and averting threats, including sensors and telewar systems, must at least be on technical parity with those used by the adversary. This is a key prerequisite for credibility and endurance. Against a high-tech adversary like Russia, which is once again investing large amounts of money in implementing new technology in its most qualified units, investments in cutting-edge technology and not just quantity are required. This is only touched upon peripherally in Defense force.

In the event of a military attack, we must be able to meet it wherever it comes with combat forces, whereby strategically important areas, sea connections, important ports and airfields must be able to be controlled and defended. Particularly important locations must be able to be quickly reinforced by operationally composed units, for example with a rapid reaction force similar to that proposed in KV21, either in advance or immediately after an attack. The combat components of the Armed Forces, in all branches of defense, should therefore be roughly doubled compared to the current organization, at the same time as new technical innovations must be added to the combat units.

In a prolonged grey zone situation with increased tension, threats, military incidents and attacks of a hybrid nature, etc., the total defense must have very good endurance. The proposals in Resistance must be both financed and implemented at a faster pace, which, in addition to a larger unit volume, is a prerequisite for the Armed Forces' units to be able to operate for a long time, months.

An attacker always seeks surprise. The operational units of the Armed Forces must therefore have a high level of readiness. Units manned by duty personnel, especially mechanized brigades and battle groups, must be able to mobilize quickly and solve combat tasks within a day or two. This requires measures regarding both basic organization, logistics and supply positions.

In terms of finances and implementation, the Academy would like to point out the necessity that the strengthening of our total defense does not drag on. It would therefore be wise not to let funding be a stumbling block this time. A large early one-time grant should be considered in order to quickly equip our defense.

In conclusion, the Academy would like to advise the government, based on the Defence Committee's proposal, to:

  • ensure that the country's combined resources can be utilized effectively during a grey zone situation,
  • speed up the process of equipping civil defense in order to, among other things, make military defense effective,
  • increase resources to improve the technical quality of the combat units, primarily with regard to sensor and telecommunications warfare systems,
  • strengthen the ability to quickly create operational response capacity in the event of surprising developments, and to
  • accelerate growth in volume.

Sweden must have a credible and war-resistant total defense nu and not in a distant future.

 

Sverker Goranson
President

Bjorn Anderson
The permanent secretary

Project Manager KV21, Jörgen Ericsson

Notes

[1] Military Science in the 21st Century (KV21), Royal Swedish Academy of Military Sciences April 2018.
[2] Security in tomorrow's Europe Swedish Perspective (SES).

 

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Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Justice
The Armed Forces
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
Försvarets materialilverk
National Defense University
Total Defence Research Institute
The National Police Authority (NOA)
Royal Naval Society
Royal Swedish Academy of Forestry and Agriculture
Royal The Academy of Engineering Sciences