Introduction
Previous articles in this series describe the changed operational and security policy context that the Swedish army must now deal with. This is partly based on a comprehensive change in the operational environment where Russian aggression in combination with accelerating technological development has changed the conditions on the battlefield. This is partly based on Sweden's entry into NATO, which has meant that the Armed Forces have had a changed role. From a situation where we primarily practice and train to build up national defense capabilities for use after mobilization in wartime, to now constituting a puzzle piece in a larger alliance of states and where our army needs to be available across the entire conflict scale.
The changing security policy context, NATO membership, an aggressive Russia and accelerating technological development, require a comprehensive adaptation of how our combat units are educated, exercised and trained. To meet these demands, we must initially understand and relate to the operational context. This means that we must exercise to a greater extent in a multi-domain context, where we integrate our units with NATO's command structure, as well as in scenarios that develop our ability to solve tasks with our allies. For Sweden and the Swedish Army, this has meant that we are expected to take on a large responsibility for NATO's northern operational area. For the Army, this specifically means that we need to further develop our ability to conduct subarctic combat with a division. Our ability to operate with divisions under an army corps is not only a theoretical and practical challenge in terms of exercise and training. This is a strategic area where the Army can contribute to NATO with unique experiences and capabilities in combat in a subarctic environment, which also means realpolitik benefits for Sweden within the framework of supranational cooperation. A focus on NATO's northern area of operations and a Swedish leadership role in subarctic combat will clarify the role of the Swedish army within NATO and, in addition, strengthen the alliance's collective capabilities and contribute to Sweden's ditto.
This article aims to deepen the reasoning around the issue why and the We in the army relate to education, training and exercise, as well as how this must develop to enable the transformation we have begun. We hope that this article also encourages debate and reflection on the development of the army in general and the army's development of new concepts of exercise and training in particular.
The changing security policy context
Our membership in NATO has entailed a large number of changes for Sweden and the Armed Forces, which not only include changes in our defense policy but are much more extensive than that. By joining NATO, Sweden has joined an alliance where all members are expected to support the other members in the event of war through a joint use of capabilities. This joint use of capabilities means that Sweden has now also committed to participating in the alliance's joint capability creation and capability development. For the army, this means, among other things, that we need to change how we practice and train.
In the new context in which the Swedish Armed Forces have to operate, exercise activities are not the same as training. The purpose of exercises is primarily to practice sharp war plans, evaluate and test actual combat units that have been registered with NATO's force register, and to support the alliance's strategic communication. Ahead of the upcoming exercise period, SACEUR has identified three overall exercise objectives aimed at a main area that will characterize the exercises carried out by the ground forces:
The three overall exercise objectives are:
- Alliance first – Incorporating NATO's objectives before national exercises (Defense Policy).
- Warfighting focused – Involving a focus on functional chains with the aim of being able to operate and deliver effect within large-scale and high-intensity armed conflicts (Capability Development).
- Plan based – Meaning that exercises should test or develop the alliance's joint plans (Capability Building).
These three aimed to achieve:
- NATO Convergence – The exercise aims to enable member states to converge their resources in joint large-scale operations in order to win against a potential adversary (Capability Utilization).
For Sweden, this means a shift from how we have previously practiced and trained and a new perspective on how we will and should practice together with our allies. A central part of this is the adaptation to NATO's exercise and training program, which from now on is the governing and dimensioning of our exercise cycle. Here, we should develop our national command structures where we practice and train to the greatest extent possible in the structures that we plan to use in war. We also need to train and practice in the terrain and environment where the respective units will primarily or are planned to be used. For the majority of the army, this means a focus on subarctic conditions. This environment places special demands on both personnel, leadership and equipment, which means that exercises must be adapted to reflect these challenges. Therefore, the Swedish army needs to contribute and participate with interoperable numbered units in preparation for upcoming NATO exercises, whether our own, others' or joint ones. Given the alliance's rules, units reported in the force register are expected to be jointly trained and evaluated, which means that we can no longer participate in exercises with temporarily assembled units that are also training in the wrong terrain or against the wrong tasks. This is a shift that affects how we plan and execute our unit production, but also how we communicate and report our capabilities.
To deter an aggressive and capable opponent
The normative opponent of NATO in Europe is Russia. Through an increasingly aggressive foreign policy, which is perhaps primarily manifested through the war of aggression against Ukraine, European security policy has changed and deteriorated. Sweden, as a member of NATO, is facing an acute threat of war together with the other members, which means that the state's war-fighting capability has developed and gone from being a theoretical challenge to a potentially existential issue. This is a common but also individual concern for the member states of NATO. Therefore, the member states have entered into binding agreements not only to support each other in a joint use of capabilities in the event of war and the triggering of Article V, but also to contribute to a joint capability creation and a joint capability development. But perhaps even more importantly, this means that the alliance has a common defense policy that aims to deter and thereby act as a deterrent to potential adversaries. For Sweden as a (Near front state) As a close neighbor to Russia, this deterrence is crucial. If it fails, we risk being drawn into war, along with the other Baltic Sea states.
Within this framework, Sweden has a broad responsibility to defend NATO's northern operational area together with the other Nordic countries. To succeed in this, Swedish exercise activities must, in line with NATO's overall principles, be focused on both signaling deterrence (deterrence) and prepare ourselves to, if necessary, defend (defence) alliance. In accordance with SACEUR's previously reported priorities, NATO's exercise series aims, in addition to deterrence, also to exercise, test and develop the military capability within the alliance. Therefore, Sweden also needs to contribute to exercises that support the alliance's capability development while maintaining the Swedish perspectives. The exercise activities in which we participate need to support both the alliance and Sweden. Apart from Sweden, Finland and Norway, only the USA can currently operate effectively with larger units in this area of operations. This means that Sweden needs to exercise and prepare the units that will operate in the north, and this means that we need to support other countries with their capability development to operate in the Arctic. By supporting our allies' capability development to operate in the subarctic, the number of units that can support us increases, which contributes to increased opportunities for capability utilization and thereby deterrence. This requires a paradigm shift in our approach, where exercise and training are not only a national tool for capability development, but part of NATO's campaign plansWith this approach, our participation and engagement in exercises such as Swift Response 25 or cold response 26 extremely important.
To succeed in this, the army must first prioritize which exercises we participate in, and secondly ensure that we exercise with the “right units” or the right capabilities. If we do not do this, we will not credibly support NATO’s deterrence, nor will we adequately contribute to testing and developing the alliance’s operational plans. In addition, we need to take a much greater responsibility for contributing to the capability development of other states. This involves a balancing act if we are to succeed in conducting combat unit exercises with numbered combat units within the framework of NATO’s exercise and training program at the same time as we train and educate conscripts for other combat units. Overall, this means that the Swedish army urgently needs to review how we train and practice and how this is connected in a larger perspective.
Ongoing technological development and a changing operating environment
The experience from the war in Ukraine confirms old truths while contributing new insights. It is still true that the ability of our combat units to protect themselves against and combat an opponent's dimensional systems is crucial for the outcome of future duels. During the ongoing war in Ukraine, this has proven to be more complex than before. The now available advanced UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems) and CUAS (Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems) systems in combination with electronic warfare (EW) bring about a more transparent and unforgiving context than before. At the same time, the ability to have long-range capabilities has developed in depth, where cheap and relatively simple systems in combination with very advanced and expensive systems can deliver effects far into the enemy's rear areas. If the battle was previously defined by a defragmented battlefield, this has now developed into a highly transparent battlefield where the majority of the impact and losses are achieved in the rear areas or with units close to the front but not in a defense group. However, technological development, both through the development of new systems or through the combination of using previous capabilities but in new ways, is happening so quickly that it is risky to draw long-term and concrete conclusions. An example of this accelerating technological development is the ongoing battle of means and countermeasures that is currently taking place between UAS and CUAS and between long-range combat systems and air defense.
As a consequence, we must focus particularly on developing effective methods for detecting, identifying, evading and combating these systems during exercises and training. The rapid development of technology requires us to continuously adapt and further develop our combat units and the technology they use.
Exercise and training will be used here as a platform for continuous experimentation and thereby developing new technology and new capabilities. This will be carried out to a greater extent than before in close cooperation with industry, FMV and FOI. Our ability to develop and deliver new technology contributes not only to our and the alliance's capabilities, but also to Sweden's reputation and to Swedish business. Close cooperation between the Armed Forces, other Swedish authorities and our allies will therefore make us both stronger and more robust. This also requires that we become better at using intelligence to understand what and how our adversary is developing its capabilities. Such intelligence must also be disseminated within the organization and be available to prepare and develop our own methods. Withholding intelligence from our own units in order not to make the adversary aware of our knowledge must be carefully weighed against the negative consequence of our soldiers and officers not being able to prepare our war units in the best possible way. This approach needs to change to enable exercises to be planned and conducted in such a way that we exercise against an accurate and relevant adversary that reflects the actual operational environment.
In parallel with this, simulators should play a greater role in our exercises, where the focus is on non-scripted scenarios to create dynamic and realistic combat situations and against a thinking opponent who is allowed to tactic. These exercises should be carried out to a greater extent than now, around the clock, even during darkness and, as previously mentioned, in the right environment or geographical area. The exercises should also include realistic consequences of commanders' decisions, for example the consequences of dead and injured or negative impact on civilian society. It is only by practicing realistically that we allow our units the opportunity to truly develop in peacetime. Therefore, it is also absolutely crucial that LI[1]/LL[2] quickly handled and refined into concrete measures, and not left lying around at different levels for processing. In the same way, we must also test our managers in order to create conditions for development and for the organization to evaluate management and leadership. It is a fundamental requirement and a prerequisite that the war-deployed manager leads his own unit and also participates in and influences the unit's capability development.
Our exercises and our participation in NATO's exercise series must therefore evolve to allow for the development of new technology and the implementation of new capabilities while supporting the Alliance's common approach. Choosing which exercises to participate in and choosing the right units and objectives will become increasingly important for our future capability development. Within this framework, smaller but more specific exercises that focus on specific functions, such as Dynamic Front, important. These exercises serve, among other things, the purpose of increasing our ability to operate interoperably with other units within the NATO context, but also contribute to signaling the capabilities or intentions and development of individual soldiers and officers. This is a shared responsibility for both the organization and the individuals operating in the combat units.
Focus areas for the Swedish Army
The army's tactics will also be based on maneuver warfare, where we strive to apply mission tactics at all levels of command. This forms the basis of Swedish warfare and, in our opinion, is one of the prerequisites for successful military operations in a subarctic environment and thus constitutes one of our unique contributions to NATO. At the same time, we must realize that we are now part of NATO, which means that our methods but also tactical and operational concepts need to change. This is partly based on a shift in command levels where we need to standardize ourselves according to the division's combat rather than the brigade's, which is challenging since the majority of the officer corps was raised in a brigade army at best, and in a battalion army at worst. But this is also based on the increased need to coordinate fire and movement in a multinational context and with a significantly greater element of resources for effectiveness than Sweden has ever practiced or trained for. With this as a starting point, we will plan, conduct and evaluate our exercises and our training. This means, for example, that from the lowest level up to the brigade level, typical cases and the duel should be prioritized, which is primarily handled within the framework of training or own exercise activities. From the division and up, the tactical prerequisite activities and coordination of multinational and joint defense forces capabilities are to be practiced.
We believe that in order to succeed in this, the army must focus on exercising in the right environment, in the right operational context and with the right units. This means, above all, that the army must continue to intensify the work of developing our division within the framework of a (multinational) corps. In the short term, this means that we must both develop and organize our maneuver brigades, while at the same time we must assemble these brigades together with our functional units in a functioning division. To do this, we need to develop our functional chains within the framework of NATO's command and capability structure, which also contributes to the alliance's deterrence and our own capability development. For the Swedish army, it is the division's battle that is normative and the exercise of our units should take place based on the assumption of a Swedish division as part of a multinational corps.
The division and corps create the conditions for the brigade and its units to win the battle, with the support of the functions. Furthermore, we must allow ourselves to practice 24/7 and develop the ability to fight in the dark. In this context, adjusting combat readiness levels, march readiness, etc. are central to maintaining the best possible combat value over time. Finally, a restructuring of the training system, where the army does away with “GMU logic” and position training begins earlier in order to get into unit training more quickly. The soldiers should not be fully trained until they are deployed. Basic soldier training can be advantageously planned and implemented in coordination with position training.
This in turn means a greater focus on practicing our functional chains (Warfighting functions) so that these work and support us and our allies. For the Swedish army, the ability to operate with a Joint Air-Ground Integration Cell (JAGIC) be central. This can be seen as a driving force in our ongoing division development work and in our ability to coordinate air and ground operations. There are already established collaborations around this and upcoming exercises will be used to an even greater extent to accelerate the development of our ability to integrate and operate with a Swedish division in NATO's command structure. The conditions for succeeding with this partly mean that we continue with the collaborations that are already being carried out with, for example, the US V Corps or with ARRC. But it also means that we become better at participating with the right units in the right exercises and that we use NATO's exercise series to practice and develop the right capabilities and the right functional chains. For this to be possible in a NATO context, we need to urgently develop our interoperability. This does not only mean technical conditions but also includes methods, culture and trust with intended partners. Overall, interoperability can be described as all the conditions required to effectively solve combat tasks together with others.
As previously mentioned, we need to participate to a greater extent than before with the right units and with the right personnel in the NATO exercise series. This is fundamentally different from exercising composite units based on a Swedish production logic at a lower level or based on the personnel and material resources that happened to be available. From a production perspective, this means that exercises need to be viewed to a greater extent in the same way as military operations or international military efforts. The exercises need to be planned and prepared for a longer period of time and with consideration of all production factors and with pre-designated combat units that are prepared for the task. This will affect our production in such a way that one or more of our brigade platforms will need to conduct full brigade KFÖ simultaneously. This needs to be done in order to be able to exercise and evaluate entire combat units. This also needs to be done in order to create sufficient unit volume to be able to adequately exercise the division's functional chains, but also to be able to exercise and test our actual war planning. In addition, we need to ensure that we take our responsibility so that the exercises we register for or plan meet the needs of the Swedish Army, support the Armed Forces' joint defense planning or contribute to Sweden's strategic communication.
Conclusion
As mentioned in the introduction, this article aims to deepen the understanding of how the army's view of exercises must develop to meet the new security policy context and the changed operational environment. For the Swedish army, we believe that this places greater demands on us to take greater responsibility for NATO's northern area of operations and contribute to the alliance's capability development for combat in a subarctic environment. In addition, the army needs to adapt more clearly to the technical and tactical changes that NATO entry and ongoing technological development have entailed. This means that we must place the army in a context larger than ourselves, where we must understand the events and dependencies that affect us. This basically aims to understand the new conditions that it means to move from a battalion army to a division-centered army within the framework of an army corps in a defense alliance. The consequences of this are that the army's personnel and those who support the army realize and absorb the new conditions that currently prevail and thereby contribute to adapting themselves and the organization. These demands for change affect both the daily work and the long-term work of increasing the army's warfare capability within the framework of national and collective defense. Overall, this means that three perspectives need to be addressed:
- The Army must urgently identify its role as a capability creator and capability developer of ground combat forces for large-scale, high-intensity military operations within NATO's Northern Theater of Operations and immediately adapt its exercise activities accordingly.
- The Army's exercises must be standardized to either support deterrence or capability creation at a comprehensive level. This means that the Army must recognize the importance of practicing and training entire functional chains, from the lower unit level all the way up to the division and corps levels. This is crucial to building a robust and credible capability, where we as part of the Alliance can meet and defeat an aggressive and capable adversary.
- The army's exercises must be characterized by a culture and attitude where we actually practice and test our plans and capabilities. This means that mistakes are a natural part of the learning process, which also needs to be handled through a clear experience and follow-up methodology. The purpose of the exercises is not only to deter, but also to practice, test and develop the military capability within the alliance and Sweden. Therefore, we must allow a culture that accepts failure, but also where we dare to practice and test new methods both in terms of technology and tactics. Only through such a shift can we increase our overall capability and adapt to the current challenges.
In conclusion, all commanders at the army's combat units and the army's personnel in general must accept and understand what these changes mean and support our development in the right direction. This places great demands on both the individual and the organization. In the short term, it is therefore particularly important that the daily work at the army's organizational units should be characterized by increasing the combat units' ability to initially win the duel and combat contact and then to contribute to the division's or corps' combat in a larger context. In doing so, the army needs to distinguish between training and exercise and realize that even though they both serve the same purpose, they have different meanings. The way forward to succeed in this is to put exercise activities at the center and to ensure, to a significantly greater extent than today, that the right commanders, personnel and the right units participate in our exercises. This means that exercise activities need to be prioritized and put in focus within the framework of our ongoing growth.