Germany has recently published its new information document “Marine Course” about the future plans of the German Navy, and as the largest NATO country with a Baltic Sea coast and home to Commander Task Force Baltic, it is of interest for us in the Nordics to follow their thinking. As is well known, Germany has a somewhat divided navy with one eye on operations in the Baltic Sea, and one on the North Sea and the Atlantic. How the balance between these two theaters looks affects NATO's capabilities in the Baltic Sea in both peacetime, crisis, and wartime.
An interesting detail is that right from the beginning the so-called Fourth Battle of the Atlantic is mentioned (although not by that name), when Russian submarines attacking civilian and military shipping between North America and Europe are mentioned as a threat. This in turn is linked to the area of operations on NATO's northern flank (a word that is used and which is also used in italics, a clear shift in perspective compared to the talk about NATO's eastern flank that often dominates the media), with the Norwegian Sea, the North Sea, and the Baltic Sea as the three areas mentioned.
For the Baltic Sea, the threat picture is familiar, with Russian Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities threatening NATO's vital sea lanes, which is driving NATO's planning to create a plan for how shipping will be protected from Russian influence. The importance of national plans being consistent with NATO-wide planning from the highest to the lowest levels is also emphasized.
On a global scale, the threat to the right to free passage is being discussed, especially in the context of China and its increasingly ambitious demands in "the Indo-Pacific” (Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean).
But the big issue is in many ways technological development, which means shorter cycles and an increased number and better sensors that make it increasingly difficult to hide on the battlefield – both for us and for our opponents. At the same time, innovations in areas such as AI are increasing the pace of the battlefield, and one requirement is that all parts of the navy have the ability to conduct joint operations together with systems and functions in other domains. Unmanned systems are increasing in importance, but larger conventional platforms also still have a central role, especially in the North Atlantic. This is partly due to the synergy effects that are created when manned platforms – small and large, below and above the surface, on land and in the air – act as carriers for the unmanned systems. The use of unmanned systems should become a natural part of all operations.
Presence is also described as a central part of deterrence, meaning that the German Navy needs to have a sufficient number of platforms – manned and unmanned – with a sufficiently high level of availability and the personnel required to operate and maintain them in order to be able to carry out its core tasks of providing a deterrent capability and, if that fails, being able to defend Germany and its allies on the modern battlefield.
Especially in a Baltic Sea context, the need to be able to combat land targets from the sea – including from submarines – is seen as a key capability, including to be able to neutralize Russian A2/AD capabilities. In recent interviews, it has also emerged that the navy is studying the possibility of integrating Tomahawks on German frigates to provide a long-range land attack capability. The desire to be able to operate from sea to land can also be linked to the coastal troops, the German navy's grief-stricken children who have still not received their promised combat boats.Maritime Jagdkampf" is the coastal battalion's new concept, which has already been promised in previous documents, and includes the ability to conduct offensive operations in coastal environments. For this, the new combat boats will be equipped with action systems, but new capabilities will also need to be added to the troops' equipment and the systems they use once they have landed. The ability to operate in subarctic environments and other demanding environments is a prioritized capability in the longer term, all to increase the flexibility that the naval infantry allows.
When it comes to platforms, there is relatively little new in the document. By 2029, the aforementioned combat boats should be in place, and by 2035, at least some combat boats should also be able to operate unmanned, which could speak in favor of Saab's CB90 in what is generally seen as a duel between the CB90 and the Finnish Watercat M18 AMC ("Jehu"). By 2029, the new A707 tankers that are being built should also have replaced the current A702 Rhön class, the old Lynx helicopters should have been phased out in favor of the NH90 Sea Tiger and the P-3C Orion replaced by the P-8A Poseidon. In addition, a number of unmanned systems should have been introduced. The latter include flying platforms for surveillance, underwater surveillance and mine hunting systems, and the much-talked-about FCSS (Future combat surface system) program, which aims for networked unmanned platforms that can operate in a swarm and have the ability to combat surface targets in conjunction with the K130 Braunschweig-class corvettes.
By 2035 we will see a number of changes, including the replacement of the small A404 Elbe-class maintenance ships by a larger design under the designation A405, the Oste-class signals intelligence ships by the new A424-class, and the majority of the fleet's frigates by replacing both the F123 Brandenburg-class and the F124 Sachsen-class with the new F126 Niedersachsen and F127-class. These will be supported by three Large Remote Missile Vessels (LRMVs), which are unmanned missile platforms. The current MJ332 Frankenthal minehunting platforms will also be replaced by a new class under the designation MJ334. The big question mark is still what will happen to the current U212A-class submarines, where the plan leaves room for half of the six boats to possibly be retired as the larger U212CDs being built together with Norway enter service.
The plan as a whole is ambitious – take, for example, a total of twelve new frigates of two different classes that are still just a bit of welded sheet metal and a stack of drawings respectively – and the German defense investments of recent years do not necessarily inspire confidence that the more innovative programs will go according to plan. At the same time, we have seen increased political interest in defense and there are major economic interests in the German shipbuilding and defense industry receiving the orders that the program would entail, so with the stubbornness of a fool, one can only hope that now is when Germany wakes up.