At this point, the fight in Ukraine is not about borders or flags but about what kind of world we've built over the past century, and whether that world can sustain itself in the face of limitless brutality. As the Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin said in Davos last week: "We don't know when the war ends, but Ukraine has to win. I don't see another choice.”[1]
Tom Nichols, The Atlantic
The front today
Almost eleven months after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, it may be worth stopping and reflecting on how the world and Europe have changed in the past year.
Due to heroic efforts by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Russia has not succeeded in its goal of turning Ukraine into a vassal state.[2]Following the counterattacks in northern Ukraine and the recapture of Kherson in the autumn, Ukraine has now recaptured more than half of the areas occupied by Russia since February 24.[3]
Despite minor Russian tactical gains at the beginning of the invasion, it must be seen as among the greatest strategic mistakes made by a country in a long time. Ironically, perhaps on par with the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, or Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812.
There are several points about the invasion and the current situation that Ukraine and Russia are in that are worth highlighting.
During December 2022 and January 2023, the front line has been relatively quiet, with the most notable being that Ukrainian troops have left Soledar, a smaller village about ten miles north of Bakhmut.[4] Beyond this, from a Russian perspective, there is hardly any positive news to speak of. In fact, the gains around Soledar (with a pre-invasion population of around 10) are the first time since July that a Russian troop has occupied new ground.[5]
According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Russia has lost over 19 men in January alone.[6] In October 2022, Ukrainian sources stated that eight thousand Russian soldiers had died around Bakhmut.[7] That figure is now considered considerably higher, and Ukrainian commanders in Bakhmut stated on January 28 that Russian forces suffered “absurd losses.”[8] The battle for Bakhmut has been going on since July, ninety percent of the population has fled and President Zelensky has described the battle as “madness.”[9] It is worth considering that the city largely lacks strategic value for Russia.
If these numbers sound like Ukrainian propaganda, it is worth remembering that US Defense Secretary Milley stated in November that Russia had suffered over 100 dead or injured since the invasion.[10]
To this it can be added that when comparing how the front looked in September and today, the differences are minimal. Despite the Russian mobilization, the front has barely moved.[11]
Of the more than fifty thousand recruited by Wagner, the Russian organization “Rus Sidyashchaya” stated that only ten thousand are fighting in Ukraine. The organization said that the rest have died, deserted or surrendered. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) found the figures “very plausible”.[12] Despite this, Ukrainian authorities state that the fighting around the city is increasing in intensity.[13]
This article will highlight three aspects that inevitably lead to the conclusion that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is nothing more than a strategic defeat for Russia: Western arms deliveries to Ukraine, the collapse of the Russian energy sector, and Western sanctions.
Western arms deliveries
The hope of Western governments is now, according to CNN, that Ukraine can break the war of attrition that is underway around Bakhmut and focus on offensive operations in the spring with the help of the Western weapons systems that have begun to be delivered.[14]
This message from Western governments contains not only hope, but also a significant strategic defeat for Putin and Russia.
Two aspects are clear. First, Putin's attempt to use winter and Russian gas as a weapon against Europe has failed. In August, Reuters reported that Putin hoped that high energy prices and gas shortages would force Europe to bring Ukraine to the negotiating table. According to two anonymous Russian sources with insight into the Kremlin, this would have been the only way Putin saw that peace could be achieved.[15]
This attempt at blackmail has failed and inevitably leads to the second aspect. Instead of sending diplomats to Ukraine to begin negotiations, Europe and the US are sending armored vehicles and tanks.
321 tanks, according to the Ukrainian ambassador to France, to be exact.[16] However, it is unclear exactly what quantity and type were intended, but the US has previously said it will deliver 31 M1 Abrams, Germany, Poland and Canada a total of 32 Leopard 2, and the UK 14 Challenger 2. Several Eastern European countries, mainly Poland and the Czech Republic, have previously donated T-72s.
In addition, deliveries of Western armored vehicles, combat vehicles and air defense systems have begun. Among other things, the US will deliver 90 Strykers, another 59 Bradleys and the US, Germany and the Netherlands will send a number of Patriot air defense systems.[17]
If someone had claimed a year ago that the West would deliver modern tanks and combat vehicles to Ukraine with the explicit purpose of attacking Russian units, would anyone have believed it? If the idea seemed absurd in the West, can we even imagine what the odds were for it to be so in the Kremlin?
The paradigm shift that has occurred over the past year cannot be overstated.
The Russian energy sector
Before February 24, 2022, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia accounted for forty percent of Europe's imported gas. Today, Europe imports almost no Russian gas at all. According to analysts the Financial Times spoke to, 2023 will see further shifts from gas to renewable energy sources. One consequence of this, the Financial Times claims, is that Europe's economy will become more secure while Russia loses its previously largest gas market. [18]
The European market for both crude oil and natural gas has collapsed. In 2017, it was estimated that Russia had invested $100 billion in developing gas reserves on the Samoyed Peninsula in Siberia, which were mainly connected to Europe. The figure was expected to double by 2025, but the investment now looks redundant.[19]
Like the Russian gas market, the European market for Russian crude oil has collapsed. From importing around 1.5 million barrels per day in January 2022, the figure was closer to 2023 barrels per day in early January 150 – a ninety percent drop.[21] By the end of January, the figure had indeed risen to almost 500 barrels per day.[22], on par with the figures from the end of November 2022. This can be explained by the fact that in early February the EU imposed an import ban on Russian refined oil products, including diesel and gasoline. The sanctions, which come into effect on February 5, include a ban on using European ships, insurance and other services to export Russian products unless they are purchased for an amount lower than the price ceiling to be established.[23] This particular ban, writes Julian Lee, will likely hit Russia harder than the ban on crude oil, as the Indian and Chinese markets do not need refined products to the same extent.
The gradual escalation of measures taken in the US and Europe regarding Russian gas and oil has taken time, but now the consequences are gradually becoming clearer.
If we assume that Europe and Russia would recreate some kind of agreement after the war regarding gas, oil and other energy sources, it is difficult to disagree with Julian Lee when he writes that it is unlikely that EU countries will ever allow themselves to be as dependent on Russian gas as they were before February 24, 2022.[24] China currently buys Russian oil at a thirty to forty percent discount and India has managed to negotiate significant discounts.[25] Through its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has lost its most important energy export market and Europe is now actively looking for other energy sources. Putin's threats and hopes to freeze Europe and wait it out have failed.
The speed with which Europe has succeeded in this has, according to Forbes, surprised many – including Russia.[26] As inflation in the West and Europe adjusts its energy policies, sanctions will become even more unmanageable and harmful to Russia.[27]
An article in Bloomberg summed it all up by saying that Putin managed to destroy the energy market that took the Soviet Union and Russia fifty years to build in fifty weeks.[28]
In the same vein, Ariel Cohen notes in Forbes that even if the war is not over, Putin and Russia have lost – “Regardless of the outcome, Russia has lost the European energy market and a major source of income, and Europe has ended its dependence on Russian energy.”[29]
Sanctions and their consequences
Since February 24, Russia has been subject to a number of sanctions. The ones already mentioned include those on the Russian energy market. The EU has also introduced several different packages of sanctions that include measures against individuals, economic sanctions, and stricter visa requirements.[30]
The goal of the sanctions, according to the EU, is to “impose serious consequences” on Russia and to “effectively thwart Russia’s ability to continue its aggression.”[31] and to "weaken Russia's ability to finance the war."[32]
Agathe Demarais writes in Foreign Policy that by analyzing the sanctions packages that the US, the EU and its allies have implemented, three goals are indicated. First, to send a signal to Russia that they are determined and united; second, to degrade Russia's ability to wage war; and third, to slowly strangle the Russian economy and especially the energy sector. Based on these criteria, Demarais writes, it is clear that the sanctions are succeeding.[33]
The sanctions have had an effect. In October, Russian GDP was 4,4 percent lower than the previous year. Retail sales in Russia have “collapsed” by ten percent for two years in a row, which Demarais says demonstrates the effects of high inflation.[34] Available data suggests that the situation “has been terrible” since April and “things are not getting better.”[35]
At the end of 2022, Russian GDP was estimated to have decreased by 3,4 percent – at best. In 2023, the trend is expected to continue and decrease by between 2,3 and 5,6 percent.[36]
Among the measures the EU has taken are price caps on gasoline and diesel, continued economic sanctions until at least July 2023, and export bans on a number of products.[37]
Vladimir Milov, former Deputy Minister of Energy in Russia in 2002, states in Foreign Affairs that the sanctions have had an effect. Milov believes that the macroeconomic indicators that demonstrate the resilience of the Russian economy to the sanctions are misleading. Officially, Russia has an unemployment rate of 3,7 percent, but Milov believes that ten percent of the Russian workforce is unemployed – a figure comparable to the worst years of the 1990s.[38]
The ruble is supported by draconian currency controls and reduced imports. As a result, some industries have been hit hard. Steel production fell by over seven percent in 2022. Russian state revenues from sources other than oil and gas had fallen by twenty percent in October 2022 compared to 2021; Russian automotive production fell by two-thirds in 2022.
According to an October 2022 poll, sixty-eight percent of respondents in Russia had noticed a decrease in the number of goods offered in stores in the past three months, and according to another survey, thirty-five percent of respondents were forced to spend less money on food than before. In December 2022, only twenty-three percent of respondents said that their financial situation was “good.” According to the Russian Central Bank, capital flight from Russia in 2022 was $251 billion.[39]
Maria Demertzis at the Bruegel think tank in Brussels summed up the consequences of the sanctions by stating that “It [Russia] will not disappear from the world map, but it will be a much, much, poorer country.”[40]
Sanctions, writes Milov, may have a restraining effect on Russia in the long run. But they must be given time to work, and expecting immediate results is unrealistic and counterproductive. Patience is the key.
Finally, it is worth considering that not all available types of sanctions have yet been used. Agathe Demarais lists additional types of sanctions that the West could implement to put pressure on Russia. Among other things, all Russian banks could be blocked from SWIFT and the US could ban Russia from using the dollar to hinder exports. Another means would be stronger secondary sanctions on entities, companies and countries that do business with Russia, which would force them to choose between the US and Russian markets. In effect, Russian oil and gas would become impossible to export, which would cause immense damage to Russian finances.
Demarais sums up that the West's sanctions against Russia are working and that for Russia it can only get worse.[41]
Conclusions
Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, only eleven percent of the Russian population considered Ukraine an enemy.[42] Putin chose to try to mobilize Russian civil society after the invasion and almost a year after the invasion, Putin has militarized Russia and increased propaganda against the West. In a survey conducted in Russia by Levada in November 2022, 81 percent of respondents over fifty-five stated that they had negative views of the West.[43]
Kimmage and Lipman call the development “Wartime Putinism,” in which the Russian state has become more authoritarian and inflexible in the past year. It is, the authors write, an “empty project” in which the Kremlin achieves no success but through propaganda promotes a narrative of success that is completely at odds with reality. The war has created a type of Putinism with “diminishing returns.” Russia, the authors write, is a hard-line power in which “Wartime Putinism” has all the hallmarks of a dead end. [44]
As the situation in Russia deteriorates, the US and the EU continue to support Ukraine. The EU has sent military equipment worth at least €8 billion and pledged a further €18 billion in aid in 2023.[45] In addition to immediate support for Ukraine, the United States has taken steps to increase its production of artillery ammunition by five hundred percent.[46] Sweden and Finland are, after all, on their way to joining NATO.
Joschka Fischer described the situation clearly when he wrote that “as long as NATO and its members continue to support Ukraine militarily and economically and as long as Ukraine continues to maintain its resolve, Russia cannot achieve its goals.”[47]
Almost a year after its brutal invasion of Ukraine, the road ahead for Russia does not look bright. The invasion can be seen as nothing more than a huge strategic mistake. The big question is how Russia will get out of the hole that Putin has created.