In the latest issue of the Royal Academy of Military Sciences Documents and Journal, 3/2021, there are five articles that highlight different aspects of mission tactics. Here are some reflections.
Lieutenant Colonel Ola Palmqvist, former head of the Tactics Department at the Swedish Land Combat School, gives a rather pessimistic picture of the development of tactics in the Armed Forces in his very readable overview of the various components that constitute a functioning mission tactic. After reading his analysis of the writings in more recent manuals such as DGO 20 (Doctrine for Joint Operations), I get the impression that somewhere in the process the fundamental motive for mission tactics, the unpredictability of combat, seems to have disappeared in the handling. Instead, the thinking seems to have become strongly method-driven and where the implementation of tactical plans is somewhat similar to checklists where various, previously determined, events are to be checked off.
When mission-tactical slogans such as initiative, independent thinking, seizing opportunities on the run, etc., are to be translated into practical methods, the handbook authors seem to have had difficulty adhering to a basic and very simple causal connection, namely: Since it is impossible to predict how the battle will develop, it also makes moderate sense to try to devise plans that assume a certain course of events.
However, there may be a fairly simple explanation for this lack of clarity of thought. If you collaborate closely and for a long time with a country, the USA, whose resource superiority in various combat situations has often been so great that you have been able to force a desired course of action, regardless of what the opponent does, there is a risk that you will adopt methods that fit this collaborative environment. Even if they may be counterproductive in a Swedish context. This tendency to uncritically adopt other people's ways of thinking has probably been reinforced by our "strategic timeout" where we did not devote ourselves to thinking about warfare on a larger scale in a Swedish context for a long time.
Captain Christian Wester, Skaraborg Regiment, who is currently implementing the Senior Officer Program at FHS, has in a readable article looked at the societal conditions for applying mission tactics in Sweden. One aspect he highlights as a good basis for mission tactics is the democratic genes of Swedish society. Factors such as freedom of the press and expression, the habit of co-influence and a moderate fear of bosses and authorities should contribute to shaping people who see it as natural to act mission tactics. He draws parallels here with the Israeli Defense Forces. An organization with a distinct mission tactics culture. Christian Wester points here to its roots in a non-hierarchical, partly guerrilla-oriented, military organization, the Palmach, as a possible explanation.
This raises the question for me: can democratic states therefore be expected to have better conditions to apply mission tactics than authoritarian states? Or if you like: do we have a competitive advantage over Russia here? Does history perhaps provide any clues? Yes, unfortunately.
The German military during World War II is probably the organization that has historically been most successful in applying mission tactics in larger contexts. Did it emerge from a society characterized by subordinates seeing it as natural to question superiors and other authorities? Hardly. This was independent of the influence of the Nazi regime from 1933. German workplaces, schools, associations, homes, were generally not places where questioning authority was seen as something positive or natural. Yet the superiors (at all levels – corporal to general) in the Wehrmacht were often considerably more initiative-driven and flexible than those of their opponents.
With the development we see in Russia towards more mobile warfare, combined with purposeful measures to create commanders at battalion and brigade level who are expected to act independently, we should probably be careful not to rely too heavily on the idea that our democratic society would automatically give us a competitive advantage in war. There is probably every reason, as Christian Wester points out, to systematically practice our ability to lead in a mission-oriented manner. Relying on Swedish social culture may not be enough.
Major Peter Lindberg, Norrbotten Regiment, analyzes mission tactics in two interesting articles. First, one where he analyzes the relevance of mission tactics in a high-tech combat environment. There he points out both the advantages and disadvantages that can be found in utilizing artificial intelligence in decision support systems. He also highlights the crucial role of humans in an activity, combat, where initiative, decision-making, imagination and risk-taking are crucial factors. Characteristics that it can be difficult to create algorithms for.
Peter Lindberg also points out the difficulty of determining how means and countermeasures will affect each other. A timeless problem that makes me think of an episode during the Second World War. During the German bombing campaign against Malta in 1942, the Germans managed to jam, in effect blind, the British radar stations on the island. However, the British allowed the radar stations to continue transmitting even though they saw nothing. The Germans concluded that they had not succeeded in their jamming efforts (then the British should have stopped transmitting) and therefore felt obliged to take resource-intensive measures to protect their bombers against what they assumed would be an effectively led British air defense. Even the best information technology will not help if you choose the wrong criteria against which to evaluate the information.
In his second article, Peter Lindberg discusses the role of the staff, versus the commander, in operational decision-making. He expresses a concern that our strategic and operational planning model (SPL) overemphasizes the importance of staff work in creating sufficient decision-making data. This leads, among other things, to late decision-making. I have never worked with SPL, so I cannot comment on that particular model. However, my experiences as a brigade commander and later as an operations leader at the then Milostab Mitt mean that I am happy to join those who warn against complicated assessment and decision-making models at both the tactical and operational levels.
In an article with the signature J R, a Swedish officer who is currently studying at the Naval Postgraduate School strikes a powerful blow for the Armed Forces to become better at appropriating new technology. For example, armed drones. He points in particular to the opportunities it would give fighter units to contest an attacker's control over the surface. The decentralized and unconventional behavior that armed movements such as Hezbollah and Fedayeen successfully applied against traditionally acting military forces could serve as inspiration. A concept that would be developed with the support of modern technology. It is not without that one, I, can begin to wonder if the circle is not about to close? It was in Palmach (see Christian Wester above) that many leading Israeli officers were shaped by a mission-tactical thinking. Something that they carried with them and successfully applied to other types of units in 1956, 1967 and 1973. Operations from which the Swedish armored troops of the Cold War largely drew inspiration for a distinct mission-tactical culture. Are our jaeger units the ones that will revitalize mission tactics in Sweden?
Overall, the articles give hope that Ola Palmqvist will not become a lone voice crying in the wilderness when he warns that a process is currently underway that risks impoverishing mission-based tactical thinking and action in the Armed Forces. The articles show that younger comrades, who have recently completed or are currently undergoing higher education, see mission tactics as the cornerstone of the Armed Forces' way of leading. And where they point to methods for how it can be developed with the help of modern technology, simplified staff work procedures, changed organization and training activities that strengthen the officers' initiative and willingness to make decisions.
A final reflection is that military history should be given a much more prominent role in all military leadership training. It would contribute decisively to increasing understanding of the application of mission tactics in practice, and not just as some kind of theoretical concept. No, no more about Guderian's or Rommel's actions in the Ardennes in 1940. It certainly shows two senior leaders who successfully act within the framework of a mission tactical culture, but it has limited value in explaining the essence of mission tactics, how it permeates an entire organization. The benefit of mission tactics for us would probably be better illustrated by studying a (fairly large) number of examples that show how leaders at all levels act based on the possibilities or demands of the situation when the unexpected occurs. The platoon leader who, on his own initiative, changes the direction of attack when the neighboring platoon has become stagnant, and thereby clears up the situation. The company commander who averts an impending disaster by immediately, without waiting for orders, carrying out a counterattack when the enemy has surprisingly broken through the defenses of the neighboring company. The battalion commander who achieves success by interrupting the ordered attack and instead carries out a range by exploiting a gap in the enemy grouping that he has discovered. The maintenance battalion commander who quickly and without orders redirects his forces and gets extra ammunition to a unit in difficulty, etc.
It would also not be wrong, but probably very useful, to study the “sharp” orders that successful mission tactics in various contexts have given to their subordinates. This could provide an indication of how mission-oriented managers create freedom of action for their subordinates to act based on what happens, and not based on what they believe, or hope will happen. Or, to allude to Moltke d ä – orders that do not become obsolete after the first combat contact with the enemy.