For Donald Trump – if he were a normal politician – the general situation in the Middle East, especially if you put this theme next to the Russian-Ukrainian drama, must seem like something of a nightmare of constant complications, contradictions, setbacks, rather than the successes that prestige demands and presupposes. During his evening prayers – or his nightly social media chat – he must reasonably reflect on the strangeness of himself and his colleague Vladimir Putin simultaneously fighting their own wars, in both cases costly wars (without any comparisons otherwise) with a significant risk of being branded as historical fiasco. And in parallel with that, his colleague Netanyahu in Israel, in his difficult balancing act before his October election, has taken the risk of formally saying no to Trump's latest attempt to operationalize his prestige-heavy peace plan for Gaza, another example of Netanyahu's need for "total victory" in Gaza and other war theaters in the region clashing with Trump's broader agenda and the need to enforce compromises.
For Netanyahu, the nightmare (equivalent) before the existential October election is that both Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran's existing regime (and all sorts of proxies) will ultimately survive "standing" all the politically, economically and militarily costly efforts that his regime has made since October 7, 2023, while at the same time that his Israel has received an international pariah status as a result, the relationship with Trump's USA has soured and the possibilities for the combative prime minister to avoid problematic legal repercussions have decreased, down to zero.
But for Trump, the nightmare is clearly primarily about the fruitless attempts to justify the war of aggression against Iran through a solution to the Hormuz dilemma, so that the continued process and, not least, the aftermath, do not paint the picture of a fundamentally failed war. makes missed their various goals point by point, makes demonstrated to the world American impotence without principles and strategy, makes created a new Hormuz problem that did not exist before the war, makes caused serious material shortages in sensitive and expensive cutting-edge areas, makes has not made clear progress in the nuclear portfolio beyond what Obama achieved in the 2015 JCPOA, makes has not freed Israel and the region from the Iranian missile threat, and makes questioned the overall US security policy role and presence in an even more unstable Middle East. In other words, an unsustainable and unacceptable picture, ahead of the mid-term elections and beyond, yet as difficult to avoid now as it now appears. Especially the Hormuz issue, now linked to another strait and another, similar, problem, the Bab al-Mandab inflow into the Red Sea and the resumption of hostilities between the Saudis and Houthis.
Hence Trump's obvious, seemingly strange vacillation between eagerly brandishing the whip and energetically waving the carrot, the always equally difficult-to-interpret speech about the "negotiating table" - the reference that sometimes seems to aim to force the Iranian regime into total submission with forceful language (in the hope that threats will be enough, but with the risk that Iran has long since "called the bluff" and coldly and cynically expects that today's Trump absolutely does not want to risk a renewed major war), sometimes despite everything, pleading for negotiations, for real, regardless of purpose and framework.
At the time of writing, Trump is talking about “half-negotiations” taking place, while Iran’s recently partially reshuffled leadership seems to be characterized by renewed, optimistic confidence in timing, and is now steadfastly pointing out the conditions that actually apply at various levels, for a ceasefire, an agreement on Hormuz traffic, and continued talks on the other issues of importance for a lasting peace. As if it is Trump and his team who are in a hurry and backing down and Tehran who is moving forward, without haste (despite the suffering caused by war and politics).
And that actually brings us back to the MoU that Trump solemnly signed on June 17, in connection with the G7 meeting, in the historic Versailles environment, after a period of mutual wrangling over time and substantive issues. Part of the issue is that the 60-day negotiation deadline set in this MoU – if the issues that were not explicitly stated in the MoU were settled with the signing – is about to expire. What happens next was supposed to be decided by the negotiations during these two months, but without negotiations, no answer about the steps forward, if there are any steps at all. Part of the issue is also that Trump has indeed declared this MoU and the process dictated therein as “over”, while it is obvious that this makes it even more unclear what can be meant by returning to “the table”, even though the Pakistani and other mediators have a number of ideas. Ideas for smaller steps for the time being, shorter ceasefires and the like.
But it should still be true that a return to the agreed MoU, with the package agreement that this implied in terms of immediate measures and criteria for continued talks during the 60 days, is “the only game in town”, and that the alternatives – going back to square one with a view to a completely new agreement – are terrifying, and not only the mediators but also the markets in the world and the war opposition in the US. Going back to what was actually agreed in the MoU, this strange document characterized by Trump’s haste at the time and by the American concessions dictated by it in substance and in terms of process and timing, is what Iran is essentially now asking for, but it also means being forced to confront this agreement’s many excesses in strategic ambiguity, at the same time as the nature of the agreement as a package deal, with unresolved questions about conditionality and timing, reminds us of how difficult even the Hormuz issue alone will be to resolve.
Since it is obvious that the Hormuz issue, which is fraught with dilemmas for the US, has primarily been the stumbling block in restoring credibility and momentum in the process of bringing the war to an end as soon as possible, at least a so-called "off ramp" to enable an orderly negotiation process, even though the memorandum also contains sweeping formulations on other controversial issues, it is of interest to recall what is actually stated in the text, in this case paragraphs 4 and 5, about the Hormuz issue as such. The paragraphs read as follows.
4. Immediately upon signing of this MoU, the United States of America will begin the removal of its naval blockade and any disturbances or impediments against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and will fully end the naval blockade within 30 days. During this period, the traffic of vessels will be in proportion to the numbers of pre-war traffic being restored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America further undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final deal.
5. Upon the signing of this deal, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge, for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles, and demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran will be established within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.
This is what the agreement that Trump – and the Iranian leadership – took a chance on signing in this vital part almost two months ago looked like, in the hope that the rest would fall into place and that the market would rejoice. Just as in the case of Gaza, and other similar cases, it hinged on the fact that the forced negotiations were unable to clarify in detail the order of precedence, in this case between Iran's closure and the US blockade and between the immediate commitments and the issues that were being postponed for the future for the 60-day continued final negotiations (in the case of Gaza, the order of precedence was between Hamas' disarmament and the Israeli IDF's withdrawal). In other words, the dilemma of moving from the diplomacy of the moment to the implementation of the tough reality in situations of a total lack of basic trust and therefore a total focus on credible and binding security guarantees. Who shoots first, who blinks first?
Is it possible, therefore, to break the deadlock and wake up from Trump's – and for that matter Netanyahu's – nightmare risk of being branded a fiasco by simply returning to the package deal from June 17, before the 60 days expire? And if not, is the alternative a completely new agreement? Or a return, after all, to full-scale war, on Trump's part (cheered on by Netanyahu) in the haphazard hope that the Iranian leadership will capitulate, completely or almost completely?
But as we have seen, there are powerful arguments against the latter, partly the signs that the Iranians in their existential struggle will not surrender or resign, partly the resistance to a new major war both among the regionally affected states (which have now begun to look for alternative security arrangements, most recently the NATO-like security agreement between the regional powers and the mediator countries Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey) and on the global energy etc. market, partly the growing opposition at home, including the GOP in Congress, and partly the alarm reporting about what the war has already cost in terms of irreplaceable material consumption and the consequences of this in other parts of the world. Hence, incidentally, increasing Iranian cockiness and pain tolerance.
Could the soon-to-be negotiated agreement between Iran and Oman, linked as we have seen to the original MoU but arguably insufficiently equal to the American minimum requirements for the unrestricted navigability of the Strait, after all be or pave the way for the solution that Trump is eagerly seeking to avoid the label of fiasco? Perhaps, in the absence of alternatives, but the question of the MoU's other clauses, including the paragraphs on non-aggression and on economic compensation for war- and sanctions-stricken Iran, remains, under the fog banks.
And until then, Trump's, and thus Netanyahu's, nightmare remains. But the situation, as we have seen, can change quickly.