Three Wars that Affect Sweden

by Niklas Granholm

THREE OPEN WARS are raging in Europe and its vicinity. A new and more difficult security situation has quickly emerged in our part of the world. Each of the wars affects Sweden in different ways.

Following Russia's occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, an armed rebellion is now being supported in eastern Ukraine with the aim of destabilizing the country. Heavy and advanced weapons systems, military resources and other support that Russia provides to the various groups of rebels are fueling the open acts of war. The shooting down of a civilian airliner – MH17 – over eastern Ukraine, resulting in 298 deaths, has escalated the conflict and further internationalized it. The conflict is no longer local and limited. At the same time, the Ukrainian government's counter-offensive has been successful in recent times. The Russian leadership is therefore faced with the choice of either trying to de-escalate the conflict or investing in open intervention. The question is how the gradually tightening sanctions imposed by the US, the EU and the G7 countries will affect Russian actions in the long term.

The long-standing conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip has, following the aborted peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel and high-profile assassinations, devolved into open hostilities. The exchange of rockets and airstrikes escalated into ground battles on and underground in the densely populated urban areas of the Gaza Strip. This pattern is repeated with depressing regularity. A solution seems far away.

The Middle East and parts of North Africa have been subject to a high degree of instability since the Arab Spring. There is much evidence that the instability in the region will be long-lasting – comparisons with the Thirty Years' War have been made. Part of the escalation is related to the religious conflicts within Islam between Sunnis and Shiites. The extremely brutal civil war in Syria has further escalated and spread. The latest phase of the conflict has led to the proclamation of a so-called caliphate in northern Iraq and parts of Syria. ISIS/ISIL/IS's military successes have been accompanied by large-scale, elaborate atrocities against and displacement of civilian populations. Iraq's territorial cohesion, which was already in question, is now even more precarious. It is unclear whether the caliphate will be a mere ephemeral event or whether the territorial order that has prevailed in the Middle East for almost a century is now about to be overturned. Given the fundamental factors at play, it is likely that the conflict will be very long-lasting. The chaos in Libya and the wars in Syria and Iraq are also raising migration pressure to Europe to even higher levels. All other things being equal, this is probably not sustainable in the long term.

In a very short time, the security situation for Europe has deteriorated. The three open conflicts clearly affect Sweden in at least three ways.

Firstly, the Ukraine war has accelerated a development in which the military normality in the Baltic Sea region is hardening. More advanced exercises, increased naval and air operations and, not least, more of the almost permanent military capabilities are now a fact in Sweden's immediate vicinity. The crucial importance of safe sea lanes and airspace for the economy, the development of the business sector and our livelihoods stands out clearly for Sweden as a country that is extremely dependent on imports and exports. In a tougher security situation, the barely increased Swedish resources for defence and security will gradually be put to increasingly difficult tests relative to what they were designed for, even if no open conflict were to break out. In the long run, the development indicates that open acts of war cannot be ruled out in our part of the world. It has also been pointed out by representatives of NATO and representatives of central member states that those outside NATO cannot automatically count on support in the event of an open conflict. The military defense model that Sweden is building seems in many ways to have been overtaken by the rapid development in terms of volume, focus, content and allocation of resources. In addition, the struggle over the image of the conflict has also raised the issue of a modernization and upgrading of psychological defense.

Secondly, the recent Gaza war in multicultural Sweden has led to the conflict spilling over into the streets and squares in parts of the country. This is partly a police issue. But it is also about how long-term successful integration of new citizens can be achieved. Respect for minorities and tolerance is being challenged and parallel societies are emerging. Where is the limit for tolerance of intolerance? Can a reasonable degree of social calm be maintained in the long term? If fundamental loyalty to and acceptance of Sweden cannot be achieved, it could pave the way for serious future tensions.

Thirdly, the wars in the Middle East and the Syrian war in particular have led to several thousand young men in Western Europe being radicalized and enlisting in various Islamist guerrilla movements. For Sweden, it is estimated that there are just under a hundred people so far. This is a development that has been going on for a number of years, but which now seems to have further accelerated and become clearer. Those who do not die are expected to return with severe trauma and/or with knowledge of terrorism and information warfare that could pose a direct threat to society. Norway's recent increase in terror alert is a clear example. How would Sweden cope with a similar situation, even if nothing were to happen?

The three wars raging this long, hot summer therefore present Sweden with different security problems. It is likely that the security policy climate change we are now seeing in the long term is moving towards something considerably colder and more conflict-filled. The development of recent decades towards an increasingly peaceful and less conflict-filled world can no longer be taken for granted. It is not only Sweden but also large parts of the Western world that are physically and psychologically ill-equipped to meet this development. It will therefore be a challenge to say the least for decision-makers to maintain the overview of several simultaneous developments that is required. None of the areas mentioned above can be ignored, handled one at a time or – which is unfortunately all too common – pitted against each other. Our frames of reference for external developments need to be reviewed. An open attitude towards the changes and the pursuit of a holistic view improve the conditions for increased resources to be allocated to the right sectors for handling the new and long-term deteriorating security situation we now have to deal with. How can we manage it?