Undermining society — trust, hybrid threats and psychological defense with DG Magnus Hjort, Prof. Bo Wennström and DG Lars Nylén

Conversation led by Lars Nylén with Bo Wennström and Magnus Hjort, introduced by Lars-Erik Lundin, 2026-06-10

Thematic summary

The podcast is part of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences' project activities on overview and reflection on security and defense policy issues. Lars-Erik Lundin introduces the conversation to the development of the project: the working hypothesis of a few years ago — that the liberal legal order in the West would hold as a basic assumption — is now shaking its foundations. Undermining cannot be deterred in the classical way; there is a continuous hybrid activity that must be managed and faced. The podcast is hosted by Lars Nylén, chairman of the academy's Department V, with guests Bo Wennström, professor emeritus of law at Uppsala University and current author of the book Att venda bort blicken — om undermining, dess philosophie, politik och praktik, and Magnus Hjort, director general of the Swedish Psychological Defense Agency (MPF).
The conversation revolves around three intertwined tracks. The first is the concept of undermining itself, which Wennström has taken from the Dutch debate on how organized crime — especially drug crime — affects society from local communities to courts and municipal administrations, and which he has broadened to also include Russian influence and “our own thinking”: a Swedish self-aggrandizing culture where the question of what there really is to defend has long been pushed aside. The second track is the mission and limits of psychological defense: the MPF’s dual task of building long-term resilience in the entire population and identifying what foreign powers are doing to Swedish interests — as well as the growing European discussion about moving from “considering the problem” to actual deterrence even in peacetime. The third track is the methods: two-phase Russian information campaigns that turn into self-playing pianos, the exploitation of opinion clusters, criminals as proxy actors (“disinformation for hire”) and the Soviet tradition of reflexive control and cognitive shifts, which with AI have become both cheaper and harder to attribute.
The conversation ends with the parliamentary elections in September 2026. Hjort's assessment is that Sweden is not currently a priority target — the electoral system is robust and eight parliamentary parties are behind the Ukraine support, which gives Russia little to gain — but the preparedness of the national electoral network is high and the threat picture is being monitored continuously. Wennström's closing words point to the role of research and academia: to deliver the factual knowledge and the overall picture that the debate about undermining often lacks. Lundin links it to Department V's ten-year work for the restoration of civil defense: even a strong military and civil defense can be attacked from behind through undermining — therefore a strategic overall picture is needed.

Podcast Episode Title Speaker Time Conclusion

1 Undermining — from the Netherlands to Swedish debate Wennström 20:25–21:35 Organized crime affects institutions right up to the top of society; the concept is needed in Sweden
2 Turning away — what is there to defend? Wennström 21:56–24:17 Self-indulgent culture and state individualism make the defense issue existential
3 MPF's mission — including the offensive dimension Hjort 24:32–28:30 From analysis to deterrence: raise the costs for the attacker even in peacetime
4 Two-phase campaigns, opinion clusters and competing concepts Wennström 29:12–31:57 Controlled first phase turns into information cascades — a self-playing piano
5 Criminals as proxies — “disinformation for hire” Hjort 37:01–39:26 Purchased contractors provide multiple layers of deniability; Iran recruits criminals in Sweden
6 The Four-Folder — from resilience to deterrence Hjort 46:27–48:13 Societal and individual resilience, platform regulation and deterrence must be built simultaneously
7 Reflexive control and cognitive shifts Wennström/Hjort 57:35–1:02:32 Soviet method that continues with AI — the goal is for the opponent to make favorable decisions themselves
8 The 2026 Riksdag election — robust but on its toes Hjort 1:04:44–1:07:01 Sweden has not prioritized the target, but the election network practices, trains and monitors the threat landscape continuously

Additional notable points

• Moldova as a counterpoint (35:00–36:19, Hjort): Despite enormous resources — threats, vote buying, organized protest movements, information influence — Russia has essentially lost three Moldovan elections in a row; the elections in Hungary and Armenia also went against Russia. However, the subtle, long-term shift in attitudes in stable democracies is considered more dangerous than individual election influence operations.
• The domestic/foreign border (32:42–34:45, Hjort): MPF does not follow domestic debate to find threat actors but rather maps vulnerabilities — crime and the connection between crime and migration are the areas that foreign powers target. Suspicions of crime are submitted to the police and the Security Service.
• Methodological criticism of the enabler reports (53:39–55:03, Wennström): statistics based on intelligence data cannot be checked by the research community — the numbers are partly unreasonable and should not be swallowed uncritically.
• Transparency and attribution (55:59–57:33, Hjort): MPF works exclusively with open sources and publicly attributes three countries — Russia, China and Iran — after approval by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
• The media's verification work (1:03:17–1:04:42, Hjort): SVT's verification editorial team based on the BBC model is held up as an example for exposing fake clips and building the public's understanding of how people can be deceived.
• Inferiority nationalism (49:18–50:43, Wennström, with reference to Katarina Barrling): Swedish naivety is sometimes exaggerated, but the undermining via organized crime has become an existential crisis for which Sweden lacks language.