The Russian advance around Ukraine resembles a play where spectators with binoculars can follow everything that happens on stage in detail. But are we also seeing a revolution in future warfare? Are the days of surprise attacks over?
The importance of surprising the opponent has always been emphasized in military contexts as a crucial component of the art of war. Sun Tzu says “to confuse, mislead and surprise the enemy”. Clausewitz, “Surprise is not only a means of achieving numerical superiority; but should also be considered a fundamental (warfare) principle because of its moral effect (affecting the enemy's morale). Army regulations part 2 from 1995 writes “Surprise is always sought…” and then devotes a whole page to describing how it can be achieved. The Swedish Armed Forces' document Military Strategic Doctrine from 2016 states “Surprise remains an important component of the threat landscape”.
The advantages of surprising the enemy apply to all levels. From strategic assaults like Pearl Harbor, or operational surprises like the Ardennes in 1940 and the Suez Canal in 1973, to tactical surprises like the airborne landing at the Belgian fort Eben Emael.
There is nothing to suggest that surprise will not be an important success factor in the future as well – but will it be possible?
It is clear that a buildup of the size we have seen around Ukraine in recent months cannot be hidden. The sensors that can detect what is happening are too numerous and too good. Surveillance satellites with SAR technology (Synthetic-aperture radar) are now capable of detecting individual tanks and robotic vehicles even in the dark and in bad weather. This type of information is commercially available. It is no longer the preserve of well-funded and technically advanced intelligence services. If what the satellites see is combined with information from qualified drones and signals intelligence, there will not be many physical activities that can be kept hidden. If the information is also analyzed in real time with the support of AI, it will not be easy to prepare a major military attack without it being detected at a fairly early stage. To this should be added information that can be retrieved from the internet or mobile networks in the form of posted images from mobile phones, intercepted conversations, location information about a person's whereabouts and hacked messages. No, hiding a march, or major unit movements in general, is not possible.
The problem of achieving surprise is not limited to the operational level, but also at the combat technical and tactical level; at platoons, companies, battalions and brigades, new thinking will be required regarding how to achieve surprise. The conflict in Nagorno Karabakh, between Azerbaijan and Armenia, in 2020, can be an illustration of the challenges. Azerbaijani drones knocked out important parts of the Armenian defense there in a few weeks. Drones of the TB2 and Harop types, purchased “over the counter” from Turkey and Israel, respectively, detected as well as very successfully fought several different types of ground targets. During the fighting, several dozen air defense positions, many artillery pieces and hundreds of armored vehicles are said to have been destroyed by the Azerbaijani drones. TB2, and other similar systems, have an endurance of up to twenty-four hours in the air. They will be located in connection with most conceivable grouping areas almost continuously. It will be difficult to assemble forces to carry out a surprise, larger attack if you do not have the means to blind or combat the drones in some other way. But that will not be enough. If existing plans regarding the number of SAR satellites are realized, they will be able to survey any area on the globe every fifteen minutes, regardless of weather and visibility. A service the company Cappela plans to be able to offer its customers. Satellites have also become a problem at the tactical level.
That surprise is something worth striving for has not ceased to be true just because it has become more difficult to achieve. The question is; what can be done to create surprise?
At a strategic and operational level, we can see an attack being launched directly from the units' peacekeeping groups, and then primarily with standing units. This applies to both ground, naval and air forces. This avoids both movements, which are likely impossible to conceal, and revealing mobilization measures. The units that are to follow up on the initial efforts are mobilized and moved forward only after the attack has begun. Operational mobility becomes a crucial capability in such a model. For someone who is to attack Sweden, transport aircraft for, among other things, air landings and tonnage that can be loaded and unloaded quickly, such as modern ferries, will then be the main decisive systems. In this concept, long-range combat systems such as cruise missiles also constitute an important component as they can operate directly from their peacekeeping grouping locations, without any revealing preparations.
The disadvantage, the risk, of the model is of course that if the intention to attack is revealed prematurely, through espionage, an important communication network is hacked, or in some other way, there is a great risk that the attack will fail as the combat forces that can be deployed initially are quite small. The latter of course assumes that the defender has effective and quickly available resources that can be used, placed on high alert, even in the event of weak indications of attack.
However, there is a great danger in unilaterally investing in meeting this type of surprise attack. If from the attacker's point of view it does not matter much whether the defender has time to prepare, that is, the defender does not have the ability to grow even if he gets a longer warning, then the attacker will obviously not choose this rather risky model. He will then load up with what is needed, even if it is visible, and only then go on the attack.
Although it is not possible to march up undetected, there are other ways to try to surprise at the operational level, primarily perhaps through deception. A historical example could be the creation of General Patton's "ghost army" in southeast England in 1944 ahead of D-Day, Operation Fortitude. Its fictitious existence and grouping were intended to make the Germans believe that the invasion would come in the Calais area, not in Normandy. Here, dummy targets and dummy signaling were used on a large scale. To ensure that it was discovered, it was made "just difficult" for German reconnaissance aircraft to fly over the area. It could not be too easy, otherwise the Germans would become suspicious, but also not so difficult that they discovered nothing. If you can create the illusion that the opponent is trying to hide something, but is not fully successful, the information obtained becomes more credible.
Another example could be the Suez Canal in 1973, where recurring large Egyptian exercises in connection with the canal over time became a normal occurrence, which led to the Israelis not reacting in time when an "exercise" turned into an attack.
Both of these methods can be developed. A variation on the “Fortitude Model” could be to exploit the large capacity of modern information systems and the different technologies they use by “feeding” them with what you want them to detect. The more different sensors that collect information, the more different opportunities to record information that, if done skillfully, can become mutually reinforcing.
Just as a simple illustration of how one could build a false image today – the reality is considerably more complicated. Something is detected by source A (e.g. a satellite sees carelessly covered combat vehicle tracks), confirmed by source B (drones that detect some deliberately poorly masked false targets) and source C (some soldiers who “call home” on their mobile phones to their family in an otherwise extremely radio-silent area). This method is “dual use”. It can be used to make the enemy’s intelligence service draw the conclusion; "We have found the enemy's attack unit, this is where the attack will take place". But it can also be a method to economize with your own units. Create an image that ""The defense here is strong," and hopefully make the attacker refrain from attacking that location, or expend resources fighting dummy targets. To what extent the anecdote from World War II about the German dummy airfield that the British bombed with dummy wooden bombs is true or not is disputed by scholars. However, poorly executed deception is wasted effort, it is a difficult art.
If we look at the tactical level, the possibilities to operate in larger units, and also to conduct static combat, will become smaller. This will force a number of adjustments in how we conduct the battle, the development of various signature-suppressing measures and the introduction of means to combat or otherwise neutralize an enemy's various intelligence systems. It would lead too far to try to describe here all the measures that may be relevant and various research projects that should be initiated. But that it must be done is obvious.
Overall, technological developments mean that even small states today have the opportunity to create intelligence that was previously only the preserve of a few larger states. We should not miss out on that opportunity. One can marvel at the stepmotherly treatment that the space and drone areas have received in the latest defense decision. However, and it is a big however, no wars are won with information alone – action systems are also needed. Otherwise, what good is the information for?