In the spring of 2026, or ifwere the governments formed in four EDeveloping and NATO countries in the East — Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and SlovakiaHungary received all the attentionThe other three ended up in the shade, despite everything happeningthey almost simultaneously, within a couple of months.
In this conversation, Gunilla takes Herolf — doctor of philosophy in sPolitical science, previously second classSenior Fellow at the Royal Military Academythe academy and for many years researchers at SIPRI and Foreign Affairspolitical institute — take action precisely the three forgotten cases, based on Herolf's newan article on the academy's blog https://kkrva.se/bulgarien-rumanien-och-slovenien-vad-hander-i-ostra-europa/, in conversation with Lars-Erik Lundin.
The question they are trying is a pre-test.a hidden meaning many of us carryå: that small countries in the East are one easy prey for the great powers, lable to influence both Russia andcountry and the USA. Herolf's answer is more nuanced. Attempts to influence certainly exists — Romania's prPresidential election in 2024 had to be rerun after a court found everythingr major Russian interference, and aAmerican representatives have openedhas stepped in and supported the candidateter. But the desire to belong to vhas always been strongare, and the countries have shown a surprising resilience.
The conversation goes country by country:
Bulgaria, where a president livedresigned his post, formed a newtt party and won the election on antincorruption — while the others the parties were weak and dividedthey work.
Romania, where an EU-friendly regimeering fell, not on Russiafthe top but because its budgetpolicy was considered too harsh for at country with a weak economy. The fwas inspired by an unexpected alliance withellan social democrats and yttYour right — who are not friends, but together they became the governmentn overpowering. Then land standst without government.
Slovenia, where an election in splendorThe match ended in a draw and the hard-headed Janša finally became Prime Minister for the fourth timeGen.
Behind the different processes, H seeserolf common patterns: young democracies built in haste afterer 1990, without preparation and with parties formed by pepersonal loyalties rather thann ideology; a widespread corruption that is difficult to eradicate; andh an exodus of young and oldlye-formed which erodes both eeconomy and the party system. SluThe recurring theme is that voters' first question rarely is NATO or Russia — without a tolerable life without corruptionone.
What does it mean for us? Herolf sharply distinguishes between NATO and EU. The risk that any of the countriesa turns its back on NATO is small; even the Russian Federation of Bulgariakind-hearted President Radevlar as a normal alliance agentm and want to see more, not less, cooperation. The EU is more difficult: budget requirements linked to recoveryremedies, rule of law issues, and a Romanian far-right partyrti behind the scenes can create proproblem — although perhaps not insurmountableclimbable.
The conversation also broadens the horizons: against North Macedonia, like Bulgathe river has long been blocked by the rivernationalism rather than in Russian oorders; against Moldova, which hasts for a form of warfare mone mobilized the entire community; and towards an uncomfortable but useful thought — that we like to measure the islandt towards an ideal image, but rarely against the old EU countries, by which eight recently vetoed against the twenty-first sanctionthe company for its own financial reasons.
Herolf's and Lundin's joint The score is simple and disarming.: these countries are not so kThey are like us—but hhave had worse conditions. And it is dangerous to assume frob that our way of thinking alTime is the right thing.
A call for everyone who wants tounderstand Europe's eastern flank beyond the headlines — and the allies we too often treat as black boxes.
