New article: Between Power and Principle: Europe's Strategic Dilemma in the Age of Spheres of Influence
Europe's security policy space is shrinking as the US under Trump clearly embraces a doctrine of regional spheres of influence, with Venezuela, Greenland and Ukraine as test cases. The article shows how European governments are forced to balance three conflicting goals: to maintain deterrence against Russia, to keep the US engaged in the Ukraine war, and at the same time to defend the international law-based world order that ultimately legitimizes their own security. For Sweden and other smaller states, the conclusion is that a period of uncomfortable strategic ambiguity is inevitable – but also that inaction now increases the risk of future conflicts.
In the Consilio article “Between Power and Principle: Europe's Strategic Dilemma in the Age of Spheres of Influence,” Lars-Erik Lundin analyzes how the parallel crises surrounding Venezuela, Greenland, and Ukraine expose Europe's growing strategic dilemma in its relationship with the United States. When the Trump administration openly justifies armed intervention in Venezuela and territorial claims to Greenland with a “Donroe Doctrine,” European decision-makers are faced with an uncomfortable question: how far can one compromise with international law in order to preserve a necessary transatlantic unity?
The article shows how European governments and EU institutions are reacting differently – with sharp symbolic gestures in support of the sovereignty of Denmark and Greenland, but with much greater hesitation when it comes to drawing practical consequences towards Washington. At the same time, Russia and China are exploiting the situation to test the limits of their own spheres of influence, while the war in Ukraine continues to be both Europe’s greatest weakness and its most important leverage vis-à-vis the US.
For Sweden, the focus is on the risks that arise when trust in American security guarantees is eroded while NATO membership has not yet been filled with its own European content. The article is a contribution to the SV-A-R project's broader discussion on how Sweden and Europe should handle an international system where spheres of influence are once again becoming the norm.
Conclusion
The article takes as its starting point three simultaneous crises: the US military operation against the Venezuelan leadership, the openly declared territorial ambitions towards Greenland, and the negotiations over Ukraine’s future security arrangements. Together, they create a laboratory test for a new US “Donroe Doctrine,” in which the US asserts exclusive security interests in the Western Hemisphere and the Arctic, while expecting continued European support in Ukraine.
A central thesis is that Europe’s response is twofold. On the one hand, key states – including Denmark, Germany, France, Poland, Italy, Spain and the UK – act through joint statements that emphasize that “Greenland belongs to its people” and that only Denmark and Greenland can decide on their future. The Danish Prime Minister goes as far as to speak of a possible “end of NATO” in the event of a US attack, while other leaders deliberately avoid fully supporting this red line. On the other hand, there are the EU institutions, which deliberately avoid drawing direct parallels between Venezuela and Greenland, emphasize international law but refrain from calling the US an aggressor and refer to legal and institutional limitations.
This caution is interpreted both as structural problems – including unclear defense commitments for non-European areas, veto risks around sanctions and lack of capacity – and as a conscious choice not to jeopardize the relationship with Washington. The result is a strategic ambivalence: Europe tolerates a transgression of international law in Venezuela, but defines similar behavior in the Arctic as existentially crucial. Normatively, this becomes difficult to defend, not least towards third countries that have long been urged to respect the very principles that are now being relativized.
The article emphasizes the role of Ukraine as European leverage. The United States needs European diplomatic, economic, and military support to reach a sustainable solution, but Washington is also signaling that a troop presence in Europe is more negotiable than dominance in its own hemisphere. If European governments implicitly accept an American “higher value” on Latin America and the Arctic than on Eastern Europe, both deterrence against Russia and the credibility of support for Ukraine risk being undermined.
Another key theme is Russian and Chinese opportunism. Moscow and Beijing formally condemn the operation in Venezuela but avoid confrontation, and Russian representatives cynically point out that Washington has now lost the moral basis for its criticism of Russian and Chinese spheres of influence. This normalizes a logic in which great powers claim their own zones, while small and medium-sized states are reduced to objects in a transactional game.
Three scenarios are developing going forward. The first, most likely, is “managed ambiguity”, where Europe, through symbolism and limited resource investments in the Arctic, tries to slow down a “creeping annexation” of Greenland without triggering an open alliance crisis. The second is an accelerated European strategic autonomy, with greatly strengthened Nordic-Baltic cooperation, increased investments in Arctic defense and a more independent use of the EU’s economic power – even against close allies. The third is a full-scale transatlantic rupture, where American coercion against Denmark and Greenland is responded to with European solidarity, which could ultimately lead to NATO erosion and Russian exploitation of the gap.
For Sweden and other smaller European states, the message is that they must plan for a simultaneous three possible futures: continued American involvement, a more autonomous European security structure, and potential strategic isolation. The article argues that the least irresponsible stance right now is concrete capacity building in both military defense and civil resistance and political capacity to act.