On July 1, 2010, a narrow majority in the Riksdag voted to suspend conscription, and no more conscripts would be trained. The Armed Forces would be staffed with permanent personnel, and in part with volunteer personnel, for example in the Home Guard. A model that was considered to meet the need for soldiers for a small organization that would mainly be engaged in international tasks.
The purely professional defense was short-lived. This for several reasons, including: the intended recruitment goals were not reached (although there were probably several reasons, such as salary) and that the pious hopes of the security policy died with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The focus of the defense decision in 2015, to recreate the ability for national defense, with the expansion of the Armed Forces required for this, and the need to fill the gaps in already existing units, led to the reactivation of conscription on March 2, 2017.
Does this mean that permanently employed soldiers, professional soldiers, will only become a parenthesis in the development of the Armed Forces?
To staff a reasonably credible national defense, conscription is required. Hiring the number of soldiers needed would be practically impossible. Both for economic reasons and for a lack of people who would see it as a possible profession. But does this also mean that we should forgo permanently employed soldiers, now that we can once again rely on conscription as a staffing system?
No. Permanently employed soldiers, even if they only constitute a limited part of the organization, play a significant role in creating a defense force with the ability to meet the spectrum of threats we face today. That is provided that they are used in the right way. The discussion below is primarily conducted from an army perspective, as the interchangeability between conscripted and employed soldiers in ground combat units seems to arouse the most debate. The benefit of, for example, having permanently employed sailors on board ships seems to be less questioned.
There are three basic reasons for having permanent soldiers: readiness, individual capability, and overall efficiency. Linked to these reasons, the question always arises: how best to utilize employed soldiers in the organization? Should they constitute a skeleton, a cadre, which is supplemented with conscripts in the event of mobilization, or should they be organized into their own units?
preparedness
It is often emphasized that units with employed soldiers have higher readiness, compared to units manned with conscripts. A strong argument for being able to handle different types of gray zone scenarios, or a surprise attack. However, there is reason to take a closer look at what this higher readiness actually consists of. It can affect how the permanently employed personnel are utilized in the organization.
It is doubtful whether units with only permanent employees could mobilize significantly faster than units with conscripts. A soldier who lives reasonably close to his mobilization depot can be there about as quickly regardless of whether he or she is permanently employed or conscripted. How long it then takes to get the unit equipped and combat-ready is probably more a question of how the equipment is stored, whether the personnel have practiced mobilization, etc. If it was possible to have a mobilization time of twenty-four hours for a fairly large number of battalions, manned by conscripts, during the Cold War, it should not be impossible today either. It is a question of mental attitude, planning, preparation and training – not primarily the form of employment.
In the 1970s, when the then commander of PB 8, Colonel Hans Nilsson, on various occasions thanked units after completing KFÖ, he used to remind them of what he expected from the brigade's personnel in the event of a possible mobilization.
The Russian is standing in Ystad one morning at six:
- Then you have the morning to sort things out with your family and to move to the bully spot where we are now. You can ignore the employer. Bring something to eat.
- You then have the afternoon (and evening) to take out your equipment, go through the tanks, load ammunition, etc.
- During the night we will move the unit...
- The next morning we will attack.
The timetable would probably not look that much different if it were a question of putting one of today's mechanized battalions, with permanent personnel, on a war footing in the event of a surprise attack.
No, the big difference lies in the availability before it is completely obvious that we are, or will be, exposed to an attack. Before that, it is very likely that the country's political leadership will hesitate for the longest time before ordering the mobilization of conscripts. Arguments such as; "it may seem provocative", "it costs a lot of money", "it may create unrest in society", "the military is always alarmist", "XX can't start a war, what would he gain from it?" and others, would likely be as decision-making-inhibiting today, or tomorrow, as they were yesterday. There are therefore strong reasons why parts of the Armed Forces should be able to be made operationally ready without requiring political decisions, and that this can be done with minimal impact on civilian society. Being able to quickly increase defense readiness by starting exercises, conducting readiness checks or whatever you choose to call it, even on weak indications, is one of the decisive advantages of having units with permanently employed personnel.
It is also obvious that for this task, to be able to raise the country's defense readiness without calling up conscripts, the majority of the permanent soldiers should be organized into units that can quickly begin solving a task. If they are "smeared" in the organization, the whole idea of having permanent soldiers for readiness reasons is essentially a sham.
The individual's ability
When it comes to achieving basic usability in most current positions, there is no major difference between a conscript or a permanent soldier. The big difference is the increased skill that the professional soldier gains through recurring and more qualified exercises. It is one thing to get a truck driving license, another to be a skilled truck driver. The number of possible analogies is almost endless, well-coordinated football teams, more or less skilled hunters, musicians, etc. Those who practice more become more skilled. Another factor that should be taken into account is the greater versatility of the permanent soldier. He or she often masters more tasks. For example, the vehicle driver can also be a skilled machine gunner. This gives the unit redundancy. The routine and versatility of the individual, in addition to the unit being well-trained, are especially important in the initial, always very confused, phases of a conflict. The actions of each soldier can be of great importance here.
This should be contrasted with the fact that a few professional soldiers per “conscription platoon” (regardless of the type of platoon) would increase the platoon’s combat value quite significantly. This suggests that the employed soldiers should be spread out throughout the organization, and function as a professional “skeleton” in units that become fully staffed by being replenished with conscripts upon mobilization. However, there is reason to remember, in addition to the preparedness aspect, that if the professional soldier does not practice together with others at the same level of education, and thereby develop his or her ability, he or she will not reach any further in terms of knowledge than a conscript soldier.
The professionalism of the organization
I am not afraid of an army of lions led by a sheep; I am afraid of an army of sheep led by a lion.
The quote is sometimes attributed to Alexander the Great, but there are several variations with different sources. The spirit, however, is always the same: if you have bad leadership, the bravery and skill of the soldiers do not matter.
In my opinion, this is one of the strongest reasons for having standing units manned by professional soldiers. It provides the opportunity to train the officer corps in what it is there for: leading combat or other combat-related activities. Or if you prefer: avoiding the risk of having lions led by sheep.
During the Cold War, the focus of the activity, especially in the Army, was on training individual soldiers and lower units, platoons, companies and battalions. When a training year was over, the units that had been fully trained were replaced with a new batch of conscripts and the process began again. This meant that the opportunity to practice with complete, well-functioning units was limited to a short time at the end of each training year. Commanders and field staffs deployed to war thus had few opportunities to practically consolidate their knowledge, let alone to develop their abilities by trying out new solutions.
To some extent, the problem was addressed by having quickly trained conscripts as a training squad at the troop schools, the Infantry Combat School, the Armored Troop School, etc. However, it was not fully trained units that the students were put to lead. The level of difficulty of the exercises and the demands on the students were adapted to the training position of the unit. Likewise, the units were not complete with all the functions that are included in a battalion, for example: mechanized companies, indirect fire, medical service, repair service, field work, etc. Coordination of different functions, an essential part of a commander's tasks, could therefore only be practiced to a limited extent. The training opportunities were also not as numerous as one would have liked. It is true that the conscripts were quickly trained in order to be a training squad, but even rapid training takes time. Time that should have been spent doing what motivated the existence of the training squad, training the officers.
The training squads at the various troop schools were also an important resource for testing equipment and developing combat techniques and tactics. However, the question always arose here: would the outcome have been the same if the same elements had been carried out with fully trained units, instead of conscripts with incomplete training? How fair were the different results when compared with each other, i.e. how much of the differences in outcome were due to the troop's training position, and how much to the method tested?
It should also be noted here that by having standing units at "all regiments", not just as a training unit at the Land Combat School, the officers can rotate between serving in the standing component, with its more intensive and more qualified training activities, and positions that mainly involve training conscripts. Something that will also contribute to increasing troop leadership ability.
There is no doubt that the ability of commanders to lead complete and jointly trained units is a crucial component in increasing the ability of the entire organization. Or, more clearly stated; if the commanders cannot handle the instrument, it does not matter what equipment the units have, or how well trained the individual soldier is. In addition, the units with permanent employees would also be the ones who could set the standard for other parts of the organization “that’s how it is done”. They would have the time and opportunity to develop and refine different methods, and not start anew every year by training the soldiers in basic skills.
To the above reasons should also be added the better opportunities for standing units to participate in international exercises, independent of the Swedish conscription cycle, and to be able to quickly initiate an international operation.
Conclusions and suggestions
To use the reinstated conscription as a means of getting rid of professional soldiers would be a big mistake. Instead, the opportunity now offered to create a mixed organization should be used to eliminate some of the most serious weaknesses in yesterday's system, built solely on conscripts. At the same time, the reinstated conscription creates the opportunity to give the war organization a sufficient volume.
The two most important reasons for having standing units with permanent soldiers are: the units' operational readiness can be varied without waiting for political decisions, and that they constitute an instrument for radically increasing the officers' ability in their main task, troop leadership.[1]. Both factors clearly indicate that the majority of the permanently employed soldiers should be gathered in a few, essentially complete units. Not "smeared out" across the organization. Here, one should also not ignore the constant reminder that complete standing units would constitute for the entire organization (and outsiders) "this is what the business is about - creating and leading combat units".
The need for a professional “skeleton” in units mainly manned by conscripts should be met with a cadre of specialist officers deployed at lower command levels, not with permanent soldiers. Admittedly, a “smearing out” of even the permanent soldiers would probably increase the combat value of some mobilization units, but it would also mean that the two primary reasons for having permanent soldiers; readiness and increasing the capability of the officer corps would be compromised. The overall effectiveness of the Armed Forces would decline.
The question of how many permanent soldiers there should be in the organization has no clear answer. A starting point for the discussion could, however, be how many have recently shown interest in taking up employment as soldiers, and to increase that volume somewhat, now that it is possible to recruit also from people who are completing their military service. Perhaps a reasonable approach would be about 10 permanent soldiers and sailors. The principle of how these should be distributed in the Armed Forces as a whole can be discussed from several aspects, but where the opportunities to improve the Armed Forces' preparedness and develop the officer corps' capability appear to me to be by far the most important.
In the Navy and the Air Force, ship and air units are already largely manned by permanent personnel and thus already have a fairly high level of readiness in peacetime, without call-ups. This also largely satisfies the officer corps' need to be able to practice with "sharp" units. In these cases, permanently employed soldiers/sailors should therefore be prioritized to ensure that there are no crucial gaps in the individual unit. In the Navy's case, this could, for example, be to ensure that ship crews are fully comprised of permanent personnel. For the Air Force, there may, for example, be reasons to review and ensure the availability of briefing and other basic personnel.
It is primarily in the Army that units with permanent soldiers represent a "quantum leap" in the form of the addition of new capabilities. This in two respects; the possibilities of acting in the event of a surprise attack and in various gray zone scenarios increase drastically, and the conditions are created to radically improve the officer corps' capability in war.
These two tasks, and based on the Army's intended development according to the defense bill, would very roughly speak for a permanently employed combat group, in the order of battalion size, at each brigade and a smaller combat group on Gotland. In addition, some air defense units should also be manned with permanently employed soldiers. If it were necessary to prioritize within the framework of this principled solution, it would be primarily the need to have constantly available and essentially complete units available in the Stockholm area and on Gotland, as well as the need to have a versatile "test and exercise battalion" connected to the Ground Combat School, which should be the governing body. This does not mean that other functions such as artillery, engineers, etc. should not have standing units, but these should then primarily be focused on being "competence developers", perhaps in the form of standing units of company size. When the day comes when the Army has both armed drones and reconnaissance drones, and long-range indirect fire systems, those units are obvious candidates to be partially staffed with permanent soldiers. They would constitute a vital component of the preparedness system, especially when it comes to meeting a surprise attack.
To answer the question in the title. Are units with professional soldiers a parenthesis in the history of the Armed Forces? No, instead let the pure conscription defense be a parenthesis. Historically, before the introduction of conscription in 1901, we have always had a mixture of mobilizable units and units with full-time soldiers. This for reasons of preparedness and training. The need is no less today, on the contrary.
The author is a major general and has previously served as rector of the Swedish National Defense University. He is a member of KKrVA.
[1] Just to avoid any ambiguities in these times of conceptual confusion. "Troop management" is a collective term for all what a commander does to lead his unit: tactics, coordination of functions, exercising leadership, etc. It is also level-independent, platoon to division.