Just in time for this year's People and Defense in Sälen – and today's (at the time of writing Epiphany) Western summit in Paris, on Ukraine – the Trump administration, i.e. Trump himself and the few handpicked loyalists who now control American policy, including foreign and security policy, are offering another spectacular addition to the already hard-pressed global security situation. The addition, the armed surrender of Venezuela's rogue president Nicolas Maduro, which few in and of itself are crying crocodile tears over, subsequent question marks regarding what the US has in mind for Venezuela next and exclamation points as a result of statements by Trump and others about possible steps forward in other directions, have aroused renewed international consternation.
It is not particularly easy for those who, on their own initiative or at the behest of the editors, are now trying to navigate, or even contribute to, the deluge of international commentary on what is happening in what appears to have broken any dams. After all, not least for Europe, it is about further dramatized issues of a security-political existential nature.
For the European side, ahead of today's Paris meeting with the "Coalition of the Willing" and the upcoming Seal Collection, it is perhaps natural to base the choice of analysis on what has now been said from the American side - Trump himself, Marco Rubio, Stephen Miller and his wife, and a few others - about Greenland, partly in light of the Venezuela intervention and partly considering what was emphasized in the American security strategy about the Western Hemisphere's (from the Monroe Doctrine to the "Donroe Doctrine) special importance in Trump-American security policy. In addition, Stephen Miller's unvarnished statement to CNN that the world today is governed by the language of power, implicitly the language of power of powerful states (i.e. "might is right", not the other way round), and Marco Rubio's statement that it is time for the world to realize in all seriousness that when Donald Trump says he intends to do something, he will also make And this now applies, among many other things, to Greenland, and a now accelerated American language of power meaning that if and when the US decides to "take over" Greenland, regardless of the means, no power in the world, not Denmark, not the EU, not anyone, can stop the US from doing so.
And at the same time as these prominent and highly worrying American statements, a number of international – and Swedish – comments of significance partly that the question really is what "we" (Denmark, the Nordic countries, the EU, the rest of the "West") have to actually oppose or speak out against to prevent or deter the US from moving forward in this direction, partly what such a development – in relation to today's Paris meeting – would mean for Western support for Ukraine, militarily, economically and in terms of negotiations, and partly the forecast that this would happen, either as an open political conflict between the US and a Denmark-supporting other NATO or as a result of a long-term European kneeling before American supremacy, it means the death of NATO (correspondingly). In other words: extremely delicate questions that everyone now realizes must be asked, and then not (anymore) as a speculative "worst case". At the same time that answers are clearly lacking.
In this there is, at the same time, a deposit dilemma for Sweden and other European countries (and Canada, etc.), an unusually clear example of when the distance is large between what can and should be held to be true purely analytically and what is possible and necessary to say politically/diplomatically, given the fundamental security policy interests of the nation in question and existing actual dependencies. To have to draw a line for the sake of one's own self-preservation and self-esteem for how far the creeping in the face of superior power can be tolerated, including also domestic political reasons for such a line, and to realize both for one's own security and especially for the sake of Ukraine the importance of all efforts being made not to further risk the remnants of the transatlantic link, given the actually existing realities of dependency. A terribly delicate balance, in these times, especially considering Trump's personal position of power and demonstrated frivolity, and long-suffering. It is obvious that the latest developments – actually the entire year's developments – at an analytical level raise extremely thought-provoking questions about the damage already done to the credibility of the alliance's Article 5, but it is equally obvious that it does not necessarily benefit, for example, Swedish security policy interests to openly and seriously problematize this cornerstone.
Is it sufficient, for example, for Sweden, as a credible balancing act for the time being, to speak on the one hand about the non-existent legitimacy and thus neglect of the one-handed Maduro in the context, and on the other hand to express the long-term importance of international law being followed, also in dealing with a rogue regime and its leader? Does such a balancing act risk upsetting the hegemon? A number of government representatives around the world trembled for feared American retaliation against unfavorable criticism, given the demonstrated combination of frivolity and long-suffering. Comparisons in this regard may be made with the simultaneously current dilemma regarding Israel-Gaza, etc.
But even apart from the Greenland aspect and other possible strategic directions for the new version of the previous combination America first – peace making – influence through strength, there is quite a lot else to note and try to understand in connection with the Venezuela operation.
The Venezuela operation has clearly revealed a great deal about the Trump administration's willingness and ability to carry out spectacular commando raids into the territory of other countries, without support in either American law or the Constitution and without consulting Congress, including its GOP majority (but counting on its automatic acquiescence), with a military-technical skill that in today's known world is only matched by Israel's bravado in Lebanon, Syria and Iran.
We should remember that the Caracas raid, which reportedly cost the lives of some 40 Cuban security guards, was nevertheless a continuation of the late autumn campaign at sea against a significant number of suspected drug-smuggling vessels. These operations also lacked documented evidence of the illegality of the traffic and were therefore legally and constitutionally questioned by both the opposition (and the occasional GOP) and legal experts, especially the case where survivors of one attack were killed in a second, complementary attack, disregarding US law and the law of the sea. And we should remember US operations abroad last year, especially the B-2 attack in June against Iranian nuclear facilities, but also other operations of varying degrees of international legitimacy. This undeniably raises questions about how a number of actors, perhaps in Tehran, or Pyongyang, Bogota, Santiago de Cuba, or Yemen (in addition to the world's terrorist groups according to the US definition), see themselves having to take into account the risk of becoming the tangible object of Delta Commando's close interest. The Trump-American will and ability have demonstrably become a reality in the international security system, as have probably all sorts of backlashes, possibly in the form of terrorism.
Another concern, pointed out by many in the international discourse, is the way in which current American actions, including the Venezuela operation, are burdening international security by partly serve as encouragement to counterparts – if, for example, Russia and China can no longer be called counterparts – to follow John and act similarly, and partly generally further undermine respect for international law in international relations and thus the credibility of all talk of a rules-based international security order, as a goal or as a description of the here and now. In the ongoing international discourse, the risk is highlighted that continued stubborn American behavior on the foreign front, and increasing internal resistance to this, could lead to a constitutional crisis in the United States. This risk obviously has a bearing on the timeline in the United States, with an approaching – politically existential – mid-term election and the shifts of power in Congress and society that it can involve.
Speaking of today's discussion in the "Coalition of the Willing" circle, and the current crisis meeting in the Danish Foreign Affairs Committee, there is reason to problematize the Venezuela crisis as a security-politically troublesome distraction, especially for a Europe already pressured by the difficult decision-making and credibility issues on the transatlantic plane in relation to both Ukraine and the Middle East.
At the time of writing, there are reports of unrest on the streets of Caracas, with armed groups hunting suspected Trump and opposition sympathizers in the streets. This is at the same time that the United States is indicating an interest in, instead of lifting up the political opposition, recently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, it seems to be focused on a more limited regime change through the recently installed acting president Rodriguez, coupled with signals of skepticism regarding the upcoming elections and the relevance of leading opposition politicians in dealing with the consequences. All the more there is talk of the restoration and Americanization of the Venezuelan oil industry coupled with vague messages about American remote control, in the future, of the country at large, all depending (it is said) on the new and old leadership's willingness and ability to "do as I/Trump dictates". And in the meantime, the trials are being prepared against the Maduro couple, who, according to Attorney General Bondi, will now face "the full wrath of American justice" (sic!) - so she did not speak about the full and impartial justice of American justice. The degree of turbulence as a result of the Maduro surrender, etc., in Venezuela and in the world, controls the degree of turbulence in other strategic directions as above.
Exaggerations and alarmism are, as is well known, to be avoided in a sober crisis assessment. Perhaps the escalation will subside and the Trump-dictated development will flow into calmer grooves. But right now there is every reason to assume that the gang in and around the White House unfortunately intends to keep what they (Han) promise, and try to take the consequences into account, in the knowledge that in terms of security policy it is really about a balancing act that is almost uniquely difficult for post-war conditions. If you are Sweden and belong to Europe.