Photo: Mats Carlsson, Swedish Armed Forces.
There are times when the sickly pallor of reflection affects each of us. Ola Palmqvist seems to have identified such an occasion in relation to how we use our ground forces. It is very strong of Palmqvist to come to this insight and also dare to communicate it in the organization. The built-in conservatism in the Armed Forces in general and in the Army in particular makes it difficult to create acceptance for new ideas and change. Or as Sir Basil Liddell Hart expressed it;
"There are over two thousand years of experience to tell us that the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old out” [1]
Palmqvist's thoughts point to a relationship that has not previously been formulated but which has been experienced as a lack of clarity in training and implementation of, primarily, ground tactics. This can be interpreted as both an effect of and a contributing cause of a doctrinal confusion that stems from us generally saying one thing but practicing another. Something that also indicates a poor understanding of our own military culture, i.e. who are we? Where do we come from? And how do we work?
Closely linked to mission tactics is maneuver warfare. Mission tactics can be said to be a part of and at the same time a prerequisite for the application of maneuver warfare. Problems in the application of mission tactics thus also create problems in the application of maneuver warfare, regardless of whether this refers to maneuver warfare as a philosophy or a command method.
This post problematizes the concept of maneuver warfare in line with the challenges that Palmqvist outlines regarding mission tactics. Since maneuver warfare does not only involve ground forces but is also part of operational doctrine, the lack of ability to use mission tactics and maneuver warfare affects not only the Army but also the planning and execution of operations with other forces.
What is maneuver warfare?
AR Tactics from 2016 states that; “Maneuver warfare – the armed implementation of maneuver thinking – is a concept that enables an inferior force to defeat a superior force.” [2] As a complement to this, there is also a theoretical basis for the concept which is described below.
Attrition – Maneuver
Maneuver warfare as a concept or philosophy can be used both as a polarized contrast to attrition warfare and as a model of thought for having numerically inferior resources and still having the opportunity to win through a more creative use of resources in time and space.[3]
A war of attrition should not only be considered the war waged on the Western Front during the First World War, but also in many of the wars fought until the side with the most resources has won. Often the war has not begun until a considerable numerical superiority has been secured which, according to comparative calculations, should ensure victory.[4]
However, the party with fewer numbers is not doomed to defeat in advance, as is the case in the Vietnam War or the Second Sino-Japanese War. In both cases, the defender skillfully used maneuver warfare, unconventional methods, and decentralized command. The defender exploited the attacker's weaknesses against him and developed his own strengths and capabilities, for example by exploiting the attacker's sensitivity to loss and thus public opinion for the war, or by appearing where the enemy is not present so that he has to allocate resources and thereby expose himself in other places that can then be used.[5]
The balance between attrition and the possibility of great momentary success is what distinguishes linear warfare from maneuver warfare. One implication of maneuver warfare is that through creative and dynamic use of one's own resources one can achieve disproportionately great success against an opponent if the operation succeeds but lose everything if it fails. Maneuver warfare thus has a significantly greater element of risk, chance and uncertainty but also an opportunity to win quickly and decisively with limited resources. An attrition war with superior resources is certainly a safer path to success if one possesses resources, but in the absence of these, risks must be taken in order not to be surely attrited and lose.[6]
Centralization – Decentralization
An important factor for maneuver warfare to work is decentralized decision-making through mission tactics.[7] Maneuver warfare is also based on creating, finding and exploiting gaps in the opponent's position that one's own forces can quickly exploit before they disappear.[8] It is through these gaps that the quick decision (or the quick defeat) can be reached. If we are to be able to use these gaps, decision-making mandates must be at as low a level as possible. This is based on the fact that there is trust between managers at different levels.[9] Trust is inherently based on solid training to be able to identify opportunities but also know how to exploit them and, above all, how this supports, not only one's own tactical level of combat but also two levels up, thus the operational and strategic plan. For a company commander or ship commander to be able to "act in the spirit of the commander", identify a gap that benefits the operational plan, have the competence to exploit this and dare to do this requires both solid training, great integrity and a developed dynamic approach.
The officer's intellectual ability to grasp all these elements is crucial. Mastering maneuver warfare is not just about mastering the "clock and ruler" or time, troops and terrain, but making the meaning of these concepts irrelevant to an opponent by creating a situation so complex for him that previous experiences and intuition become outdated. At the same time, the officer must have the intellectual flexibility to be able to quickly regain an initiative if he himself is exposed to a situation where he is forced to react.[10]
Culmination
Much of maneuver warfare revolves around the culmination point. This is the point or moment when one side's power to win runs out or transfers to the other side. It is normally thought that it is through attack that decisiveness is achieved. This is probably true, but the attacker also consumes his resources, often faster than the defending side. If the defender can economize on his resources and thereby make the attacker consume his at a high rate, this creates an opportunity for counterattack when the attacker has become weak.[11] This is a way to create gaps and opportunities. However, waiting for the opportunity can mean a somewhat counterintuitive action for the officer, namely backing off more than what normally feels good or even not acting at all in order to create the advantageous situation and make the opponent outwit him.[12] The elastic defense itself can be perceived as problematic, especially if a senior commander has assigned an area of operations with narrow boundaries and detailed tasks.
Battle Command – Planning
In order to be effective in battle and create the conditions needed for subordinates to be able to take the initiative and use the opportunities, simplicity in planning and implementation is also required. The military commander's task is therefore to create the best possible conditions and the largest possible scope for his subordinates to resolve the battle. The conditions are often dependent on the coordination of functions and the scope for a minimum of details.[13] This requires an overall purpose for the battle and a simple order to initiate the battle. The operations going forward should then be based on battle command so that the commander can support units that identify opportunities during the course of the battle.
A crucial difference between the German maneuver school and the more reductionist French/American school is how military problems are conceptually viewed. One tool for categorizing problems is the “Cynefin Framework” which, among other things, creates understanding (sense-making) as a basis for decision-making. The model breaks habitual patterns of thought and changes the way a difficult problem is viewed. Cynefin classifies problems into simple, complicated, complex and chaotic. The American school views military problems as complicated and means that there is always a cause and effect in military operations that can be analyzed. If the analysis is only accurate enough, it is possible to predict the opponent’s actions and thus take the right countermeasures. NATO’s planning method COPD (Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive) and the Swedish equivalent SPL (Swedish Planning and Management Method) use this logic to analyze military problems. The German school rather views military problems as complex and thus not predictable. Instead, a quasi-experimental approach is applied, where one's own actions lead to new opportunities that are exploited through battle management. Creativity and intuition are thus more important than analysis. This also provides the flexibility necessary to quickly regain the initiative if it has been lost due to the opponent's actions.
Maneuver warfare involves, among other things, having the ability and being allowed to think and act outside the box. The maneuver warrior's vocabulary does not include "that can't be done because we haven't done it before" if he is to be successful. In that case, the counter-question should be "why not?"
Why is maneuver warfare good?
With the limited military resources that Sweden possesses today, we cannot engage in anything other than maneuver warfare, something that our doctrines also state. If you are a state with large economic and personnel resources relative to your opponent, you are happy to use these large resources to minimize risks and wear down your opponent. Maneuver warfare is therefore not necessary, desirable or appropriate for certain states, which is why smaller states, such as Sweden, cannot uncritically import concepts from larger states, such as the USA, and expect them to function in a corresponding way here. The strategic culture shapes how states can use military power and with Sweden's limited resources, we do not have the opportunity to wear down an opponent and therefore we must use maneuver warfare instead.[19] That said, we should also have maneuver warfare that is adapted to Swedish conditions and not copy the classical German school outright.
A prerequisite for being able to apply maneuver warfare is good officer training. The officer must be able to think critically, analyze situations, draw relevant conclusions, and dare to question and go against orders from higher-ups when necessary.[20] This does not mean that anarchy prevails, but at the same time this places demands on senior commanders to set relevant tasks but also to manage rapid changes. Officer training should not be about trying to organize or minimize chaos, but rather to learn to use chaos to one's advantage and channel this to influence the opponent. If we thrive in and can handle chaos, we can also put the opponent in a state of chaos. If we instead spend time trying to organize a constantly recurring chaos, we will probably lose. [21]
As described above, trust and confidence between superiors and subordinates are a prerequisite for being able to handle maneuver warfare. Trust is rarely something that can be ordered, but something that is cultivated in the relationship between superiors and subordinates. A good trust between individuals is facilitated by a social climate that is characterized by a high level of trust in the foundation. Sweden has a high level of trust both among citizens and between citizens and authorities.[22] This trust is also transferred to the Armed Forces and lays the foundation for the trust needed to be able to apply maneuver warfare and mission tactics.
What is the problem with maneuver warfare?
If maneuver warfare is an appropriate concept for a state like Sweden with relatively small military resources, but we do not really apply the ambitions expressed in the doctrines, then what is the problem?
Maneuver War and the Legacy
Although we have long claimed to have applied maneuver warfare and mission tactics, this was probably not the case for most of the Cold War. Although (land) warfare has been characterized by offensive, mobility and local superiority, the methods have not really lived up to the requirements of maneuver warfare.[23] Maneuver warfare is not based solely on physical maneuver but at least as much on mental maneuver.
The Armed Forces in general and the Army in particular are characterized by a strongly conservative approach.[24] This is something we are socialized into and characterizes the officer role. It also makes it difficult to change perceptions and behavior, which is necessary to be able to see and handle the new security policy threats and thus the tasks and role of the Armed Forces.
Much of the time spent on officer training in the past was focused on soldier training or squad-leading tactical commanders at platoon to battalion levels. However, in a combined Armed Forces, wars are not won at the platoon level but at higher tactical, operational or strategic levels. The staffing of these higher levels is necessarily taken from the lower tactical levels, but if the training there is only focused on the lower tactical level, we get worse operational and strategic officers, i.e. at the level where wars are actually decided.
Maneuver warfare and interoperability
One of the reasons for the lack of maneuver warfare can be assumed to be the effects of the increased military cooperation with the outside world. Well-functioning cooperation requires an integration of methods and systems to succeed. In the early 2000s, the Swedish Armed Forces were to be aligned with NATO as far as possible with the aim of increasing interoperability.[25] NATO's methods are based primarily on American strategic, operational and tactical culture, where an analytical approach and risk minimization are used to deal with complex military problems. As mentioned earlier, this is in part at odds with creativity and pace. The American culture is based on large military resources and more attrition warfare, which inhibits the application of maneuver warfare.
It is probably not realistic to say that we should apply maneuver warfare fully at the expense of the interoperability that we have built up. However, all methods that are imported should be analyzed in relation to our own strategic culture so as not to risk getting lost between doctrine and method.
Maneuver warfare and Method
As Ola Palmqvist describes, our planning methods are also a limitation on our ability to conduct maneuver warfare. This applies at both the tactical level in the army and at the operational level. Although PUT (Planning Under Time Pressure) is a significantly more flexible and intuitive method than, for example, SPL, both methods risk creating an action where the method itself becomes more important than the creative tactical or operational solution. The solutions to most military problems are uncertain and unclear, which is why something objectively right or wrong cannot be said to exist in advance. If we assume that we should consider military problems as complex, this requires a number of attempts with intermediate combat command to arrive at the right solution. However, it is possible to say what is right or wrong in the method regardless of the solution to the military problem. It can then be tempting to focus on the method itself because it is concrete and it is easy to evaluate how faithful the officer is to the method. The implication of this is that the method is then used as a substitute for the general uncertainty in the assessment of the military problem and the intellectual process is focused on applying the method correctly rather than producing creative and flexible solutions.
There is reason to review the tactical and operational training in the Armed Forces in light of Palmqvist's reasoning. Training in tactical and operational leadership, regardless of the school, is most often conducted as planning training where the training is intended to be leadership but is implemented as method training and the evaluation of the solution is done partly against how faithful one was to the method and partly against the solution to the military problem. This creates a somewhat confusing situation regarding what is to be learned and what is important. Unfortunately, the implementation part of the planning is often omitted, which further reinforces the focus on planning and method.
Conclusion
Tomorrow's war will not look like yesterday's and that means that we cannot use the same concepts and methods as yesterday. We must adapt to the reality we find ourselves in and to be able to do this we must be able to critically examine ourselves from the outside. This is not entirely simple but Palmqvist has succeeded and points out shortcomings in our practice that we must address and improve. This is necessary so that in an armed conflict, we are not worn down without even trying to win.
The author is an army officer, major, and is completing the Senior Officer Program at FHS.
[1] Stefan Axberg et al., Textbook of Military Technology, Vol. 9: Theory and Method, ed. Defense Academy (Stockholm, 2013), p. 7.
[2] Army Regiment Tactics (Stockholm: Swedish Armed Forces, 2017), p. 35.
[3] William S. Lind, Handbook of Maneuver Warfare, ed. Arne Baudin and Nils Maurius Rekkedal (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence University, 2006), p. 14.
[4] Richard W. Harrison, Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II, 2018, p. 130-138; Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol 4, The Gulf War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 9-11.
[5] Williamson Murray and Peter Masoor, Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 241; Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (Dover Publications Inc, 2005), pp. 97-112.
[6] Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: The Belknapp Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 113-123.
[7] Peter Thunholm et al., Military Methods of Operation: A Textbook of Military Science, ed. Peter Thunholm, Jerker Widén, and Niklas Wikström (Malmö: Universus Academic Press, 2018), pp. 35ff.
[8] H Liddell Hart, Basil, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (New York: Plume, 1991), p. 45.
[9] Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011)
[10] Meir Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield (Stanford: Stanford Security Studies, 2011), p. 30 ff.
[11] Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, p. 112ff.
[12] Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield, p. 55-66.
[13] Jim Storr, The Human Face of War (London: Continuum, 2009)
[14] Kurtz CF, Snowden DJ, "The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicated world", IBM Systems Journal, vol42 no3, 2003
[16] Simon French, “Cynefin: Uncertainty, Small Worlds and Scenarios,” Journal of the Operational Research Society 66, no. 10 (October 2015): 1635–1645, doi:10.1057/jors.2015.21
[17] Swedish Armed Forces, “Swedish Planning and Command Method SPL 2017,” 2017.
[18] Thunholm, (2018), page 74.
[19] Fredrik Doeser, "Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector: The Impact of Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy 35, no. 4 (August 2016), p. 284–297.
[20] Arne Baudin et al., Traditions of War (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence University, 2011), pp. 105f.
[21] Linden, Handbook of Maneuver Warfare, pp. 14-15.
[22] Confidence Barometer 2017; https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=438&artikel=7439864
[23] Baudin et al., Traditions of War, p. 338.
[24] Holmberg, Arita and Alvinius, Aida: "How Pressure for Change Challenge Military Organization Characteristics," Defence Studies 19, no. 2 2019, p. 132.
[25] See, among others, “Report 2001/02:FÖU2 Defense Decisions for 2002–2004,” 2001.